

THE PLATONIC 'THEAGES' : AN INTRODUCTION,  
COMMENTARY AND CRITICAL EDITION

Mark A. J. Joyal

A Thesis Submitted for the Degree of PhD  
at the  
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**THE PLATONIC THEAGES: AN INTRODUCTION, COMMENTARY AND  
CRITICAL EDITION**

submitted by

Mark A.J. Joyal

for the Degree of Doctor of Philosophy

to the University of St. Andrews



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## Abstract

The *Theages* poses a number of problems for the interpreter of Plato and the Platonic dialogue. Traditionally, the most controversial one concerns the authenticity of the work: is Plato its author, and what criteria may be considered valid and important for settling the debate over authorship? But there are numerous other questions of at least equal significance. What is the purpose for which this dialogue was written, and what is its meaning? Is it merely a patchwork, as is commonly assumed, or does it display a structural unity? How does the Socrates of this work compare with the same character in other Socratic compositions, and what literary qualities can be attributed to the author's portrayal of the dialogue's other *personae*? How are we to evaluate the lengthy section in the *Theages* on Socrates' "divine sign"? When was this dialogue written? What is its relation to the other works in the Platonic Corpus, to Socratic literature generally, and to philosophical interests at the time of its composition?

The introduction and some of the appendices to this thesis attempt to offer answers to these questions, both through a comprehensive review and assessment of the critical literature on the *Theages*, and through the use of new evidence, argumentation, and interpretation. At the same time, a basis for the analyses offered here (and for future examinations of the *Theages*) is provided in this study by a detailed line-by-line commentary on the text. The text on which this commentary depends has been established from a fresh collation of all known manuscripts, early printed editions, and ancient testimonia, containing all or part of the *Theages*. This thesis represents the first attempt, in any language, to undertake the above programme of work on a definitive scale.

## Preface

I should like to take the opportunity to acknowledge the various kinds of assistance which I have received in the writing of this thesis. I owe my greatest academic debt to Professor Ian Kidd, who supervised this project, and provided constant advice and encouragement. Most of his suggestions I have gratefully followed. Mr. A. Coxon very kindly allowed me to make use of his notes to an unpublished lecture on *Theages*. Dr. E. Duke of the University of Otago gave me access to her own work on the indirect tradition of the dialogue, as well as information on some matters of detail. I have also received assistance on specific points in my work on the manuscripts of *Theages* from Dr. M. Campbell, Dr. R.A. Reid, and Mr. D.B. Robinson.

I am particularly grateful to the University of St Andrews, which provided me with a studentship that allowed me to begin and continue research, and to the Overseas Research Scheme, which also contributed financial support. I would not have been able to inspect manuscripts held in the Biblioteca Marciana, Venice, but for a postgraduate travel award from the University of St Andrews. The Special Collections department of the Hunterian Library, Glasgow University, allowed me to inspect its copy of the Aldine edition of Plato, and librarians in the University Library, St Andrews, and the Scarborough College Library and Robarts Library, University of Toronto, have gone to the trouble of supplying me with a great deal of material by interlibrary loan which could not have been easy to acquire. I should also like to thank the Centre for Computing in the Humanities, University of Toronto, which introduced me to the use of the *Thesaurus Linguae Graecae*, and enabled me to undertake complex word searches which would have been otherwise impossible.

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## I. Structure and Purpose

### a. Introduction

Over the past two centuries the *Theages* (*Thg.*) has been discussed and criticized in a number of articles, in general as well as specialized studies of Plato, in a single monograph, and in numerous critical editions of the dialogue. But in recent years it has excited only scattered serious comment. Hence a casual observer might be led to infer that little more now needs to be said about *Thg.*; and, indeed, an examination of most of the modern literature would probably drive one to the conclusion that some measure of scholarly orthodoxy as regards this dialogue has been achieved. Nevertheless, it is accurate to say that the most basic work on *Thg.* has not yet been attempted. For in making the question of the authenticity of the dialogue almost the exclusive focus of their endeavours, scholars have been led largely to ignore what is, or should be, of primary importance, namely the detailed interpretation of the work from beginning to end, with a view to elucidating and determining, as far as possible, its meaning. We can hardly expect to be able to pronounce on the authenticity of *Thg.* until we have made an effort to know what its author's intentions are, and what the purpose of the dialogue is. In examining *Thg.* (or, for that matter, any work of disputed authorship), there are issues which deserve to be given priority over the problem of authenticity.<sup>1</sup>

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<sup>1</sup>On this methodology, see O. Gigon in *Gnomon* 27 (1955) 14-20 (a review of M. Soreth, *Der platonische Dialog Hippias maior* [München, 1953]); and for an appraisal and modification of Gigon's statements, see Müller, *Die Kurzdialoge* 10-11 n.3.

An extended study of *Thg.* demands such an approach. Therefore, while the commentary which is included in this study is intended to provide much of the information on which an evaluation of the dialogue might be based, and certain introductory chapters seek to answer more specific questions about characterization, authenticity, date of composition, etc., it seems best to try to establish at the outset how the author set about composing this dialogue, and by what principles he was guided. Accordingly, the following sections will focus on problems of structure, unity, and meaning in *Thg.* But in order to clarify the arguments that will be offered in these pages, it will be helpful, in anticipation of the detailed exegesis which follows, to sketch in a preliminary fashion what conclusions I have evoked from the evidence at our disposal.

*Thg.* divides naturally into two unequal sections, 121a1-128c8 and 128d1-131a10; about this, at least, scholars seem to be in general agreement. As to whether these two sections actually cohere logically and thematically there is less unanimity, and this problem, central to the whole issue of the purpose of the dialogue, will be fully treated below.<sup>2</sup> The second of the above-mentioned sections, the rather lengthy description of the activities of Socrates' divine sign, is one of two structural features of which a reader, familiar with the Platonic Corpus, is most likely to take particular note. The other feature is the presence in *Thg.* of so many apparent Platonic borrowings, a few of which are almost *verbatim* extracts; in fact, some scholars have felt that there is justification in calling *Thg.* a *cento*. Not surprisingly, it is these two aspects of the dialogue that previous schol-

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<sup>2</sup>For a detailed division of *Thg.* into various sections, see comm. *ad* 121a1-8, 121b1-122b1, 122b2-e1, 122e1-123b3, 123b3-e17, 124a1-e10, 124e11-125b4, 125b5-e7, 125e8-127d1, 127d2-128c8, 128d1-130e10, 128d1-129d8, 129e1-130e4, 130e5-131a10 (I have divided the dialogue up differently for the discussions in this chapter). For other divisions of the dialogue, see Pavlu 15-8; Souilh  129-30; Kr ger 9-11.

arship has concentrated its efforts upon, to the virtual exclusion of all else. Yet, taken by themselves, they tell us virtually nothing about the structure of *Thg.*, and are of even less assistance as guides to the purpose of this work.<sup>3</sup>

In order to determine the purpose and meaning of *Thg.*, its structure must be carefully examined and an attempt made to understand the way in which the two main portions of the dialogue relate to one another. For there has always been a tendency and temptation to claim that *Thg.* is somehow "about" Socrates' divine sign. Assertion is usually substituted for argument when the problem of subject matter is considered, and the belief that Socrates' divine sign, *tel quel*, is in some vague sense the crux of the whole matter has been expressed in its most extreme form in the thesis of H. Müller (469ff., 473-4), who held that *Thg.* is really the work of two hands, one of which completed what Plato had left unfinished at his death. Scholars who have approached *Thg.* in an analytic manner such as this maintain explicitly that the purpose of the dialogue is to relate stories about the divine sign; implicitly, they assume that *Thg.* possesses no unity, and that there is no means of connecting the earlier part with the later.<sup>4</sup> It is no

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<sup>3</sup>This is not to deny the importance in the interpretation of *Thg.* of parallels and *topoi* from Platonic and Socratic literature generally, many of which will in fact be cited below as providing valuable clues to the meaning of the dialogue. The point is that, unless we are prepared to relate these potential borrowings to the context in which they occur, and attempt to discover the author's reason(s) for the use of a particular Platonic passage or *topos*, the mere listing of such passages as evidence of the author's "copying" (a common practice) is of no substantive value for deciding authenticity, and is sure to be counter-productive in our attempt to determine his meaning. Stefanini (I.28) comes close to recognizing this defect in methodology, though he tends to underestimate the degree to which other dialogues besides *Ap.* may help to clarify the meaning of *Thg.* F. Cairns (*Generic Composition in Greek and Roman Poetry* [Edinburgh, 1972] 98-124) makes some pertinent remarks about the employment of *topoi* in ancient literature; his comments mostly concern poetry, but they may be applied, *mutatis mutandis*, to the use of *topoi* in prose as well.

<sup>4</sup>For some judgements on the theme and purpose of *Thg.* which reflect this approach, see (*int.al.*) Ast, *Leben* 495-6; Stallbaum 220; Steinhart 435; Wagner 3; Knebel 9; Taylor, *PMW*<sup>6</sup> 532; Krüger 11.



wonder therefore that critics have, for the most part, been either baffled by its purpose, or appalled by its inconsequentiality.<sup>5</sup> Even those who have from time to time defended its authenticity have made little attempt to appreciate the work as a unity.<sup>6</sup> One must, however, avoid the inclination to be purely destructive, for some suggestive lines of approach have been brought forward. But it ought to be said that the scholars who have contributed to our understanding of *Thg.* have not subjected their assessments to any detailed investigation, nor have they recognized the full implications of their theories.

*Thg.* is not "about" Socrates' divine sign in any strict sense. The lengthier first section of the dialogue introduces, and dispenses with, the possibility that the sophists will satisfy Theages' desire to become σοφός. This is achieved more through heavy-handed irony than carefully-reasoned dialectic. Here the process of question and answer is used to call into serious question the ethical content of the sophists' teaching. Next, the claims of the politicians of Athens to possess and teach σοφία are considered, but are swiftly rejected as well. Finally, one alternative is presented to replace the pseudo-σοφία that other educators might offer, and this is Socratic association (συνουσία). Socrates redefines Theages' desire for σοφία as a desire to become ὡς βέλτιστος, and proceeds to show, first, how some people who have associated with him have been affected by the occurrence of his divine sign, and second, how

<sup>5</sup>So, e.g., Hermann, *Geschichte und System* 427; Steinhart 435-9; Lamb 344.

<sup>6</sup>See Knebel (n.4 above); Grote 436ff.; Friedländer (148) makes a number of telling points, but again largely fails to relate the earlier pages of the dialogue to the section on the divine sign. Socher's discussion is little more than an attempt to refute a number of arguments against authenticity raised by Schleiermacher, Ast, and Stallbaum. For a list of upholders of authenticity see *Intr.* ch. IV, *a.*

others, through the agency of the divine sign, have actually improved by association with him.

If the dialogue is analyzed in this fashion, the section on the divine sign functions primarily for the sake of contrasting Socratic συνουσία with that of other individuals, notably sophists and Athenian πολιτικοί. To the extent that Socrates emerges as the person with whom both Theages and Demodocus believe Theages will achieve what he desires, this dialogue may be considered apologetic: it is the sophists, not Socrates, who are likely to corrupt a young man like Theages, and from the outset of the dialogue care is taken to distinguish Socrates from the sophists; nor is there any efficacy in association with the πολιτικοί. This message is emphasized the more strongly by the presentation of Socrates as the ἐρωτικὸς ἀνὴρ, who is concerned for the welfare of his young associate, in contrast with the sophists, whose main distinguishing feature is their demand for money. Moreover, Socrates' ability to "help," "improve," or "make better" those who associate with him marks him out as the one genuine πολιτικός, as that term is understood elsewhere in the Corpus. Thus he emerges as the individual best-suited to help Theages achieve his goal of becoming a πολιτικός, though of a far different kind from that which the young man envisaged at the outset.

## *b. Structure*

### *i. Prologue: 121a1-122b1*

Demodocus and his son Theages have come to Athens from their home in the coastal deme of Anagyrous (127e3), with the express purpose of finding an educator for Theages. This young man wishes to be entrusted to a sophist who, he believes, will make him σοφός (121d4-6).

The introductory portion of the dialogue essentially belongs to Demodocus, whose extensive opening monologue conveys his trepidation about his son's desire, and elicits Socrates' advice on this problem.

A very limited range of observations tends to surface repeatedly in reference to the first page or so of *Thg.* By far most frequently, the dramatic setting of *Thg.* is said to be much like that of *La.*, in so far as Demodocus shows the same concern and hesitation about his son's prospective welfare as Lysimachus does at the opening of the latter work (178a1-180a5), and, like Lysimachus, does so in a rather long-winded manner.<sup>7</sup> It may or may not be the case that our author had *La.* in mind at this point; but the issue is not in itself of primary importance. For it appears as though we are dealing here with a *topos* in which a father asks Socrates for guidance on the education of his son. A similar situation arises in *Euthd.* where, at the end of the work (306d2ff.), Socrates offers words of encouragement and advice to Crito, who is at a loss as to how he might urge his son Critobulus to the pursuit of philosophy (compare also Socrates' direct questioning of Hippocrates at the beginning of *Prt.* [310a8-314c2] concerning the latter's education). The same theme was evidently taken up by Aeschines Socraticus in the fragmentary *Aspasia* (cf. fr. 17 [Dittmar]: Socrates offers Callias advice about the training of his sons),<sup>8</sup> and seems to have been adapted somewhat in his *Miltiades*.<sup>9</sup> The best-known example

<sup>7</sup>See, e.g., Hermann, *Geschichte und System* 430; Bruns 345; Pavlu 25; Brünnecke 99-102; Friedländer 147-8; Krüger 27-8; Souilhé 137; Robin 1642. G. Billings (*The Art of Transition in Plato* [Diss. Chicago, 1920] 16) calls the introduction of *Thg.* "purely conventional," though it is never clear precisely what this label is intended to mean.

<sup>8</sup>See B. Ehlers, *Eine vorplatonische Deutung des sokratischen Eros* (München, 1966) 35ff.

<sup>9</sup>Cf. frs. 37-8 (Dittmar) and *POxy.* 2889, 2890: Socrates, Euripides, and Hagnon deliberate (apparently; see S.R. Slings, *ZPE* 16 [1975] 301-8) over the identity of the person who best deserves the epithet of the wisest man in Greece, and who would therefore be the right educator for Miltiades.

of this, however, is the dramatic point of departure of Aristophanes' *Nu.*: Strepsiades wishes to learn from Socrates how his son may gain from education in the *phrontisterion*.<sup>10</sup>

This evidence points to the strong possibility that the dramatic setting of *Thg.* is formulaic.<sup>11</sup> It seems unnecessary therefore to pursue any further the similarity of this part of the dialogue with the corresponding section of *La.*, as the similarities seem to be generic rather than specific, and the parallels which can be cited are mostly superficial.<sup>12</sup> But there are other features in the opening part of *Thg.*, which, though overlooked for the most part by critics, will prove much more important for a critical understanding of the rest of the work.

It is necessary, first of all, to consider the arrival of Demodocus and his son in Athens after a journey of some distance, for the purpose of enlisting someone to educate Theages (first established in 121d2). This dramatic *mise en scène* creates a stereotypical situation: the country dweller, armed with his peculiar set of assumptions, confronts the very different attitudes which characterize those who inhabit the city. This contrast, or conflict, between country and city, is an opposition which in Greek literature finds its most poignant expressions in comedy (again, Ar. *Nu.* suggests

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<sup>10</sup>Cf. also the situation in Aristophanes' first play *Δαιταλείς* (frs. 198-244 Kock).

<sup>11</sup>And perhaps remained so, cf. Lucian's adoption of this dramatic setting in *Somn.* (*init.*).

<sup>12</sup>This is especially true of the respective characterizations of Demodocus and Lysimachus, see *Intr.* ch. III, c. The numerous parallels that Brünnecke (99-102) draws between *La.* and *Thg.* can hardly be taken as proving the dependence which he believes to be so manifest; so, e.g., the use of ἐπιμεληθῆναι *Thg.* 121d4 and *La.* 179a5 (see also comm. ad 122 b6-8, 131a4-6).

itself).<sup>13</sup> Although this opposition may be exploited in a given instance for a number of purposes, one that is prominent is an author's desire to contrast the traditional values of the countryside and its inhabitants, with the new and revolutionary ideas that tend to take hold and have a corrupting effect in the city, especially with regard to upbringing and education. Here Demodocus represents the rural way of life, and his rusticity is presented most forcefully (but not only, see **Intr.** ch. III, c) through his early simile of plant-rearing and child-rearing (121b1-c5): when pressed into describing the gravity of his situation, Demodocus immediately falls back upon an analogy with the toil of a farmer; he cannot help but view the world in this way.<sup>14</sup> His attitude towards the sophists, moreover, reflects a generally traditional and reactionary disposition: all he knows, apparently, is that a sophist is a professional who claims to be able to make a student σοφός, but is not to be trusted too readily (see **Intr.** ch. III, c); the thought that his son wishes to be trained by them causes fear in him (121c5, c7); and a tinge of contempt may be noted in his voice when he refers to them (see comm. *ad* 122b5-6). But the portrayal of Demodocus is not unsympathetic, for in giving priority to the well-being of his son over any financial considerations (121d6-122a1), he is ranging his values in a way that elsewhere in the Corpus evokes the admiration of Socrates, who voices alarm that a father should care for money and how his sons will be as rich

<sup>13</sup>For this stock theme see V. Ehrenberg, *The People of Aristophanes*<sup>2</sup> (Oxford, 1951) 82-9; R.L. Hunter, *The New Comedy of Greece and Rome* (Cambridge, 1985) 109-13; Dover, *GPM* 112-4; and on Plato's relationship to comedy and comic expression, see W.C. Greene, *HSCP* 31 (1920) 62-123; E. Hoffmann, *Zeitschrift für philosophische Forschung* 2 (1947) 472ff. Others, not surprisingly, have compared the dramatic setting of *Thg.* with that of *Nu.*, e.g. Krüger 27; Carugno 8 n.1; C.W. Müller 135; Pangle 149-50, 152 (who, in being driven by the comparison to assert [152] that "Plato presents in the *Theages* his most direct dramatic reply to the *Clouds*," introduces a thesis with which I cannot agree: Did Plato ever feel compelled even to "reply" to Aristophanes? See further DeVries, *Mnem.* 4.26 [1973] 1-8).

<sup>14</sup>See **Intr.** ch. III, c. The husbandman's bemoaning of the hardship of his way of life is a commonplace; see Ehrenberg, *op. cit.* 88-9.

as possible, yet neglect at the same time the education of these sons (see comm. *ad* 121d6-122a1; **Intr.** ch. III, c). Opposite Demodocus, and underlining the implicit tension in the dramatic circumstances of the dialogue the more clearly, are the "new" educators, the sophists, to whom Theages wishes to be handed over (121d5, 122a6).

It is clear that, whatever may be the connection of the opening of *Thg.* with other Platonic literature, it is not merely one of slavish imitation of any particular dialogue, not simply an attempt to do what Plato (if different from our author) had done more effectively elsewhere. The originality of our author at this point lies precisely in his looking outside of Socratic literature to a commonplace of Athenian social values, most recognizable to us through a *topos* of comic literature. And by the use of this device he is able to establish at once an antipathy towards the sophists and new education in general, of the kind that is raised explicitly by individual characters in other dialogues,<sup>15</sup> quite apart from the many notes of implicit disparagement that we encounter.

Between the traditional way of life of Demodocus and that represented by the sophists, the future of Theages hangs in the balance. At this stage in the dialogue any information about what Theages himself has to say is restricted to Demodocus' reports. Above all, we are told, Theages desires to become σοφός (121d1, where ὥς φησι makes σοφὸς γενέσθαι look like the quotation of an incantation by Theages). This aspiration must have been typical of many young men in Athens in the fifth and fourth centuries, and in many circumstances may be expected to have contained a political dimension (see comm. *ad* 121d1); indeed, as we shall see, Socrates does assume that the political dimension is part of Theages'

<sup>15</sup>Cf. e.g. *Prt.* 314d2ff. (cf. also 316d3ff., 318d7ff.), *Men.* 91c1ff.

desire for σοφία. But Demodocus' exceedingly vague use of σοφός in 121d1 (the first appearance of the word in the dialogue) betrays the fact that neither he nor Theages, whose words he is reporting, have a firm grasp of what the attaining of σοφία might, in the present circumstances, possibly entail. Demodocus does not attempt to qualify his initial use of σοφός, and Theages is undoubtedly no more certain of what the desire to become σοφός involves (though his conception is clarified further on in the dialogue). Significantly, Theages himself has never met a sophist, but has based his comments on the reports of friends who have made a trip to Athens before him (121d1ff.). Demodocus perceives that there are dangers involved in Theages' desire to become σοφός, but he is little more specific about these dangers than he is about his notion of what it actually means for his son to become "wise" or "clever." It seems reasonable to suppose that his trepidation about Theages' becoming σοφός has been conditioned by an innate, though unelaborated, suspicion of σοφισταί. As Demodocus sees it, Theages runs the risk of being corrupted by continuous association with a sophist who has not passed his own scrutiny (122a3-5); and that is virtually all we are told.<sup>16</sup> His characterization of Theages' desire for σοφία as οὐκ ἀγεννής, σφαλερὰ δέ (121c7-8) does not take us much further (see comm. *ad loc.*), although it does draw our attention to the inherent ambiguity of the terms σοφός and σοφία.

<sup>16</sup>Apart from reflecting a general distrust of what he does not fully understand, Demodocus' words could well be taken simultaneously as the expression of a father who feels ambivalence upon watching his son about to enter into a conventional ἐραστής-ἐρώμενος relationship: ambivalence, because of gratification, on the one hand, over the benefit his son may receive, and because of fear, on the other, that his son may be corrupted (see Dover, *GH* 81-91). Such a mundane process of thought would indicate (and this in any event must be the author's intention) that Demodocus has not extricated himself from conventional ways of thinking.

Hence Theages' desire to become σοφός is thematic to the dialogue, at a dramatic level, because it furnishes Demodocus with the reason why he must ask for Socrates' advice. But at the same time it provides a motive for Socrates' questioning of Theages, since it is evident at once that Socrates will need clarification about the meaning of Theages' unqualified desire for σοφία. The issue of σοφία is given a prominence which would seem to indicate that it is central to the dialogue as a whole.

What position, then, does Socrates assume within the rural-urban opposition sketched above, on the one hand, and Theages' vague desire to become "wise," on the other? Clearly he stands, at first, as somewhat of a mediator. It is likely that Demodocus has come with his son to Athens with the prior intention of asking for Socrates' help (see comm. *ad* 121a1 ἐδεόμην), and Socrates is greeted enthusiastically at this chance meeting, first upon Demodocus' catching sight of him (121a1ff.), and later, at the end of Demodocus' monologue (122a6-b1), as the one person who can relieve a distressed father of his fears.<sup>17</sup> It is possible the sophists may corrupt young men, but Socrates, who sacrificed his life to such a charge (and Demodocus' words in 122a4-5 inevitably call to mind the very similar accusations brought against Socrates in his indictment, see comm. *ad* 122a4, and sec. *c* below), is evidently seen by Demodocus as the person who can best help his son avoid such corruption. Moreover, that his advice is solicited so eagerly by Demodocus is a hint that Socrates holds an honoured place, for not only is advice "a sacred thing," according to the proverb that Socrates quotes, but Demodocus himself describes Socrates' chance appearance in terms that suggest the arrival of a god (see comm.

<sup>17</sup>For Demodocus' relief at being able to consult with Socrates, see comm. *ad* 122a7 (παρεφάνης), 122a9-b1, 127b3 (ἔρμαιον).



*ad* 122a7). He is therefore intended to be viewed as quite distinct from the class of educators about whom Demodocus feels so much hesitation and doubt.

But, despite this medial position which he occupies, Socrates is himself engaged in a separate conflict of sorts from the very outset of *Thg.* This conflict, sketched merely in outline at first, but gaining in clarity as the dialogue progresses, involves the opposition of παιδία and σπουδή, and is familiar from many Platonic contexts.<sup>18</sup> Here it embraces Socrates on one side, and Demodocus and (later) Theages on the other. The author wastes little time in conveying Demodocus' attitude of seriousness. His first halting words - the first words of the dialogue - communicate the sincerity of his trepidation, and his anxieties are further articulated in the course of the monologue which follows shortly after.<sup>19</sup> Socrates' cast of mind is first represented by his response, which I have characterized as ironic (see *Intr.* ch. III, a), to Demodocus' opening words; in his tone and general disposition, Socrates in this dialogue is the very antithesis of Demodocus and Theages. The παιδία-σπουδή theme will be developed in greater detail below.

If this opening section of *Thg.* may be characterized in any particular way, it should be said that it is dominated by signs of Demodocus' confusion and suspicion, as one might expect if the first page or so is interpreted, as I have done here, as a confrontation of the traditional with the novel. Theages wishes to become σοφός, and this is seen to be possibly good or possibly bad; the ambiguity of the word, and Demodocus' ambivalence towards this desire, is emphasized. Theages wants his father to

<sup>18</sup>On παιδία and σπουδή in Plato, see Guthrie, *HGP IV*. 56-66 (with reff. on 59 n.2).

<sup>19</sup>See comm. *ad* 121a1, a2-3, and *Intr.* ch. III, c.

entrust him to one of the sophists, who are to Demodocus an unknown quantity. Demodocus' difficulty is such that he needs advice from Socrates. But he indicates that he is clear on one matter: Socrates is not to be confused with these sophists, and if anyone will corrupt, it is they, not he. The dialogue will return to this important topic. But for now, it will be seen that Demodocus' opening monologue anticipates many of the developments in the dialogue as a whole.

## *ii. Socrates and Demodocus: 122b2-e1*

Having listened to Demodocus' anxieties about his son's future, about sophists, and about σοφία, and having had the request made of him to advise about Theages' education, Socrates proceeds to behave in a characteristic manner. First, he calls attention, quite emphatically,<sup>20</sup> to something to which he will return periodically through the rest of the dialogue, namely the fundamental importance of education and the care that one should take over it. Next, he underlines the need for him and Demodocus to reach agreement on their proposed subject of discussion. This latter point seems reasonable enough to Demodocus, but Socrates has another suggestion to make: they must first determine exactly what it is that Theages desires (122d2-4).

The dialogue would appear to falter slightly at this stage, in so far as Socrates so promptly casts aside the agreement he has just made with Demodocus concerning their commitment to begin discussion from agreed premises, in favour of making the same commitment with Theages. In fact, Socrates' adjustment is perfectly understandable. In dramatic terms, it allows the author to introduce Theages into the dialogue, and this is done

<sup>20</sup>Cf. 122b2 ἄλλα μὲν δὴ and καὶ . . . γε (see comm. *ad loc.*).

by means of typically Socratic παιδιά.<sup>21</sup> Much more importantly, however, the adjustment indicates where Socrates' priority lies in terms of the deliberation about education which he has placed in such high esteem just a moment ago, for it is clearly his concern above all to consult directly with the young man himself whose future is at stake; consultation only with his father will simply not do. Socrates establishes at once that his main pre-occupation on the question of education is with Theages; there is nothing impersonal about education in the form in which he considers that it ought to be pursued. Demodocus had originally approached Socrates with a request for a private discussion (121a1f.), but the dialogue evolves into something quite different.

The introduction of Theages will effectively remove Demodocus from the course of discussion for the time being, and allow for a transition in the movement of the work. But Socrates first requires one more piece of information from Theages' father, i.e., the name of his son. Some objections among commentators have been provoked by the way in which Socrates puts his request for information here (122d6). There is, however, no reason to trouble over these lines, since their tone is highly Socratic, both in the interest in male beauty that they reflect, and in the sportive flavour of the words (more παιδιά; see comm. *ad* 122d6, d9, e1). We may also note that elsewhere in the Platonic Corpus Socrates, as here, seems to employ etymology for its own sake, and that this sometimes involves a proper name (see comm. *ad* 122e1 ἑροπρεπής).<sup>22</sup>

<sup>21</sup>For the characteristically Socratic "one small change," see comm *ad* 122c8.

<sup>22</sup>Some critics are inclined to find important thematic significance in Theages' name (e.g. Friedländer 147; Pangle 153), but, whatever may be the value of this hermeneutical technique, the precise meaning of the name is in fact uncertain (see comm. *ad* 122e1).

The interplay in this brief section between Socrates and Demodocus serves a couple of functions. First, it allows the author to present Socrates at once in a guise that the reader will recognize from other Platonic literature. Second, and somewhat more importantly, it enables Socrates to modify and delineate the perspective from which Theages' desire to become σοφός is to be examined, for Socrates here emphasizes the value of direct contact with the young man, while the importance of Demodocus' apprehension of the present situation is, at least for the time being, limited.

*iii. Socrates, Theages, and σοφία (pt.1): 122e1-124e10*

Socrates' first address to Theages (122e1-3), prefigured by his request for the young man's name, serves to sum up ostensibly the two main issues of the dialogue: Theages wishes to become σοφός, and to be entrusted to a person who will make him so. Socrates is reiterating points that were touched upon by Demodocus in his monologue (e1-2 ἐπιθυμῆν...σοφὸς γενέσθαι ~ 121d1, ε3 ὅστις σε σοφὸν ποιήσῃ ~ 121d5-6). But Socrates, just as he had earlier sought to turn the conversation away from Demodocus towards Theages, now carefully seeks assent and confirmation from the young man on both the main issues. Theages' acknowledgement of Socrates' question (122e4) thus confirms all the information already provided by Demodocus.

122e5ff. seem to be little more than a further display of Socratic play, as Socrates forces Theages essentially to admit that, since the σοφοί are ἐπιστήμονες, and since Theages himself has learned the ἐπιστήμαι of letters, music, etc., he too must be ἐπιστήμων, i.e., σοφός. Certainly there is a teasing irony in Socrates' words, and structurally we may think of other dialogues in which the earliest discussion is conducted on an appar-

ently trivial level (see comm. *ad* 122e1-123b3). But this very brief questioning of Theages is a necessary elaboration of Theages' avowed desire to become σοφός. Any reader would have recognized that this desire, *simpliciter*, is intolerably vague and uninformative. Indeed, to determine more accurately what σοφία Theages desires is the task that Socrates quite naturally sets for himself in the next several pages; and 122e5ff. are the first stage in the process of elucidation. But the way in which they fulfil this role has, it seems, gone unnoticed.

Socrates plays here upon the assumption that, having learned to become proficient in the curriculum of the typical Athenian "primary" education (122e10-11 γράμματα...ἀγωνίαν), one may possess all the ἐπιστήμη that one will ever need; for he frames the question which follows Theages' acknowledgement that he has been schooled in this curriculum in the form "Do you think [sc. having learned the above skills] that you *still* (ἔτι) lack..." (123a1-2). The process of argument has more than passing significance, since the traditional attitude was that this kind of conventional education surely *was* all that might be required to make a person σοφός, and, for that reason, ready to handle the affairs of the state. Doubtless we may believe that a man like Demodocus thinks this is all his son requires, and had not previously countenanced the idea that Theages might wish to gain *further* education, above and beyond that which has been provided to him. That Socrates is playing upon these traditional assumptions through his initial interrogation of Theages is all but confirmed by his reference (122e9-10) to the class οἱ καλοὶ καὶγαθοί, which denotes the very people who are likely to consider the education Socrates is mentioning as the exclusive property of their sons, and as practically sufficient for all their needs. Theages' dismissal of Socrates' suggestion is significant for its im-

PLICIT denial of an outlook which his father would undoubtedly espouse. Again, it becomes evident that Theages stands at a crucial point: he lacks σοφία, and recognizes this lack, but where will he obtain it from, and of what will it consist?

Here some aspects of another dialogue must be considered for the light that they shed on the passage presently under discussion. Very early in *Alc. I*, Socrates infers that Alcibiades intends to advise the Athenians in assembly within a short time (106c4ff.). Socrates rightly assumes that Alcibiades' previous training has followed exclusively the conventional Athenian series of subjects, γράμματα καὶ κιθαρίζειν καὶ παλαίειν (106e6). Yet in spite of (or, indeed, because of) this limited background, Alcibiades has been confident up to now about his ability to become a statesman; and it is only through ἔλεγχος that Socrates forces Alcibiades to recognize his ignorance, and to realize that no advantages of class, education, or upbringing are sufficient to ensure the kind of knowledge to which he lays claim (118b4ff.). Alcibiades is taught the need to "know himself" (129a2-10).

As in *Alc. I*, Socrates' allusion to Theages' education occurs early in *Thg.*, and, consequently, scholars have assumed our author's dependence on *Alc. I*. In isolation, the presence of virtually identical lists of school subjects proves nothing, as the curriculum thereby denoted was a standard one and the same catalogue of subjects occurs frequently in Plato and other authors.<sup>23</sup> But the mention of the curriculum early in both dialogues does invite a comparison of the function which the reference to it performs in each case. For whereas Alcibiades reckoned that his back-

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<sup>23</sup>See comm. ad 122e10 for other parallels, as well as for the commentators who have connected *Thg.* and *Alc. I* on the basis of this passage.

ground was sufficient to prepare him for a political life, and acknowledged no further requisite skills, Theages at least admits that a certain ἐπιστήμη or σοφία is lacking in him, and realizes that what he has thus far accomplished simply will not suffice. One might say that Theages has the advantage of recognizing his own ignorance, and is therefore not a replica of the Alcibiades of *Alc. I*, as is sometimes believed (see *Intr.* ch. III, *b*). In view of this, if the author of *Thg.* has drawn upon *Alc. I* at this point, he has not done so in meek imitation. If anything, comparison between the two dialogues on this particular issue mainly serves to distinguish from one another the attitudes that the two young men have about themselves in their respective dialogues.

This distinction between personalities will go some way to explain an important structural characteristic of *Thg.* The argument in the sections of this dialogue which I have classified as *iii-v* (122e1-127a7) is unlike that of numerous other Platonic dialogues, including the doubtfully Platonic *Alc. I*,<sup>24</sup> in as much as Socrates here makes no effort to convince Theages of his own ignorance. Section *v* does end, it is true, in a very modified kind of ἀπορία (see sec. *b*, *v* below). But there is no reason for Socrates here to convict Theages of ἀμαθία, as he does, for example, with Euthyphro, Meno, and Alcibiades, in fulfilment of his "mission" (cf. *Ap.* 22e6-23c1). Theages is a somewhat different sort of interlocutor for Socrates, because he does not exhibit the same pretensions that others do. Considerable hope might be held out for him: knowing that he is not σοφός, he is instead at the critical stage of considering how he will attain to this level. This, then, is the problem that Socrates must consider along with Theages, rather than trouble himself over the preliminary confuting of his respondent.

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<sup>24</sup>On the authenticity of this dialogue, see *Intr.* ch. V, *g*.

Theages' early admission of ignorance also accounts for another difference from early, Socratic dialogues. Unlike other dialogues, in which Socrates encounters a person who claims to possess a certain skill or virtue, and then asks him (without positive result) to define that skill or virtue (e.g. *La.*, *Lys.*, *Euthphr.*, *Men.*), Socrates is here relieved of any need to frame his discussion explicitly in the "what is x?" form so common elsewhere.<sup>25</sup> True, in 123a4, in response to Theages' admission that he does lack some ἐπιστήμη, Socrates asks τίς ἐστὶν αὕτη;; but that is as close as he ever comes to putting his words in a form that remotely calls to mind questions which elsewhere explicitly seek a definition. Rather, his question here has greater immediacy, for it means, in effect, "what is the ἐπιστήμη/σοφία you desire" (although the question turns out not to be as simple as Theages, or the reader, may have originally imagined; see sec. *b*, *iii-v*). The dialogue is rather more thematic than aporetic.

Theages' answer to Socrates' τίς ἐστὶν αὕτη; question in 123a4 nevertheless adds a new dimension to the dialogue. As we saw a moment ago, Theages in this work does not suffer from the delusion displayed by some of Socrates' other interlocutors, of claiming expertise in a certain ethical or intellectual body of knowledge. He is, however, under a different kind of mistaken impression. He claims to know precisely what he desires, to have told his father about this often, and, for all of that, to have been denied any access to a teacher (123a5-8).<sup>26</sup> At this point Socrates' present task is clarified: Theages believes that his desire to become σοφός is a straightforward one, easily fulfilled by none other than a sophist, but

<sup>25</sup>Although it should be added that the question "what is x?" is far from the only kind with which Socrates is concerned in the early dialogues (see Robinson, *PED*<sup>2</sup> 49), and the absence of it in *Thg.* is therefore in itself no indication of spuriousness.

<sup>26</sup>For misunderstandings of this passage, see comm. *ad* 123a5-8.



nonetheless frustrated by his father.<sup>27</sup> Yet, as the conversation unfolds, Socrates proves that the matter cannot be as Theages thinks.

The interrogation of Theages which now follows requires comment on certain points. To begin with, we must look at the question and answer sequence between Socrates and Theages, which commences immediately from the use of analogies with various crafts. Craft-analogy is, of course, one of the features most typical of Socratic elenchus, and for that reason its application here is, in itself, unremarkable. But the use to which the craft-analogies are actually put is nevertheless peculiar. From the outset, the kinds of craft to which Socrates compares the σοφία that Theages desires are carefully restricted; for the σοφίαι Socrates names are such as to denote exclusively skills to which the concept of "command" or "supervise" might be applied. First the narrower verb κυβερνᾶν is used (123b4, c2), but this yields shortly after to the more general ἄρχειν (123d9, d13, e1, e8, e12, 124a6, 8, b2). This application of craft-analogy is peculiar because it confines the σοφία which Theages desires to one specific sphere of activities, while suppressing mention of any other possible kinds of σοφία. This is curious, since σοφία possessed a very wide field of reference beyond the one set forth here: besides the capacity "to rule/ command/ supervise," it could indicate, for example, simply a practical or prudential sagacity, or the knowledge and ability to perform some ἔργον or produce some artifact.<sup>28</sup> Socrates, in other words, is scarcely surveying the full range of meanings for this elusive term. This is enough to encourage the supposition that there is more to the present argument than might

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<sup>27</sup>Socrates emphasizes the adversarial disposition of Theages towards his father on this point by his use of metaphors and language of litigation (see comm. *ad* 123b1, b1-2, b2).

<sup>28</sup>See also comm. *ad* 121d1.

initially be imagined, and it is therefore necessary to look in greater detail at 123b3ff.

Socrates' first analogy, in his attempt to elicit the name of the σοφία Theages desires, is constructed with reference to the σοφία by which one commands or steers ships (τὰ πλοῖα κυβερνῶσιν 123b3-4 = κυβερνήτική b7); his second with reference to the σοφία by which one steers chariots (τὰ ἄρματα κυβερνῶσιν 123c2 = ἡνιοχική c4). One reason (among many) that several scholars have adduced for athetizing *Thg.* is the persistence of the verb κυβερνᾶν in these two analogies; they object that in the second analogy the use of the verb is "un-Platonic," or poetic, or both.<sup>29</sup> I shall not defend the text against the strictly linguistic argument that this raises, as this has been done at length in the commentary (*ad* 123c2). However, it must be emphasized that the difficulties which have been expressed about phraseology completely misapprehend the point of Socrates' present argument, and result merely from a failure to examine closely what he is trying to accomplish here. What is significant is that Socrates' first two analogies both involve the use of the verb κυβερνᾶν, *even though* this produces a somewhat metaphorical construction in the second instance. Now the words κυβερνᾶν, κυβερνητής, and κυβερνήτική hold a special place in the field of Socratic and Platonic analogies. Where they occur, it is very often in connection with discussions about the political craft, as in metaphors of the "ship of state," or where a

<sup>29</sup>Brünnecke's comment (103) is rather typical: "Id porro monere licet, quomodo imitator ab exemplo e navigatione sumpto transitum muniverit ad novum idque ex arte equos moderandi petitum. Fit verbis inusitatis ἄρματα κυβερνᾶν et iis quidem maioris momenti ad Academicorum (illius aetatis) docendi rationem inlustrandam. Tantum enim abest, ut magister statim novis notionibus afferendis discipuli animum perturbet, ut verbis paene ridiculo modo conectendis ab uno ad alterum exemplum paulatim transitum munire conetur, veteribus notionibus quoad fieri potest retentis." I cannot share Brünnecke's confidence that Socrates' method of argument is evidence for the dialogue's date of composition.

ruler is likened to the state's "helmsman." The most famous example of this is in the parable of the ship of state in *R.* 488a7-489a2, but there are numerous others.<sup>30</sup> Hence the most logical explanation for the twin use of κυβερνᾶν in *Thg.*, and for the prominence given to the verb, is, I think, that the political metaphor underlies the language in use here.<sup>31</sup> Socrates, it would seem, is tacitly attempting to narrow down the σοφία which Theages desires to the concept of πολιτική, by introducing, exclusively at this stage, the notion of helmsmanship. Such an interpretation of these lines makes Socrates' examination of Theages coercive from the outset, in that Socrates is excluding all other forms of σοφία from Theages' purview. But Socrates is reasoning *ad hominem*: he has met other young men in Theages' position, and quite naturally assumes that what he is really seeking is the skill required to make him a success in public life; thus he understandably feels no need to waste time eliminating all other possibilities.

Socrates' subsequent request for the name of the σοφία which Theages has in mind (123c6-10) shows a typical Socratic demand for precise specification, without unnecessary circumlocution, of the subject at hand. The answer he wants from Theages is clearly πολιτική, or even (on the basis of his previous examples) ἡ τῶν ἀνθρώπων κυβερνητική (cf. *Clit.* 408b3). However, Socrates is frustrated in this, as Theages can manage nothing better than the answer "σοφία" (123d1-2). So far, the process of investigation has been of a kind exceedingly familiar from Socratic dialectic: two cases are introduced, leading to a coordinate pro-

<sup>30</sup>See comm. *ad* 123c2; also R. Bambrough, "Plato's Political Analogies" in *Plato: A Collection of Critical Essays II*, ed. G. Vlastos (Notre Dame, 1978) 192-6.

<sup>31</sup>Pangle (153-5) seems to be thinking roughly along these lines, but his over-interpretation leads, it seems to me, to a curious distortion of Socrates' choice of analogies.

position.<sup>32</sup> But, as Theages remains confused even at this elementary level, Socrates proceeds to a still simpler and lengthier series of examples. He does away with any metaphorical obfuscation by withdrawing the term κυβερνᾶν and replacing it with the wider ἄρχειν instead, and shows that there are many kinds of σοφία that involve the principle of ἄρχειν (here he recurs, for his first two cases, to the previous examples of κυβερνητική and ἡνιοχική, though chiastically arranged [ἡνιοχεία 123d3, κυβερνητική d11]). Since it is a specific kind of σοφία that they are concentrating upon, Socrates seeks to distinguish the various σοφίαι according to that which each σοφία aims to control.<sup>33</sup> Theages has no difficulty in naming οἱ ἄνθρωποι as the subject matter of the σοφία he desires (123e2), but that is still too wide for Socrates. Soon, however, Theages gratefully endorses Socrates' suggestion that what he means in fact is that he desires the σοφία by which he might rule *all* the people in the city (124b5-9).<sup>34</sup> Still, Socrates is not finished with this line of thought. Through five separate parallel examples, Socrates demonstrates that "to rule everyone in the city" was exactly what various tyrants did, and, again eliciting a precise name from Theages, forces him to acknowledge, reluctantly, that the σοφία he desires is τυραννική, and that he is thus destined to become a τύραννος.

It is perhaps understandable (though symptomatic of the neglect with which this dialogue is treated) that commentators generally view all this as little more than absurd play on Socrates' part. Certainly Socrates'

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<sup>32</sup>See Robinson, *PED*<sup>2</sup> 33-5.

<sup>33</sup>This involves Socrates in the use of some fairly strained analogies, on which see comm. ad 124a5-8.

<sup>34</sup>For the argument that 123d3-124b3 contains considerable extracts from examples given in *Alc. I*, see comm. ad 123d1-2.

reduction of Theages' desire for σοφία to a desire for τυραννική is ironic, and may be taken as another sign of the παιδιά by which he is characterized in this dialogue. But this will hardly do as a full explanation of Socrates' aims, and it would be well to look to the earlier mention of the sophists for a clue (see sec. *b*, *i*). Socrates had accepted Demodocus' report that Theages wishes to apply to a sophist, and he structures his interrogation of Theages on this assumption. The development of the argument whereby πολιτική, first interpreted discreetly as metaphorical κυβερνητική, becomes a function of ἄρχειν, and is in turn distorted into τυραννική, is a manifestation of dialectical παιδιά which can be paralleled from other contexts: Socrates accepts unqualifiedly the words of an interlocutor, and presses the consequences of these words to the logical limit (see n.48). But in this instance Socrates' παιδιά is particularly pointed if it is taken at the same time as an earnest parody of the sophistic basis of morality. Sophistic relativity advocated, or could be seen to advocate, that terms such as σοφία and πολιτική were content-neutral; the conventional significance of the term could be transvalued according to the user's beliefs and set of assumptions. Thus here the equation of πολιτική (implicitly put forward) with τυραννική represents a cynical distortion which comes vividly to life in some of Plato's most impassioned writing, and in characters who are either themselves sophists, or reveal sophistic influence, and who actually believe that τυραννική (i.e., ἄρχειν *simpliciter*) is the only form of πολιτική worthy of the name. So, for instance, Callicles, who is not a sophist, but bases his view of the good life on the notion that the man who is just φύσει will achieve ἀρετή through the removal of all restrictions on his freedom, envisages τυραν-

νίς or δυναστεία as a fitting goal (*Grg.* 491e5-492c8);<sup>35</sup> Thrasymachus, who is a sophist, holds that justice is the interest of the stronger, and that the stronger will inevitably and appropriately want to exercise absolute injustice, which he calls τυραννίς (*R.* 343b1-344c8); and Polus exalts the life of the tyrant as an ideal at which most Athenians would aim (*Grg.* 470 c9-471d2). To the end, Plato recognized the existence of, and spoke against, such persons who were unencumbered by the bonds of νόμος in their belief that absolute domination was a perfectly right and natural state of political affairs (*Lg.* 889e3-890a9, a passage which utilizes basic sophistic principles). For all these individuals there is no question of what sort of rule πολιτική ought to imply,<sup>36</sup> and Socrates in *Thg.* ironically takes over the same assumptions that they do. But in our dialogue there is no explicit argument *pro* or *contra* this evaluation of πολιτική. Socrates is only concerned to present the consequences of sophistic morality as starkly as he can, and in order to do so he performs, one might say, *in loco sophistae*,<sup>37</sup> taking advantage of the inherent ambiguities in the term σοφία, and in the concept allied to it in this dialogue, πολιτική.

Thus does Socrates hit upon the sort of corruption which Demodocus fears will be perpetrated on Theages by certain educators about whom he knows little. The demonstration is the more forceful for the uncompromising direction in which it is compelled to go. And like other interlocutors in Platonic dialogues, the bewildered Theages can do nothing but acquiesce in Socrates' conclusions: he admits, to his own dismay, that τυραν-

<sup>35</sup>As Dodds remarks (*Gorgias* 15), "Gorgias' teaching is the seed of which the Calliclean way of life is the poisonous fruit"; see also Maier, *Sokrates* 233-5, 246-8.

<sup>36</sup>Thuc. 3.82.8 is good evidence for the transvaluation of conventional political terminology in the fifth-century; see further Versényi, *Socratic Humanism* 53-9.

<sup>37</sup>Another instance in which Socrates seems to argue (ironically) in the manner of a sophist in the presence of an un-sophistic interlocutor is *Lys.*; see Guthrie, *HGP IV*. 146.

νική is, indeed, what is meant by ἄρχειν τῶν ἐν τῇ πόλει (124a1, a3-4).

One more feature of this section, already alluded to, must be examined in greater detail. As mentioned above, no illustration is required to show that Plato's Socrates is powerfully inclined to the use of craft-analogy; it is among the most recognizable and "typical" traits of this Socrates. So we should not be surprised to find evidence of the same characteristic in this dialogue. But the extensive use of craft-analogy here demands further investigation as to its aim and particular method: is it included merely to impart a Socratic flavour to the dialogue as a whole, as is commonly believed,<sup>38</sup> or is the employment of craft-analogy subservient to some larger purpose of the author's?

Previous discussion in the dialogue has shown that the σοφία Theages desires is actually ἄρχειν τῶν ἐν τῇ πόλει (in effect, πολιτική). By comparing this σοφία to such things as μουσική, κυβερνητική, τεκτονική, etc., Socrates is tacitly assuming, for the moment at least, that what Theages desires possesses (ideally at any rate) the status of τέχνηαι like these; this he emphasizes by his interchanging of the words τέχνη and σοφία in 124a5 and b8: Theages' desire for σοφία is a desire for a τέχνη. Now the assumption that an ideal πολιτική is a craft or science, parallel in certain respects with others like medicine, music, or mathematics, is a familiar and fundamental Platonic doctrine, unquestionably Socratic in origin.<sup>39</sup> But if the kind of πολιτική Theages is after (and which he designates as σοφία) is a craft in the true sense of the word, it is necessary that someone, in order to prove definitively its status as a

<sup>38</sup>So, e.g., Schleiermacher 173; Shorey, *WPS* 661; Krüger 15.

<sup>39</sup>It is the basis of his criticisms of democracy; for testimony outside of Plato, cf. X. *Mem.* 4. 2.3-7; 1.2.9.

τέχνη, be able to show what the rational basis of this τέχνη is, or "give an account" of it, as Socrates would have it. Alternatively, πολιτική can be shown to be a τέχνη if one is able to demonstrate that it is teachable; and the simplest way to do this is by indicating that it is, in fact, taught. This much at least is familiar from a number of Plato's dialogues; and, since the connection between πολιτική and certain τέχναι is also being made in *Thg.*, we expect Socrates to draw some inferences about the validity of the parallel within the specific context of Theages' desire for σοφία. Is this expectation realized?

I believe that it is, though not in an altogether straightforward manner. When Socrates sets out to learn more accurately what σοφία it is that Theages desires, he asks Theages for its name (123c9ff.). It seems a simple request, but the appearance of a long series of questions involving τέχναι after Theages failed to supply an appropriate name indicates that Socrates is setting out to establish something more fundamentally significant than simply the name of the σοφία in question. Of the two methods cited in the previous paragraph for determining whether or not the σοφία Theages desires is really a τέχνη, Socrates reserves the second (consideration of its teachability, or, at least, of whether it is or is not taught) for later, when he will briefly examine whether the σοφία that οἱ πολιτικοί impart is a τέχνη (see sec. *b*, ν). Here, however, he is concerned with the kind of σοφία that the sophists are likely to pass on to Theages, and it is, I think, rather through the first method that he tackles the problem at this point. When Socrates requests the name that Aegisthus, Peleus, Periander, Archelaus, and Hippias all have in common, he first gives a demonstration of what he expects from Theages by asking for the name that Bakis, Sibyl, and Amphilytus share, to which question Theages



readily offers the answer "χρησµωδοί" (124d10). A number of scholars have objected that the appearance of the class χρησµωδοί in an analogy at this point is irrelevant (see comm. *ad* 124d10), but the significance of its presence here seems to me to be this: If there are any individuals in Athens whose occupation does *not* depend upon some τέχνη, i.e., does not issue from a communicable set of rules, the χρησµωδοί are these; and when Plato wishes to underscore his conviction that politics, as practised in Athens, have nothing to do with τέχνη, the comparison he draws is between πολιτικοί and χρησµωδοί (cf. *Men.* 99c1-5).<sup>40</sup> Although our author does not in so many words announce the same deduction in *Thg.*, nevertheless, by drawing τύραννοι and χρησµωδοί into close proximity, he leaves it to the reader (and to Theages) to draw the inference that πολιτική, evaluated as τυραννική, is on equal footing with χρησµωδοία, which is itself not a τέχνη. Once this connection is perceived, it becomes clear that Socrates intends that any claim to be a real τέχνη ought to be denied to the kind of σοφία that Theages believes he will receive from the sophists.<sup>41</sup>

Essentially, then, Socrates' reasoning has two stages. The first may be roughly represented by the following schema.

*i. The σοφία Theages desires = πολιτική*

*This σοφία = τέχνη*

*Therefore πολιτική = τέχνη*

Socrates, as we have seen, does not argue these steps. But since the final proposition to which the first two lead represents a standard Socratic and

<sup>40</sup>For the χρησµωδοί working θεία μοίρα, not τέχνη, cf. also *Ap.* 22b8-c3, *Ion* 534b7-d1.

<sup>41</sup>A Platonic attitude; cf. *Grg.* 465b1ff., where Socrates classifies σοφιστική and ῥητορική as spurious forms of πολιτική.

Platonic ideal, we can understand why he implicitly assumes these steps, and we should look upon them as rather uncontroversial. This first stage is the base from which Socrates operates, and represents the assumptions which he sets out to test under the present circumstances. The second stage, however, as an examination of the first, gains its effect wholly from irony and parody. It consists, I think, of the following steps.

- ii. *The σοφία Theages desires (i.e. πολιτική) = τυραννική*  
*But τυραννική, like χρησμωδία, not a τέχνη*  
*Therefore this σοφία not a τέχνη*

Socrates' argument here is, as we have seen, insidious rather than logical: he allows Theages no choice but to accept that the σοφία he seeks is tantamount to tyranny, then parallels tyranny with soothsaying, though without drawing attention to the important respect in which the two may be considered similar. Any effect that is gained here comes through association and juxtaposition. But then, this is meant to be mockery of a *sophistic* conception of σοφία, Theages is never intended to be an adversary in the face of whom intellectual rigour is demanded, and logical consistency has a subordinate role where irony and parody are the main objectives. The assumptions which Socrates sets out to examine (i) are presented as a serious matter; his means of examining them (ii) are not, and reflect his attitude towards the subject of investigation.

Suffice to say that the presence in this dialogue of craft-analogy is not gratuitous or decorative. It is, on the contrary, an integral part of Socrates' examination of the essence of sophistic σοφία; indeed, Socrates is not yet finished with the sophists and his application to them of craft-analogy (see sec. *b*, *v*).

*iv. Interlude: 124e11-125b4*

As in earlier parts of the dialogue, we again encounter a prominent measure of Socratic παιδεία. This feature of the interlude is illustrated by the remarks in the commentary *ad* 124e11-125a8 (*pass.*), and so need not be elaborated here. Otherwise, there are several features of interest in this section which bear directly on the structure of *Thg.* itself.

Demodocus' response to Socrates in 125b1-2 affirms that he and Socrates must, as Socrates had suggested (125a6-8), decide to what person they ought to send Theages to make him a σοφὸς τύραννος. Can Demodocus have missed Socrates' manifest irony? Although this question has been answered in the affirmative (see comm. *ad* 124e11-125b4), I doubt that this can be right; for we would then have to accept that Demodocus supports the idea that Theages become a tyrant. Whatever other criticisms scholars may make of our author, I should be disinclined to convict him of this kind of insensitivity; and, in any event, the heavily emphatic language Demodocus employs seems to indicate that he is himself ironic in his response (see comm. *ad* 125b1-2). I would prefer to interpret Demodocus' acceptance of Socrates' suggestion as evidence that he understands one goal, at least, to which Socrates is leading up, namely the refutation of Theages' censure of his father for not providing the education he demanded. It makes better sense if Demodocus is seen to be a party to Socrates' intentions in his examination of Theages, though of course he need not understand everything that Socrates is contriving. But his later uninhibited acceptance of Socrates (127b2--d1, 131a8-9) is at any rate some incidental confirmation of his cognizance of Socrates' superficially

ironic tone. On this analysis Socrates' eventual criticism of Theages for his behaviour towards his father (126d9-e127a3) is here foreshadowed.

However this may be, Socrates at once dismisses his original offer to deliberate with Demodocus over the question of who will become Theages' educator. It is Socrates' wish to postpone this, at least until Theages has been adequately examined (125b3). We cannot but be reminded here of an earlier part of the dialogue, where Socrates cautioned that he and Demodocus had first to determine if they were talking about the same thing, but then apparently changed his designs and asserted that it was first necessary to carry out this process with Theages (122c8ff., see sec. *b*, *ii*). As before, Socrates is here giving priority to the young man himself whose future is at stake; it is another affirmation of the need for direct contact with a person in Theages' circumstances.

At the same time, our argument that it is Theages' desired σοφία *qua* τέχνη that Socrates has been interested in up to this point, and that the *technical* (i.e. rational) aspect of this σοφία is in reality the centrepiece of Socrates' examination of Theages, receives support in this interlude, for here Socrates reverts quite subtly to his earlier interest in how this σοφία may compare with other τέχναι. Socrates calls this issue to mind when he takes ironic aim at Demodocus for begrudging Theages an education, even though he knew where he could have sent him to make him a δημιουργόν...τῆς σοφίας ἧς ἐπιθυμεῖ (125a4). The terminology here patently alludes to the earlier craft-analogies (Socrates could just as easily have said simply αὐτὸν σοφὸν ἂν ἐποίησας instead of using the phrase in 125a4), since Theages could become a δημιουργὸς σοφίας only if he were to practice some τέχνη, in other words, if the σοφία in question were a τέχνη. Socrates would seem to be accepting

that what Theages has claimed to be searching after, and what the sophists will provide, is in fact a τέχνη, and that Demodocus could have made Theages a "craftsman" of it had he sent him to a sophist, as his son demanded. But Socrates' ironic tone throughout this interlude is against such an interpretation. And to call Theages a δημιουργὸς σοφίας, even hypothetically, should hardly be considered complimentary, either for Theages or for those who might profess to render him thus; it is hard to imagine what else a "manufacturer of the wisdom which [Theages] desires" could be but a sophist, especially as the word δημιουργός, within the context of a discussion of crafts, suggests professionalism. Socrates therefore appears to be hinting that, had Demodocus acquiesced in granting Theages' wish by entrusting him to a sophist, a sophist is what Theages himself would have become. Socrates makes a similar point in *Prt.* (311 a8-312a7), when he induces the young Hippocrates to admit (very reluctantly) that, as education by a doctor or sculptor makes one a doctor or sculptor, so education by a sophist is bound to turn a student into a sophist.

On purely structural terms, this interlude functions as a transitional hinge. Section *iii* leading up to it had ostensibly sought to clarify the nature of the σοφία to which Theages aspired. Socrates brought that investigation to a satisfactory conclusion, or at any rate to the conclusion to which he deliberately drove Theages: the σοφία which the young man wishes, or is destined, to acquire from the sophists is τυραννική. Now he must examine the second part of Theages' demand, namely, with what person should Theages associate in order to become a "wise tyrant" (125a7-8 διὰ τὴν τίνος συνουσίαν σοφὸς ἂν γένοιτο τύραννος).

v. *Socrates, Theages, and σοφία (pt. 2): 125b5-127a7*

This section is rather variegated in form. It begins with an appeal to a verse from "Euripides," which fails to elicit an answer from Theages as to the person who will best instruct him in τυραννική. Socrates proceeds to allude to a poem of Anacreon, again attempting to prompt a response from Theages concerning the appropriate object for the wisdom he is pursuing. In annoyance Theages clarifies the nature of his desire for σοφία. Socrates returns to craft-analogy to elucidate his argument, but this only results in a suggestion from Theages that σοφία may not be teachable. He then reproaches Theages because the latter does not know, after all, who will make him σοφός. Finally, Socrates offers to entrust Theages to one of οἱ καλοὶ καγαθοί, by association with whom he will gain a high reputation in the eyes of the Athenian people. Each of these parts has its own relevance to the structure and analysis of the dialogue, and will have to be considered separately, as well as in relation to other parts.

Socrates' citing of the Euripidean verse<sup>42</sup> σοφοὶ τύραννοι τῶν σοφῶν συνουσίᾳ five times in succession in 125b7-d4 should be considered co-extensive with the earlier play upon sophistic thought and values singled out above; for the criticism and evaluation of poetry, pursued largely with the intention of investigating the moral questions that the poets raised, was part of the sophistic armoury.<sup>43</sup> That Socrates looks to poetry

<sup>42</sup>For the tradition in antiquity which attributed the verse to Sophocles, see comm. *ad* 125b5.

<sup>43</sup>Cf. *Prt.* 338e6-347a5 (esp. 339a1-3 [Protagoras] ἔστιν δὲ τοῦτο [i.e. ἀνδρὶ παιδείας μέγιστον μέρος 338e7] τὰ ὑπὸ τῶν ποιητῶν λεγόμενα οἶόν τ' εἶναι συνιέναι ἅ τε ὀρθῶς πεποιήται καὶ ἅ μὴ, καὶ ἐπίστασθαι διελεῖν τε καὶ ἐρωτῶμενον λόγον δοῦναι); also *Hp. mi.* 363a6ff.

for guidance in his investigation at this stage is in itself further demonstration of παιδιὰ,<sup>44</sup> but once more a serious purpose may be detected behind this play. For one thing, in Socrates' mouth the verse sounds highly incongruous: Socrates' estimate of tyrants is everywhere low,<sup>45</sup> and there must be implicit criticism here of the sort of σοφία which can be associated with a τύραννος, unless σοφοὶ be understood in the most debased sense. From a Socratic point of view, the first two words of the verse rank as a rather gross oxymoron. As well, by substituting successively γεωργοί, μάγειροι, and παλαισταί for τύραννοι in adaptations of the verse, Socrates returns to craft-analogy, in an attempt to clarify the sort of answer he requires for the question "Tyrants are wise by association with those wise at what?". If we keep in mind our earlier consideration of craft-analogy in sec. *b*, *iii*, and Socrates' attempts to place the σοφία Theages is pursuing alongside other τέχναι, Socrates' process of thought is transparent: for each of γεωργοί, μάγειροι, and παλαισταί, the respective craft is learned through association with someone who already possesses the skill in question. So tyrants are wise by association with those wise at τυραννικά, the pattern would demand. But whether out of obtuseness, or (preferably I think; see comm. *ad* 125d7; **Intr.** ch. III, *b*) simply because he is by now too annoyed to do otherwise, Theages offers no answer to Socrates' final quotation of the verse in its original form in 125d4. All the same, Socrates has now made his point (ironically again): the kind of σοφία about which he and Theages have been speaking for some time is not like other crafts, or rather, is not a τέχνη at all. What remains implicit is that, if the σοφία which the

<sup>44</sup>For the ironic effect imparted by the ascription of the verse to Euripides, see comm. *ad* 125b5.

<sup>45</sup>Cf., e.g., *Grg.* 466c9-480a4, *R.* 576b11-580c4, *Phdr.* 248c5-e3.

sophists profess to teach is such as this, its value must be held seriously in doubt.

The interpretation of Socrates' use of the Anacreontic poem mentioned in 125d10ff. and of its role in the dialogue, depends on the inferences we can draw concerning its original meaning, based on the limited amount of information with which its context provides us. It is inconceivable to me that the mention of τυραννικά (which must have been present in Anacreon's poem, since the word obviously prompts Socrates' allusion to the poem in the first place) can have referred to anything but erotic prowess on the part of the unknown Kallikrite of the poem. Since a detailed investigation into this problem is set out in Appendix 2, I offer this assessment here without further argument. If this evaluation of the original tenor of the passage from Anacreon's poem is right, Socrates' allusion to it becomes important for an interpretation of the dialogue. Superficially, it extends his overtly ironic treatment of Theages: the apparent incongruity of Socrates' shift from political τυραννική to erotic τυραννική proves Theages' subsequent charge that Socrates is making fun of him (125e4 παίζεις) to be particularly well-motivated. There is however a good deal more to the allusion. When Socrates asks Theages if he wishes to associate (125d13 συνουσίας ἐπιθυμείς) with a man who "practises the same craft" (ὁμότεχνος 125e1) as Kallikrite, he is clearly keeping our attention fixed upon the use of craft-analogy which has bulked fairly heavily in his discussion so far (and the word τυραννικά furnishes precisely the answer that Socrates was seeking earlier in his quotations from "Euripides"). But to Theages the notion that, if one practised what Kallikrite did (i.e. ἐρωτικά), he could on that account be called τεχνικός (and so σοφός) is ludicrous, and he responds to the suggestion in what he feels is



an appropriate manner. Thus, by association, rather than through any detailed argument (not unlike the juxtaposition of tyrants and seers earlier on, see sec. *b*, *iii*), Socrates brings into further ridicule the notion that the σοφία which Theages is after is a τέχνη, or, indeed, is worthwhile at all. Socrates' attitude is apparently dismissive.

This level of meaning is undoubtedly intended to be amply clear to Theages, and to the author's contemporary reader as well, who would have known the Anacreon poem, as Theages does (cf. 125d12). But the allusion contains another level of meaning, which will become fully evident later, and only in retrospect. Like Theages, commentators tend to see nothing but irony (of an unspecified kind) in Socrates' suggestion that Theages would desire to associate with a man who is skilled in the same craft as Kallikrite. It is more probable, however, that these words also point forward to later developments in the dialogue. By the end of the section presently under discussion Theages will apply to Socrates to become his companion; and not long after that, Socrates himself will claim to be completely unknowledgeable, except in the matter of τὰ ἐρωτικά, in which field his skill surpasses that of all others. In view of this, it would appear that in 125d13-e3 the author is foreshadowing Theages' eventual desire to associate with Socrates, the consummate master in τὰ ἐρωτικά. Socrates' irony is at once richer than might at first be realized.

So far, we have observed that, while the tone of the poetic allusion is at one level unquestionably playful, it also anticipates a later stage when Theages will apply to Socrates to be his companion; as such, Socrates does emerge as the very person who is ὁμότεχνος with Kallikrite, i.e., who also ἐπίσταται τυραννικά of an erotic kind. How Socrates' erotic expertise could be called τυραννικά is an important matter which will be

examined later (sec. c). Now, however, Theages' anger at the attitude which he feels that Socrates has displayed towards him prompts a restatement of the nature of his desire for σοφία, expressed in the form of a rejection of any aspirations to become a tyrant, or even a god (125e8-126a4).

This passage has, for several reasons, attracted a certain amount of attention. Those discussions which are only concerned with the possible bearing that the passage has on the dialogue's date of composition may be disregarded here (see *Intr.* ch. V, c, d). Instead, I shall restrict my comments to an examination of the putative dependence of these lines on a passage in *Alc. I* (an issue which is, admittedly, not wholly unrelated to the problem of the dialogue's date, see *Intr.* ch. V, g). A number of scholars have expressed the view that, when our author depicted Theages' rejection of tyranny and divinity in 125e8-126a4, he had *Alc. I* 105a7-c6 in mind.<sup>46</sup> In the latter passage Socrates represents Alcibiades, who is destined within a few days to speak for the first time before the Athenian δῆμος (a7-b1), as inflamed by the prospect of becoming master of all Europe (b2-8). But, the dialogue continues, it is unlikely Alcibiades would be satisfied with this, as his eyes would inevitably turn toward the subjugation of Asia as well, in emulation of Cyrus and Xerxes (c1-6).<sup>47</sup>

<sup>46</sup>See Pavlu 26-7; Heidel 55 n.8; Brünnecke 104; Souilhé 139; Robin 1643; Turolla 311.

<sup>47</sup>This is not the occasion to examine fully the possibility that the author of *Thg.* also had before him *Alc. II* 141a5-b8, in which place Alcibiades again affirms that one could count himself blessed if he were made a tyrant (see Brünnecke 104; Heidel 55 n.8; Turolla 311). The evidence is far too slim to allow any confidence that it is a source for *Thg.*; and since the date of *Alc. II* may well be in the first half of the third century (see, e.g., Taylor, *PMW*<sup>6</sup> 528-9), while that of *Thg.*, whatever its authorship, is unlikely to be after 330 (see *Intr.* ch. V, g), the chances of such derivation seem slight indeed, unless the accepted dates for *Alc. II* are radically altered. For my own part, I see no advantage in deriving *Thg.* from *Alc. II*, quite apart from the problem of priority. If anything, the opposite hypothesis may be true: Alcibiades' confirmation of the happiness of the tyrant (141b7-8 Ἐγὼ μὲν οἶμαι, ὃ Σώκρατες, καὶν ἄλλον ὄντινόν, εἴπερ τοιαῦτα συμβαίη αὐτῷ) may depend on *Thg.* 126a2.

It should be noted, first of all, that a good deal of the tone and meaning of Theages' statement in 125e8-126a4 can be accounted for simply by reference to the evidence of commonplace utterances elsewhere in Greek literature (see *Intr.* ch. V, c). Verbal parallels, therefore, cannot by themselves prove the dependence on *Alc. I* that some scholars have postulated. However that may be, it is hard to resist the temptation to accept *Alc. I* as the earlier work, and to interpret our passage in *Thg.* in the light of it. For if it is the case that the author of *Thg.* had *Alc. I* in mind here, the parallelism which scholars point out is not evidence simply of thoughtless imitation. On the contrary, it is much more probable that our author, by representing Theages as rejecting tyranny and divinity, wished to contrast the young man with Alcibiades in *Alc. I*, and to offer an evaluation of his character. Simply put, juxtaposition of the two passages demonstrates that Theages is no Alcibiades. Earlier, I drew attention to another correspondence between these two dialogues (122e8-123a3; see sec. b, iii), where the author of *Thg.* seems to be urging that there is an important difference between the character and aspirations of Theages, on the one hand, and those of Alcibiades, on the other: Theages, we saw, was prepared, unlike Alcibiades, to admit that he lacked some ἐπιστήμη. It will be argued later (see sec. c) that these two parallels, taken together, have significance for the meaning of our dialogue.

As in other Platonic works, Socrates' deliberate misunderstanding of his interlocutor has forced that person to clarify himself.<sup>48</sup> And as vague answers are at other times discarded and replaced by more precise ones during the process of elenchus, though a conclusive position is not achieved (this process could be illustrated by a glance at the arguments of

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<sup>48</sup>Cf., e.g., *Men.* 70a1-72d1, *Hp. mi.* 364b1-365d4, *R.* 338c1ff.

almost any early dialogue), so here (and earlier in 123b3-124b9, up to the beginning of Socrates' deliberate distortion) progressively more satisfactory answers are evoked.<sup>49</sup> Theages' subsequent elaboration of his desire to rule (126a7-8) is of some interest, since the kind of ruler he professedly wishes to become (constitutional, ruling by consent) accords with what is likely to have been an ideal of the historic Socrates.<sup>50</sup> This aspiration underlines all the more strongly the difference between Theages and a person like the Alcibiades of *A/c. I*; and again, Theages shows signs of promise to be found in by no means all of Socrates' associates.

Theages' acknowledgement that he wishes to rule like Themistocles, Cimon, and Pericles (126a9-10) performs the further function of shifting the emphasis away from the previous issue of what effect the sophists might have on him, to the question now of whether or not the Athenian πολιτικοί can satisfy his desire for σοφία. Socrates returns once again to craft-analogy (126a12-c9), and the questions he puts forward are framed in a predictable enough form. If one wanted to become σοφός at either horsemanship or javelin-throwing, one would go to someone skilled in these τέχναι. If a person wanted to become wise in τὰ πολιτικά (126c3), would he go to anyone but οἱ πολιτικοί? What is at stake once more is the question of whether πολιτική, as it is commonly understood, can be regarded as a τέχνη, and if those reputed to possess it are τεχνικοί, as horsemen and javelin-throwers indisputably are. The answer to this question is the more final for the fact that it is supplied by Theages himself, and there are several points of note in the manner in which he responds.

<sup>49</sup>Cf. *Men.* 82b9-85b7; see Robinson, *PED*<sup>2</sup> 72-84; Versényi, *Socratic Humanism* 117-24; Irwin, *PMT* 68-71.

<sup>50</sup>See comm. *ad loc.*; Gulley 170-5.

The most striking is that Theages has recourse here to a *topos* which Socrates not infrequently looks to in support of his thesis that ἀρετή or σοφία is not teachable, namely, that those who might be thought to possess it in greatest abundance do not even pass it on to the individuals who would be most expected to receive it from them, i.e., their own sons (see comm. *ad* 126d1-7). Here Socrates' craft-analogies lead to the same conclusion as earlier: σοφία, i.e. πολιτική, as Theages knows it, and as οἱ πολιτικοί practise it, is not a τέχνη; if it were, someone who could give a rational account of it, and could therefore teach it, would present himself; but that has not happened. The argument on its own cannot be considered conclusive, but Theages is satisfied by its premises (126d3-4). Moreover, he cites the *topos* with full knowledge that it belongs to Socrates himself (126d1),<sup>51</sup> and this acts as a convenient device to indicate that Theages is at one with Socrates on an important point, just as Theages' reformulation of his desire to rule in 126a7-8 had done.

This admission by Theages that it is futile to look to οἱ πολιτικοί in order to help him accomplish what he is seeking, coupled with the earlier rejection of the kind of πολιτική that is best characterized as τυραννική, carries the interrogation back to its original point of departure by a "ring form" of sorts. The conversation between Socrates and Theages had essentially begun with Theages' indignant claim that his father was withholding the instruction he desired (123a5-8). Socrates' expression of (ironic) shock in 126d9-e7 and 127a1-a3, and indeed the irony of the whole conversation with Theages, as much as indicate that, formally at

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<sup>51</sup>Theages has heard this report from others (φασί). One thinks first of the companions of 121d1ff. as the probable subject of the verb, but they have aroused Theages' excitement because of their reports about *sophists* (see comm. *ad* 126d1). It is therefore tempting to suppose that we have here an allusion to the regularity with which pronouncements of this kind occur in the context of Socratic literature in general (see comm. *ad* 126d1).

least, it was his intention all along to refute Theages' presumption of knowing what the implications of his desire were, and who could make him σοφός. Demodocus himself seems to have perceived that this is the direction in which the dialogue was moving (see sec. *b*, *iv*). And, while the object of this examination has not been to establish a definition for any term, and differences from the structure of other Socratic investigations, especially definition dialogues, may therefore naturally be detected, there are nevertheless also some similarities which prove instructive.

One of these is an interlocutor's realization that he and Socrates are no further along than when they originally set out upon their investigation, and have even returned to their starting point. This circularity is often signalled in other dialogues by a verb containing the prefix περι-, accompanied sometimes by a personification of the λόγος.<sup>52</sup> In *Thg.* there is no such concise signpost, but Socrates' virtual restating and rebuking, in 126 d9-e7, of Theages' original position serves much the same purpose. This development in a Platonic dialogue is usually attended by the interlocutor's sense of ἀπορία, which, ideally at least, also produces a recognition of his own ignorance (so, e.g., *Tht.* 210b11-d4). A very similar conclusion is reached, I think, at this point in *Thg.*, for Theages himself can do nothing but admit (126e8) that his father has acted rightly in holding him back (Theages' condition is now like that of his father, who ἀπορεῖ ὅτι σοι χρήσεται καὶ ὅποι πέμπτοι 127a2-3). That the author does not represent Theages as dwelling despondently on this is not surprising, since, as we saw, Theages already is at an advantage (unlike other respondents in Plato's dialogues) in recognizing his own shortcomings (see sec. *b*, *iii*).

<sup>52</sup>Cf. *Chrm.* 174b11 (περιέλκεις κύκλω), *Euthphr.* 15b10 (κύκλω περιιόντα), b11 (περιελθών), *Euthd.* 291b8 (περικάμπσαντες), *Grg.* 517c6 (περιφερόμενοι), *Tht.* 200c3 (περιτρέχειν).

Moreover, as often happens in similar situations, Socrates shares in his interlocutor's inability to offer the correct solution to the problem at hand (this becomes especially clear in coming pages). It is also typical of numerous instances of ἑλεγχος in Plato that a state of perplexity is reached through the use of analogy with crafts: virtue x, assumed to be a τέχνη at the outset, turns out, under present circumstances, to be unlike other τέχναι; though here the implication of Socrates' examination of Theages is that the σοφία he is pursuing is *inferior* to other τέχναι, whereas in other dialogues ethical virtues often resist classification as τέχναι because they are different in kind from conventional crafts, being of a *higher* order (and anthropocentric).<sup>53</sup>

*vi. Socrates, sophists, and politicians: 127a8-128c6*

If there had been any doubt that Theages was not destined to fulfill his ambition by associating with either the sophists or some successful public figure of Athens, this apprehension is dispelled by Socrates' heavily ironic words in 127a3-7. They are a formulation of the most commonplace conceptions of utility: Socrates is prepared to entrust Theages to any among οἱ καλοὶ καὶ ἀγαθοὶ τὰ πολιτικά (127a3) the young man wishes; he and his father will not have to spend money for what he receives, yet from this association Theages will gain a high reputation among οἱ πολλοὶ ἄνθρωποι (127a5-6). Theages is confronted with a choice. Although Socrates' words sound vulgar and *are* ironic (his commendation

<sup>53</sup>Cf. e.g. *Euthd.* 288d5-292e7; see further n.81 below. Thesleff's schematic delineation of Platonic dialogues led him (168) to call *Thg.* "climactic," i.e. as displaying no central culmination or *peripeteia* (an absence shared, according to Thesleff, only by *Cri.*, *Alc. II*, *Clit.*, and *Min.*). Whatever may be the merits of a classification such as this, I do not think it wholly valid for the present dialogue, for at this point we do indeed encounter a reversal: other possible educators are discarded, Theages' confidence is ruptured, and a new start is made as attention turns to Socrates. The structure is not simply linear.

of the judgement of οἱ πολλοί could not be otherwise, see comm. *ad* 127a6), nevertheless Theages, having now been shown that any systematic σοφία is unattainable, may yet accept the notion that popular approval by the majority of Athenians is, realistically, the only measure of σοφία that matters. But Theages, who, as we have seen, is not like all other young men, commits himself otherwise; it is Socrates he now wants to associate with, and this proposal meets with the vehement approval of Demodocus (127b2-c2, c5-d1, see comm. *ad locc. pass.*).

Socrates' reaction to this turn of events is elaborated in 127d2-128b7, and is characteristic of the homonymous figure of other Platonic dialogues. First, he marks Demodocus' anxiety and serious demeanor (ἐσπουδακέναι 127d2, σπουδάζοι d4); next, he recommends the qualifications of others (Demodocus and other politicians of Athens, the sophists) as potential educators for Theages (127e1-128b1); finally, he disclaims any ability of his own to satisfy Theages' desire, since he knows virtually nothing except τὰ ἐρωτικά, at which however he is the greatest expert who has ever lived (128b1-7). Theages is unsatisfied with these declarations, interprets them as παιδιά once again (n.b. παίζων πρὸς ἡμᾶς 128c1), and cites the positive experience of other young men in his situation, who became "better" by association with Socrates (128b8-c5). He is convinced that Socrates himself was responsible for their improvement.

When Theages rejects Socrates' proposal in 127a2ff. to put him in the care of οἱ καλοὶ καὶ γαθοί, only to turn to Socrates himself for his personal attention, there is no reason to suppose that he is abandoning his initial desire to acquire σοφία; rather, he now apparently feels that Socrates is the one who can help him achieve this goal. Thus when Socrates



addresses Demodocus and Theages in 127d2ff., it is as a person thought to represent an alternative to other prospective educators. It is also important to recognize that both Theages and Demodocus see Socrates as a desirable alternative: this agreement represents the concurrence of two widely differing outlooks, and produces as close to an expression of consensus as the author can achieve within the strict confines of the dialogue form. Socrates, consequently, is to be distinguished utterly from other people, especially other educators, and he is, moreover, a person about whose value there is no dispute. As well, the structure of Socrates' address in 127d2-128b7, in which the two types of people with whom he was concerned earlier (the sophists and οἱ πολιτικοί) are first assessed, before he expresses incapacity on his own part, all but proves that it is the author's desire now to force a comparison between Socrates and these individuals, and to effect thereby a transition in the dialogue.

But, once we recognize that Theages and Demodocus wish to press the possibility that Socrates is σοφός, an inevitable difficulty arises, for it is precisely the claim to σοφία that Socrates most vigorously rejects in *Ap.* and other works where he upholds his profession of ignorance (see comm. *ad* 128b1-2). It is therefore difficult to see how Socrates could contend with sophists and politicians for the kind of σοφία that Theages desires; nor do we anticipate that he would in any event claim to be able to compete with them, or would want to, since "success in public life," as implied by the type of σοφία which Theages and ambitious young men like him were seeking, was certainly not what Socrates hoped any companions would gain from him. One does not expect Socrates to assert that he can defeat the sophists or οἱ πολιτικοί at their own game; nor does he make this claim. After the appearance of the word σοφός in an ironic parting shot at

the sophists (128a2),<sup>54</sup> σοφία and σοφός vanish from sight for the rest of the dialogue. The reason is obvious: if the remainder of the dialogue is going to concentrate on the characteristic qualities of Socrates, it would be pointless for the author to talk of σοφία. Socrates' profession of ignorance in 128b1-2 is therefore, as far as this is concerned, coherent.

Yet his claim is unusual here, for Socrates circumscribes the limits of his ignorance by proceeding to assert a special expertise in one body of knowledge, namely τὰ ἐρωτικά. This amounts to a modification of his regular profession of ignorance, and has been the source of much confusion and oversimplification among scholars, who object to the apparent inconsequentiality of the statement about τὰ ἐρωτικά, and frequently cite it as a defect of composition for which Plato could not be responsible (see comm. *ad* 128b2-4). In order to clarify the meaning of this passage, it will be necessary to look in detail at Socrates' profession of a knowledge of τὰ ἐρωτικά in *Thg.*, along with the context in which this expression occurs.

The first thing one tends to notice about Socrates' claim in 128b2-4 to know only one small μάθημα, namely τὰ ἐρωτικά, is the apparent lack of motivation for the statement. As mentioned, this is usually evaluated as a sign of faulty composition: it is judged to be an unsuccessful attempt by the author to depict Socrates in Platonic terms, i.e., as erotically preoccupied. Yet this abrupt introduction could just as well be taken as the

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<sup>54</sup>The sophists are so σοφοί that they persuade the wealthiest and highest-born young men to shun the company of their own fellow citizens in favour of association with the sophists, to whom they gratefully pay high fees. This is mentioned in a passage (127e7-128a7) which is so similar to another in *Ap.* (19e2-20a2) that it is impossible not to assume collusion of some kind (a similarity recognized by all writers on *Thg.*, e.g., Stallbaum 223; Schleiermacher 351; H. Müller 464; Heidel 53; Pavlu 28-9). Notwithstanding this patent correspondence, it is important to note that the word σοφοί is absent from the passage in *Ap.*, and it is probably legitimate to infer therefore that our author is including it here in order to deride the value and meaning which "most people" would ascribe to the word. Socrates' disposition is the same as that which he displays in *Ap.* 21b9, d8, where he speaks of those "who have the reputation for being σοφοί."

author's method of attracting the reader's attention to something which he considers important within the context of the dialogue; and, indeed, other features point to the same inference. One of these is Socrates' device for introducing the subject of τὰ ἐρωτικά; according to Socrates, he knows virtually nothing, *except for* one small body of knowledge (πλήν γε σμικροῦ τινος μαθήματος 128b4). This is just the sort of phraseology that Socrates frequently uses when he is about to introduce something of crucial importance into a conversation (see comm. *ad loc.*). Another feature is Socrates' contention that a surpassing knowledge of τὰ ἐρωτικά is something to which he lays claim very frequently (ἀεὶ 128b3). Since this statement flatly contradicts the evidence of all surviving Socratic literature, in which the positive claim to have knowledge in τὰ ἐρωτικά is very rare (see comm. *ad* 128b2-4, b3), one is tempted to search for ways of explaining it away, and several possible means of accounting for the inconsistency may be suggested (see comm. *ad* 128b3). But it seems to me that the author has Socrates lay emphasis (cf. δῆπου 128b3) on the frequency of the assertion about τὰ ἐρωτικά because he wishes, above all, to underline the importance of the statement itself in this particular context. Finally, we have already seen that Socrates anticipates his claim here to be the ἐρωτικὸς ἀνὴρ *par excellence* when in 125d13-e3 he refers to Theages' prospective companion as one who will be knowledgeable in (erotic) τυραννικά (see sec. *b*, ν). The prediction that this is the sort of person Theages will seek out, offered apparently without serious intent at that point, is now realized in the person of Socrates. And the fulfilment of this prediction (whether or not Theages actually recognizes the connection is immaterial) further underlines the importance of Socrates' expertise in τὰ ἐρωτικά, since it would be pointless for the author to

prefigure a statement in this way unless that statement were one of some relevance to the dialogue as a whole.

Hence we can see that the author has gone to considerable trouble both to draw attention to Socrates' professed skill in τὰ ἐρωτικά, and to emphasize its significance. It will not do, therefore, simply to deny coherence to the dialogue at the point at which reference to τὰ ἐρωτικά is made; but it is nevertheless incumbent on the reader to determine what the relevance of the reference is.

To begin with, we have already seen that 127d2-128b7 are intended to bring Socrates into explicit comparison with the sophists and οἱ πολιτικοί. But these lines also underscore the idea that Socrates' assets are qualitatively different from those of the former classes of individuals: they possess σοφία (of a certain kind), while he is skilled in τὰ ἐρωτικά; and the two, as we shall see, are mutually exclusive. Thus the solution to the problem of why Socrates mentions τὰ ἐρωτικά would seem to be simply this: if others are to benefit from association with Socrates, it will be through τὰ ἐρωτικά, just as the sophists and politicians would claim to help others through their σοφία. That this is the meaning the author wishes to convey is also indicated by certain details which accrue around his reference to τὰ ἐρωτικά.

First of all, Socrates calls τὰ ἐρωτικά a μάθημα in 128b4 and b5. Since in the same sentence he speaks of what the sophists offer also as μαθήματα (b2; the reference is ironic, see comm. *ad* 128b1), it is clear that he is placing himself and his particular offering on common ground with the sophists and their skills, and is inviting a comparison to be drawn. Furthermore, the application of the term μάθημα to τὰ ἐρωτικά appears to be an implicit announcement that Socrates is now entering the

"competition" over Theages, for μάθημα is a word which has strong connotations with regard to learning and education;<sup>55</sup> thus Socrates is here setting up τὰ ἐρωτικά as a rival to the μαθήματα of others. This is further implied by ἐπιστάμενος in 128b4, the influence of which is carried over from ὡς...οὐδέν (b3) to the phrase πλήν...ἐρωτικῶν (b4). Since any object of ἐπίσταμαι has a claim to be considered a τέχνη,<sup>56</sup> the importance of Socrates' knowledge of τὰ ἐρωτικά would clearly seem to consist in the fact that it *alone* allows him to be presented as a viable alternative to other individuals and to the skills which they claim to possess.

Doubtless Socrates speaks of τὰ ἐρωτικά in this way in order to confront, in closely parallel terms, his own special capacity with that of others, and for this reason utilizes the same vocabulary in each case. Nevertheless, this account of τὰ ἐρωτικά and of the language which Socrates applies to it gives the strong impression that he is arguing in favour of τὰ ἐρωτικά as a τέχνη, i.e., a subject of learning and teaching. Now, if τὰ ἐρωτικά is the one way in which Socrates can be of any advantage to another, and this capacity is represented in rationalistic terms, to my mind this can only mean that our author is here thinking of Platonic philosophic ἔρως, of rational desire as it is depicted in *Smp.* 201d1-212c3: Diotima taught Socrates τὰ ἐρωτικά (201d5) - Socrates possesses no knowledge (ἐπίστασθαι 177d7-8) except in this field - and this τὰ ἐρωτικά emerges as the name for an individual's gradual progress through dialectic to transcendent beauty. As Socrates only

<sup>55</sup>It can also be used as a synonym of τέχνη when the emphasis happens to be on education, cf. *Prt.* 318e1, 319a4; see also J. Lyons, *Structural Semantics* (Oxford, 1963) 187 n.1.

<sup>56</sup>See Lyons, *op. cit.* 159-70, 176-88.

alludes to this concept at this point in *Thg.*, the question is left open as to whether the notion of rational ἔρως will be developed in later pages, and we shall return to this question.

The application to Socrates of the adjective δεινός in the sentence that follows (b5-6) also serves to draw Socrates face to face with other individuals. The most obvious reason for the use of the adjective in relation to Socrates is, naturally, that some word other than σοφός must be found, since it would be absurd for Socrates now to claim to be σοφός with respect to τὰ ἐρωτικά (τοῦτο...τὸ μάθημα b5) after he has already reserved the quality of σοφία exclusively for others (see above). Socrates is strictly consistent in this dialogue in his abnegation of σοφία. At the same time, however, the choice of δεινός ought to carry one's mind back to Socrates' earlier consideration of οἱ πολιτικοί, in which context alone he applied the word δεινός (126a10, b1, b4, c5). The politicians were said to be δεινοὶ τὰ πολιτικά; Socrates now holds that he is δεινὸς τὰ ἐρωτικά. The effect of this parallelism is, again, to show not only wherein Socrates' special capacity lies (this is reinforced by b5-6 παρ' ὄντινοῦν...τῶν προγεγονότων ἀνθρώπων καὶ τῶν νῦν, see comm. *ad loc.*), but also to force a comparison of this capacity with the alleged qualities of others.

The structure of 127d2-128b7 then is this: Socrates recommends οἱ πολιτικοί and the sophists over himself as prospective companions of Theages, implying that he will be useless in promoting the skills at which they are so adept. This is meant to be taken seriously, in so far as Socrates would never have claimed any knowledge in these skills. But he does indicate through irony his low opinion of this kind of ability. Socrates' assertion that he knows nothing but τὰ ἐρωτικά appears to be a denial

that he can do anything for Theages or anyone else (and this is how Theages understands it in 128b7-c5), but in a number of ways Socrates indicates that this is not only his one special quality (and τέχνη), but also the one respect in which he can vie with the sophists and οἱ πολιτικοί.

On this reading, what we now expect is that Socrates will demonstrate how τὰ ἐρωτικά has a beneficial effect on his companions. The author is prevented (for reasons already mentioned above) from representing this effect as an ability to make others σοφοί by association with Socrates. The passage 127d2-128b6 again offers a clue as to what we will find in its place. In 127d5 Socrates, instead of referring to Demodocus' anxiety about his son's becoming σοφός, substitutes the phrase ὡς βέλτιστος. This phrase frequently denotes a moral ideal for Socrates, and is not simply a neutral expression (see comm. *ad* 127d5). Two lines later, Socrates states that Theages' and Demodocus' goal is for Theages to become a πολίτης ἀγαθός (127d7). Both of these phrases avoid the connotations that σοφός and σοφία have acquired up to now, and they at least represent a goal which Socrates (though he does not say as much) might be thought to be able to help Theages achieve. Even when Theages a little later on refers to the effect of Socrates' presence on others, the author avoids having him say that those individuals in Socrates' company became σοφοί; instead, they are said to have become πάντων βελτίους (128c4; Theages calls Socrates himself καλὸς ἀγαθός [127a8] rather than σοφός). In this way our author prepares us for the imminent consideration of Socrates as the most suitable companion for Theages. Thus if Theages' aim is to become ὡς βέλτιστος, or βελτίων, rather than σοφός, Socrates may be the one Theages has been looking for all along.

*vii. Socrates and the divine sign: 128c6-fin.*

If my analysis of the previous section is accurate, we should now await Socrates' elaboration of the way in which τὰ ἐρωτικά plays a decisive role in his improvement of others. And if it can be shown that this is what we are presented with, not only can critics' objections to the alleged impropriety of the earlier mention of τὰ ἐρωτικά be silenced, but, more importantly, the same critics' bewilderment over the function of the final section of the dialogue (see above sec. *a*, and nn.4-6) will be answered.<sup>57</sup>

We might hope to gain some assistance in interpretation by observing our author's method of transition to the divine sign section (128d1ff.). This transition is effected by Socrates' correction of Theages' misapprehension that it is Socrates himself who determines (128c7 ἐὰν σὺ βούλῃ) if others are to become "better" by his company: as Socrates proceeds to elaborate at great length, it is rather τὸ δαιμόνιον that is responsible for this (128 c6ff.). This transaction bears a certain resemblance to a passage at the end of *Alc. I* which it would be worth examining. In 135c12-3 of this dialogue Socrates asks Alcibiades if he knows how he will escape his present servile condition; Alcibiades eventually responds (135d3) with Ἐὰν βούλῃ σύ, ὦ Σώκρατες. When Socrates tells Alcibiades that he is mistaken, and Alcibiades asks Ἀλλὰ πῶς χρὴ λέγειν; (d5), Socrates retorts Ὅτι ἐὰν θεὸς ἐθέλῃ (d6). Since Socrates at different points in this dialogue has made reference to his divine sign, sometimes under the name of ὁ θεός (see *Intr.* ch. II, *c*), it would appear that, here as well, Socrates is referring to the agency of the sign by playing upon a common

<sup>57</sup>As the details of this section are dealt with in a chapter of its own (ch. II below), I shall concentrate only on those aspects of it which relate directly to the meaning of *Thg.*



formulaic phrase. Thus in both *Thg.* and *Alc. I* the importance of Socrates' sign is emphasized by Socrates' assertion that it, rather than he, decides if someone is to benefit by association with him; and several scholars have therefore suggested that this is another place at which our author has made direct use of *Alc. I*.<sup>58</sup>

This is, I believe, another instance in which critics have merely looked at a similarity in language, without scrutinizing the full implications which the parallel, if a conscious imitation, might possess with regard to the *Thg.* passage. To begin with the question of imitation, it may be true, of course, that the passage in *Alc. I* was a source for our author. In all fairness, however, the evidence could equally be taken to indicate the priority of *Thg.* over *Alc. I*.<sup>59</sup> Then again, both passages reflect a fact about the historic Socrates, namely that he denied any ability to teach, and was therefore not himself responsible for a companion's intellectual progress; so we cannot ignore the possibility that the two dialogues are independent of each other at this point. Be that as it may, we ought, I think, to concentrate instead on the way in which this parallel provides evidence that both dialogues share a similar point of view about the importance of Socrates' divine sign in his associations with others. But the similarity is not a vague one. Suffice to say at this point in our discussion that in both *Thg.* and *Alc. I* there is a close conceptual link between Socrates' divine sign and Socratic ἔρως (see *Intr.* ch. II, *b*, *c*). Thus when Socrates in *Alc. I* claims that Alcibiades will improve his own condition, not if Socrates is willing, but ἐὰν θεὸς ἐθέλῃ, this is a concession to the prominence of the unexplainable

<sup>58</sup>See, e.g., Heidel 55 n.8; Pavlu 19-20; Vouveris 118. Krüger (14-5) criticizes Pavlu's assessment, but is answered by Pavlu in the latter's review of Krüger's dissertation (see *PhilWoch* 22 [1939] 593-5)

<sup>59</sup>See Krüger 15.

in Socrates' beneficial relationship with Alcibiades. We have already seen that τὸ δαιμόνιον is prominent in Socrates' mind at this point, but that this irrational force also has a great deal to do with love is made clear in Socrates' next words in 135e1-3. In *Thg.* as well, Socrates, by denying the importance of his own volition in the improvement of his companions, is simultaneously affirming his lack of a rational or "technical" ability, and is thinking instead of the effects of τὰ ἐρωτικά, though at this point the connection between τὸ δαιμόνιον and τὰ ἐρωτικά is not as clear as it will become (see *Intr.* ch. II, *b*). It appears, then, that the transitional passage under review is intended to bind Socrates' earlier statement about his knowledge only in τὰ ἐρωτικά with the section on his divine sign, which reveals the role that the unaccountable plays in an associate's success or failure.

But this use of the formulaic εἰάν θεὸς βούλη now clearly creates a difficulty of interpretation: whereas the arguments in the preceding paragraph concerning the place of τὰ ἐρωτικά suggest that this concept plays a purely irrational role in Socrates' contacts with others, Socrates' earlier profession of knowledge only in τὰ ἐρωτικά brought to mind quite strongly the Platonic doctrine of a *rational* ἔρως (see sec. vi). Yet this contradiction and confusion can be explained if attention is paid to another, non-Platonic, member of the Alcibiades-dialogue genre, the *Alcibiades* of Aeschines Socraticus. After much philological work on the fragments of Aeschines' *Alc.*, the general character, and many of the details, of this work seem fairly clear.<sup>60</sup> Rather than give a summary of this dialogue, however, I shall concentrate on three fragments, numbered consecutively 11a-c by

<sup>60</sup>See Dittmar 97-159; Gaiser 71-95; R.A. Applegate, *The Alcibiades of Aeschines of Sphettus* (Diss. Princeton, 1949); K. Döring, *Hermes* 112 (1984) 17-22.

Dittmar (Krauss 3-4). Brünnecke (63) was the first to draw attention to these fragments in connection with *Thg.*; but Gaiser (98f.) went much further (independently) in pointing out various parallels which he considered to provide definite evidence that our author drew upon Aeschines' dialogue.<sup>61</sup> Whether Gaiser was correct in this assumption is not the main point at issue here, although the question of Aeschines' *Alc.* as a source for *Thg.* will be discussed.<sup>62</sup> But it will be best first to examine at length some features of this dialogue, and then consider how they may shed light on the contradictory element in Socrates' treatment of τὰ ἐρωτικά. Here are the fragments in question, with emphasis on those words and phrases which will be pertinent to the ensuing discussion (Socrates is the speaker).

a) "Ἐγὼ δ' εἰ μὲν τινὶ τέχνῃ ᾧμην δύνασθαι ὠφελῆσαι πάνυ ἂν πολλὴν ἑμαυτοῦ μωρίαν κατεγίνωσκον· νῦν δὲ θεία μοίρα ᾧμην μοι τοῦτο δεδόσθαι ἐπ' Ἀλκιβιάδην καὶ οὐδέν γε τούτων ἄξιον θαυμάσαι."

b) "Πολλοὶ γὰρ καὶ τῶν καμνόντων ὑγιεῖς γίνονται οἱ μὲν ἀνθρωπίνῃ τέχνῃ, οἱ δὲ θεία μοίρα. ὅσοι μὲν οὖν ἀνθρωπίνῃ τέχνῃ, ὑπὸ ἰατρῶν θεραπευόμενοι, ὅσοι δὲ θεία μοίρα ἐπιθυμία αὐτοὺς ἄγει ἐπὶ τὸ ὀνήσον· καὶ τότε ἐπεθύμησαν ἐμέσαι, ὅποτε αὐτοῖς ἔμελλε συνοίσειν, καὶ τότε κυνηγετῆσαι, ὅποτε συνοίσειν ἔμελλε πονῆσαι."

c) "Ἐγὼ δὲ διὰ τὸν ἔρωτα ὃν ἐτύγγανον ἐρῶν Ἀλκιβιάδου οὐδέν διάφορον τῶν Βακχῶν ἐπεπόνθειν. καὶ γὰρ αἱ Βάκχαι ἐπειδὰν ἐνθεοὶ γένωνται, ὅθεν οἱ ἄλλοι ἐκ τῶν φρεάτων

<sup>61</sup>See also Müller, *Die Kurzdialoge* 233 n.1; Guthrie, *HGP III*. 401 and n.1.

<sup>62</sup>Although it should be added at once that any borrowing from Aeschines Socraticus does not by itself render *Thg.* spurious; B. Effe has argued persuasively (*Hermes* 99 [1971] 198-208) that *Chrm.* is, in part, a reaction to Aeschines' *Alc.*

οὐδὲ ὕδωρ δύνανται ὑδρεύεσθαι, ἐκεῖναι μέλι καὶ γάλα ἀρύ-  
ονται. καὶ δὴ καὶ ἐγὼ οὐδὲν μάθημα ἐπιστάμενος ὁ διδάξας  
ἄνθρωπον ὠφελήσαιμ' ἄν, ὅμως ὥμην ξυνὼν ἄν ἐκείνῳ διὰ τὸ  
ἐρᾶν βελτίῳ ποιῆσαι."

We must look at fr. 11c for a moment. There can hardly be any question, as we compare its final sentence with *Thg.* 128b1-7 (esp. b3 ἐγὼ...b4 ἐρωτικῶν), that we are dealing with more than general similarities in thought. The language itself is strikingly close to what we find in *Thg.*, and strongly suggests collusion of some kind; note in particular Socrates' claim to ignorance in both, the respective occurrences of ἐπι-  
στάμενος and μάθημα (up to this point the author of *Thg.* had spoken only of τέχνηαι), and the coincidental expressions about love. The connection of thought in Aeschines' *Alc.* is, as we shall see, much more readily explicable than that of *Thg.*, but this is as it should be, since Socrates is rendering a narrative account in the *Alc.*, whereas *Thg.* is in dramatic form. Partly because of the correspondences cited here, and partly because of other evidence which will be adduced below, I shall assume that the respective passages in the two dialogues are related (see further below, and sec. c). Moreover, since the *Alc.* fragments are relatively transparent as to their meaning, they should be able to help us elucidate the meaning and role of the last few pages of *Thg.*, as well as the apparent change in the character of τὰ ἐρωτικά as it is described by Socrates.

Socrates introduces his divine sign into the dialogue with the words ἔστι γάρ τι θεία μοῖρα παρεπόμενον ἐμοὶ ἐκ παιδὸς ἀρξάμε-  
νον δαιμόνιον (128d2-3). He will proceed to sketch in detail the way in which the divine sign is the decisive influence in his associations with others, most importantly in his educational contacts (129e1-130e4). That

the sign is said to have attended him *θεία μοίρα* since childhood (a point not mentioned in the parallel passage in *Ap.*, see *Intr.* ch. II, *b*) may be explained by reference to the three instances of that phrase in the *Alc.* fragments above. In these fragments *θεία μοίρα* assumes a specific function: in fr. 11b<sup>63</sup> the words characterize one means by which any person might be aided, or might aid another (cf. ἐπὶ τὸ ὀνήσον); here it is closely associated with desire or will (ἐπιθυμία), and is at the same time strongly contrasted with what may be performed τέχνη. In fr. 11a the same *θεία μοίρα*~τέχνη opposition is upheld, but here it is applied to the way in which Socrates thought he could exercise a beneficial influence (ὠφελῆσαι) on Alcibiades in particular; the careful opposition to τέχνη shows, of course, that this influence had no rational basis. Now, the most obvious point of contact between *Thg.* and Aeschines' *Alc.* is that Socrates speaks in each of his ability to "improve" another person. But whereas Socrates in *Alc.* maintains that this ability was conveyed to him merely *θεία μοίρα*, in *Thg.* the same ability emanates from an intermediary agent, τὸ δαιμόνιον, which is itself allotted to Socrates *θεία μοίρα*. In both instances, however, the result is virtually same: those who come into contact with Socrates are able to improve through non-rational means (i.e., not τέχνη). The use of the term ὠφελεῖν (ὠφελία) in both works (*Thg.* 129e4, e6, 130a2; *Alc.* fr. 11a, c) in the sense "to improve" or "make better" (see comm. *ad* 126d6), as applied to Socrates, further underscores the

<sup>63</sup>I have presented the fragments in the order in which they appear in Dittmar's edition. For my own part, however, I should prefer that 11b precede 11a. With this arrangement, Socrates' narrative proceeds by use of analogy: first (11b), instances within human experience are presented, in which the influence of either ἀνθρωπίνη τέχνη or *θεία μοίρα* may be the critical factor; then (11a), Socrates applies the same dichotomy to his own situation vis à vis Alcibiades, by affirming that he was able to help Alcibiades *θεία μοίρα*, not τέχνη. The inductive argument is much more what we would expect of Socrates (cf. the similar use of craft-analogy in Aeschines' *Miltiades*, as discussed by S. Slings, *ZPE* 16 [1975] 304-5).

similarity in the function of *θεία μοῖρα* in either dialogue (cf. also fr. 11c *βελτίω ποιῆσαι* ~ *Thg.* 127d5 ὅπως ὡς βέλτιστος ἔσται, 128c4-5 πάντων βελτίους φαίνονται κτλ.).

It is in this context that Socrates' previous claim in *Thg.* to know nothing but τὰ ἐρωτικά gains direct relevance. If we look once more at fr. 11c of Aeschines' *Alc.*, the connection of thought is this: Because of his love for Alcibiades, Socrates experienced the same thing that Bacchants do, who perform wonders when they are ἔνθεοι, in circumstances when other people are ineffectual.<sup>64</sup> Socrates, too, became ἔνθεος because of the workings of *θεία μοῖρα*, and thought himself capable, in this inspired condition, of helping Alcibiades. Although he knew (ἐπιστάμενος) nothing by which he could benefit (ὠφελῆσαι μ' ἄν) Alcibiades, nevertheless he thought that by being with him (ξυνὼν...ἐκείνῳ) he could make him better through love (διὰ τὸ ἐρᾶν; so ἐπιθυμία worked hand in hand with *θεία μοῖρα* to produce a beneficial effect in fr. 11b).<sup>65</sup> The Socrates of *Thg.* also professes to know nothing, as we have already seen. But whereas in Aeschines he holds that *despite* knowing nothing, he still believed he could make Alcibiades better διὰ τὸ ἐρᾶν, and the role of τὰ ἐρωτικά is thereby made unambiguous, the Socrates of *Thg.*, through a Platonic device (see above on b4 πλήν γε κτλ.), fastens on to this same profession of ignorance a strictly Platonic assertion about his expertise in τὰ ἐρωτικά. Aeschines, in other words, states explicitly what is only implicit in *Thg.* (and what is clear enough in *Smp.*), that τὰ ἐρωτικά is the source of Socrates' ability to help others. For in *Thg.* this ability, and its connection with τὰ ἐρωτικά, is made manifest largely through the

<sup>64</sup>Cf. *Ion* 533e5-534c4; *Phdr.* 245a1-8.

<sup>65</sup>For ἐπιθυμία as the generic term under which ἔρως is subsumed, cf. *Phdr.* 237d3-4.

story about Aristides, who maintained (according to Socrates) that he improved (ἐπιδιδόναι) in direct proportion to his physical proximity to Socrates, so that he made his best progress when he actually grasped Socrates and fixed his eyes on him (130d3-e4).

Hence in certain important respects the triad "ignorance-ἔρως-θεία μοῖρα" follows a similar pattern in both *Thg.* and *Alc.*<sup>66</sup> In Aeschines' *Alc.* Socrates possesses no μάθημα, i.e., is not τεχνικός; in *Thg.* he possesses no μάθημα but one. What distinguishes him in each, however, is ἔρως/τὰ ἐρωτικά, with which his relationship is very close. In Aeschines, ἔρως further defines the means by which Socrates can help Alcibiades θεία μοῖρα. In *Thg.*, τὰ ἐρωτικά typifies Socrates' relationships with others, particularly as depicted in the Aristides story in 129e1-130e4, though his conscientious and persistent diverting of the conversation to Theages himself (122c7ff., 125b3; see sec. *a, ii; iv*), which demonstrates his insistence on *personal* contact in an educational context, should also be recalled. In this dialogue, moreover, θεία μοῖρα proves to be an important concept, because Socrates, for his ability to help another person, is totally reliant upon τὸ δαιμόνιον which has always attended him θεία μοῖρα (see further *Intr.* ch.II, *b*, for the connection of these two concepts).

It should be evident, however, that there is an important difference between the introduction of τὰ ἐρωτικά in *Thg.* and in Aeschines' *Alc.* For in Aeschines there is never any question that the love of Socrates is irrational; but in *Thg.*, as we have seen, we are initially confronted with the prospect of rational desire of a Platonic kind (Socrates' one μάθημα), only to be shown subsequently that τὰ ἐρωτικά is in fact responsible for the

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<sup>66</sup>Gaiser (98) saw this complex as the fundamental link between Aeschines' *Alc.* and *Thg.*

*irrational* component in Socratic association. And this has given the appearance of an inconsistency in *Thg.* It seems now that the best way to explain this inconsistency is by postulating the influence of two kinds of Socratic ἔρως on our author: in the first place, the Platonic, philosophic variety, closely connected with learning and teaching; in the second place, an Aeschinean concept of Socratic ἔρως, which is seen purely in terms of an irrational impulse. The author's desire to graft these together has consequently resulted in the marriage of essentially incompatible principles.

We can see then that the difficulty in evaluating Socrates' assertion about a knowledge in τὰ ἐρωτικά stems largely from two sources. The first of these is the one that has so troubled commentators, namely the casual way in which the assertion is introduced, and its lack of a formal connection with the section of *Thg.* that deals with the divine sign. But the apparent lack of clarity in *Thg.* is not tantamount to faulty composition, for not only is Socrates' declaration about τὰ ἐρωτικά introduced in a Platonic (or Socratic) manner, but, as well, Socrates' earlier surprise at Theages' and Demodocus' notion that he could help anyone at all (cf. 127d5-e1, and comm. *ad* 127b1) can hardly be contradicted now by a sudden *volte-face*, in which he expresses confidence that he could in fact assist Theages. Rather, it is left primarily, and more discreetly, to the section on the divine sign to show how τὰ ἐρωτικά actually figures in Socrates' associations, and how he can be beneficial to others. Because Aeschines leaves no real doubt about the function he assigns to ἔρως, he helps to elucidate our author's intentions; and so, too, does the parallel from *Alc. I* which was pointed out a little earlier. At the same time, we are able, through comparison, to identify a crucial difference between the respective views of the authors of *Thg.* and Aeschines' *Alc.* as to the way in



which people profited from association with Socrates, in the presence and role of the divine sign in the former (on which see **Intr.** ch. II, *b*).<sup>67</sup> The second difficulty in assessing Socrates' assertion about τὰ ἐρωτικά is a less obvious one and concerns a matter of detail. It arises from the author's own shift in his attitude to the concept, in so far as he moves away from a Platonic point of view to a less rationalistic attitude. This shift I would attribute to the influence of a second philosophical source. To my mind this difficulty, though it seems not to have been detected before, is a much more serious one than the first.

Our earlier inference (sec. vi) about the function of Socrates' claim to be knowledgeable in τὰ ἐρωτικά, that it served to introduce the crucial difference between Socrates and those people who profess an ability to make Theages σοφός, would therefore seem justified. For through all the talk about the divine sign, Socrates' words imply that it is as the ἐρωτικὸς ἄνθρωπος that he can benefit others. Although he does not disavow any claim to τέχνη through his assertion of ignorance in all but one thing in 128b1-4, such a disavowal is implicitly made through his correction of Theages' misapprehension about Socrates' role in a companion's progress; and he further emphasizes this irrational aspect of himself when at the end of his discussion about the divine sign he says that Theages would do well to look to others who have control (ἐγκρατεῖς 130e10) over the help they can render (implying knowledge of a τέχνη), rather than attempt to achieve anything at random (ὅτι ἂν τύχῃς τοῦτο πράξαι 130a9-10) from Socrates. The irony here is not, I think, that Socrates really does

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<sup>67</sup>By comparing Aeschin. *Alc.*, *Thg.*, and *Alc. I*, Gaiser concludes (99) that θεία μοῖρα and τὸ δαιμόνιον mean essentially the same thing in these specific contexts. Terminological identification of this kind is hazardous, however, when one is relating one author to another. At any rate, in *Thg.* it is much closer to the truth to say that it is τὰ ἐρωτικά with which τὸ δαιμόνιον is conceptually related in the mind of our author (see **Intr.** ch II, *b*, *c*).

possess knowledge of a τέχνη, but rather that the other educators do not. Moreover, our author at this point comes near to an expression of the antithesis between τέχνη and τύχη, placing Socrates firmly on the side of τύχη.<sup>68</sup> This is also an affirmation that, whatever Socrates does accomplish, is achieved through τὰ ἐρωτικά, closely linked to τὸ δαιμόνιον and θεία μοῖρα. As many critics have seen, the whole section on the divine sign strongly emphasizes the irrational side of Socrates' character: to borrow from the language of Aeschines, Socrates is shown to be ἔνθεος (see *Intr.* ch. II, *b* for an elaboration), to act θεία μοῖρα (or τύχη), not τέχνη, and to be able to improve others through the one thing about which he can express confidence, ἔρως/τὰ ἐρωτικά; τὸ δαιμόνιον also fits precisely into this scheme (for the details see *Intr.* ch. II, *b, d*). The connection between ἔρως and Socrates' positive influence on others, and the opposition of both of these to τέχνη, prove to be as strong in *Thg.* as they are in Aeschines' *Alc.*

For all this, the contrast in *Thg.* between Socrates and others who may claim to be educators is not really a contrast between those who operate τέχνη, and Socrates, who does not. It would appear that this contrast does lie at the bottom of Aeschines' *Alc.*, where however Socrates seems to distinguish himself from craftsmen, rather than sophists or politicians. But the situation in *Thg.* is not so simple. For, as we have seen, the essential contrast here is not between Socrates and craftsmen; our analysis of Socrates' discussion with Theages has shown that it is precisely the sophists' and politicians' claim to possession of a τέχνη that is held in doubt; and, moreover, any references which Socrates may make to the

<sup>68</sup>On the τέχνη~τύχη antithesis, see L. Edmonds, *Chance and Intelligence in Thucydides* (Cambridge, Mass., 1975), esp. 1-6; M.J. O'Brien, *The Socratic Paradoxes and the Greek Mind* (Chapel Hill, 1967) 73 n.41.

possession of a τέχνη by the sophists or οἱ πολιτικοί, or to their claim to impart a τέχνη, is ironic. It is rather, as has already been remarked, with respect to τὰ ἐρωτικά that Socrates parts company with others: whereas this is the distinctive feature marking Socratic association, attention is forcefully drawn on the other side not only to the dubious ethical value of sophistic association (through the distortion of Theages' aspiration into a desire to be a tyrant), but also to the mercenary status of the sophists, both at the outset of the dialogue (121d5f.), and immediately before Socrates makes his statement about τὰ ἐρωτικά (128a5ff.; see comm. *ad* 128a1, a2-3, a6-7, a6). It is the chief merit of Friedländer's chapter on *Thg.* that he recognizes (152), as an important element in the dialogue, this opposition between "Socratic education through love" and "sophistic instruction without love." At the same time, this Socratic "education," which is portrayed as being so heavily dependent upon Socrates' personal contact with one individual, is nothing like the life of οἱ πολιτικοί of Athens, whose existence is justified only with reference to οἱ πολλοί, and who are recognized as σοφοί only by the masses (127a5-7, e2-4).<sup>69</sup>

The *basic* structure of *Thg.*, that is to say, the separation of the dialogue into two broadly distinct sections, also brings into focus the opposition between Socrates and those other individuals who claim to be able to train Theages.<sup>70</sup> This is emphasized through form - question and answer

<sup>69</sup>Other writers have also recognized this contrast between Socrates and other educators (see Wagner 3; Pavlu 19; Krüger 11, 14; Vouveris 119-23), but generally take into consideration only 127d2-*fin.*, and, like Friedländer, do not argue in precise terms. Hackforth (*Plato's Phaedrus* [Cambridge, 1952] 40) makes a similar distinction with regard to "Lysias'" speech and Socrates' first speech in *Phdr.*: "The whole attitude of the speaker [in Socrates' first speech], unlike that of Lysias's speaker, shows a real concern for the welfare, especially the moral welfare, of the boy....we see the lover peeping through the disguise -- not indeed the σκαιὸς ἐραστής but the true lover as conceived by Socrates and Plato; in fact we get a glimpse of the ἐραστής *par excellence*, Socrates himself."

<sup>70</sup>There is a similar use of clear structural demarcation for thematic purposes in *Euthd.*; see Friedländer II.183-93, who thoughtfully explores the effects of this use of structure.

is discarded in favour of the continuous exposition of the divine sign section - and through the change in Socrates' tone; in the divine sign section he largely abandons the irony with which he conducted the previous examination of the sophists and οἱ πολιτικοί, and assumes a much more serious demeanor. The contrast is essentially that between his present σπουδή and his earlier παιδιά, much as Socrates' previous manner had been opposed to that of Theages and Demodocus.<sup>71</sup>

One thread that runs through the confrontation of Socrates, sophists, and οἱ πολιτικοί, and helps to furnish some common ground upon which the contrast between them can be made, is the use of the thematic words συνουσία, συνεῖναι, and συγγίγνεσθαι. Although the dialogue is ostensibly περὶ σοφίας, yet in an important respect it is about συνουσία: how συνουσία with Socrates differs from that with other people. Demodocus is anxious that Theages, by being with (συγγενόμενος 122a4) someone, may be corrupted. It is association (συνουσίαν 122e3) with some man that Theages demands of his father. When Socrates and Theages have agreed that Theages wishes to become a tyrant, Socrates proposes to Demodocus that they set out to determine through association (συνουσίαν 125a8) with what person Theages might become a σοφὸς τύραννος. The ensuing quotations from "Euripides" highlight συνουσία, as does the allusion to the Anacreontic poem that follows (in which the use of συνουσία may involve a sexual *double entendre*, see Appendix 2). After Theages declares that he wishes to

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<sup>71</sup>It is tempting to link Socrates' σπουδή in the final pages with the fact that he is there concerned with τὰ ἐρωτικά, a subject about which he himself claims to possess unbounded knowledge (128b5-6), whereas in previous sections of the dialogue he is distinguished by παιδιά because here he is the character who does not know. Yet even in the section on the divine sign, though Socrates is strongly characterized by τὰ ἐρωτικά, he is not the rational expert.

conform to the ideal of politician established by the likes of Themistocles, Pericles, and Cimon, Socrates again reverts to the question, with whom Theages should associate (συγγενόμενος 126c8, cf. συνών 127a7) in order to fulfill this ambition. Theages' application to Socrates, once οἱ πολιτικοί are discarded, is an appeal for Socrates to "be (or associate) with" him (συνεῖναι 127a9, cf. συνουσίαν 127c4), an appeal supported in the same language by Demodocus (cf. συνουσία 127b4, συνεῖναι b5, b7, συγγενέσθαι b8). And so it goes up to the outset of the section on the divine sign (cf. 127e6, 128a5, a6, c3, c4). In this section itself, Socrates expressly tells us that the first four anecdotes (128d8-129d8) are intended to prove that τὸ δαιμόνιον is all-powerful in his associations (τὰς συνουσίας 129e2, cf. e6, e7) with others. More than that, this part of the dialogue is itself intended as a demonstration of one conception of the *nature* of Socratic association, exemplified, above all, by the story of Aristides (cf. συνεῖην 130d5). Socrates points this up in no uncertain terms when, after the story has been completed, he says "That is what association with me is like" (Ἔστιν...τοιαύτη ἡ ἡμετέρα συνουσία 130e5). And as the account of Aristides functions as the dialogue's climax, so συνουσία gains added dimension as a thematic concept: Socratic association so obviously transcends other, ineffectual kinds. By exploiting συνουσία as a theme, with its possible social, physical, and educational connotations (see comm. *ad* 122e3), our author is able to shift naturally, and without explicit comment, to the subject of Socrates, the ἐρωτικὸς ἀνὴρ, whose συνουσία is characterized by τὰ ἐρωτικά.<sup>72</sup>

<sup>72</sup>Fr. 11c of Aeschines' *Alc.* similarly emphasizes Socrates' "being with" Alcibiades, and juxtaposes it with ἔρως (ᾧμην ξυνὼν ἂν ἐκείνῳ διὰ τὸ ἐρᾶν βελτίῳ ποιῆσαι). For a development in the connotations of συνεῖναι not unlike that which we find in *Thg.*, cf. *Smp.* 211d6-212a2: first it is used (d6, d8) in a strictly sensual meaning; but within a very short space the same word is applied (a2) to intellectual involvement with the form of beauty.

Another way in which Socrates is seen to differ from those who profess to be educators is in the effect which he has on his associates. I have already alluded to this briefly in drawing attention to Socrates' virtual abandonment of the terms σοφός/σοφία at the point at which he becomes, in Theages' mind, the candidate of choice to be the young man's mentor (see sec. *b*, vi). As we saw, it is only to be expected that Socrates should avoid these words in connection with his own influence. In their place he speaks of Theages' becoming "as good as possible"; Theages notes that others his own age became "better" (βελτίους) in Socrates' company; and Socrates speaks extensively in the second part of the section on the divine sign (129e1-130e4) of those who "improve(d)" (ἐπιδιδόασιν, ὠφελοῦνται) by association with him. This is very like certain contexts of Aeschines' *Alc.*, in which Socrates asserts that, despite his ignorance of any τέχνη, he nevertheless thought he could make Alcibiades better (fr. 11c βελτίω ποιῆσαι); indeed, it even appears that this effect was one of the most distinctive features of the Socrates in Aeschines' dialogues generally.<sup>73</sup>

But despite this particular affinity, the effect of "improving," rather than of making another person σοφός, has a special application to the present work. Theages' ambition is to rule the people of his city, in other words, to become a prominent πολιτικός, and he himself identifies this with the acquisition of σοφία. I have argued above that Theages' decision to apply to Socrates as his educator does not represent an alteration in his plans: he still at this stage desires to become a πολιτικός (see sec. *b*, vi). Nor need we suppose that Socrates' avoidance of the terms σοφός/σοφία is meant to indicate that he has lost sight of Theages' goal.

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<sup>73</sup>See Döring, *Hermes* 112 (1984) 16-30.

On the contrary, the ideal of "improvement" with which he replaces it demonstrates that, in so far as Socrates produces this effect on others, he is himself the true πολιτικός. For it is a commonplace in Plato that the most famous politicians of Athens, those who have been praised to the highest degree (cf. 126a9-10 "Themistocles, Pericles, Cimon, and others"), in fact failed in their tasks and were not, in the strict sense, πολιτικοί at all, because they did not make the citizens of Athens better.<sup>74</sup> On these grounds Plato held that Socrates was the one genuine πολιτικός (*Grg.* 521d6-8).<sup>75</sup> And it is a simple development from here that the πολιτικός comes to be defined generally by Plato as the person who improves his fellow citizens, and the πολιτικὴ τέχνη as the art which brings this about.<sup>76</sup> Hence it follows that in depicting Socrates as the person around whom people "become better," the author is also positing him as the one who can make Theages a πολιτικός, though of a very different kind from that envisaged by Theages at the outset of the dialogue; no longer is πολιτικὴ considered strictly in terms of ἄρχειν, as had been the case in the first part of the dialogue.<sup>77</sup>

Still, it would be well to recognize that the divine sign section poses certain difficulties for the interpreter of this dialogue. Quite apart from those problems that concern the authenticity of the work, we must ask how

<sup>74</sup>Cf. *Grg.* 515b6–517a6, 517b3ff., *R.* 493a6-d9.

<sup>75</sup>As Guthrie seems to recognize (*HGP* V. 186), Plato's reference in *Plt.* 293a2-4 to the art of government as being in the possession of only one or two individuals is a probable allusion to Socrates.

<sup>76</sup>Cf. *Prt.* 319a3-5, *Euthd.* 292b4ff., *Men.* 99e4-100a7, *R.* 487e7-502c7, *Plt.* 296d6-297b3, *Lg.* 650b6, *Amat.* 137c6-138b10 (an oblique reference); so also Arist. *EN* 1099<sup>b</sup> 29-32, 1102<sup>a</sup>7-10. On the origins of Plato's concept of the philosopher-statesman see J.S. Morrison, *CQ* n.s.8 (1958) 198-218.

<sup>77</sup>It seems to me that Ficino was thinking along very similar lines when he looked beyond the dramatic limits of the dialogue and inferred (*Comm. in Conv. Plat. de Amore* 7.16) that "Theagem iustum fortemque in republica civem" [sc. Socrates fecit].

successfully this section does demonstrate the superiority of Socratic association. In the first place, what is the relevance of the first four anecdotes (128d8-129d8) in the first part of this section to the second part (129e1-130e4)? The author is quite explicit in his answer: the stories about Charmides, Clitomachus, the Sicilian expedition, and Sannio show that the divine sign is almighty in Socrates' associations with others (129e1-3). This, however, is not at all what they prove. It is true that Socrates' subsequent narrative demonstrates the omnipotence of the divine sign: τὸ δαιμόνιον determines which of Socrates' companions are to make progress and which are not. But the previous four anecdotes only show that the sign has an apotropaic power which makes itself known after a companion of Socrates' has already determined on a course of action; it does not, however, at least according to these reports, determine the fate of an individual.<sup>78</sup> It is evident, therefore, that a dislocation of sorts occurs between the two parts of the divine sign section, in so far as the first part is taken to prove what it cannot legitimately be considered to have done.

This cannot be explained simply by arguing for multiple authorship. There is no indication of disunity here. For the first four anecdotes comprise the μάρτυρες to which Socrates alludes in 128d7, and the second part of the section, working from the (false) assumption that the first part has established that the divine sign is "almighty," is persistent to the end in demonstrating this within the educational sphere, through the story of Aristides. A better explanation of the dislocation is, I think, the hypothesis that our author wished to reveal the miraculous workings of τὸ δαιμόνιον, and, as he was more concerned with inspiring a sense of wonder in the reader than he was with drawing a strictly consistent portrait of the sign,

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<sup>78</sup>Lamb (345) is alone in recognizing this.



cast around for stories about τὸ δαιμόνιον which were already in circulation. That those he found did not prove exactly what he claimed for them was not of great moment, and he included the stories virtually as he encountered them. The dislocation which can be identified in the divine sign section may therefore be explained if it is assumed that the first four anecdotes were not originally constructed specifically for this dialogue. On this hypothesis, we need not ponder for long about the sources of the anecdotes; it is as likely as not that they derive largely from oral tradition, although they may well have become part of a literary collection by the time *Thg.* was composed (see comm. *ad* 128d1-130e10).

Not unconnected with this problem is a curious use of pronouns in the divine sign section which seems to have gone unnoticed. When Socrates turns to Theages in 128d1 to correct the young man's mistaken assumption that Socrates himself determines if an associate is to improve by his company, he addresses, quite naturally, Theages alone, through the use of the singular σοι (d2). When, however, he introduces the series of four anecdotes that exemplify the apotropaic behaviour of τὸ δαιμόνιον, he does so thus: καὶ τούτων ὑμῖν μάρτυρας παρέξομαι (128d7-8; cf. γιγνώσκετε 128d8, βούλεσθε 129a1, ὑμῖν a5, ὑμῖν c7, ἀκούσ-εσθον d1). In other words, these four reports are directed at Theages *and* Demodocus. Yet, there is another shift in 129e1ff., that is, at the beginning of the second part of the divine sign section; for here, once again, Socrates explicitly addresses Theages alone (σοι 129e1, σὺ ἥσθησαι e8). Now it is tempting to connect this change of pronouns in some way with the stratification in the divine sign section identified immediately above; for instance, it might be conjectured that they are vestiges of the anecdotes' state before they found their way into this dialogue. Yet I think the shift in

pronouns can be explained otherwise. The singular pronoun at the beginning of the divine sign section causes no problem, since it is a direct response to Theages. The subsequent switch to the plural would seem to have been occasioned by the general nature of the subject matter of the anecdotes involved: they consist for the most part of a statement of the (in this dialogue) characteristically apotropaic, prophetic, behaviour of τὸ δαιμόνιον, and, in so far as they provide an introduction to the phenomenon, are likely to be of interest to both Demodocus and Theages. The description in this part of the section of the miraculous qualities of the divine sign is meant for Demodocus' ears as much as they are for Theages'. But the second part of the divine sign section, commencing at 129e1, is a different matter. Here Socrates focusses upon one specific aspect of τὸ δαιμόνιον, namely, the "educational" effect it exerts over Socrates' companions, conveyed through the story about a young man (Aristides) not unlike Theages. Its purpose is to arouse in Theages an awareness of the peculiar, "improving" ability inherent in Socratic συνουσία, for which τὸ δαιμόνιον is responsible; and so Socrates seems to consider the story important for Theages in particular. In fact, this seems little different from the way in which Socrates, conformably with his conception of education as a matter of personal contact, had earlier directed the discussion away from Demodocus towards Theages himself (cf. 122c7ff., 125b3). This, in turn, may be connected with Socrates' emergence in this dialogue as a special kind of πολιτικός. For, just as it is in a peculiar sense that Socrates could be considered a πολιτικός, so his conception of his political mission, in so far as it consisted in making his city better by his appeal to individual citizens to examine themselves and recognize their own ignorance, was distinctive. If Socrates could call himself a πολ-

ιτικός, it was because of his concern for and attention to individuals, not his conformity to institutional practices.<sup>79</sup> Socrates, in the way in which he commits himself exclusively to Theages in this dialogue, is behaving in a manner consonant with his educational and personal ideal of πολιτική.<sup>80</sup>

But there is a more serious issue to consider, and that is whether or not the contrast presented to the reader, between the sophists and οἱ πολιτικοί on the one hand, and Socrates on the other, is an intelligible and effective championing of the intrinsic worth of Socrates. For my own part, I do not think that it is. It is not that Socrates does not furnish a real τέχνη of politics (or of anything else for that matter) to take the place of the pseudo-τέχνη or pseudo-σοφία offered by others; for in this matter, at least, the Platonic Socrates is elsewhere willing to accept that ethical concepts are actually unlike other, conventional τέχνηαι.<sup>81</sup> It breathes a Platonic spirit, I think, that in this dialogue a virtual *impasse* results from the search for a teacher of politics *qua* τέχνη. Nor, as we have seen, is any difficulty implied by the "improving" effect of association with Socrates, although in the context we might perhaps have expected some mention of the care and improvement of one's ψυχή. Moreover, the presentation of Socrates as the ἐρωτικὸς ἀνὴρ is unobjectionable, because, on the

<sup>79</sup>See especially Popper, *The Open Society*<sup>5</sup> 125-37; Gulley 173ff.; Morrison, *op.cit.* 200-1, 212.

<sup>80</sup>And, it may be added here, it is in direct contradistinction to sophistic procedure, which merely implants doctrine externally, without regard for argumentation or the individuality of a student; cf. *Men.* 71c5-d8: Meno offers Gorgias' opinions to Socrates ready-made, but Socrates demands (cf. d5-6) that Meno say only what he himself thinks is the truth about ἀρετή.

<sup>81</sup>This assumption lies at the bottom of the ἀπορίαι of the early dialogues; see Shorey, "Plato's Ethics" in *Plato II*, ed. G. Vlastos (Notre Dame, 1978) 9-10 (with ref.); G.M.A. Grube, *Plato's Thought* (London, 1935) 223-5 M.J. O'Brien, *The Socratic Paradoxes and the Greek Mind* (Chapel Hill, 1967) 17-20; Gulley 82; Irwin, *PMT* 71ff. (who, however, argues that Plato in his earliest work believed that analogy with crafts was justified in the ethical sphere).

testimony of other works in the Corpus (and, as well, of some that are independent of Plato), the eroticism of Socrates (whatever that may have meant to a given writer of Σωκρατικοὶ λόγοι, or to the biographical tradition) is one of the most firmly-established characteristics about him, and those scholars who have defended the authenticity of *Thg.* are inclined, quite understandably, to point this out. What *is* unsatisfactory about this dialogue is that Socrates emerges as really nothing *more* than the master of τὰ ἐρωτικά. True, his customary claim to ignorance in 128b1ff. is matched by Aristides' later assurance that, while he learned nothing from Socrates, he nevertheless made great progress (130d4-5). But whereas Socrates' ignorance usually implies joint examination of himself and others, by means of dialectic, leading to improvement through knowledge of one's own ignorance, here it means, at most, improvement through ἔρως, through the agency of τὸ δαιμόνιον. Clearly, Socrates would emerge as a superior alternative to other prospective companions if the account of him given in *Thg.* were more balanced. For Socratic ἔρως and Socratic dialectic are perfectly compatible, even complementary;<sup>82</sup> so there seems to be little excuse for this dialogue's attempt to present the superiority of Socratic association from one point of view only, as a matter of irrational influence, especially since the notion of rational ἔρως seems to be broached, albeit lightly, earlier on (see further below, and *Intr.* ch. IV, d, e). Although we do encounter within the first section of *Thg.* an example of Socrates' examination of a young man, not only is this examination, and whatever impression about the workings of Socratic dialectic that it may have left on the reader, overshadowed by what is said in the second part of

<sup>82</sup>See Friedländer I.44-58; Versényi, *Socratic Humanism* 128-46; Guthrie, *HGP III*. 395-7; R.A. Markus, "The Dialectic of Eros in Plato's *Symposium*" in *Plato II*, ed. G. Vlastos (Notre Dame, 1978) 132-43; Irwin, *PMT* 167-72.

the divine sign section (129e1ff.), but it can hardly be regarded as a perfect specimen of the way in which Socratic dialectic could achieve beneficial results.<sup>83</sup> One might contrast Alcibiades' speech in *Smp.*, in which Alcibiades, though he vividly describes the effect produced upon him by Socrates' presence, is nevertheless careful to give prominence to an account of the power of Socrates' λόγοι (221d7-222a6). In *Thg.* the most we are told is that Aristides made great progress when he looked at Socrates λέγοντός σου (130d8).

Our author's neglect of the dialectical component of Socrates and Socratic ignorance is all the more notable for his disregard of the dialectical nature of certain sources which he seems to have drawn upon for his report about Aristides (130a4ff.). In 130b6-7 Aristides, speaking with Socrates, passes judgement on Thucydides' annoyance at Socrates: οὐκ οἶδεν [sc. Thucydides]...πρὶν σοὶ συγγενέσθαι οἶον ἦν ἀνδράποδον; (for the text see comm. *ad* 130b7). There are several other philosophical contexts in which the idea of slavery is introduced, and which are of a piece: the person who is seen to live a life without philosophy, or a morally unsound life, is said to be a slave, or slavish. The following are especially germane to the exposition of our passage.

1) In *X. Mem.* 4.2.13ff. Socrates brings Euthydemus to a point at which he is unable to feel confident that he knows what justice and injustice are. Then in 4.2.22 Socrates asks him οἴσθα δέ τινας ἀνδραποδῶδεις καλουμένους;. Euthydemus admits that people are given this name because they are ignorant (δι' ἀμαθίαν). Socrates presses the point by asking Ἄρ' οὖν τῶν τὰ καλὰ καὶ ἀγαθὰ καὶ δίκαια μὴ εἰδόντων

<sup>83</sup>See also Hermann, *Geschichte und System* 428-9; Steinhart 440-41; Krüger 16-7; *Intr.* ch. III, a.

τὸ ὄνομα τοῦτ' ἐστίν;, to which Euthydemus agrees. In the end (4.2.39), Euthydemus πάνυ ἀθύμως ἔχων ἀπῆλθε καὶ καταφρονήσας ἑαυτοῦ καὶ νόμισας τῷ ὄντι ἀνδράποδον εἶναι; he recognized his remedy to be association with Socrates. Dittmar's researches (124-30, 134ff., 144) have made it probable that *Mem.* 4.2 is dependent upon Aeschines' *Alc.*, and that Euthydemus is essentially an Alcibiades-figure (see 3 below).

2) In *Alc. I* 134e8ff. Alcibiades agrees with Socrates that to do what one wishes without good sense and ἀρετή results in disaster; until one possesses ἀρετή, it is better to be governed than to govern (135b7-8); such a condition is likened to slavery (c2 δουλεύειν, c4 δουλοπρεπές), which must be avoided (c8-9). Alcibiades recognizes that he is a slave (c10-11), and that the cure for this condition is association with Socrates (d7-10).

3) Aeschin. *Socr. Alc.* frs. 6 and 10 (Dittmar) (=Cic. *Tusc.* 3.33.77) seem also to contain the motif that one who does not possess virtue is nothing but a slave: [6] *Quid enim dicemus, cum Socrates Alcibiadi persuasisset, ut accepimus, eum nihil hominis esse, nec quicquam inter Alcibiadem summo loco natum et quemvis baiulum interesse*, [10] *cum se Alcibiades afflicaret lacrimansque Socrati supplex esset, ut sibi virtutem traderet turpitudinemque depelleret...* Dittmar (100) connects *baiulus* (lit. "porter") in fr. 6 with the Greek δημιουργός. He further observes that in the passage from X. *Mem.* discussed in 1) above, δημιουργοί are equated with ἀνδραποδῶδεις, because they are ἀμαθεῖς; and δημιουργοί are ἀμαθεῖς in *Alc. I* (131a9ff.) as well (because πολλοῦ δέουσιν... γιγνώσκειν ἑαυτούς). If the section from *Mem.*, and *Alc. I* itself, are dependent upon Aeschines' *Alc.*, as Dittmar supposed (see above), and as

seems likely enough, it is a reasonable inference that Aeschines' *Alc.* also contained a declaration that Socrates' main interlocutor, in this case Alcibiades, is no better than a slave.

4) One can hardly refer to these three passages without noting as well Alcibiades' avowed servitude to Socrates in *Smp.* 219e3-5. Here however the reference is to erotic slavery (a literary *topos*).<sup>84</sup> Interestingly, the theme of ἐλευθερία/δουλεία also occurred in Antisthenes' lost *Kûros*, a composition which, on Dittmar's analysis, may have shared many of the features that can be traced within the Alcibiades-dialogue genre (68ff., esp. 75-83).<sup>85</sup> Finally, Aristotle picked up on this motif of slavery in the *Protrepticus* (B.53 Düring): We must not flee philosophy; if we pursue gain at any cost, we should do the same for wisdom: ἦ μὴν ἀνδραποδῶδές γε τοῦ ζῆν ἀλλὰ μὴ τοῦ ζῆν εὖ γλίχεσθαι, καὶ ταῖς τῶν πολλῶν αὐτὸν ἀκολουθεῖν δόξαις ἀλλὰ μὴ τοὺς πολλοὺς ἀξιοῦν ταῖς αὐτοῦ, καὶ τὰ μὲν χρήματα ζητεῖν τῶν δὲ καλῶν μηδεμίαν ἐπιμέλειαν ποιεῖσθαι τὸ παράπαν.

Some critics have objected to the use of ἀνδράποδον in *Thg.* 130c6-7, on the grounds that the thought is obtrusive and un-Platonic (see comm. *ad loc.*). I would submit, however, that the context in which it occurs belongs within the above group of passages, especially 1-3. The essence of Aristides' statement seems to be that association with Socrates has effected a positive change in Thucydides; in the past he was as a slave. It differs from the first three passages, in so far as Thucydides' "slavery" is a former condition (ἦν b6), whereas in the other places any possible development from a servile state is prospective. But a constant feature is, appar-

<sup>84</sup>See P. Murgatroyd, *Latomus* 40 (1981) 589-606.

<sup>85</sup>But for criticisms of Dittmar's reconstruction of this work, see I. Düring, *Herodicus the Crateteian* (Stockholm, 1941) 68-70.

ently, that Socratic association is the cure for moral and intellectual servitude. As well, Thucydides' irritation with Socrates (130b1-2) is highly reminiscent of a regular result of Socrates' reducing of a young interlocutor to a state of ἀπορία (see comm. *ad* 130b1-2); in fact, the words used to describe Thucydides' behaviour could almost be applied to the effect produced on the young men at the end of the conversations in the works from which 1-3 are taken (but see below). It rather appears, particularly in view of the elliptical manner in which the notion of slavery is introduced into *Thg.*, and in view of the unelaborated mention of Thucydides' annoyance, as though our author has drawn upon another source at the outset of the Aristides anecdote, in which the original context had clarified (as 1-3 above do) the meaning of the reference to slavery. Indeed, the Alcibiades-dialogue genre seems to figure prominently here; to my mind, the likelihood of its use is increased by certain parallelisms with *Alc. I* and Aeschines' *Alc.* that have already been noted.

Our argument for affinities between *Thg.* and the works numbered 1-3 above is strengthened by another piece of evidence. In 130c6 Aristides, disheartened by his apparent lack of culture since his departure from Socrates, remarks: οὕτως αἰσχύνομαι ἐπὶ τῇ ἐμαυτοῦ φαυλότητι. The feelings expressed by these words happen to conform quite closely to the final outcome of Socrates' discussions above, where Euthydemus (1) and Alcibiades (2, 3) become depressed by the bad impressions that they make (cf. X. *Mem.* 4.2.39; Aeschin. *Socr. Alc.* fr.9 [Dittmar]; Alcibiades shows less despondency in *Alc. I* 135c11). The reason why I think this reflects an external source, and is not merely coincidental, is not only that we have already found several parallels between *Thg.* and one or more of these three works, but also because of the occurrence of φαυλότητι in



c6. Although φαῦλος is extremely common in the Platonic Corpus, the noun φαυλότης is found in only three other places (*Hp. ma.* 286d2, *Lg.* 646b6, 745d3). But φαυλότης does arise in the course of the *Mem.* section cited above: at the end of his discussion with Socrates (4.2.39), Euthydemus admits to possessing such a quality: ἀναγκάζει με καὶ ταῦτα (viz., that he misapprehends the difference between "rich" and "poor") ὁμολογεῖν δῆλον ὅτι ἢ ἐμὴ φαυλότης. Moreover, among the nineteen papyrus fragments of Aeschines' *Alc.* published in 1919 by Grenfell and Hunt as *POxy.* 1608<sup>86</sup> are three occurrences of the word φαῦλος (11.35, 40, 56-7), which, in addition to φαύλοισι in fr. 8 (Dittmar), strongly support Dittmar's hypothesis (105) that *Alc.* included a discussion about φαυλότης;<sup>87</sup> and the dialogue probably ended with Alcibiades' recognition of his own φαυλότης.<sup>88</sup> In view of the passages from Xenophon and Aeschines, I would suggest that our author was at this point influenced by another work, quite possibly one of these two.

Notable though these correspondences between *Thg.* and *Alc. I, X. Mem.* 4.2, and Aeschin. Socr. *Alc.* may be, what is most important for our present investigation is the fact that, given our author's dependence on these three works, or, at any rate, on some member of the *Alcibiades*-dialogue genre connected with them,<sup>89</sup> he is apparently indifferent to the

<sup>86</sup>*The Oxyrynchus Papyri, pt. xiii*, ed. Grenfell and Hunt (London, 1919) 88-94.

<sup>87</sup>See also E.G. Berry, *TAPA* 81 (1950) 4-6. In fr.10 above, Alcibiades wants to gain *virtus*, which must translate the Greek ἀρετή in the original, and thereby lose his present *turpitude*. Dittmar (100) associates the latter with αἰσχροτής, but, as a counterpart for ἀρετή, it is equally possible that φαυλότης stood behind *turpitude* in Aeschines' text.

<sup>88</sup>Cf. fr.9 (Dittmar): κλάειν θέντα τὴν κεφαλὴν ἐπὶ τὰ γόναντα ἀθυμήσαντα ὥς οὐδ' ἐγγὺς ὄντα τῷ θεμιστοκλεῖ τὴν παρασκευὴν.

<sup>89</sup>A leading candidate might be Antisthenes' *Alcibiades* (for the fragments, see F.D. Caizzi, *Antisthenis Fragmenta* [Milan, 1966] 32-4), of which Aeschines Socraticus is said to have made use (cf. D.L. 2.61), presumably in his own *Alc.*

dialectical content and qualities of these works. He is concerned with the outcome of Socratic association, or with the effects of its absence, not with the means by which the outcome is achieved. It is worth drawing attention to this, as the author, in the course of composing the divine sign section, has similarly ignored the major dialectical aspects of other works, more readily identifiable than the ones on which he has apparently drawn in the places considered just now (see *Intr.* ch. II, *b*). The impression one is left with is that this writer has deliberately shunned any details that might divert attention away from his emphasis upon the omnipotence of τὸ δαιμόνιον and the almost mystical quality of Socratic συνουσία. This, in turn, is perfectly consistent with our earlier comments about the author's move from the hint of a Platonic concept of rational, dialectical ἔρως in 128b1ff. to an Aeschinean picture of ἔρως as the antithesis of rational influence.

### *c. Conclusions: Theme, Unity and Purpose*

*Thg.* emerges as one description of Socrates' distinctiveness, his ἀτοπία. Although this ἀτοπία is evident in the first, lengthier, section of the dialogue through Socrates' persistent irony and general παιδιά, and through the primary importance he assigns to the thoughts and wishes of his young interlocutor, it is exemplified most vividly in the course of the divine sign section of the dialogue. It is here that we discover in what respects Socrates differs from those who would claim to teach the πολιτικὴ τέχνη. It is not that he, unlike the others, *does* possess knowledge of such a craft; on the contrary, Socrates is emphatic about his ignorance. Rather, association with him is characterized by τὰ ἐρωτικά, that is, by a concern for the welfare of the companion; and a companion's progress is dictated not by the payment of fees, but by the volition of τὸ δαιμόνιον,

which, as I have argued, and as I shall set forth in greater detail below (see *Intr.* ch. II, *b*), is closely connected with ἔρως. Here also we find that the effect of Socratic συνουσία is not to make a companion σοφός, but rather to "improve" him or make him "better," which in the context is considered to be a superior benefit to the one likely to be gained from the sophists or οἱ πολιτικοί. Nevertheless, this ability to improve marks Socrates out as the one who most nearly approaches the status of πολιτικός.

These are, in outline, the conclusions at which the previous investigations have arrived. But the aim of the dialogue is not merely to present a picture of how peculiar an experience it was to be in Socrates' presence. Instead, the author goes out of his way to draw the sharpest possible distinction between Socrates and other educators. In view of this, *Thg.* may be characterized as apologetic.<sup>90</sup> Demodocus had expressed fear at the beginning of the dialogue about his son's possible association with a sophist, lest he be corrupted. At the same time, he greeted Socrates as someone whose advice could be trusted, and, later on, addressed him as one who would release him from his anxieties. The contrast vindicates Socrates, who is not the person likely to corrupt the young, as his accusers had supposed.

This message becomes clearer if we recall the various places in our analysis in which parallels have been drawn with *Alc. I* and Aeschines' *Alc.* It must be said now that the parallels between *Thg.* and these works make much better sense if priority is given to the two *Alcibiades*-dialogues. If one views these two works as background for *Thg.*, as works to which our author was responding to some degree, one becomes aware not only of

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<sup>90</sup>See Hermann, *Geschichte und System* 427, 429; Grote 437-9.

the manner and extent to which Theages differs from the Alcibiades of these dialogues (not to say from the historical Alcibiades, whose similarity to the literary Alcibiades is a separate question altogether), but also of the almost certain truth that not all of Socrates' companions were Alcibiades "types." Here the choice of Theages as interlocutor must be noted. It might be thought that the name of any young man could have been selected to represent Socrates' respondent in this dialogue, but there are, I believe, special reasons why Theages should have been chosen, and these are largely supplied by the two mentions of Theages in the Corpus apart from *Thg.* itself.

First, there is *R.* 496b6-c3. In this passage Theages is cited as an example of those who were worthy companions of philosophy (496a11-b1): it is likely that Theages would have abandoned philosophy in favour of politics, but ill health prevented him from the latter calling. These comments have not received the attention they deserve.<sup>91</sup> First of all, that Theages is said to have been held back from the political life for which he was apparently destined is a satisfying confirmation of the faithfulness of the portrait presented here of a young man desirous of political success.<sup>92</sup> Secondly, he is described in the *R.* passage as the ἑταῖρος of Socrates, and it is implied that he never parted ways with philosophy. From this it would appear that this dialogue was intended, at least in part, to depict the first meeting of Socrates with a young man who was to become a lifelong companion (see also *Intr.* ch. III, *b*), and who was to profit from this associ-

<sup>91</sup>It has, as a matter of fact, been asserted that the juxtaposition of this information about Theages in *R.* with the statement about Socrates' divine sign that follows it induced our author to connect Theages and the divine sign together as a thematic unit (see Pavlu 15; Heidel 53; Souilh  138; Carlini 43; Robin 1641; Rist 18). My subsequent remarks will, I hope, demonstrate that the author of *Thg.* operated more purposefully than this.

<sup>92</sup>Similarly H. M ller 465; Friedl nder II.150.

ation. In other words, he is, in retrospect, an example of those individuals οἷς...ἂν συλλάβηται τῆς συνουσίας ἢ τοῦ δαιμονίου δύναμις (*Thg.* 129e7-8). Hence there is no inherent irony in the promise at the end of *Thg.* of continued association between him and Socrates, for it is expected that the reader will know what the outcome of Theages' life was. To take matters one step further, Theages clearly gave up on the pseudo-σοφία offered by the sophists and politicians, as presented in our dialogue, and turned instead to φιλοσοφία, the proper concern of Socrates, in so far as he is not, in *Thg.* as elsewhere, σοφός.<sup>93</sup> Such dramatic circumstances are roughly reminiscent of the situation we encounter in *Tht.*, where we observe Socrates' initial meeting with a youth of outstanding promise, and are fully aware that this promise will eventually be realized (though not through association with Socrates). On the other hand, in contrast to the ending of *Thg.* (and the dramatic premise of *Tht.*) we may compare the *Alcibiades* dialogues and *Chrm.*, where the dialogues end with the understanding of continued association between the young men involved and Socrates, though the reader is aware of the lives that these young men will lead and of the end they will meet (the irony this produces is clearly intentional). The contrast between associates of this kind and Theages is further reinforced by the third consideration; that it was *despite* his νοσοτροφία that Theages was able to lead a life of philosophy. In *R* 407b4-408b5 it is explained that νοσοτροφία (407b1) generally makes a person's life useless, and certainly ill-suited to philosophy; it would be better not to treat such a person's sickness at all. Theages, in so far as he transcended physical disabilities and attained to the study of philosophy,

<sup>93</sup>In this respect Socrates is, in fact, nearly an embodiment of the *daimon* ἔρως; cf. *Smp.* 203d4-204a7.

must have been, in Plato's view, an exceptional individual, and the information supplied by *R.* tends to confirm our argument that the author of *Thg.* intended his reader to accept Theages as the virtual antithesis of a character such as the Alcibiades whom we meet in the dialogues bearing his name.<sup>94</sup> *Thg.* thus becomes a powerful antidote for anyone who believed that all companions of Socrates were, like Alcibiades, Critias, and Charmides, morally and socially reprehensible, or that Socrates was ultimately responsible for the way these individuals turned out. This is, essentially, the impression left by the reference to Theages in the other Platonic passage bearing his name, *Ap.* 33e7. Here Socrates calls upon his accusers to bring forth any "fathers or brothers or other kin" (33d5-6) who could claim that a young relative had been corrupted by him. Among those present at the trial whom he names, but who do not come forward to speak out against Socrates, is Paralios, Theages' brother. The implication for our dialogue of Paralios' tacit support of Socrates is clearly that the influence of Socratic *συνουσία* on Theages was beneficial, and, from the perspective of our dialogue, that Socrates saved Theages from potential corruption by other teachers. Again, we can see how the author of *Thg.* strikes an apologetic note for Socrates, one which, when we take into account all surviving information about Theages, appears to be the more effective for its concentration on one particular companion of Socrates.

The connection between the two formal divisions of this dialogue has become evident. In the first section Socrates reviews the nature of association with sophists and, at less length, with οἱ πολιτικοί; in the

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<sup>94</sup>Pangle (154) claims it is the author's intention to demonstrate "the severe limitations of Theages' intellectual capacities," and uses the testimonium in *R.* as corroborating evidence: "Theages is not adduced as someone with a philosophic nature, but rather his illness is an example of one way in which men with philosophic natures might be saved from politics" (154 n.3). I see no justification in this curious distortion (on Theages see also *Intr.* ch. III, *b*).

second, he outlines the main features of association with himself. Thus *Thg.* is a dialogue dependent upon contrast. At the most basic level this is exemplified by the broad formal divisions into which the dialogue may be articulated, and by the different tones attributable to Socrates from one division to the other. The contrast emerges more specifically through the pretensions ascribed to the various prospective companions. For while the sophists and οἱ πολιτικοί would claim to possess knowledge of the πολιτικὴ τέχνη, which in the context of this dialogue implies the possession of σοφία, Socrates not only leads the discussion to the conclusion that these individuals are not σοφοί, but also denies that he himself possesses the political craft. It is, moreover, by comparison with the sophists that the distinctiveness of Socrates emerges with greatest clarity. They are characterized as mercenary, concerned more with money than with the welfare of a young man like Theages, and likely, in Demodocus' mind, to corrupt his son. Socrates knows only τὰ ἐρωτικά, i.e., cares for the young man himself. Therefore the difference between Socrates and others lies in their respective kinds of συνουσία. And unlike the sophists, Socrates refuses to promise what he cannot deliver: nothing is said about how others in his company became σοφοί, but rather how they became better, and not through his own agency, but through that of τὸ δαιμόνιον. In this way the absurdity of sophistic professionalism is pointed up: how can a sophist demand money when he is not actually responsible for a student's progress, that is to say, is not τεχνικός? The assumptions Socrates entertains about himself are completely at odds with those of the sophists.

Apart from the importance of the contrasts evident from one section of the dialogue to the other, we have also detected certain resonances

between these two sections, functioning as threads which draw the dialogue into a unity. One of these is the theme of *συνουσία*, or association, of Socratic and other kinds. Another is the theme of *τὰ ἐρωτικά*, which, though explicitly mentioned by Socrates only once, was seen to be present from an earlier point in the dialogue. Again, there is the important subject of *τέχνη*, which is not abandoned once the sophists and *οἱ πολιτικοί* have been done away with, but also lies behind Socrates' use of the terms antithetical to it, *θεία μοῖρα* and *τύχη* (130e10 *τύχης*). We should also note that expectations expressed early in the dialogue are in the end fulfilled: Socrates, so warmly welcomed by Demodocus, is with similar feeling exhorted to become Theages' companion. Moreover, while Socrates' reference to his understanding of *τυραννικά* in the first section of the dialogue carries with it an erotic level of meaning, there is a sense in which *τυραννικά*, in this dialogue, characterizes Socratic *συνουσία* (sec. *b*, *v*), for in the second section of *Thg.* one of the most emphatic statements Socrates makes about *τὸ δαιμόνιον* is that it is "all-powerful" in his associations with others, and deals in an apparently arbitrary manner with those who wish to become his companion (see further *Intr.* ch. II, *b*).

At the beginning of this chapter I drew attention to those scholars who have asserted that *Thg.* is unambiguously about *τὸ δαιμόνιον*. Let me simply state here that the considerations offered above should serve to refute any notions about the disunity, much less the multiple authorship, of *Thg.*, implied by theories of this kind on subject and theme. Nor is the relationship between the first and second sections a vague one, as is often asserted.<sup>95</sup> On the contrary, the dialogue itself is only intelligible when examined as an integral whole.

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<sup>95</sup>See especially Pavlu 18-9; Krüger 11, 14.



One's opinions about the purpose of *Thg.* are bound to be conditioned by any conclusions as to its date of composition. Although this latter question will be pursued later (see *Intr.* ch. V, *f, g*), where an attempt will be made to draw the dialogue's original purpose into sharper focus, it is nevertheless desirable to offer some judgements based on the evidence adduced so far in this chapter. As we have seen, the author's intentions were at least to some extent apologetic. Furthermore, that Socrates is presented in the final analysis as exemplifying the qualities of a πολλῦς of a special kind, and thus, as embodying the qualities Theages was pursuing at the outset, has an interestingly Platonic ring. For it is one manifestation of Plato's apologetic ways and means that, behind the ἀπορία of some early Socratic dialogues stands a character, Socrates himself, who best demonstrates the ethical concept(s) which he and other interlocutors have been unable to define (although here it is never implied that Socrates actually possesses σοφία).<sup>96</sup> On the other hand, it is clearly not the author's goal to ascribe any particular philosophical "programme" to Socratic συνουσία, such as ἔλεγχος leading to ἀπορία and self-knowledge. In this dialogue Socratic ignorance implies, as we have seen, something rather different from that of other dialogues, and the message is manifest enough that the help Socrates rendered others was not within his own control. In this respect *Thg.* has some close affinities with other Socratic works, notably those of the *Alcibiades*-dialogue genre. In these works, Socrates encounters a young man who has political pretensions. Through comparison of politics with crafts they are made to realize the deficiency and naïveté of their aspiration, and come to desire

<sup>96</sup>For this aspect of *La.* see M.J. O'Brien, *YCS* 18 (1963) 133-43; for *Men.* see Bluck, *Meno* 124-5; for *Chrm.* see T.G. Tuckey, *Plato's Charmides* (Cambridge, 1951) 95-104; Guthrie, *HGP* IV. 170 (more cautious is R. McKim, *TAPA* 115 [1985] 59-77).

Socratic συνουσία. The πολιτικὴ τέχνη, in its contemporary manifestations, is rejected, while philosophy is extolled. If we press this similarity, it will be apparent that *Thg.* is, in a sense, and not unlike the three specimens of the *Alcibiades*-dialogue genre mentioned earlier ([Plato], Aeschines, Xenophon), of a protreptic nature, advocating a life of philosophy (i.e., continuing association with Socrates; what this association will precisely consist in is not made clear, either in *Thg.* or the other works) over the misguided attempt to acquire political power, or, at any rate, a sophistic τέχνη.<sup>97</sup> In connection with this it is tempting to believe that the alternate second title of *Thg.*, περὶ φιλοσοφίας (see comm. *ad* "Title"), is a genuine variant, and represents just such an interpretation of one of the purposes of the dialogue, namely, that it is partly an exhortation to some kind of philosophical way of life (see further *Intr.* ch. V, §). It has never been argued by scholars that this, and not περὶ σοφίας, is the true second title of the dialogue, but it may well be so, and in that case would provide evidence that *Thg.* was viewed as protreptic in tone by some ancient scholars.

Four centuries ago Cornarius remarked that in *Thg.* "magis quae [sc. sapientia] non fit, quam quae fit, declaratur."<sup>98</sup> Our examinations have shown that this is a perceptive comment: Socrates scorns what normally passes for wisdom, and looks to an altogether different ideal. Indeed, it may be reasonable to say that Cornarius' words point up another purpose served by the dialogue. For as much as *Thg.* is about Socrates and what the author considers Socrates to represent, nevertheless in the process he manages to expound his opinions about σοφία as it is popularly con-

<sup>97</sup>For this characteristic of the protreptic strand within the Socratic dialogue, see Gaiser 33ff.; and for the protreptic character of the *Alcibiades*-dialogue genre, *ib.* 77-95.

<sup>98</sup>See I.F. Fischer, *Iani Cornarii Eclogae in Dialogos Platonis Omnes, nunc primum separatim editae cura Ioh. Frider. Fischeri* (Lipsiae, 1771) 61.

ceived, and about those who claim to possess it. In rejecting the sophists and politicians the author is criticizing a pair that Plato regularly couples together as false claimants to knowledge. The passage which perhaps best illustrates this is *R.* 493a6-d9, a description of the unphilosophical temperament which Plato ascribed to the general populace; another appropriate passage is *Men.* 90b4-95a6. Our author, like Plato, is interested in delineating his position on what normally passes for wisdom.

I have stressed the characteristics, methods of composition, and aspects of thought in the structure of *Thg.* which appear Platonic, or can be compared with other works which are either fully extant or fragmentary. The extent to which this information may be taken as evidence for the authenticity of the dialogue will be considered below (*Intr.* ch. IV, c). However, it hardly needs saying that there is no other Platonic dialogue that precisely mirrors the structure of this one; specifically, only here is Socrates' divine sign made the central feature of a climax, running into several pages, of a particular work. Although some remarks have been made above concerning the composition of individual places in this section of the dialogue, it will be necessary now to look in much closer detail at the role and conception of τὸ δαιμόνιον in *Thg.*

## II. The Divine Sign and the *Theages*

Socrates' divine sign was the subject of some elaborate and extensive discussion in antiquity,<sup>1</sup> and much has been written about it in more recent times.<sup>2</sup> No effort will be made in the following pages to give a comprehensive account of the development or presentation of the sign among all ancient authors who contributed anything to the subject,<sup>3</sup> nor will an attempt be made to describe the precise nature of the sign.<sup>4</sup> Such consideration of these topics as occurs below will be dictated solely by the bearing that they have on the question of the portrayal of the divine sign specifically in *Thg.* The main thrust of this discussion must consist in determining, as far as possible, the relationship of the excursus on the divine sign in *Thg.* to the Platonic literature on the subject and to other contemporary or nearly contemporary literature, and the nature of the novelties which the author introduces into this excursus when he goes beyond

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<sup>1</sup>See the fundamental study of A. Willing, *De Socratis Daemonio quae antiquis temporibus fuerint Opiniones* (Diss. Jena, 1909).

<sup>2</sup>The secondary literature is extensive; no complete bibliography exists, but for references see Zeller II.1<sup>5</sup> 74-89 (with nn.); Friedländer I.32-6 (see nn.); H. Gundert, *Platonstudien* (Amsterdam, 1977) 61-4 (= *Gymnasium* 61 [1954] 528-31); one of the best short accounts of the divine sign in early Socratic literature is in Gigon, *Sokrates* 163-78.

<sup>3</sup>For a brief but useful account of developments in representations of the divine sign in antiquity, see (in addition to Willing, *op. cit.*) Souilhé 130-7.

<sup>4</sup>Generally speaking, such investigations as I have encountered in the course of (admittedly cursory) reading on this aspect of the divine sign are speculative in the extreme, and (originating mostly in the nineteenth century) seem to reflect a first flush of enthusiasm over contemporary discoveries in the fields of clinical psychology and psychoanalysis.

previous expositors. This last question also involves us in the attempt to decide what influences were at play where the author has ventured upon extending the functions and activities of the divine sign. As such, the presentation of the divine sign in *Thg.* itself will remain the focus of attention throughout this section. But since much of the discussion on the authenticity of *Thg.* has in the past centred around this part of the dialogue - rightly and inevitably so - it has proved quite impossible in the course of the present investigation not to engage in discussions on this important issue where the need has arisen. The evidence for authorship gathered here will be reviewed later (*Intr.* ch. IV,d). However, a selection of the Platonic and Xenophontic evidence for Socrates' divine sign must first be considered.

#### *a. Plato and Xenophon*

In Plato's indisputably genuine works certain points are consistently made on the relatively few occasions when the subject of discussion turns to Socrates' divine sign, and other individual features in these descriptions contribute to complete the picture. Above all, the divine sign is only apotropaic; it comes to Socrates when he ought to desist from a course of action contemplated by him, but it never urges him forward.<sup>5</sup> According to Plato, the divine sign was responsible for some important decisions made in Socrates' lifetime. In *R.* (496c3-5) and *Ap.* (31c7-d6) we are told that the sign prevented Socrates from embarking upon a political career. On the other hand, in *Ap.* (40a8ff.) the non-intervention of the sign on the day of Socrates' trial is his guarantee that what has befallen him during the proceedings is in fact good, and that death is no evil. That Socrates can

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<sup>5</sup>Cf. *Ap.* 31d1-4, *Euthd.* 272e3-273a1, *Phdr.* 242b8-c3, *R.* 496c3-5, *Tht.* 151a2-5.

here mention the mere non-opposition of the sign as a criterion for judging the benefit to him of a series of events may show that Plato, at least in this work, viewed the sign quite generally as a guiding force at moments of great importance in Socrates' life, and believed that the sign was in some sense infallible as a guardian for Socrates; for otherwise he could not have depicted Socrates as placing so great a trust simply in its inactivity. But the capacity of the divine sign positively to condone an act, in Socrates' judgement, by non-opposition is not mentioned elsewhere in Plato, and it seems to be merely an exception here.<sup>6</sup>

Apart from the divine sign's role in important matters, we learn from Plato that it often occurred also on trivial occasions. This is stated explicitly in *Ap.* 40a4-6,<sup>7</sup> and a particular instance is recounted in *Euthd.* 272e1-273a2.<sup>8</sup> The sign is also said to intervene (presumably on both important and unimportant occasions, cf. the *Euthd.* passage in the previous sentence) either when Socrates is about to act (*Ap.* 40a6, *Phdr.* 242b8f.), or when he is in the midst of speaking (*Ap.* 40b3-6). It was a frequent occurrence for Socrates (*Ap.* 40b3-4), and he often spoke about it (*Ap.* 31c7-8). That it was nothing like a moral conscience is evident from the fact that it merely prohibited Socrates from actions that proved to be inex-

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<sup>6</sup>It should be noted that the inactivity of the sign is not quite enough to prevent Socrates in his last words (*Ap.* 42a2-5) from expressing scepticism as to whether death is a good thing. The non-opposition of τὸ δαιμόνιον, at least among some later Platonists, was evidently taken for granted as the equivalent of a protreptic force for Socrates, cf. Olymp. in *Alc.* 21.2-3 (πρῶτον μὲν ὅτι αἰὲς αὐτὸν ἀπέτρεπεν, καὶ σύμβολον ἦν προτροπῆς τὸ ποτὲ μὴ ἀποτρέπειν).

<sup>7</sup>ἢ γὰρ εἰωθυῖά μοι μαντικὴ ἢ τοῦ δαιμονιοῦ...πάνυ ἐπὶ μικροῖς ἐναντιούμενη.

<sup>8</sup>This passage in *Euthd.* probably supplied the basic material for an account of one occurrence of the divine sign in *Thg.*; see comm. ad 129a1-c8.

pedient, rather than morally reprehensible.<sup>9</sup> Finally, Socrates asserts (*R.* 496c4-5) that his divine sign is unparalleled, or nearly unparalleled, among all who have preceded him.

Plato draws repeatedly upon a limited vocabulary in his various descriptions of the divine sign. The sign itself is τὸ δαιμόνιον (*Ap.* 40a4, *Euthphr.* 3b5, *Euthd.* 272e4, *Phdr.* 242b8-9), τὸ γιγνόμενον μοι δαιμόνιον (*Tht.* 151a4), τὸ δαιμόνιον σημεῖον (*R.* 496c4), θεῖόν τι καὶ δαιμόνιον (*Ap.* 31c8-d1), τὸ εἰωθὸς σημεῖον (*Euthd.* 272e3-4, *Phdr.* 242b9, *Ap.* 40c2-3), τὸ τοῦ θεοῦ σημεῖον (*Ap.* 40b1), ἡ... εἰωθυῖά μοι μαντική (*Ap.* 40a4), φωνή τις (*Ap.* 31d3); at times certain of these phrases are joined in combination (*Ap.* 40a4, *Euthd.* 272e3-4, *Phdr.* 242b8-9). The verb used for the occurrence of the sign is regularly γίγνομαι (e.g. *Euthphr.* 3b6, *Ap.* 31d1, *Phdr.* 242b9), and μέλλω commonly describes the imminence of Socrates' actions at the sign's occurrence (*Ap.* 31d4, 40a6, 40b3, *Phdr.* 242b8). When Socrates has already begun to act or speak, it catches him in the midst (μεταξύ *Ap.* 40b4). ἐναντιοῦμαι is one word used of the opposition of the sign (*Ap.* 40a6, b1).

Xenophon reproduces a number of the elements in this portrait. The divine sign is still regarded as something peculiar to Socrates alone, so that Socrates' mention of it at his trial aroused a θόρυβος, brought on by a jealousy or disbelief on the part of the jurors (*Ap.* 14); and Euthydemus can speak of Socrates as specially favoured by the gods by virtue of his divine sign, which gives him guidance even when he does not ask for it (*Mem.* 4.3.12). In Xenophon's accounts it is a warning sign (e.g. *Mem.* 1.1.4 [προσημαίνοντος], *Ap.* 13), and is explicitly connected with μαντική

<sup>9</sup>See Zeller II.1<sup>5</sup> 78f.; Gundert 46; Taylor, *Socrates* (New York, 1952) 45; Burnet *ad Euthphr.* 3b6.

(e.g. *Mem.* 1.1.9). The term τὸ δαιμόνιον is regularly applied to it (e.g. *Mem.* 1.1.2, 4, *Ap.* 4, 13), and, as Plato had done, Xenophon calls it a "voice" (φωνή *Ap.* 12). Whereas Plato regularly employed the term σημειῖον, Xenophon prefers to predicate the verb (προ-)σημαίνειν of the divine sign's activities (cf. *Mem.* 1.1.2, 4, *Ap.* 13). For the instances in which the divine sign opposes Socrates, Xenophon occasionally uses the word ἐναντιοῦμαι (*Ap.* 4, 8). Xenophon also is at pains to defend the infallibility of the divine sign (cf. *Ap.* 4ff., *Mem.* 4.8.1f.), and it is no more a manifestation of conscience in Xenophon than it was in Plato.

The differences between the descriptions in Plato and Xenophon are, however, considerable. In the first place, Xenophon has more to say about Socrates' sign, which is hardly surprising when one considers his apologetic purpose and the connection he draws between τὸ δαιμόνιον and the accusations of impiety which were brought against Socrates (see below). Secondly, while the tone of the Platonic Socrates in speaking of the divine sign often seems ironic or whimsical,<sup>10</sup> Xenophon's Socrates is in strict earnest about the topic of τὸ δαιμόνιον. Additionally, it seems likely that Xenophon's notion of what made Socrates' sign unique was its spontaneity, which is not the characteristic that made Plato view it as distinct (see below). But most significantly, the persistence with which the apotropaic element is observed in Plato's portrait is largely disregarded by Xenophon. He still speaks of its prohibitive functions, as when his Socrates remarks that the divine sign prevented his attempts to prepare a defence for his trial (*Mem.* 4.8.5, *Ap.* 4). But this facet of the sign is entirely shrouded by frequent assertions, first, that it also prompted Socrates to carry out, rather than simply abstain from, a given course of action (*Mem.*

<sup>10</sup>E.g. in the *Euthd.*, *Phdr.*, and *Tht.* passages mentioned above.



4.3.13, 4.8.1), and second, that its apotropaic and protreptic powers were directed towards Socrates' associates as well (*Mem.* 1.1.4). In Xenophon's view the sign is neither for Socrates' utility alone, nor merely protreptic.

Before examining the portions of *Thg.* that deal with Socrates' divine sign, it would be well to consider a little further the respective treatments accorded it in Plato and Xenophon. For if plausible explanations to account for the different approaches taken towards the phenomenon can be put forward, this should constitute a background against which the intentions and tendencies of the author of *Thg.* may emerge with greater clarity. Since I am here concerned ultimately with the method of composition in the divine sign section of *Thg.*, there is no advantage in pronouncing on the relative authenticity of the two accounts, a problem which properly belongs to a study of the historical Socrates. The texts must speak for themselves.

Xenophon has been described as "religious with the religion of the plain and honest man,"<sup>11</sup> and indeed there is much conventional piety to be found throughout the pages of his works. This is nowhere truer than in the opening portions of *Mem.* Acutely aware of the charges of irreligion brought against Socrates, and prompt in connecting Socrates' divine sign with these charges, Xenophon offers an explanation and defence of its existence by means of arguments calculated to be most intelligible to other Greeks who shared his own religious presuppositions, in other words, to a large segment of the Athenian population. His argument essentially runs: Everyone makes use of omens, voices, tokens, and sacrifices, in an attempt to determine the future, and everyone admits that signs which are generally accepted as betokening a future event are simply media, the

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<sup>11</sup>Guthrie, *HGP* III. 334.

instruments of the gods. Most people say that they are urged forward or checked by these signs, and it was no different with Socrates and his divine sign. It showed him both what to do and what not to do (1.1.4 τὰ μὲν ποιεῖν, τὰ δὲ μὴ ποιεῖν, cf. 4.8.1), and Socrates functioned as an agent of the will of god for his friends as well. What is obscure to people ought to be learned from the gods through μαντική, and the gods give a sign to those to whom they are propitious (1.1.9). Hence Xenophon, through a rather orthodox filter, interprets all aspects of Socrates' sign, as far as he can, as fairly typical features of Greek religious experience. To Xenophon the sign is just another instance of familiar mediumistic activity which should never have aroused the suspicion it did, for like other such phenomena it existed for the public good, and not for any individual alone. In conventional terms Socrates might simply have been called εὐδαίμων. This at any rate seems to be the perspective from which Xenophon evaluated the divine sign, and evidently he felt that the opprobrium attaching to Socrates from popular stories about it could be mitigated by assimilating it into a common strand of Greek religious life.<sup>12</sup>

Such an analysis of Xenophon's disposition toward Socrates' divine sign receives corroboration from an overlooked passage in that author's *Apology*. As already mentioned, both Xenophon and Plato employ a wide variety of terms in order to allude to the same thing, τὸ δαιμόνιον. Viewed from one side, this flexibility of nomenclature no doubt reflects the indeterminate nature of the sign, as perceived by Socrates as well as by

<sup>12</sup>See Zeller II.1<sup>5</sup> 75 n.2; Joël I.71ff.; Maier 450f.; Gigon *ad X. Mem.* 1.1.2ff.; Guthrie *HGP III*. 403-4. In this connection it may be significant that Xenophon in *Mem.* 1.1.4 uses the verb σημαίνειν absolutely ("give a sign"), as it is applied to the divine sign (τὸ δαιμόνιον γὰρ ἔφη σημαίνειν); for a very similar use, but of Apollo, cf. Heraclitus DK 22B93 ὁ ἄναξ οὐ τὸ μαντεῖόν ἐστι τὸ ἐν Δελφοῖς οὔτε λέγει οὔτε κρύπτει ἀλλὰ σημαίνει.

the writer in question. At the same time, however, Plato provides much information that allows us to assume that his use of multiple epithets was in fact part of a deliberate effort by him not simply to describe the indescribable, but rather to dissociate Socrates' sign from the general run of δαίμονες; for δαίμων, while it is never applied by Plato to the sign, is precisely the word one might have expected to find (see below). Xenophon also, whether following Plato or not, avoids using the word δαίμων of Socrates' divine sign. But in one place in *Ap.* the distinction between τὸ δαιμόνιον, φωνή, etc., and δαίμων, clearly begins to break down. There Socrates is made to speak first about his divine sign, and then about Chairephon's questioning of the Delphic oracle (*Ap.* 13-4). The connection between the two reports is effected by the following sentence: "Ἄγε δὴ ἀκούσατε καὶ ἄλλα, ἵνα ἔτι μᾶλλον οἱ βουλόμενοι ὑμῶν ἀπιστῶσι τῷ ἐμῇ τετιμῆσθαι ὑπὸ δαιμόνων. Even allowing for a certain looseness of expression in the text, a couple of inferences can be firmly drawn. First, Xenophon's treatment of the two topics, the divine sign and the Apolline prophecy, in *Ap.* 13-4, demonstrates no real concern to distinguish them as separate and unrelated phenomena; instead they are classified as elements of one aspect of Socrates' life, viz., that he enjoyed heaven's special favour, a general point of view which is punctuated and highlighted by the ensuing reference and comparison to the oracular utterances concerning Lycurgus (15). Moreover, whereas in Plato's *Ap.* the Delphic response is made the foundation of Socrates' mission (20e6-23c1), and the divine sign is put forward as the cause both of his avoidance of political life, and of his calm acceptance of the outcome of his trial (31c4-32a3, 40a2-c3), Xenophon evidently has no interest in the divine sign or the Delphic oracle's response *per se*. Xenophon's juxtaposition of

the divine sign with the much more familiar component of religious belief is therefore perfectly consistent with his attitude towards what he saw to be the oracular and prophetic role of the sign in Socrates' daily life. The second, and critical, point is that Xenophon, in describing the special advantage Socrates enjoyed at the hands of the gods, employs the phrase ὑπὸ δαιμόνων. These words undoubtedly have a fairly general reference, in as much as they are being used in a sentence describing Socrates' relationship with the gods as a whole: they point back to the preceding lines as well as to Socrates' further reports (ἄλλα). Nevertheless, ὑπὸ δαιμόνων must reveal the true light in which Xenophon apprehended Socrates' divine sign: the "voice" which belonged to Socrates alone was demonstrable evidence of how highly he was honoured by δαίμονες. Hence we may surmise that Xenophon saw Socrates' "voice" or "sign" quite simply as the direct work of a δαίμων; this might have been deduced from other passages, but here in any case Xenophon comes closer to its explicit acknowledgement than anybody does before the middle-Platonists (see sec. d).<sup>13</sup> And that this direct connection of Socrates' sign with a δαίμων stems from an essentially popular view of mediumistic activity can, I think, hardly be questioned.<sup>14</sup>

In Plato, as we saw earlier, Socrates' sign is considered unique; but in what this uniqueness consists Plato never explicitly tells his reader. Presumably, however, its special quality is something that prompted Socrates (or Plato) to attach the term τὸ δαιμόνιον (or other sobriquets) to the sign, rather than the conventional ὁ δαίμων. Whereas a specific

<sup>13</sup>Zeller no doubt could sustain the following remark (II.15 73) only by athetizing X. Ap.: "An kleiner Stelle einer platonischen oder xenophontischen Schrift ist wirklich von dem Verkehr des Sokrates mit einem Dämon die Rede, sondern immer nur von einem göttlichen oder dämonischen Zeichen, von einer Stimme...."

<sup>14</sup>See Burkert 179-181.

body of inherited belief was conjured up by the word δαίμων, τὸ δαιμόνιον was vague enough to allow Socrates (and Plato) to speak of the phenomenon without committing himself to a declaration of its precise nature.<sup>15</sup> For this reason the common rendering of τὸ δαιμόνιον as "the *daimonion*" ought ideally to be avoided in each instance, since the deliberately imprecise conception of it transmitted by Plato becomes lost in the process.<sup>16</sup> For this reason also, assertions that the word δαιμόνιον in this peculiar Socratic context is being used sometimes adjectivally, sometimes substantively,<sup>17</sup> are misdirected; Plato's Socrates has no desire to personalize the sign.<sup>18</sup> Further, Plato has much to say about δαίμονες, but unquestionably those deities which, in his system, attend all people,<sup>19</sup> are not to be precisely identified with Socrates' sign, for, on Plato's evidence, how could it have been so commonplace an element of religious belief?<sup>20</sup> The application of the term δαίμων to Socrates' sign would therefore have constituted a vulgarization (to which, as we saw, Xenophon inclines) and would have provoked confusion; thus Plato assiduously avoids it in this context. There is full justification in holding therefore that τὸ δαιμόνιον and ὁ δαίμων were not seen to be the

<sup>15</sup>Cf. the vague use of the phrase τὸ δαιμόνιον in *R.* 382e6; *Hdt.* 2.120; *Dem.* 19.239 οἱ θεοὶ δ' εἴσονται καὶ τὸ δαιμόνιον τὸν μὴ τὰ δίκαια ψηφισάμενον; *Arist. Rh.* 1398<sup>a</sup>15 shows clearly the ambiguous use to which the phrase could be put: οἷον ὅτι τὸ δαιμόνιον οὐδὲν ἐστὶν ἀλλ' ἢ θεὸς ἢ θεοῦ ἔργον; *Hipp. [?] Morb. Sacr.* 3 ὅτε πολὺς αὐτοῖς τοῦ λόγου ἐς τὸ θεῖον ἀφήκει καὶ τὸ δαιμόνιον.

<sup>16</sup>See Friedlander I.33; J. Beckman, *The Religious Dimension of Socrates' Thought* (Waterloo, 1979) 77 (who however speaks of "the δαιμόνιον"). Schleiermacher (I.2. 432f.) first did the service of stressing the indeterminate nature of the references to the divine sign.

<sup>17</sup>So R.E. MacNaghten, *CR* 28 (1914) 187ff.; according to Zeller (II.1<sup>5</sup> 73 n.6), it is used adjectivally in Plato, substantively in Xenophon.

<sup>18</sup>See Burnet *ad Euthphr.* 3b5.

<sup>19</sup>Cf. *R.* 620d8ff., *Phd.* 107d6-7, *Ti.* 90a2ff.

<sup>20</sup>Rist 15f. is especially valuable on this point.

same; Plato certainly did not equate the two in speaking of Socrates, even though in later times the distinction was not carefully upheld,<sup>21</sup> and modern writers have frequently used question-begging phrases such as "the *daemon* of Socrates."<sup>22</sup> Plato, it would seem, sought carefully to distinguish Socrates' sign from common and hackneyed aspects of religious thought and sentiment.<sup>23</sup>

Yet the term τὸ δαιμόνιον cannot but indicate that the phenomenon was vaguely recognized as in some sense intermediary, in other words that, though not a δαίμων, it was somehow demonological in character. Nor was it possible for Plato completely to avoid describing Socrates' sign in terms that at least sound traditionally demonological, for the statement that it originated from Socrates' childhood (*Ap.* 31d1-2 ἐκ παιδὸς ἀρξάμενον) calls to mind a detail reminiscent of popular beliefs about δαίμονες, namely that a δαίμων attaches itself to a person from birth.<sup>24</sup> Moreover, we have already seen that Xenophon, going so far in one place as almost to call the sign a δαίμων outright, quite thoroughly assimilates Socrates' sign into a stream of popular religious beliefs, and

<sup>21</sup>E.g., Procl. in *Alc.* 60ff.; Herm. in *Phdr.* 93-4; Lactant. *Div. Inst.* 2.14.9; Tert. *Apol.* 22.1, 46.5; Min. Fel. 26.9; Calc. in *Ti.* 168.

<sup>22</sup>E.g. Socher 97f. ("kleiner daimon"); Grote 436ff.; J.-A. Hild, *Étude sur les Demons dans la littérature et la religion des Grecs* (Paris, 1881) 243ff.; J. Souilhé, *La notion platonicienne d'intermédiaire* (Paris, 1919) 198; J. Brun, *Socrates* (Eng. tr.) (New York, 1962) 64-78; and many others.

<sup>23</sup>For an attempt to show that Plato's consistent avoidance of the term δαίμων in referring to Socrates' divine sign was a denial of old religious concepts, exemplified in tragedy, see A. Cameron, *Plato's Affair with Tragedy* (Cincinnati, 1978) 36ff.

<sup>24</sup>Cf. Men. fr. 550 K. ἅπαντι δαίμων ἀνδρὶ συμπαρίσταται εὐθὺς γενομένῳ μυσταγωγὸς τοῦ βίου; the same idea is behind *Phd.* 107d6-7 ὁ ἐκάστου δαίμων, ὅσπερ ζῶντα εἰλήχει κτλ. (Plato however rebuts this traditional way of thinking in *R.* 617e1); see Wilamowitz, *Der Glaube* β 362; Dodds, *G. and I.* 42. It also seems possible that Plato was drawing upon colloquial usage in employing γίγνομαι to describe the occurrence of the sign; at any rate, it is so used with φωνή very frequently in the New Testament (see F.F. Bruce, *The Acts of the Apostles*<sup>2</sup> [London, 1952] 83).

tends to attribute qualities to Socrates' sign which indicate that the difference between δαίμονες and τὸ δαιμόνιον was probably in his mind not sharply discernible.<sup>25</sup> Where Plato and Xenophon part company is in the degree to which each feels at liberty to describe Socrates' sign in terms that directly recall δαίμονες. Plato consciously reacted against any tendency to do so, while Xenophon may not even have clearly perceived any need for a real distinction.

Generalizations may tend to mislead, but here I think a few summary remarks about the respective treatments of τὸ δαιμόνιον in Plato and Xenophon are in order. Xenophon's discussions on this topic are everywhere conditioned by a desire, consonant with his apologetic intentions, to integrate Socrates' sign into an orthodox strand of belief, and he accomplishes this for the most part by setting the sign, as far as he is able, comfortably alongside accepted forms of prophecy. As well, he attempts to show that the special favour that Socrates apparently enjoyed was not unparalleled. Plato's intentions clearly have little in common with Xenophon's. Far from wishing to exonerate Socrates of the claim to the exclusive enjoyment of a unique gift, Plato maintains the sharp distinction, conceptually and linguistically, between Socrates' divine sign and δαίμονες. To judge from the scant information on which we may draw, it was precisely attempts such as Xenophon's to popularize the divine sign that Plato militated against. Plato, in sharp contrast with Xenophon's purpose, was concerned to demonstrate that Socrates' divine sign had nothing to do with oracles or δαίμονες. It was, on the contrary, seen by Plato to be another aspect of Socrates' ἀτοπία, and, apparently, he was honest enough to represent τὸ δαιμόνιον for what he thought it actually was.

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<sup>25</sup>See Rist 17.

*b. τὸ δαιμόνιον in the Theages*

The literary picture of the divine sign which the author of *Thg.* inherited must, if my conclusions about date of composition are essentially correct (see *Intr.* ch. V, *f*), have been basically as sketched above. Among the similarities between the presentation of the divine sign in *Thg.* (128d1-130e4, but 130e5ff. will be considered also) and the depiction of it in Plato and Xenophon are numerous details in the activities ascribed to it, and in the author's description of the sign itself. Hence the sign is τι... δαιμόνιον (128d2-3), (ἡ) φωνή (128d3, e3, 5), τὸ εἰωθὸς σημεῖον τὸ δαιμόνιον (129b8), τὸ σημεῖον (129d3, 5), τὸ δαιμόνιον (129e1-2, e7-8); the simple occurrence of it is signified by γίγνεται (d4, d6, e3, etc.), while the verb σημαίνει, which was more common in Xenophon than in Plato, is also in evidence here (d4, e6); its intervention is indicated once by ἐναντιοῦμαι (129e3); it also occurs in the midst of an act (μεταξύ 128e5), and when someone is on the verge of acting (μέλλω 128e2, e3). The author's vocabulary for describing the divine sign is therefore very similar to that of Plato and Xenophon,<sup>26</sup> but it is worth noting that the familiar term τὸ δαιμόνιον usually occurs in an oblique case (genitive) in *Thg.* (128e5, 129e1-2, e7-8, 131a2), whereas in Plato it appears in the nominative in all instances but one (*Ap.* 40a4).<sup>27</sup> Also, in *Thg.* the term δύναμις governs τὸ δαιμόνιον on two of these occasions (129e1, e7-8); this specific use, which will be discussed in detail below, is nowhere to be found in Plato or Xenophon, although it does occur in *Alc. I* (103a4-6; see sec. c). As for the events in which the divine

<sup>26</sup>See Willing 139-40.

<sup>27</sup>See comm. ad 128e5.



sign takes part, conformably with the picture drawn in Plato and Xenophon it does not function as an aspect of conscience, since it occurs simply to prevent Socrates' companions from committing acts which are not in their best interests; there is no question of the "health of the soul" if someone disobeys the warnings of τὸ δαιμόνιον (see comm. *ad* 128d1-129d8). These then are a few of the similarities which *Thg.* 128d1-*fin.* shares with the Platonic and Xenophontic portraits of the sign. However, much more enlightening are the differences, and these must occupy the largest share of the following discussion.

The author of *Thg.* attempts to establish at once (128d2-5) his perspective for treating of the divine sign by quoting, with small (but, as we shall see, not unimportant) changes, a famous passage from *Ap.* 31c7-d4.<sup>28</sup> As *Thg.* in a number of ways is constructed as a Platonic work (see *Intr.* ch. I, *b*, *v*; *c*), so also the conception of the sign is placed on an equal footing with that of Plato's by the invoking of this *locus classicus* for τὸ δαιμόνιον. We are assured that the divine sign is only apotropaic (προτρέπει δὲ οὐδέποτε d5), as it had been in Plato. But no sooner does the semi-quotation of the *Ap.* passage end than a feature which never surfaces elsewhere in the Corpus is added to the initial description: the sign is at the direct service of Socrates' friends as well, for if the "voice" comes when Socrates is communicating with an acquaintance, that person must by implication desist from what he has set out to do (d5-7). And so unlike its performance in the Platonic instances recounted above, the

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<sup>28</sup>The connection of *Thg.* with this passage in *Ap.* has, of course, been remarked upon often, e.g., Stallbaum 223; Schleiermacher 351; H. Müller 464; Heidel 53; Pavlu 28-9. Defenders of authenticity seem to be particularly uncomfortable about this correspondence. Grote, Friedländer, and Pangle, e.g., do not even mention it; and Knebel confronts the similarity by asserting that Plato in both *Ap.* and *Thg.* was merely reproducing the words which Socrates himself used to describe the divine sign, thus producing the close verbal parallels in the respective passages of the two dialogues. But few people, I think, will feel compelled to believe that the words in the *Ap.* passage are necessarily Socrates' own.

divine sign in *Thg.* is not merely for the advantage of Socrates. This is a feature, on the other hand, which Xenophon did not eschew; yet Xenophon never quite gives his reader what the author of *Thg.* at this point provides, namely examples (128d7 μάρτυρας) of the truth of Socrates' statement about the efficacy of the sign in his associations with others. Has Xenophon directly influenced the representation of the sign in this part of *Thg.*? Since other data must be collected before a judgement can be made on this question, a consideration of it must be postponed until the conclusion of this chapter.

What we may clearly infer here, however, is that when Socrates' sign is said in *Thg.* to benefit his friends as well as Socrates himself, we are dealing with the admission of a popular element, as comparison with the Xenophontic accounts demonstrates. This description of τὸ δαιμόνιον tends to blur the distinction between Socrates' sign on the one hand and conventional δαίμονες on the other; but the author of *Thg.*, in the short compass of the passage that he has paraphrased from *Ap.*, has added a couple of further details which produce a similar effect

τὸ δαιμόνιον, we are told in 128d2, attends Socrates θεία μοίρα. This phrase is an accretion onto the original *Ap.* passage, and nowhere else (as far as I can discover) is Socrates' sign ever said to attend him θεία μοίρα.<sup>29</sup> I have already drawn attention (see *Intr.* ch. I, *b*, *vii*) to the role this concept plays within the structure of the dialogue at this point, and to the character of Socratic συνουσία in *Thg.* But the use of the phrase is rather complex, and it is worth considering why it is so closely

<sup>29</sup>The expression has a long and complex history, into which there is no need to delve here; see, e.g., W.C. Greene, *Moirai: Fate, Good, and Evil in Greek Thought* (Cambridge, Mass., 1944); E.G. Berry, *The History and Development of the Concept of ΘΕΙΑ ΜΟΙΡΑ and ΘΕΙΑ ΤΥΧΗ down to and including Plato* (Diss. Chicago, 1940); B.C. Dietrich, *Death, Fate, and the Gods* (London, 1965) 59-90, 194-231.

associated here (and only here) specifically with τὸ δαιμόνιον. It may be argued that it never even occurred to Plato to employ the phrase elsewhere in connection with Socrates' sign, or that its appearance here simply underlines the unique favour Socrates was shown by the attachment to him of τὸ δαιμόνιον. But given the frequency in classical and earlier Greek literature with which a δαίμων is closely connected in one way or another with θεία μοῖρα, or with its variant θεία τύχη,<sup>30</sup> it seems likely that Plato studiously avoided linking it up with τὸ δαιμόνιον, because to his way of thinking the connection would have set Socrates' sign squarely in the realm of the conventional run of δαίμονες. True, Socrates claims (*Ap.* 33 c4-7) that the signs which were sent to him indicating that he must take up his mission of elenchus were conveyed to him by θεία μοῖρα (nominative). These signs, however, are to be carefully distinguished from the "messages" Socrates received from τὸ δαιμόνιον, for the commands sent to him by god through dreams and oracles (ἐκ μαντείων καὶ ἐξ ἐνυπνίων) gave positive instructions (πράττειν c5), while τὸ δαιμόνιον was, of course, apotropaic.<sup>31</sup> Certainly in *Ap.* Plato did not wish to merge these two phenomena. But we need not believe that the author of *Thg.* considered himself to be under any restrictions of this kind; for, if I may anticipate some later arguments in this chapter, he clearly felt quite free, as had Xenophon, to "de-mystify" the divine sign by classifying it

<sup>30</sup>E.g. δαίμων and (θεία) μοῖρα/τύχη virtually equated or coupled: *S. Ph.* 1466-8; *E. IA* 1136, *Ion* 1512-14, *Hel.* 213, *Cyc.* 606-7, fr.901.2 Nauck; *Lys.* 13.63; δαίμων proceeding from θεία μοῖρα: *Ar. Thesm.* 1047; (θεία) μοῖρα/τύχη allotted by (or to) a δαίμων: *Pi. Ol.* 8.62; *A. Pers.* 602; *E. Andr.* 1007-8, *Heracl.* 934, fr.37 Nauck; *Lys.* 2.78. For the relationship, see Wilamowitz, *Der Glaube* β 356f.; R.P. Winnington-Ingram, *Sophocles: An Interpretation* (Cambridge, 1980) 187.

<sup>31</sup>Moreover, Socrates' mission was enjoined on him in adulthood, whereas τὸ δαιμόνιον, as we have already seen, had attended him since childhood.

as a species of *μαντική* or of oracular utterances generally. And the author would have had sound Platonic precedent behind his connection of *θεία μοῖρα* with (what he took to be) a prophetic phenomenon: not only is this connection made in the *Ap.* passage, but in *Phdr.* 244a6ff. as well. Socrates remarks that the prophetic madness is one of the greatest goods, adding the condition (a7-8) *θεία μέντοι δόσει διδομένης* (where *θεία...δόσει* is virtually equivalent to *θεία μοῖρα* [cf. c3]). In his use of *θεία μοῖρα* the author of *Thg.* demonstrates that he has a more specific notion than Plato, and probably Socrates, held, of where *τὸ δαιμόνιον* might fit within a conventional framework of religious belief. That it accompanies Socrates *θεία μοῖρα* strongly suggests the association in popular belief of that phrase and concept with *δαίμονες* (he appears even to have a specific *δαίμων* in mind, see sec. c [fin.]), and at the same time it seems hardly fortuitous that both Plato and the author of *Thg.* should use the same phrase of phenomena that are seen by the respective authors as essentially prophetic.

Further confirmation of the author's tendency to view *τὸ δαιμόνιον* in the light of *δαίμονες* is provided by the appearance alongside *θεία μοῖρα* of the participle *παρεπόμενον* (128d2): from childhood the sign has "attended" Socrates. Again this word does not occur in the parent passage in *Ap.*, and again its presence must be significant. Never in the Corpus, apart from its appearance in this place, is *ἔπομαι* or any of its compounds used in conjunction with the activities of the sign. Yet the word is frequently applied to the behaviour of *δαίμονες*, both in Plato and elsewhere.<sup>32</sup> And so, while it may be offered once more that Plato did not

<sup>32</sup>Cf., e.g., *Phdr.* 246e6, *Lg.* 730a1-2, 848d2; of *τις...τῶν κρείττωνων* in *Sph.* 216 b4; cf. also, e.g., the passage of Plotinus quoted in n.80.

deliberately avoid using the word in connection with Socrates' sign, the specific demonological applications of ἔπομαι, and the coincident appearance of θεῖα μοῖρα, to my mind strongly rule this possibility out. In fact, it seems quite obvious why Plato in the other dialogues did not use this word of τὸ δαιμόνιον: it implies the omnipresence of the sign and its consequent status as a "guardian angel," carefully watching over and protecting a person at all times<sup>33</sup>; yet never in the other relevant Platonic passages is this stressed as an aspect or characteristic of the divine sign,<sup>34</sup> and only once can it be inferred - perhaps doubtfully - from a certainly genuine text in the Corpus (see above sec. a). Thus ἔπομαι and its compounds are often, quite naturally, part of the reservoir of language applied to conventional δαίμονες, and come to be used of Socrates' divine sign centuries later.<sup>35</sup> But Plato, not eager to confuse these with τὸ δαιμόνιον, strictly avoided the verb in the context of Socrates' sign.

Having suggested therefore that the divine sign section of *Thg.* commences from the position of the classic Platonic description, but concomitantly vulgarizes that description, first by introducing details concerning δαίμονες and prophetic warnings that are more closely related to beliefs of popular religion, and then by extending the activity of the sign to include apotropaic warnings for Socrates' friends, we should expect that

<sup>33</sup>In *Thg.* this is further emphasized by the παρ- prefix of παρεπόμενον; see on 122a7 παρεφάνης. The role which a δαίμων plays as guardian in Greek belief is obviously very old, cf. Hes. *WD* 121ff.

<sup>34</sup>Thus Plato's regular use of the instantaneous γίγνεσθαι in connection with the sign. In *Alc. I* 124c5-10 ὁ θεός, which in that dialogue is identified with τὸ δαιμόνιον, is called by Socrates ὁ ἐπίτροπος ὁ ἐμὸς (c5); on the divine sign in *Alc. I* see below sec. c.

<sup>35</sup>E.g. Max. Tyr. 8.1. We are also reminded of the later classification of Socrates' divine sign as a δαίμων πάρεδρος or *daemon assiduus* (see J. Den Boeft, *Calcidius on Demons* [Leiden, 1977] 2).

from this point forward other evidence will emerge to support the initial impressions of a systematically popularized divine sign.

This, I think, is unambiguously the case. Taking as a whole the first part of the divine sign section (128d8-129d8), it is noticeable that three of the four stories that are related involve incidents which may be characterized as "typical" occasions for prophecy, viz., athletic contests and military expeditions (see comm. *ad* 128d1-129d8, 129d3). Moreover, in the course of these narrative accounts Socrates emerges in his behaviour as a "warner" or "wise adviser," a figure especially familiar from Herodotus (see comm. *ad* 128d1-129d8); and the dramatic quality of the Charmides and Timarchus episodes appears to be as important as any "message" which Socrates attempts to convey through the recounting of the stories (see comm. *ad* 128d8-129c8). The medium of expression for these stories, the anecdote, is also noteworthy. In *Ap.* 31c7-8 Socrates mentions that his fellow citizens had often heard him alleging his divine sign as the reason for his inactivity in public life. This is in itself strong evidence of something we could have safely inferred anyway, that the sign was well known among Socrates' contemporaries, not to mention his closest companions. Combine with this the piece of information in *Ap.* 40a5-6, that the sign came to Socrates even on quite trivial occasions, and we may well suppose that the divine sign early became a subject for anecdotes not unlike the kind we encounter in *Thg.* Wide circulation and trite subject matter are the essence of an anecdotal tradition, and as a form of communication anecdotes generally represent an impure and vulgarized (and often oral) form of biography (see also *Intr.* ch. I, *b*, *vii*). Significantly, it is through anecdotes that we first encounter Socrates, in Aristophanes' *Nu.*; and much of Xeno-

phon's *Mem.* assumes the form of collected anecdotes (see comm. *ad* 128d1-130e10).

The most serious questions about this first part of the divine sign section arise when specific details of exposition are scrutinized. The first account, concerning Charmides (128d8-129a1), is of least interest in this respect;<sup>36</sup> it involves the occurrence of the sign when someone other than Socrates himself is to desist from a particular course of action. The Timarchus episode (129a1-c8), on the other hand, must be examined more closely. Once its considerable dramatic persiflage has been set aside, a single striking feature confronts the reader. As the matter stands in this account, the efficacy of Socrates' sign is beyond any doubt only so long as Socrates is fully cognizant of Timarchus' attempt to depart from the symposium to undertake the assassination which he and Philemon have plotted. The sign comes to Socrates the first two times Timarchus tries to leave the drinking party, after he has announced his departure to Socrates; Socrates thus has the opportunity to check Timarchus. On his third attempt to depart, Timarchus is careful to leave when Socrates' attention is directed elsewhere; the result is that the sign, which would otherwise indicate that something is amiss, fails to occur to Socrates. Hence, any claim to omniscience which could have been made for the sign is here lost.

In the commentary (*ad* 129c3-5) I have considered what the consequences of this passage must be for our judgement of the author's conception of the divine sign, and they accord closely with the notion of τὸ δαιμόνιον as a product of popularization. Simply put, they are 1) that the idea of a "fallible omniscience" in θεοί and δαίμονες, of the kind just

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<sup>36</sup>Some brief comment is made in the commentary (*ad* 128d8-129a1) on the actual method of composition of this anecdote; the dialogue *Chrm.* was possibly its inspiration.

described, is compatible with conventional Greek religious feeling (especially for δαίμονες, which share the qualities of men and gods), and 2) that Socrates was, on the other hand, if not unique, at least characteristic in his religious attitudes by a belief in the *absolute* omniscience of deities. The Timarchus story, therefore, runs strongly counter to the religious beliefs that we might regard as reasonably compatible with Socrates' own, while at the same time it betrays the intrusion of elements which derive from a commonplace stratum in religious thought.

The third report concerns the Sicilian expedition. This short account does not even expressly connect the sign with Socrates' warning of disaster, and provides little material for the present discussion (see comm. *ad* 129c8-d2 on the historicity of the warning). Such evidence as it does furnish will be considered in conjunction with a particular aspect of the story following it.

In the fourth anecdote (129d3-8) the divine sign receives some further elaboration. Especially peculiar is the sentence d3-4 πείραν δ' ἔξεστι νυνὶ λαβεῖν τοῦ σημείου εἰ ἄρα τὸ λέγει. Evidence is collected in the commentary (*ad loc.*) to demonstrate that the phrase πείραν λαβεῖν has a distinctive use in Plato, and indeed to an extent in Aristotle as well, in connection with dialectical processes, specifically with the "putting to the test" of an interlocutor. The phrase εἰ ἄρα τὸ λέγει in this context is also unusual because the subject of λέγει is τὸ σημεῖον. The language of the sentence as a whole, in other words, is of a kind that one would expect to find applied to one of Socrates' interlocutors rather than to τὸ δαιμόνιον. Consequently, we might be tempted to identify this as the product of a writer imbued with the language of Socratic dialectic, who has confounded the customary functions of question and an-



swer in the Socratic tradition with the very limited and peculiar operations of the divine sign. And perhaps this is supported by the fact that the author, as will be pointed out later in this chapter, takes a serious step in the final section of the dialogue by substituting the workings of the divine sign for active philosophical dialectic. However, it would be best to set aside speculation about the subconscious state of mind which gave rise to the particular language that we encounter here. But what can be safely inferred is that the author envisages τὸ δαιμόνιον as an entity susceptible of language which is more familiar and precise in its reference than either Plato or even Xenophon had ventured to use.

My own feeling is that this way of speaking about the sign could only have come from a person who viewed it in conventional deistic terms, for I see no reason to doubt that in this anecdote the main influence on the author's conception of a prophetic "sign" that can be put to the test is the paradigm of the oracular utterance. As we saw a moment ago, the author of *Thg.* applies language to the divine sign which is quite regularly used for procedures of elenchus. Certainly outside of *Thg.* no work in the Corpus speaks in this fashion about τὸ δαιμόνιον. Yet that the author here is not actually thinking of philosophical dialectic, but rather of the testing of an oracle, would seem to be supported by a fairly obvious parallel in *Ap.* Socrates has just revealed to his jurors (20e6-21a8) the response from the Delphic oracle which Chairephon received to his famous question. Doubting that he can be in any sense σοφός, Socrates sets out to "refute" the oracle (ἐλέγξων τὸ μαντεῖον 21c1). The process of refutation consists of nothing less than the questioning of the politicians, poets, and craftsmen (21c3-22e5), and the outcome is, of course, ἀνέλεγκτος ἡ μαντεία (22a7-8). Hence we can observe that in both *Thg.* and *Ap.*

phraseology which might be considered compatible with Socratic cross-examination is employed, in one case (and with full amplification) of an oracular utterance, in another of Socrates' divine sign, and in each instance that which is put to the test is not found wanting. It seems to me entirely plausible that Socrates' application of the language of ἔλεγχος to the testing of an oracular utterance in *Ap.* set our author onto the use of similar language in the context of Socrates' sign. However this may be, it is not difficult to deduce the reason why Plato himself does not elsewhere speak of "putting to the test" τὸ δαιμόνιον: that is what one may do to an oracle, but Socrates' sign, in so far as it was unique, was not to be confused with this. In fact, it never occurs to Plato's Socrates to question the truth of his sign's warnings. On the other hand Xenophon's Socrates, who uses words that are, again, conditioned by Xenophon's overwhelming tendency to view τὸ δαιμόνιον merely as another form of oracular phenomenon, is by no means above this.<sup>37</sup> Similarly, the assimilation of all prophetic utterances under one classification seems also to have taken place in *Thg.* 129d3-4 (and the second anecdote showed that the Socrates of this dialogue cannot take for granted the sign's infallibility).

This same episode is peculiar in another respect, for along with the report that precedes it, it would seem to indicate that the apotropaic force of the divine sign is not restricted, as it now turns out, to Socrates or his friends, but extends to deliberations which are being made by the πόλις

<sup>37</sup>*Ap.* 13-14 ὥς γε μὴν οὐ ψεύδομαι κατὰ τοῦ θεοῦ καὶ τοῦτ' ἔχω τεκμήριον· καὶ γὰρ τῶν φίλων πολλοῖς δὴ ἐξαγγείλας τὰ τοῦ θεοῦ συμβουλευμάτων οὐδεπώποτε ψευσάμενος ἐφάνην (cf. also *Mem.* 1.1.5). The verb ἀνακοινῶται, "consult," is used somewhat illogically in 128d6 (cf. 128e2) of our dialogue (see comm. *ad loc.*), and it rather looks as though the "consulting" of Socrates is seen in terms of the consulting of an oracular authority. Much later, in the first Socratic epistle, the assimilation of Socrates' sign with the Delphic oracle is actually complete (*Socr. Ep.* 1.8-10).

at large.<sup>38</sup> In the previous account we are told that Socrates foresaw the destruction of the Sicilian expedition; in the present one we learn that the sign came to him upon Sannio's departure on a military expedition to Ionia, and this has now caused Socrates concern for both Sannio and the expedition in which he is involved. This evolution of the divine sign's sphere of influence is consistent, again, with the tendency in these stories for the sign to be assimilated into conventional perspectives about the proper role and performance of all prophetic statements. As we have seen, Xenophon developed the sign in the same direction by classifying it as one more instance among several of *μαντική*. Whether in this story the sign has also taken the substantial leap of endowing Socrates with the ability to predict unerringly another's actual fate, rather than simply to forewarn disaster, if that person disobeys the warnings of the sign, as has been assumed,<sup>39</sup> is another matter. It seems entirely natural that, if the divine sign, apotropaic in nature, occurred when a friend of Socrates' was departing on a military expedition, and that he either did not heed Socrates' warnings, or did not have the opportunity to obey them, the ultimate personal disaster in this connection will be death; it does not require special mantic powers to envisage this. It may be noted that Socrates does not lay special claim to the adamant force of his predictions: he "thinks" (*οἶομαι* d7) that Sannio will die, or suffer something almost as bad, and he "fears" (*φοβοῦμαι* d8) for the fate of the expedition generally.

It is clear, then, that in this first part of the divine sign section of *Thg.* the activities of Socrates' sign have been enhanced. It remains apotropaic, as it had been in the other related passages of the Platonic Corpus, but it is

<sup>38</sup>See Schleiermacher 173; Tarrant, *CQ* 32 (1938) 172.

<sup>39</sup>See Tarrant, *ib.* 172.

now at the service of Socrates' friends as much as it is at his own behest, and also offers apotropaic warnings in connection with public policy. As well, some new methods of describing τὸ δαιμόνιον are invoked, which seem to derive from and reflect popular and conventional concepts about δαίμονες, or about deities in general. Comparison with Xenophon's description of the sign, as well as with Plato's references to oracular utterances, would also seem to reinforce the notion that the author of *Thg.* approached the divine sign as though it were a phenomenon explicable within a framework of commonplace religious belief. And finally, the medium of communication in use here, i.e. the anecdote, generally reflects the essentially popular viewpoint which is established in these stories.

These are findings which are developed and reinforced by the second part of the divine sign section (129e1-130e4). As argued in the introductory chapter on the structure of this dialogue (see *Intr.* ch. I, *b*, *vii*), a dislocation can be detected between 128d7-129d8 and 129e1-130e4, which suggests that in the composition of these parts our author has drawn upon different sources, or, at least, from a heterogeneous source. As we shall see, the consequences which this has for the investigation at hand, are that while religious attitudes no less commonplace than those of the previous section are identifiable in 129e1ff., there emerges also a formidable component the inspiration for which has been gained mostly from philosophical sources. This part also deals not with specific individuals who have suffered by refusing to heed the warnings communicated to Socrates by τὸ δαιμόνιον, but rather with the idea that it is "all-powerful" in his educational contacts with his companions. Socrates plays no active part in the advancement of an associate; this is left entirely to the activity of the divine sign, which stimulates the progress of an individual through its

participation in his contact with Socrates. This information is fleshed out with a story about Aristides, who actually experienced this for himself (much as the anecdotes in 128d8-129d8 illustrated the general statement in 128d2-7).

The remarkable correspondence between this part of the divine sign section and the famous μαλευτική passage in *Tht.* (esp. 150c8-151a5, 151b2-6) has not gone unnoticed.<sup>40</sup> I can see no reason for doubting that the lines before us are indebted to *Tht.*,<sup>41</sup> although some ingenious deni-

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<sup>40</sup>See, e.g., Stallbaum 223; Schleiermacher 352; Hollenberg 360-1; Bruns 347; Heidel 53 n.2; Pavlu 21-2; Rist 17-8.

<sup>41</sup>This need not be taken to imply that Plato could not be the author of both passages; that can only be decided by a close examination of the relevant details in each work (see below). A simple scheme for the various points of contact would be: 1) τὸ δαιμόνιον prevents Socrates' association with some individuals (*Thg.* 129e3-5 ~ *Tht.* 151a3-4); 2) τὸ δαιμόνιον at times sets up no obstacles between Socrates and other men, but the latter nevertheless derive no benefit (*Thg.* 129e6-7 ~ *Tht.* 151b6-7); 3) among those who make rapid progress in Socrates' company (*Thg.* 129e7-130a2 ~ *Tht.* 150d2-6), some leave him too early and lose the gains they have made (*Thg.* 130a2-4 ~ *Tht.* 150e1-151a1); 4) Aristides, the son of Lysimachus, was an instance of this (*Thg.* 130a4ff. ~ *Tht.* 151a1-2); 5) those associates who improved by Socrates' company have never actually learned anything from him (*Thg.* 130d4-5 ~ *Tht.* 150d6-8). The all-important differences will be examined below. One discrepancy about which I shall have no occasion to speak is that nothing is said in *Tht.* of those who, admitted by τὸ δαιμόνιον, simply make lasting progress (cf. *Thg.* 129e9-130a2). Certain linguistic parallels may or may not be significant. Souilhé remarked (140; see also Tarrant, *CQ* 52 [1958] 95; Carlini 44) that συνουσία, συνείναι, and ἐπιδιδόναι in the *Thg.* passage (cf. e2, e6, e7, e9, 130a3) have simply been lifted from the context of *Tht.* But συνουσία/συνείναι are at any rate highly thematic to *Thg.* (see *Intr.* ch. I, b, vii). On the other hand, cf. *Thg.* 130a2-3 θαυμάσιον ἐπιδιδόασιν, and *Tht.* 150d5 θαυμαστὸν ὅσον ἐπιδιδόντες.

als of this generally accepted position have surfaced now and then.<sup>42</sup> But as with the preceding discussion, differences in exposition prove more enlightening than the similarities that exist between the accounts, and it is necessary once again to place the emphasis on these differences.

What is required is a detailed examination not only of the relationship between *Thg.* and *Tht.*,<sup>43</sup> but also of certain generally overlooked aspects of the *μαλευτική* passage itself. I will state immediately that at the centre of such an investigation must be a consideration of the use Plato makes of the terms *τὸ δαιμόνιον* and *ὁ θεός* in the *Tht.* passage. It is surprising that so little effort is made by scholars to distinguish Plato's use of these terms. Most critics, it is true, acknowledge that Plato is not referring to the same thing when he employs the two phrases in *Tht.* 150b6ff. But if *ὁ θεός* is different from *τὸ δαιμόνιον*, wherein does this difference lie? The importance of this question cannot be overesti-

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<sup>42</sup>One such denial was put forward by Janell (434-6), who wished to date *Tht.* after *Thg.* (as Socher and Friedländer did [see *Intr.* ch. V n.1], but at the same time defending the authenticity of *Thg.*, as Janell did not), and to make the former's *μαλευτική* passage Plato's implicit rehabilitation of the distorted impression about Socrates that *Thg.* had supposedly created. But the *μαλευτική* passage is so closely bound up with the rest of *Tht.* (references to Socratic midwifery punctuate the remainder of that dialogue) that it would be artificial to separate it off as Janell wished to do; and surely all of *Tht.* is not to be taken as a refutation of *Thg.* (for some further arguments against Janell, see Pavlu 22 n.1; H. Gomperz, *AGPh* 19 (1906) 540ff.; Janell's thesis has not found any supporters). Another denial of the dependence of *Thg.* on the *μαλευτική* passage was made by Willing (177-8; he condemned *Thg.* as spurious) on the grounds that any writer drawing upon the *Tht.* section in question, as the author of *Thg.* allegedly did, could not have failed to exploit the metaphor of midwifery (so also Janell 434; Willing postulated a popular source for the version of the story found in *Thg.*). Certainly the midwife metaphor is a famous one to the modern interpreter, and it was by Plutarch's time as well (cf. *Quaestiones Platonicae* 1 = *Mor.* 999c-1000e). But whether it struck a contemporary or near-contemporary reader as such, and as an absolutely essential part of its context, is another matter, for it is possible, I think, to lay the section in *Tht.* bare by removing the metaphor. A much more important consideration is that the author of *Thg.* actually has positive reasons for leaving the metaphor out, since he wishes in this work to de-emphasize the dialectical side of Socrates' character. When Socrates says in *Tht.* that nobody learns anything from him, this implies *μαλευτική*; but when he makes the same claim in *Thg.*, the statement means something very different; see further *Intr.* ch. I, b, vii; ch. IV, d. Most upholders of authenticity are content merely to argue that the two passages are not contradictory (see Knebel 6-7; Friedländer I.148ff.; also n.51 below).

<sup>43</sup>This has been done in outline in n.41 above.

mated, for if it can be shown that the author of *Thg.*, who speaks only of τὸ δαιμόνιον in this part of his dialogue, has manifestly misunderstood the structure of the *Tht.* passage and its references to ὁ θεός and τὸ δαιμόνιον, this must go a very long way towards settling the question of authenticity, which will itself be formally taken up later.

In fact there are two stages to the educational process Socrates describes in *Tht.* The first consists of Socrates' association with certain individuals, who make wonderful progress "if (the) god/heaven permits it" (οἷσπερ ἂν ὁ θεὸς παρείκη 150d4), though they learn nothing from Socrates; some of these, one of whom was Aristides, leave him too early and thereby suffer "miscarriage" (150e4ff.). The second stage of the process takes place when those who have "miscarried" attempt to return to Socrates; it is only then (151a2-5) that τὸ δαιμόνιον explicitly enters the picture, for it prevents Socrates from associating any further with some individuals, while others are allowed back into the fold, and they again make progress.

What emerges from this analysis is that, according to the terminology employed, ὁ θεός is involved solely in the first stage, while τὸ δαιμόνιον alone takes part in the second. That these two entities are not to be identified is clear, I think, from several considerations. The first is that one term is used to the exclusion of the other in the first and second stages respectively. When Socrates finally introduces the divine sign, he does so using descriptive phraseology which suggests that it had not been mentioned or alluded to until now (151a4 τὸ γιγνόμενόν μοι δαιμόνιον). The second consideration is the nature of the activities which Plato ascribes to ὁ θεός and τὸ δαιμόνιον. The former "compels" (ἀναγκάζει 150c8) Socrates to "deliver" (ματεύεσθαι), and both it and

Socrates are "responsible" (αἵτιος 150d8-e1) for the delivery of intellectual "offspring." In this context of mental midwifery ὁ θεός has clearly assumed an active role; and when the verb παρείκη (150d4) is predicated of it, this presents at most its passive side, rather than anything inhibitory. τὸ δαιμόνιον on the other hand, in its very brief mention, preserves its purely apotropaic pattern.

The third consideration serves both to distinguish ὁ θεός from τὸ δαιμόνιον and to shed some light upon the role of ὁ θεός in the μαιευτική passage. If ὁ θεός is to be distinguished from τὸ δαιμόνιον, it is anything but clear what Plato intends by the former; the latter at least is familiar from several other passages elsewhere in the Corpus (see sec. a). But we may look at other Platonic texts for possible illumination on Plato's use of ὁ θεός. For instance, in *Euthd.* 290e1ff. Crito interrupts Socrates' recounting of the previous days' discussion to express wonder at the words attributed to the young and inexperienced Cleinias, who has just now shown such stunning capacity for dialectic.<sup>44</sup> To explain the young man's progress (291a3-4) Socrates proposes that τις τῶν κρείττωνων was perhaps at hand to utter the words.<sup>45</sup> In a different context (*Sph.* 216a5ff.) Socrates (ironically again) suggests that the Eleatic stranger

<sup>44</sup>For Plato's disruption of the reporting of a dialogue to indicate that what has just been spoken is truly extraordinary, cf. similarly *Phd.* 102a3ff.

<sup>45</sup>Gundert (56-7) sees this as an oblique reference to τὸ δαιμόνιον which had been mentioned earlier in the dialogue (272e3f.). But Socrates is certainly ironic here, and Crito, who takes Socrates to be the "higher being" to which Socrates referred (see Gifford *ad loc.*; perhaps this was Plato's intention), responds in an equally ironic manner in 291a6-7 (τῶν κρείττωνων μέντοι τις ἔμοι δοκεῖ, καὶ πολὺ γε). This passage may be seen to be still more closely connected with the μαιευτική section of *Tht.* if we compare *Euthd.* 279d7-8 οὕτως ἔτι νέος τε καὶ εὐήθης ἐστί (said of Clinias before he has been examined) with *Tht.* 150d2-3 οἱ δ' ἔμοι συγγιγνώμενοι τὸ μὲν πρῶτον φαίνονται ἔνιοι μὲν καὶ πάνυ ἀμαθεῖς, πάντες δὲ προιούσης τῆς συνουσίας, οἷσπερ ἂν ὁ θεὸς παρείκη, θαυμαστὸν ὅσον ἐπιδιδόντες κτλ.



might be *τις...τῶν κρείττωνων*, in other words *θεὸς ὧν τις ἔλεγκτικός* (b4-6). Meno turns all this on its head when he asserts that, were Socrates to practice his *ἐλεγχος* anywhere else but in Athens, he would be arrested as a sorcerer (*Men.* 80b4-7). Now the *μαευτική* passage in *Tht.* seems to be offered in greater earnest than any of the three other passages cited. Nevertheless, they all point, it seems, to a similar way of viewing dialectic (especially as it was opposed to eristic and other sophistic practices) on the part of Plato and the Platonic Socrates, namely that the means by which it could produce its results were often too difficult to apprehend and explain in rational terms, so that reference was made to the assistance of a god; or, again, that the person who was in some way adept at dialectic seemed to transcend the normal lot of humanity and to be specially favoured. I would venture to suggest that in *Tht.* *ὁ θεός* is being used in just this sort of way: Socrates knows nothing himself, but is yet able to elicit latent knowledge from his respondents; and to account for this otherwise unexplainable efficacy of *ἐλεγχος*, and for the fact that some individuals make progress while others do not, Plato fell back upon the notion of divine intervention.<sup>46</sup> Whether or not Plato in this is to be taken *au pied de la lettre*, it is clear that the reference served to emphasize the difference which he perceived to exist between Socratic *ἐλεγχος* and other forms of argumentation and education (though Socrates would hardly have used the term "education" of his own methods).<sup>47</sup> But Plato, it should be added, is also quick to point out the effort an individual must

<sup>46</sup>Probably the most illuminating discussion on the *μαευτική* passage in general, and on the point made above, is that of M. Burnyeat in *BICS* 24 (1977) 7-16, esp. 12-3.

<sup>47</sup>Whereas Plato may speak of divine intervention in Socratic elenchus, the sophist is regularly called a sorcerer, and eristic is labelled as sorcery or magic; see E. Belfiore, *Phoenix* 34 (1980) 128-37.

himself make if he is to achieve progress in philosophy. This much is demonstrated by the remainder of *Tht.*, and is hinted at also by the exhortation to Theaetetus at the end of the ματευτική passage (151d3-6):  
 πάλιν δὲ οὖν ἐξ ἀρχῆς, ὦ Θεαίτητε, ὅτι ποτ' ἐστὶν ἐπιστήμη, πειρῶ λέγειν· ὥς δ' οὐχ οἷός τ' εἶ, μηδέποτ' εἵπης. ἐὰν γὰρ θεὸς ἐθέλῃ καὶ ἀνδρίζῃ, οἷός τ' ἔσῃ (where the formulaic ἐὰν... ἐθέλῃ is, I think, a play on earlier references to θεός).<sup>48</sup>

That the identification of ὁ θεός and τὸ δαιμόνιον is unnecessary and unwarranted thus seems quite evident. It should be acknowledged at this point that ὁ θεός is in fact used in one place by Plato with reference to the divine sign;<sup>49</sup> but there is no reason on this account to abandon the distinctions we have already arrived at, since ὁ θεός is in any event a ubiquitous phrase with a highly indeterminate frame of reference, and can be used on an *ad hoc* basis, as indeed it is so used in that

<sup>48</sup>Cf. *Men.* 81c9-d4 ἅτε γὰρ τῆς φύσεως ἀπάσης συγγενοῦς οὔσης, καὶ μεμαθηκυίας τῆς ψυχῆς ἅπαντα, οὐδὲν κωλύει ἓν μόνον ἀναμνησθέντα – ὃ δὲ μάθησιν καλοῦσιν ἄνθρωποι – τᾶλλα πάντα αὐτὸν ἀνευρεῖν, ἐὰν τις ἀνδρείος ᾖ καὶ μὴ ἀποκάμνη ζητῶν. Anamnesis can be achieved, and can produce its wondrous results, only when the efforts of a given interlocutor are also brought to bear.

Gundert (54) argues that the *Tht.* passage quoted above deliberately connects the earlier reference to Aristides (151a1f.) with the final lines in *La.* (201b6ff.), where Socrates responds with the words ἐὰν θεὸς ἐθέλῃ (c5) to Lysimachus' request that they meet on the following day over the education of Aristides and Thucydides. Gundert remarks that it is left open at the end of *La.* whether, in the case of Aristides, god was actually willing or not. It is indeed plausible that *Tht.* does cast a glance back at *La.* to elaborate on the mention there of θεός (see also Burnyeat, *op. cit.* 16 n.20; Friedländer III.154), though I am hesitant to accept that ἐὰν θεὸς ἐθέλῃ in the earlier work was charged with any higher meaning than the stock "god willing."

<sup>49</sup>*Ap.* 40b1 τὸ τοῦ θεοῦ σημεῖον.

one instance.<sup>50</sup> Moreover, although the precise function of ὁ θεός in the μαευτική passage of *Tht.* remains somewhat obscure (and was probably vague enough in Plato's mind as well), it was apparently seen to be an essential part (but only a part) of progress in dialectic. τὸ δαιμόνιον on the other hand performs its familiar role in *Tht.*, and is strictly limited in the place which it assumes in the process Plato describes in that dialogue.

We must return now to *Thg.* 129e1ff. and consider what its precise relationship to the above analysis is. In the first place, the author of *Thg.* reduces the stages in *Tht.* from two to one, so that the role of τὸ δαιμόνιον in preventing Socrates from associating with a prospective companion, or in allowing him to associate with an individual who is destined not to improve, occurs at Socrates' first meeting with that person. In *Tht.* τὸ δαιμόνιον occurs only *after* a former associate attempts to return to Socrates subsequent to his abandoning him too early. Moreover, when Aristides is presented in *Thg.* as an example of such a one who went away from Socrates too soon, his departure is fixed in the period after τὸ δαιμόνιον had enabled him to make surprising progress. In *Tht.* on the other hand Aristides is used as an example of someone who, after ὁ θεός had "compelled" Socrates to deliver his intellectual offspring, left Socrates sooner than he ought to have done; he is also an example of the sort of person who then returns to Socrates, and whose possible future relation-

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<sup>50</sup>See Burnet *ad Ap.* 40b1; also n.53 below. Among others, Grote (440-1) used this passage to argue for the identification of ὁ θεός and τὸ δαιμόνιον in *Tht.* Unless we recognize that ὁ θεός can be employed in an indeterminate fashion and with varying points of reference, we will be forced into the paradox of claiming that every time Socrates uses the phrase ὁ θεός he is alluding to Apollo, who was Socrates' patron deity (cf. *Phd.* 85b1-5), and who is sometimes (e.g. *Ap.* 23b7, c1) referred to as ὁ θεός by him (so, e.g., Socher [97] identifies ὁ θεός in *Tht.* with Apollo; see also Burnyeat, *op. cit.* 16 n.19).

ship with Socrates is vetoed or accepted by τὸ δαιμόνιον. The author of *Thg.* has therefore conflated the two stages set out in *Tht.* It may be that he did this in order to emphasize the omnipotence of τὸ δαιμόνιον in Socrates' associations. But it seems more likely that, not understanding what Plato meant by ὁ θεός, he simply confused it with τὸ δαιμόνιον in *Tht.*, equating the former with the latter on a "one-for-one" basis (see also next paragraph), even though, as argued above, this was anything but Plato's intention when he wrote the ματευτική passage.

Although this evidence in itself would be enough to show that the *Tht.* and *Thg.* passages under consideration are not complementary, but that the latter represents a distortion of the former,<sup>51</sup> other specific details can be offered which confirm the presence of this distortion and confusion. In 131a1ff. Theages suggests that he and Socrates make a test of τὸ δαιμόνιον to determine if it will admit Theages into Socrates' company. In a3-7 Theages continues: καὶ ἔαν μὲν παρείκη ἡμῖν, ταῦτα βέλ-  
τιστα· εἰ δὲ μή, τότε ἤδη παραχρῆμα βουλευσόμεθα ὅτι δρά-  
σομεν, εἴτε ἄλλω συνεσόμεθα, εἴτε καὶ αὐτὸ τὸ θεῖον τὸ σοῖ

<sup>51</sup> This has been basically the conclusion of a few other interpreters, who have however not followed up this line of argument in any detail, see Stallbaum 220-1; Schleiermacher 171-2; Wagner 9; Bruns 346. Pavlu (22 n.1), on the other hand, draws attention to what he considers to be a confusion in *Thg.* of the syntax in *Tht.* (but his arguments are not cogent, see comm. ad 129e6). Taylor, though he judged *Thg.* to be spurious, nevertheless saw no evidence in the dialogue which might suggest a misunderstanding of *Tht.* (*PMW*<sup>6</sup>533). But his conclusion results from an oversimplification of the problems at hand and is, I believe, refuted by the evidence presented above (it is curious that elsewhere [*PMW*<sup>6</sup> 523 n.3] Taylor asserts, against the authenticity of *Alc. I*, that "God and the 'sign' are never confused...in any certainly genuine works of Plato"). It is only to be expected that upholders of authenticity consider ὁ θεός and τὸ δαιμόνιον in the *Tht.* passage to refer to identical concepts: Socher 97-8; Knebel 6-7; Grote 440-1; Hollenberg 360-1; Friedländer I.35 (who calls it "pedantic" to attempt to distinguish ὁ θεός and τὸ δαιμόνιον), *id.* II.328 n.14. Gundert also (54), who athetizes *Thg.*, tends to view the two as representing one concept (similarly, e.g., C. Piat, *Socrate* [Paris, 1900] 211; MacNaghten, *op. cit.* 188). The equation of ὁ θεός and τὸ δαιμόνιον (*apropos Alc. I*) goes back at least to Proclus (*in Alc.* 78.10ff.); but cf. also the title of Apuleius' (second-century A.D.) treatise on Socrates' sign, *De Deo Socratis*.

γιγνόμενον πειρασόμεθα παραμυθεῖσθαι εὐχαῖσί τε καὶ  
 θυσίαις καὶ ἄλλω ὅτῳ ἂν οἱ μάντεῖς ἐξηγῶνται. In a3 the sub-  
 ject of παρείκη is τὸ δαιμόνιον (cf. a2),<sup>52</sup> and the whole expression  
 καὶ...ἡμῖν inevitably calls to mind *Tht.* 150d4 οἷσπερ ἂν ὁ θεὸς  
 παρείκη, of which the author of *Thg.* must himself have been thinking.  
 Again, we may observe the innocent substitution implicit in *Thg.* of τὸ  
 δαιμόνιον for ὁ θεός of Plato's version. This alone is sufficiently re-  
 vealing, but also to be noted is the phrase in a5 τὸ θεῖον τὸ σοὶ  
 γιγνόμενον, which once more in this context refers to τὸ δαιμόνιον.  
 The closest parallel for these words is *Tht.* 151a4 τὸ γιγνόμενόν μοι  
 δαιμόνιον, where the only difference of substance from the phrase in  
*Thg.* is the occurrence of δαιμόνιον instead of θεῖον. Now this latter  
 word is quite unobjectionable in a reference to τὸ δαιμόνιον, as *Ap.*  
 31c8-9 θεῖόν τι καὶ δαιμόνιον demonstrates. But that it is merely by  
 coincidence that the passage in *Thg.* 131a3 recalls the parallel in *Tht.*  
 would seem to be ruled out by the other correspondence in wording  
 between *Tht.* and *Thg.* commented upon just now. Consequently, the  
 exchanging of θεῖον in *Thg.* for the original δαιμόνιον, while not to be  
 faulted *per se*, is probably not fortuitous. On the contrary, it could well  
 represent the influence of the phrase ὁ θεός, now expressed in adjectival  
 form, in the original place from which the author of *Thg.* likely composed  
 the sentence καὶ...ἡμῖν in 131a3. Indeed, this writer explicitly identifies  
 τὸ δαιμόνιον with ὁ θεός earlier in 130e6, where, summarizing the  
 effect of τὸ δαιμόνιον as described over the previous few pages, he

<sup>52</sup>Pavlu (21 n.2) supplies ὁ θεός as subject, which is correct only in so far as it and τὸ  
 δαιμόνιον are now being treated as interchangeable; but it must be kept in mind that the  
 distinction which was drawn in *Tht.* is in reality not observed here.

remarks ἐὰν μὲν τῷ θεῷ φίλον ᾖ, πάνυ πολὺ ἐπιδώσεις καὶ ταχύ κτλ. Here τῷ θεῷ can be nothing other than τὸ δαιμόνιον, an equation which further confirms the conflation that this author has performed over the μαιευτική passage in *Tht.*<sup>53</sup>

Finally (and this anticipates some points which will be made below), we may look to a further confusion of the *Tht.* passage, one which likely prompted the author of *Thg.* to include in his work the category of those who are actually assisted by τὸ δαιμόνιον (129e7ff.). Nothing like this is mentioned in *Tht.* of course, but if we take it for granted, as now seems most natural to do, that the author of *Thg.* drew no distinction (as Plato did) between ὁ θεός and τὸ δαιμόνιον, it is reasonable to assume that in speaking about the positive assistance of τὸ δαιμόνιον he is elaborating on the notion in *Tht.* that ὁ θεός is "responsible" (ἄτιος 150e1, cf. c7) for the delivery of the intellectual offspring of Socrates' companions,<sup>54</sup> and actually compels him (ἀναγκάζει 150c8) to play the role of midwife.

We must conclude therefore that *Thg.* 129e1ff., while drawing directly upon its corresponding passage in *Tht.*, is at fundamental variance with it, and that in all probability it stands apart from *Tht.* because of a misunderstanding of Plato's intentions. The consequences of this for evaluating the question of the authenticity of *Thg.* will be fully drawn out later (see *Intr.* ch. IV, d), but our discussion may continue with a look at some further novelties that the author has introduced into this part of his work.

<sup>53</sup>The passage in *Ap.* 40b1 mentioned above (n.49) may also have helped to induce the author of *Thg.* to identify τὸ δαιμόνιον with ὁ θεός, rather than with τὸ τοῦ θεοῦ σημεῖον of that passage (where the use of the oblique case is important [*pace* Mac-Naghten, *op. cit.* 188]: τὸ τοῦ θεοῦ σημεῖον = τὸ δαιμόνιον [σημεῖον], not τὸ τοῦ δαιμονίου σημεῖον).

<sup>54</sup>See also D.L. Blank, *ClassAnt* 4 (1985) 23.

The first of these occurs in 129e1, where the phrase ἡ δύναμις αὕτη τοῦ δαιμονίου τούτου is encountered. It has been observed that elsewhere in the unquestionably authentic works of the Platonic Corpus δύναμις is not applied to Socrates' divine sign, and the truth of this statement cannot be disputed. However that may be, what is at issue is the problem of whether this betokens an un-Platonic element within the depiction of the divine sign.<sup>55</sup> This is not an easy question to settle, but some information may be adduced to place the use of the word into its proper context. Much depends, of course, on the meaning which we now assign to δύναμις. But if it is given a fairly conventional translation such as "capability" or "power,"<sup>56</sup> it will become evident why Plato avoids the use of it in conjunction with τὸ δαιμόνιον. Plato, as we have already seen, is decidedly vague about the nature of the divine sign; it would therefore have been unusual for him to speak of its δύναμις when he could not sharply define its characteristics.<sup>57</sup> In *Thg.* on the other hand the word δύναμις is wholly appropriate, as it occurs in a context in which the author is about to speak of the *active* role that τὸ δαιμόνιον plays in Socratic association (see below). Moreover, δύναμις arises naturally out of its context precisely because the preceding part has extended the properties of the sign beyond anything that can be found in the rest of the Corpus; thus the pronoun αὕτη which follows ἡ δύναμις is retrospective, and refers to precise qualities of the sign that appear, within the Corpus, only in this dialogue. It seems likely therefore that δύναμις is not em-

<sup>55</sup>As is suggested, e.g., by Gundert 63 n.14; Pavlu 25 n.2.

<sup>56</sup>Not unnaturally this is, to judge from Souilhé's list of uses (*Étude sur le terme Δύναμις dans les dialogues de Platon* [Paris, 1919], with the table following 192), one of the commonest meanings of the word among all dialogues.

<sup>57</sup>Krüger (21) seems to be thinking along these same lines.

ployed elsewhere of the sign by Plato because the qualities ascribed to it here are not mentioned elsewhere as well. Although in this dialogue τὸ δαιμόνιον has not been called (and will not be called) a δαίμων, its description has been such as to suggest this familiar concept; and there would be nothing unnatural in speaking about the δύναμις of something that is so described.<sup>58</sup>

A second point about the use of δύναμις draws this part of the divine sign section more specifically into line with demonology, as certain peculiarities in the previous part had done. In *Smp.* 202d13ff. Socrates, recounting his discussion with Diotima, relates how she told him that Eros is a "great δαίμων," and she supposedly continued in the following vein: καὶ γὰρ πᾶν τὸ δαιμόνιον μεταξύ ἐστὶ θεοῦ τε καὶ θνητοῦ. To this Socrates responded with the question (202e2): τίνα...δύναμιν ἔχον;. Clearly τὸ δαιμόνιον in this exchange and τὸ δαιμόνιον as applied to Socrates' divine sign are not the same thing: in the *Smp.* passage τὸ δαιμόνιον has a precise area of reference; it is the quality that makes a δαίμων what it is. That, as we observed earlier, is definitely not the force of τὸ δαιμόνιον when it denotes Socrates' divine sign, at least not in Plato. But τὸ δαιμόνιον, in the sense it bears in *Smp.*, can be said to possess a δύναμις for the same reason that τὸ δαιμόνιον in *Thg.* can, namely because δαίμονες are characterized by a particular role and pattern of behaviour, elaborately described by Socrates in 202e3ff. Even some of the functions of δαίμονες he lists, i.e., the receiving of prayers and sacrifices and the relaying of them to the gods (e4-

<sup>58</sup>Thus while Schleiermacher's objections to the use of the oblique case (genitive) for τὸ δαιμόνιον in *Ap.* 40a4 and in *Thg.* 128e5 are not well-grounded (see comm. ad 128e5), here at least the same criticism would seem to carry greater force: to speak of the δύναμις of something is, inevitably, to objectify it.



5), and the acting as medium for various forms of μαντική (e7-203a1), may be closely paralleled in *Thg.*: as we have seen, in the previous part the prophetic powers which are imparted to Socrates by τὸ δαιμόνιον are much extended, and at the end of the dialogue, Theages proposes to placate τὸ δαιμόνιον with prayers and sacrifices and whatever else the μάντις prescribe (131a6-7; see n.76). One cannot be certain that the author of *Thg.* has the *Smp.* passage in mind when he uses the word δύναμις of τὸ δαιμόνιον, since Plato's use of language and his assigning of particular functions to δαίμονες could be indebted to conventional beliefs.<sup>59</sup> But if the author here has indeed cast a glance at *Smp.*, he would not have been the first to do so: others very quickly either developed the demonology they found in that work, or misunderstood it altogether.<sup>60</sup> In any event, comparison of these passages suggests strongly that what is being presented here is not τὸ δαιμόνιον of the Socrates in the indisputably genuine works of Plato, but rather Socrates' sign conceived in terms of a δαίμων, Platonic, or traditional, or both.

The predicate of ἡ δύναμις αὕτη τοῦ δαιμονίου τούτου is τὸ ἅπαν δύναται (e3): the power of Socrates' sign is "almighty" in his associations with others. This takes the theological context further, on two counts. First, the phraseology is traditional: it occurs as early as Homer, and expresses a fairly vague notion of divine omnipotence (see comm. *ad loc.*). Taking this expression together with its subject δύναμις, discussed in the previous paragraph, it emerges still more clearly that in its context in *Thg.* δύναμις possesses the kind of theological associations that Plato

<sup>59</sup>See Burkert 179-81.

<sup>60</sup>See *Intr.* ch. V,b; and for the development and modification of Plato's demonology in *Epin.*, see L. Tarán, *Academica: Plato, Philip of Opus, and the Pseudo-Platonic Epinomis* (Philadelphia, 1975) 42-7;

was bound to avoid in referring to τὸ δαιμόνιον. Second, in popular religious sentiment omnipotence is often considered to carry with it capriciousness, at least in the sphere within which that omnipotence is exercised. Here the omnipotence of τὸ δαιμόνιον is manifested in Socrates' educational contacts, and conformably with the behaviour that might have been expected, it deals in an apparently arbitrary fashion with prospective associates: it prevents Socrates from spending time with some; it does not hinder him from association with others, but these nevertheless make no progress (nothing like this is mentioned in *Tht.*); while it actively participates in the advancement of certain other individuals, many of whom then make rapid and lasting progress (129e3-130a2). If any reasons can be brought forward to explain and clarify this selectivity on the part of τὸ δαιμόνιον, the author does not bother to do so (see comm. *ad* 129e3). In contrast to this is the μαευτική passage in *Tht.*, in which, as we saw, Plato is determined to preserve at least a share of the responsibility for a companion's progress for the efforts of the companion himself.<sup>61</sup>

The author of *Thg.* is especially interested in those individuals who experience direct intervention from ἡ τοῦ δαιμονίου δύναμις (e7-8), for the progress they make, provided they do not shun Socrates' company, is θαυμάσιον (130a2). Now neither in the *Tht.* passage discussed above nor elsewhere in the Corpus does Plato attribute the role of active participant to Socrates' divine sign in connection with his educational contacts, and attention has already been drawn to the component in the Platonic account that probably provided the inspiration for the extension we find here (*Tht.* 150c7, 8, e1). Equally notable is the fact that Xenophon, whom

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<sup>61</sup>And, as Gundert (54) has shown, Socrates in the *Tht.* passage is still allowed a discretionary voice as to whom he accepts or rejects.

we might have expected to assign this co-operative property to τὸ δαιμόνιον, does nothing of the kind. To him the sign may be apotropaic or it may be protreptic, but it is never represented as an agent. Thus what we are confronted with at this point in *Thg.* is the further development of the divine sign, but this time beyond anything that can be traced in contemporary or near-contemporary literature. It has become further personalized, past the stage where it can be merely "put to the test" to determine "if there is anything in what it says" (129d3-4, see above). Its behaviour now is entirely that of a conventional δαίμων which intervenes on behalf of mortals, an ἄγαθός δαίμων in common parlance. It can be called "almighty" precisely because it has the ability to offer or withhold active assistance. And again its character as a δαίμων is underlined by linguistic details, since the word employed to describe the "assistance" of τὸ δαιμόνιον, i.e. συλλαβήται (129e7), is one which occurs occasionally to describe the activities of vague divine co-operation.<sup>62</sup> Thus the author's distortion of the *Tht.* passage which stands behind the present lines, deliberate or not, is in any event consistent with his over-all view of τὸ δαιμόνιον.

Exactly how τὸ δαιμόνιον "co-operates" with one of Socrates' companions is exemplified in the anecdote about Aristides, the son of Lysimachus. Investigation has already shown that *Tht.*, misunderstood, elaborated, and improvized upon by the author of *Thg.*, provided the basis for this account. But other sources have also been used. One of these seems to

<sup>62</sup>Cf. *Phdr.* 237a7-9 Ἄγετε δὴ, ὦ Μοῦσαι... ξυμ μοι λάβεσθε τοῦ μύθου; S. fr. 841 Nauck οὐ τοῖς ἀθύμοις ἢ τύχῃ συλλαμβάνει; E. fr. 432 Nauck αὐτός τι νῦν δρῶν εἶτα δαίμονας κάλει· τῷ γὰρ ποιοῦντι καὶ θεὸς συλλαμβάνει; for the cognate noun συλλήπτωρ used of a divine accomplice, see comm. ad 129e7 συλλαβήται. Note also the description in *Smp.* of the δαίμων Eros as συνεργός (212b3).

have included a dialectical context, and was probably a representative of the *Alcibiades*-dialogue genre (see *Intr.* ch. I, *b*, *vii*). Another source is likely to have been *Smp.*, namely the passage in which Socrates remarks to Agathon that the acquisition of σοφία by "capillary action" would be a fine thing, if only it were possible.<sup>63</sup> What is remarkable about the use of these latter two sources is, first, the author's apparent disregard for the fact that in *Smp.* the idea of education by contact is ridiculed (see comm. *ad* 130d5-e4), in as much as he seems to make this concept a cornerstone of Socratic "education" in *Thg.*; and second, the author's neglect of and general lack of interest in the probable dialectical context of the work or works in which he found further material for the Aristides story. This of course is in addition to his disregard for the dialectical activity which is integral to the μαίευτική passage in *Tht.* The author of the dialogue at this point in his work has so greatly reduced the importance of dialectic, deliberately it would seem, that it is almost non-existent, this in contrast with the general content of the works on which he has drawn (see also *Intr.* ch. I, *b*, *vii*; *c*). In its place he has introduced a notion about intellectual progress which is diametrically opposed to anything that Plato could have found acceptable, as comparison with the tone of the *Smp.* passage proves. Presumably our author gathered from his reading of *Tht.* that the "miraculous" quality of Socratic elenchus, or more generally Socratic association, was implied by the part that he believed the divine sign actually played in it. But the picture he chose to present is completely one-sided.

<sup>63</sup>*Smp.*175d3-7 Εἴ ἂν ἔχοι...εἰ τοιοῦτον εἴη ἡ σοφία ὥστ' ἐκ τοῦ πληρεστέρου εἰς τὸ κενώτερον ρεῖν ἡμῶν, ἐὰν ἀπτώμεθα ἀλλήλων, ὥσπερ τὸ ἐν ταῖς κύλιξιν ὕδωρ τὸ διὰ τοῦ ἐρίου ῥέον ἐκ τῆς πληρεστέρας εἰς τὴν κενωτέραν; see further comm. *ad* 130d5-e4.

However, Krüger (20) has argued that the story about Aristides is really nothing more than an impassioned, metaphorical statement of the impact Socrates' presence exerts on young men.<sup>64</sup> He also holds, as a consequence of this, that there can be no argument about a misunderstanding of *Smp.*, as numerous scholars have suggested.<sup>65</sup> Now, one cannot doubt that the Aristides episode does quite adequately convey the effect Socrates' presence may have had on others, and Krüger may well have been correct to assert that our author was not so foolish as unconsciously to misinterpret the *Smp.* passage in question. Indeed, it must be granted that the author realized fully that he was departing from *Smp.* in speaking of education by contact; that he was unaware of that passage seems implausible. Given this assumption, we may go further by attributing the difference of approach to a desire to emphasize his peculiar notion, or a particular side, of Socratic education.<sup>66</sup> This at least is the reason for which he departs from other sources he uses in this story, and would also seem to represent the most plausible explanation for the notional use of *Smp.* in *Thg.* And if our author could distort the μαλευτική passage in *Tht.*, as he clearly did, there need be no doubt that he could have done the same with the passage in *Smp.*

The difficult problem, however, is what connection, if any, exists between the statement that τὸ δαιμόνιον is "almighty" in Socrates' associations with others, and Aristides' description (130d2-e4) of the way in which physical proximity with Socrates brought "improvement" (ἐπεδίδουν d5). Is Aristides' description to be taken, not as a statement of

<sup>64</sup>Krüger was anticipated in essentials by Socher 95-6.

<sup>65</sup>See Stallbaum *ad* 130e; Wagner 174; Fritzsche *ad* 130e; Heidel 55 and n.10; Souilhé 136 n.4; Robin 1644; Tarrant, *CQ* 52 (1958) 95.

<sup>66</sup>On this see *Intr.* ch. I, *b*, *vii*.

what the author himself believed to be objective fact, but only, as Krüger thought, as a symbolic expression of the way young men reacted to Socrates' physical presence? Certainly it is presented as the highly individual account of one young man. But to deny any organic relationship between Aristides' experience and the role of τὸ δαιμόνιον is to deny real structural integrity to this part of the divine sign section. Nor would this be the natural way to interpret these lines, for in this context, it is appropriate that the remarkable educative force of the divine sign be complemented by an equally remarkable description of its actual educational efficacy. In fact, it seems clear that the author intended Aristides' description to be more than simply figurative language. The sign is "all-powerful" in educational associations with Socrates (129e1-3): if the author truly believed this statement, and was determined to substantiate it, the most convincing way was to provide an account of an associate of Socrates' who laid claim to the fact that, though he himself did absolutely nothing while in Socrates' presence, he nevertheless gained full advantage from this physical proximity; and Aristides' story performs this very function. This, then, is the author's proof of Socrates' assertion that τὸ δαιμόνιον is "all-powerful," that it alone is responsible for the "improvement" of Socrates' associates.

Yet precisely how the divine sign "co-operated" in this association is never stated, and doubtless the author never thought the whole process through, if in fact the problem occurred to him at all. But this is not to say that we cannot now identify the influences which produced the description that we find in the text. Indeed, that the miraculous effect of Socrates' physical presence is to be interpreted as a direct manifestation of τὸ δαιμόνιον is all but confirmed by evidence of a theological kind. In the commentary (*ad* 130d5-e4) I have argued that, while influence or educa-

tion by physical contact was not unheard of among ancient peoples, it was somewhat rarer among the Greeks. Where such instances of it do occur in Greek literature, it is usually in the context of a god operating through a person and thereby influencing a third party, or of a god exerting his influence directly. Within a framework of traditional beliefs we seem, in *Thg.*, to have an instance of a related phenomenon.<sup>67</sup> The power which is operating on Aristides through Socrates can hardly be any other than τὸ δαιμόνιον itself; Socrates is now, for all intents and purposes, barely to be distinguished from it, with the result that he appears here to have experienced a kind of *unio mystica* with τὸ δαιμόνιον. Under other circumstances (i.e., than when the source of inspiration is the divine sign), Plato himself would have called such a state ἐνθουσιασμός. But what we are confronted with in this case is an early stage in the hagiographical tradition of the Socratic biography, for the inspired Socrates whose effect on his companions, in Plato, was wrought by the process of dialectic, is now a Socrates possessed by his own divine sign, who improves his companions in a manner devoid of any identifiable philosophical context.<sup>68</sup> And where ὁ θεός in *Tht.*, carefully distinguished from τὸ δαιμόνιον, participated in the dialectical progress of others, here τὸ δαιμόνιον emerges in effect as the *sole* force behind the sort of dialectical progress which Aristides claims to experience.

In reading of the effect which Aristides' gazing upon and touching of Socrates had on him, a couple of Platonic *loci* may come to mind besides

<sup>67</sup>Tarrant (*CQ* 52 [1958] 95) was the first to suggest that "influence by contact" represented an appeal to popular belief.

<sup>68</sup>See Hackforth, *Plato's Phaedrus* (Cambridge, 1952) 54 (refuting Robin): "Nowhere do we find Socrates regarding himself as inspired by the Sign, in the sense of being possessed by the deity from whom it emanated...." But for the view that Plato saw philosophy largely as ἐνθουσιασμός, see H. Gundert, *Lexis* 2.1 (1949) 25-46 (on *Phdr.*).

the one from *Smp.* mentioned above. One of these is *Ion* 533d1ff., where Socrates, telling Ion that it is a divine force (θεία δύναμις d3) which stirs the rhapsode, draws a comparison with the magnet (in Euripides' tragedy *Oeneus*) which could produce a chain of rings, each in turn able to gain a magnetic force of its own by contacting the preceding ring. This passage would seem to furnish a respectable Platonic tenor for the content of Aristides' words, but a close examination affirms that this should not be assumed. For one thing, the passage about the magnet is brought in expressly as a simile (d3 ὥσπερ ἐν τῇ λίθῳ κτλ.), whereas the literal truth of Aristides' words is never made an issue in *Thg.* Secondly, the element of touch, so highly emphasized in the context of *Thg.*, is incidental to the *Ion* passage, since it is not transferred from the simile of the magnet to the primary concern at hand, namely poetic inspiration. The author of *Thg.* doubtless intended to represent Socrates as ἔνθεος (we have seen whence Socrates' inspiration comes in this dialogue), but if it was his intention that Aristides' words be taken merely as figurative language (in which case we might have expected Socrates to distance himself ironically from the literal truth of the young man's account), he has lost sight of his reader, as Plato in *Ion* does not.<sup>69</sup>

A second Platonic text which may be considered more relevant to the present passage in *Thg.*, in particular to the influence of Aristides' gazing upon Socrates, is *Phdr.* 250b1-252b1. This passage must be con-

<sup>69</sup>There is the additional difficulty of determining precisely how serious Plato was about the inspiration he describes in *Ion*; see Guthrie, *HGP* IV. 209-10. Socher argued (95 n.2) that Aristides' reporting *in propria persona* furnished the disinterested tone which one looks for in Socrates' words. But this explanation will not do, for the stories are still highly personal to Socrates himself, and for my own part I do not see much difference between Socrates' telling the story himself, and reporting it as another's words in *oratio recta*. I should think that the desired effect would have been achieved much better if the words were put into the mouth of another participant in the dialogue, as for example when Plato makes Alcibiades recite the eulogy of Socrates in *Smp.* 215a4- 222b7.



sidered one of the most vivid in Plato for the description of the power which vision (the "sharpest of the senses" 250d3-4), in this instance vision of transcendent beauty followed by vision of corporeal beauty, can exercise on an agent.<sup>70</sup> The reaction to the vision of corporeal beauty is irrational and is itself the product of an irrational impulse (μανία 249e3); the experience is called ἔρως (252b1-3). The connection between this description in *Phdr.* and Aristides' visual contact with Socrates may on the one hand be considered rather tenuous: in comparison with the place of vision in *Phdr.* little is made of Aristides' concentrating his sight on Socrates, and it is presented as only one step in a progression which leads to the actual touching of Socrates. Nevertheless, it should be noted that the ultimate goal of the lover's soul in *Phdr.* is also clearly to draw as near as possible to the beloved.<sup>71</sup> Similarly, it is one of the main purposes for the author of *Thg.*, as a study of the structure of the dialogue has shown (see **Intr.** ch. I, *b, vii; c*), to present Socrates in this dialogue as the ἐρωτικὸς ἀνὴρ; thus the experience that Aristides undergoes in Socrates' presence is essentially that which is described in *Phdr.*, namely the impulse of ἔρως. I would suggest therefore that some affinities do exist between the *Phdr.* passage cited above and the Aristides episode in *Thg.*, for they each depict, in quite emphatic terms, a physical attraction occurring in the context of

<sup>70</sup>The number of references in Plato to vision is considerable, as is its importance for the philosopher; see Friedländer I.69f.

<sup>71</sup>Cf. 252a5-7 πάντων καταφρονήσασα [sc. ἡ ψυχὴ] δουλεύειν ἐτοίμη καὶ κοιμᾶσθαι ὅπου ἂν ἔᾳ τις ἐγγυτάτω τοῦ πόθου; 255e2ff. ἐπιθυμεῖ δὲ ἐκείνῳ παραπλησίως μὲν, ἀσθενεστέρως δέ, ὁρᾶν, ἅπτεσθαι, φιλεῖν, συγκατακεῖσθαι· καὶ δὴ, οἷον εἰκός, ποιεῖ τὸ μετὰ τοῦτο ταχὺ ταῦτα. ἐν οὖν τῇ συγκοιμήσει τοῦ μὲν ἐραστοῦ ὁ ἀκόλαστος ἵππος ἔχει ὅτι λέγῃ πρὸς τὸν ἡνίοχον κτλ. For the verb of touching that Aristides uses (ἄπτόμενος 130e3) as employed in the context of mystical union, cf. also *Smp.* 129a4, a5 (ἐφαπτομένην).

τὰ ἐρωτικά.<sup>72</sup> Whether this can be taken as a sign of Platonic authorship, or simply as a manifestation of an approach which one might style as "Platonic," is another matter, and one not easily to be solved. I can only state here as one of my reasons for believing in the latter, that the description Aristides offers is embedded in much other material that must be considered un-Platonic (see above; *Intr.* ch. I, *b*, *vii*; ch. III, *a*; ch. IV, *d*); but further arguments will be developed below. It seems nonetheless evident that the author was working from what he considered to be a Platonic framework, and this holds not only for what is a very likely use by him of *Phdr.*; for the possibility that he has been influenced by *Ion*, despite the discrepancies noted above, should not be excluded either.

Finally, this exegesis of the Aristides story may be taken one step further through a synthesis of the findings already made. We have seen that in the context of this report τὸ δαιμόνιον is essentially responsible for the effect Socrates exerts on Aristides. It has further been argued throughout this section of the chapter that the author's conception of τὸ δαιμόνιον of Socrates has been conditioned in a peculiar way by conventional beliefs about δαίμονες. But it is evident also that a number of philosophical sources have additionally had a hand in the Aristides anecdote, most notably *Smp.*, *Tht.*, and, as I believe, *Phdr.*; a fourth, lost, source has also been postulated. Moreover, as a function of the dialogue's structure, Aristides' experience is set forth as a product of ἔρως and as

<sup>72</sup>For the attraction to Socrates one thinks of Alcibiades in *Smp.* 216d1-217a2, and of Socrates' response to Alcibiades in 218d6-219a4; cf. also *Phdr.* 279b8-9 δοίητέ μοι καλῶ γενέσθαι πάνδοθεν; see further *Intr.* ch. I, *b*, *vi*, *vii*. Vlastos' observations ("The Paradox of Socrates" in *The Philosophy of Socrates*, ed. G. Vlastos [New York, 1971] 18) seem apposite: "[Socrates' character's] surface traits, uncouth, ludicrous to the casual eye, were so severely functional, so perfectly adapted to the work he had to do, that men with the keenest eye for beauty, men like Alcibiades and Plato, found more of it in Socrates than in anyone they had known."

proof that Socrates is the ἐρωτικὸς ἀνὴρ; indeed, two of the works the author has drawn upon, *Smp.* and *Phdr.*, contain classic Platonic expositions of ἔρως. The conclusion to be drawn from this amalgam of evidence seems compelling: if τὸ δαιμόνιον of Socrates is represented in effect as a δαίμων in this story, and if it is responsible for the impulse of ἔρως produced in Aristides by Socrates, can the author have understood τὸ δαιμόνιον in this context to be anything but the δαίμων ἔρως which we encounter in *Smp.*? To be sure, in that dialogue Socrates is seen to be the individual who best embodies the δαίμων about which he speaks.<sup>73</sup> But that ἔρως should be viewed as nearly identical with Socrates' divine sign, τὸ δαιμόνιον, as clearly seems to be the author's intention here,<sup>74</sup> conflicts with the textual evidence we can uncover in the undoubtedly genuine works of Plato: to suggest that Plato wished to make this equation would run counter to anything he tells us.<sup>75</sup> Then again, an occurrence of the sign in a Platonic passage may ultimately have caused, through misunderstanding, the identification made in *Thg.* In *Phdr.* 242b8ff. Socrates says that his divine sign came to him, and a voice thereupon prevented him from crossing the Ilissus until he had atoned for his wrongdoing against Eros (τὸ θεῖον c3). Is it not possible that this prevention by τὸ δαιμόνιον led some to believe that Eros was virtually forcing Socrates to

<sup>73</sup>See e.g. Guthrie, *HGP* IV. 394-6.

<sup>74</sup>Though the connection of τὸ δαιμόνιον with ἔρως was envisaged much earlier, see *Intr.* ch. I, b, vii (also for ἔρως as the gift or dispensation of θεία μοῖρα in Aeschin. *Socr.*; for the same connection in Plato, see J. Souilhé, *Philosophia Perennis* I [1930] 24-5; Berry, *op. cit.* 53-7).

<sup>75</sup>It may be true to say, with Friedländer (I.44), that "daimonion and *Eros*, the inhibiting and the driving force, cannot but appear as fundamentally akin." But Friedländer goes astray in his chapter on *Thg.* precisely because he fails to apply this same distinction to the stories in this dialogue: in *Thg.* the inhibiting and driving forces are not akin; they are indistinguishable. Strauss (*Studies in Platonic Political Philosophy* [Chicago, 1984] 46-7) and Pangle (170-1) identify the divine sign with Eros, and take this (without justification, as I believe; see *Intr.* ch. IV, d) as a sign of Platonic authorship. Krüger (33) is aware of this problem.

perform a palinode to it, to compensate for his first speech, and that Eros and τὸ δαιμόνιον were therefore one and the same?<sup>76</sup>

*c. Remarks on the Alcibiades I*

However this may be, it would be quite false to assert that a similar identification of τὸ δαιμόνιον and ἔρως does not occur elsewhere in the Corpus itself, for the presentation of Socrates' divine sign in *Alc. I*, if I have read the opening pages of that dialogue rightly, is not altogether different, and calls for a close examination.

Socrates was Alcibiades' first ἐραστής, but has not even as much as spoken with him for a number of years (103a1ff.); the reason for this is τι δαιμόνιον ἐναντίωμα (a5-6). But Socrates now has cause to hope that this prohibition will no longer be in effect (b1-2). There follows some comments by Socrates on Alcibiades' disposition towards past lovers, and an affirmation by Socrates that Alcibiades' only hope in becoming master of Asia and Europe lies in his submitting himself to Socrates (105a3-d4); now that ὁ θεός is not preventing Socrates from speaking with Alcibiades, Socrates is confident that he can exercise great power over him (d4-5). But Socrates offers a *proviso* at this point: he will impart to Alcibiades the

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<sup>76</sup>The last reference in *Thg.* to the divine sign comes as something of an anticlimax, and may be discussed very briefly here. Theages wishes to spend time in Socrates' company, in effect "putting τὸ δαιμόνιον to the test" (131a1-3). Theages' plan is that, if the sign turns out not to be favourable, he will placate it "with prayers, sacrifices, and whatever else the μάντεις prescribe" (a4-7). Needless to say, such behaviour is never mentioned elsewhere in the Corpus in connection with τὸ δαιμόνιον, and in this instance it provides proof, if proof were still needed, that the approach of the author of *Thg.* towards τὸ δαιμόνιον is to treat it as though it were hardly distinguishable from a δαίμων. Theages' mention of swift recourse to μάντεις once again recalls *Smp.* 202e7ff., in as much as the art of seers and priests is there said to operate exclusively through τὸ δαιμόνιον (διὰ τούτου [sc. τοῦ δαιμονίου] καὶ ἡ μαντική πᾶσα χωρεῖ καὶ ἡ τῶν ἱερέων τέχνη τῶν τε περὶ τὰς θυσίας καὶ τελετὰς καὶ τὰς ἐπωδὰς καὶ τὴν μαντείαν πᾶσαν καὶ γοητείαν). See *Intr. ch. V, b* for further discussion of this passage.

δύναμις which he is seeking, μετὰ τοῦ θεοῦ μέντοι (105e5). This is elucidated by the two sentences that follow: νεωτέρω μὲν οὖν ὄντι σοι καὶ πρὶν τοσαύτης ἐλπίδος γέμειν, ὥς ἐμοὶ δοκεῖ, οὐκ εἶα ὁ θεὸς διαλέγεσθαι, ἵνα μὴ μάτην διαλεγοίμην. νῦν δ' ἐφῆκεν· νῦν γὰρ ἂν μου ἀκούσῃς (105e6-106a1).

Several items here square with certain details in *Thg.* and are worth drawing attention to: the identification of τὸ δαιμόνιον and ὁ θεός;<sup>77</sup> the protreptic force of the divine sign (n.b. ἐφῆκεν 106a1); and the use of the word δύναμις in the context of the sign (103a6).<sup>78</sup> Most important however is the close association in these early pages of *Alc. I* between Socrates' avowed capacity as lover (ἐραστής 103a2 *et pass.*), the active role which ὁ θεός has now played in bringing Socrates together with Alcibiades, and the role it will actually play in Socrates' improving of Alcibiades. The close proximity of these concepts shows that ὁ θεός, which is virtually equated with τὸ δαιμόνιον and is presented as the force that has drawn Socrates to Alcibiades, stands for the erotic impulse.<sup>79</sup> There is nothing original in this interpretation. It is essentially the

<sup>77</sup>Cf. in addition 127e5ff. καὶ ἂν τοῦτο ποιῆς, ἂν θεὸς θέλῃ, εἴ τι δεῖ καὶ τῇ ἐμῇ μαντείᾳ πιστεύειν κτλ.

<sup>78</sup>τούτου δὲ τὸ αἶτιον [cf. αἶτιον *Tht.* 150c7, αἶτιος 150e1?; see above in sec. b] γέγονεν οὐκ ἀνθρώπειον, ἀλλὰ τι δαιμόνιον ἐναντίωμα, οὗ σὺ τὴν δύναμιν καὶ ὕστερον πεύσῃ.

<sup>79</sup>Cf. Aeschin. Socr. *Alc.* fr. 11c, quoted in *Intr.* ch. I, b, vii; with διὰ τὸ ἐρᾶν in that passage cf. *Alc. I* 105e5 μετὰ τοῦ θεοῦ μέντοι. As we have seen, the similarities in thought between the two *Alcibiades*-dialogues are not likely to be merely coincidental.

way in which Proclus understood the introductory portions of *Alc. I*,<sup>80</sup> and although his exegesis naturally betrays preoccupations with the systematic demonologies imposed by later Platonism, it is consonant with the intentions of the author he is commenting upon.

The above analysis of the context in which Socrates' divine sign is introduced in *Alc. I* may be offered as one more piece of evidence against our assigning a late date of composition for *Thg.*, in so far as both dialogues demonstrate a close similarity of approach to τὸ δαιμόνιον and may therefore be regarded as products of a similar philosophical atmosphere (for the details about this see *Intr.* ch. V, b).<sup>81</sup> However, the authenticity of *Alc. I* is still hotly debated by some; as a small contribution to this controversy, I should add the above remarks as further evidence against Platonic authorship.<sup>82</sup> But of greater relevance to the present investigation is the likelihood that these correspondences in the treatment

<sup>80</sup>In *Alc.* 60ff. (Westerink); cf. esp. 62.13-4 καίτοι καὶ τοῦ ἔρωτος αὐτῷ πάντως ὁ δαίμων αἷτιος; 63.12ff. καὶ μὴν καὶ ἡ μνήμη τοῦ δαιμονίου συνᾷδει τῇ τοῦ ἔρωτος οὐσίᾳ τε καὶ δυνάμει· καὶ γὰρ ὁ αὐτός ἐστιν ἐρωτικός τε καὶ δαιμόνιος ἀνὴρ. ὅ τε γὰρ ἐρωτικός, ἐὰν ἔνθεος ᾖ, προσεχῶς μὲν ἀπολαύει τοῦ δαίμονος, διὰ δὲ τούτου συνάπτεται τοῖς θεοῖς καὶ αὐτὴν τὴν ἐπιπνοίαν διὰ μέσου δέχεται τοῦ δαίμονος...καὶ αὖ ὁ δαιμόνιος ἐρωτικός τίς ἐστιν κτλ. (see also T. Whittaker, *The Neo-Platonists*<sup>4</sup> [Cambridge, 1928] 242-4). The suggestion that each person's δαίμων might be ἔρως itself is earlier made by Plotinus (*Enn.* 3.5.4): καὶ ἄρα ὁ ἔρως οὗτός ἐστιν ὁ δαίμων, ὃν φασιν ἐκάστῳ συνέπεσθαι, ὁ αὐτοῦ ἐκάστου ἔρως;

<sup>81</sup>Proclus' words near the end of his comment on the lemma 103a6 νῦν...b2 αὐτό (93.12-4 [Westerink]) show that, to a certain extent at least, his understanding of the role of the divine sign in *Alc. I* was in harmony with the place assigned to it by the author of *Thg.* in his dialogue: οὐκοῦν ὅσῳ μᾶλλον ὁ νεανίσκος ἐπιδίδωσιν [cf. ἐπιδιδόασιν, ἐπιδιδόντων *Thg.* 129e9, ἐπιδιδόασιν 130a3] ἐκ τῶν ἐν φιλοσοφίᾳ λόγων, τοσοῦτῳ πλεον ὑπελάμβανε [sc. Socrates] καὶ τὸν δαίμονα συλλήψεσθαι [cf. συλλάβηται *Thg.* 129e7] αὐτῷ πρὸς τὸν ἔρωτα. These words could not be applied to the activities of the divine sign in any passages in the Corpus in which it is mentioned other than those in *Alc. I* and *Thg.* (Proclus may have had *Thg.* in mind).

<sup>82</sup>For a brief consideration of the authenticity of *Alc. I*, see *Intr.* ch. V, g.

of the divine sign ought to be set alongside other details which also indicate a connection between *Thg.* and *Alc. I* (see *Intr.* ch. I, b, iii; v, vii).

#### d. Conclusions

From what has been said above concerning the representation of τὸ δαιμόνιον in *Thg.*, it should be apparent that to speak of occasional un-Platonic features in its description<sup>83</sup> is only half-correct, in so far as such a statement does not go far enough. It would be more precise to recognize that the divine sign in *Thg.* is no longer the vague τὸ δαιμόνιον evidenced in Plato, but has been transformed, quite systematically (though not nominally) into a δαίμων, i.e., a representative of traditional patterns of Greek religious belief, as defined both in the way it is said by the author, through Socrates, to behave, and in the traits attributed to it. Schleiermacher, as it turns out, was clearly on the right track when he characterized the divine sign in *Thg.* as "eine kleine Daimon" (172).<sup>84</sup> However, such statements as that have always been the product of assertion rather than comprehensive argument. Hence it has been the aim of this chapter to examine all the details pertinent to forming a decision about the meaning of, and the influences which were exerted upon, this representation of Socrates' divine sign.

In the course of the inquiry it has become evident that Plato persistently attempted to avoid introducing commonplace elements in portraying Socrates' sign, and that this included any possible "debasing" of the sign into the status of a δαίμων, or the presenting of it as simply a kind of oracle. It cannot perhaps be said that the divine sign in *Thg.* is merely

<sup>83</sup>So, e.g., Shorey, *WPS* 430; Heidel 53.

<sup>84</sup>See also Wagner 9.

commonplace, but it has certainly been assimilated into some orthodox strains of belief. Nevertheless, to attribute this assimilation, as well as other novelties introduced into the divine sign section of *Thg.*, largely to the influence of Xenophon, as has frequently been done,<sup>85</sup> seems unwarranted. It might be argued that the author of *Thg.* reproduces the popular view of Socrates' divine sign which Xenophon presents, and indeed we have seen several points in which the descriptions coincide. But, apart from the evidence furnished by certain discrepancies in detail between the representations of the two authors (e.g., the active co-operation of the divine sign in *Thg.*, and the use of a collection of anecdotes in the same dialogue to illustrate specific points about the divine sign), a popular view of τὸ δαιμόνιον is exactly what we should expect from any writer who did not impose on the divine sign the restrictions that Plato obviously did (see sec. a). It should be no cause for surprise if τὸ δαιμόνιον came to be assimilated, for all intents and purposes, into the class of δαίμονες independently by two authors who did not share or understand the philosophical outlooks of Plato, and who viewed the divine sign simply as a component of conventional beliefs. Still less unusual is the fact that their accounts can also be seen to diverge in some details. Thus while our author *may* have been familiar with Xenophon's writings, I see no reason to postulate such a familiarity in order to explain the nature of the account of τὸ δαιμόνιον that we find in *Thg.* There must have been a great many individuals, both within Socrates' lifetime (as for instance his accusers) and in the decades that followed, who found his divine sign to be an obscure matter, and recourse to Plato's writings, when this became possible, will not have provided much illumination. But it was the province

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<sup>85</sup>E.g., by Willing 140; Maier 453; Shorey, *WPS* 430.



of δαίμονες to account for the unexplainable,<sup>86</sup> and once one of these was invoked to give meaning to τὸ δαιμόνιον of Socrates, the results, it seems, were inevitable. Both Xenophon and the author of *Thg.* attest to this.

Some conclusions can be drawn about a stratification within the divine sign section as a whole. That the author had the Platonic model before him is indisputable. But its influence is unevenly distributed throughout this section. Plato's version is prominent at the very outset, as is seen by the use of *Ap.*, but adaptations are quickly made to it. The series of anecdotes which follows the general prelude, beginning with the one on Charmides and ending with the story of Sannio, are likely to reflect popular stories about Socrates, possibly from an oral tradition.<sup>87</sup> Not only does the use of anecdote indicate this, but also the way in which Socrates in the course of the four reports is transformed into a kind of "Wundermann," to adopt a phrase often used in this connection. To appreciate the degree to which commonplace elements have left their mark here, we need only reflect upon the ease with which almost any other figure of legendary prescience could be substituted for Socrates in these reports: the stories, in other words, are stereotypical (see *Intr.* ch. V, *b*). On the other hand, the second part of the divine sign section (129e1ff.) is deeply imbued with concepts deriving from philosophical sources, mostly but not only Platonic, although even here a good deal of popular thought has made its presence felt. I cannot however agree with Willing when he suggests (see n.42) that the prelude to the Aristides story in *Thg.*, as well as the story itself, derives from popular accounts in circulation at the time of the dialogue's composi-

<sup>86</sup>See Dodds, *G. and I.* 11f., 39-43; Burkert 179-81.

<sup>87</sup>So Willing 143-4, 178; Stefanini l.28; see also *Intr.* ch. I, *b*, *vii*.

tion. No doubt stories about the descendants of Aristides the Just persisted as chastening rhetorical fare well into the fourth-century (see comm. *ad* 130c2-3); but all the evidence accumulated above points merely to the author's use and distortion of *Tht.* (and of other works to a lesser extent) in the composition of this part of the dialogue. It is of course possible that a few well known facts about Aristides and Thucydides have found their way into the dialogue, but it is not necessary to assume this in order to explain the background of each detail; 129e1-130e4 can be satisfactorily accounted for strictly on the basis of a text-imminent study.

A word is also in order about the use of sources in this section of the dialogue. As we should have expected, the author draws liberally upon the passages in Plato where the divine sign is mentioned. Two Platonic works figure conspicuously in this respect, namely *Ap.* and *Tht.* It is possible moreover that the author had *Ap.* in mind in 129d3 as well. No doubt our author also used *Euthd.* (see n.8). Whether he also looked to the relevant place in *R.* is a matter that can safely be left to a consideration of the composition of *Thg.* (see *Intr.* ch. I, c). But notable for its apparent absence is the passage concerning τὸ δαιμόνιον in *Phdr.* Yet the absence may only be apparent, for in this place Socrates states, immediately after the reference to his divine sign, εἰμὶ δὲ οὖν μάντις μὲν, οὐ πάνυ δὲ σπουδαῖος, ἀλλ' ὥσπερ οἱ τὰ γράμματα φαῦλοι, ὅσον μὲν ἑμαυτῷ μόνον ἱκανός κτλ. (242c3-5). It has been said (Rist 15-6) that this passage probably provided the impetus for some Platonists to elaborate upon a connection which is made in *Ap.* 40a4 between the divine sign and μαντική. As far as the author of *Thg.* is concerned, we might rather say that *Phdr.* could have fostered the notions he already entertained about the divine sign's furnishing of an oracular voice for

Socrates.<sup>88</sup> The author may also have been influenced by *Phdr.* in his assimilation of τὸ δαιμόνιον to the δαίμων ἔρως. This assimilation also seems to point to the account of the divine sign given in *Alc. I*; certainly there are other connections between the two dialogues, and they both part company with the Platonic representations of τὸ δαιμόνιον in similar and distinctive respects. In addition, it seems to me that this author, in his report of the Aristides anecdote, drew upon, or was at least influenced by, the description of ἐνθουσιασμός in *Phdr.*, and very likely by that in *Ion* as well. It is no surprise that *Smp.* should also figure in this list: for an author concerned to transform τὸ δαιμόνιον into a δαίμων, it would be curious if he did not look to the definitive Platonic expression on the subject of δαίμονες, as other authors interested in δαίμονες around his time were doing; and the use he makes of another passage in the same work to introduce the notion of learning by "osmosis" is remarkable only to those who do not appreciate the distortion he has brought about on *Tht.* Finally, in this section of the dialogue the author has employed a work of which we can reconstruct only a few outlines; but since this falls outside the actual treatment of the divine sign, reference can be made here to the discussion of this source in *Intr.* ch. I, *b*, *vii*.

In the systematization of its demonological characteristics in *Thg.*, the divine sign attains to a position which it was to preserve for most of antiquity (especially later antiquity).<sup>89</sup> Interestingly enough, there is evidence

<sup>88</sup>Friedländer (153-4) attempts to find Platonic precedence for a prophetic Socrates in *Phdr.* 278e10ff., where Socrates "prophesizes" (μαντεύομαι) about Isocrates, and in *Tht.* 142c4ff., where Socrates is said to have spoken "prophetically" (μαντικῶς) about many things. But this is special pleading, since such statements in these dialogues are not meant to be taken in a literal sense (see R.J. Collin, *CQ* n.s. 2 [1952] 93-6, on metaphorical μαντεύομαι).

<sup>89</sup>See Willing 151-66; Souilhé 130-7.

to show that some of these authors in later antiquity were disposed to view τὸ δαιμόνιον as it is presented in *Thg.* in just this light. When Clement of Alexandria (*Strom.* 1.133.3) and Calcidius (*in Ti.* 287-8, cf. 221) wish to make reference to Socrates' divine sign as a component within a demonological system, it is not the *locus classicus* in *Ap.* 31d2-4 that they quote, but rather the very similar passage in *Thg.* 128d2ff.; and demonological preoccupations are likely to have been the reason for Plutarch's interest in *Thg.* (see **Appendix 1**). A cautious inference from this could be that these later interpreters recognized the divine sign in *Thg.* to be basically what the author of the dialogue conceived it to be. Accordingly, on the basis of the date of composition suggested above (see *Intr.* ch. V, *g*) and the evidence adduced in this section, it seems reasonable to conclude that Socrates' divine sign was assimilated into systematic ways of thinking about δαίμονες at a very early stage; there is certainly no need to assume that the middle-Platonists were responsible for this,<sup>90</sup> while there *is* evidence to suggest that it did happen among Plato's immediate successors.<sup>91</sup> This would not be surprising. Socrates' emergence as a figure of legend was

<sup>90</sup>This is commonly taken for granted, e.g. Willing 157ff.; Friedländer 36f., 40f.

<sup>91</sup>See *Intr.* ch. V, *b*. Gigon (*Sokrates* 164) articulates what I take to be the most reasonable supposition on this question: "Dass aber der Schöpfer der antiken theologischen Dämonologie, der Platonschüler Xenocrates, auch das sokratische Daimonion in sein System einbezogen hat, ist mir von vornherein wahrscheinlich."

not slow,<sup>92</sup> and despite the lack of direct evidence, it is only natural that the development of τὸ δαιμόνιον will have kept pace with the swiftly-working hagiographical process of Socratic biography. Indeed, it is to be expected that the divine sign, by its very nature, would become an integral part of this whole process. Thus *Thg.* may well represent by far the earliest extant evidence for the extended depiction of Socrates' divine sign after it had already found a place within current demonological speculations. Concomitantly, this portion of *Thg.* is probably also our earliest example of a truly hagiographical approach to the Socratic biography.<sup>93</sup> It represents a demonstrable break with Platonic treatments of Socrates, and even in Xenophon there is nothing that approaches it. The Socrates of this part of *Thg.* points forward to a good deal in that which was to become commonplace in the later biographical treatment of him.

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<sup>92</sup>This is the principal argument of Magalhães-Vilhena, *Socrate*, which I see no reason to dispute. Pavlu however (34 and *Phil. Woch.* 59.22 [1939] 596) was not in sympathy with this reasoning, and made his disagreement the basis for dating the dialogue to c. 300-275 ("Vielmehr muss man m. E. eine nicht unbedeutende Zeit verstreichen lassen, damit aus dem Sokrates des Platon und des Xenophon...der Wundermann und Prophet des Theages werde" [*Phil. Woch.* 596]). In answer to Pavlu's assumptions it is important to call attention to an overlooked piece of evidence for the presence of the fabulous in the earliest phase of Socratic literature. In the Κυρσῶς (less likely Κύρος) of Antisthenes (and so not later than c. 365), the deceased Socrates appeared, at his grave, to a young man in a dream and instructed him; see Wilamowitz II.27 n.3. The story appears (without mention of source) in *Suda* s.v. Σωκράτης, but Caizzi in his collection of fragments (*Antisthenis Fragmenta* [Milano, 1966]) seems unaware of Wilamowitz's argument (see also Dittmar 63-4). Also, if the hypothesis is correct that the author of the first Socratic epistle derived his anecdote about an occurrence of Socrates' divine sign (*Socr. Ep.* I.9) from Antisthenes' *Archelaus* (see J. Bernays, *Phokion* [Berlin, 1881] 114; F. Dümmler, *Akademika* [Giessen, 1889] 3ff.), it is further proof of a predilection for the miraculous in at least one of the earliest Socratics.

<sup>93</sup>For the hagiographical quality of this portion of *Thg.*, see among others Bruns 345-7; Fritzsche 228-9; Gauss 209. At the risk of oversimplification, one might draw upon the hagiographical classifications formulated by M. Hadas and M. Smith (*Heroes and Gods* [New York, 1965] 12) as regards the terms "hero" and "saint": the hero works by his own power, the saint by divine will; and within this scheme Plato's Socrates (according to the authors) is conceived along traditional heroic patterns (49-56). In *Thg.* on the other hand, we might say that Socrates has crossed the line towards "sainthood."

### III. Characters

#### a. Socrates

The question of the authenticity of *Thg.* has sometimes been held to depend largely on the author's presentation of Socrates.<sup>1</sup> It will be evident therefore that an examination of his characterization in *Thg.* is of some importance. But the investigation is not a simple one, for while there is no question about the unity of the dialogue itself (see *Intr.* ch. I, c), Socrates does emerge here as something of a dual figure, now addicted to question and answer, now devoted to μακρολογία on a topic (the divine sign) about which he usually avoids any lengthy discussion. How does this Socrates compare with the homonymous character with whom Plato presents us in the other dialogues of the Corpus?

There is much that is familiar about the Socrates we encounter in *Thg.*<sup>2</sup> He first appears in the agora of Athens, in the Stoa of Zeus Eleutherios (121a6-7), and, as so often, he is the person with whom others are especially eager to speak. He shows a seemingly deference towards one older than himself (127e1). His initial words after Demodocus' opening speech express a strong concern for the education of the young (122b2ff., cf. 127d2ff.); conformably with this attitude, he conscientiously fixes his

<sup>1</sup>See, e.g., Stallbaum 222; Hermann, *Geschichte und System* 429-30; Bruns 345-7; Pavlu 23-5; Tarrant, *CQ* 32 (1938) 168, 171-2; I.M. Crombie, *An Examination of Plato's Doctrines* (London, 1962) 12.

<sup>2</sup>For the Platonic passages bearing upon the following features of Socrates' depiction in *Thg.*, see in each case the commentary *ad loc.*

attention exclusively upon the young man with whose education he is presently concerned (122c8-d4, 125b3). Socrates is particularly careful from the outset of *Thg.* to make provisions for determining precisely the topic of discussion (122b6ff.). His method of investigation consists primarily of a few series of question and answer (esp. 123c1ff.), and of conversation-type discussions (e.g. 125d13ff.). He innocently claims at first to be offering himself as a passive witness (μάρτυς 123b2-3) to the difficulties Theages has experienced with his father, but turns out to be the interrogator of Theages, one in fact who distorts the young man's desire to become σοφός into a desire to become a tyrant, and who on this account engages the apparent anger of the young man at one point (125e4). Throughout his questioning of Theages, he employs analogies from various crafts. He makes ready use of poetic quotation (125b6ff., d10ff.), and demonstrates, *en passant*, an interest in etymology (122d9-e1). He employs irony to force his interlocutor to clarify himself (125e5-126a6). In *Thg.* Socrates maintains that he is ignorant (128b1ff.); this is, of course, characteristic of the Platonic *persona*, and so, too, is the irony that it implies.<sup>3</sup> But here there are limits to his ignorance, for he is an expert at τὰ ἐρωτικά; and we have also seen (*Intr.* ch. I, *b*, *vi*, *vii*; ch. II, *b*) that this quality informs the Socrates of *Thg.*, and is responsible for some of the structural features of the dialogue. Though a similar claim to expertise in τὰ ἐρωτικά is rarely ever made by Socrates, an erotic disposition is nevertheless a familiar trait of the character whom we meet elsewhere in

<sup>3</sup>Irony is primarily a characteristic of Plato's Socrates, see W. Boder, *Die sokratischen Ironie in den platonischen Frühdialogen* (Amsterdam, 1973) 23ff.; but perhaps not exclusively Platonic, see Guthrie *HGP III.* 337; Vlastos, *CQ* n.s.37 (1987) 85-7; cf. also Cic. *Brut.* 292, who ascribes Socratic irony to Xenophon and Aeschines Socraticus as well. It would be interesting to know if the presence of irony was a criterion in Panaetius' judgement about "true" (ἀληθεῖς) Socratic dialogues (D.L. 2.64).

the Platonic Corpus. Finally, Socrates' recommendation of the sophists as superior educators to himself (127e8ff.) is typical of the Platonic character; but the fact that this recommendation occurs within a passage that is taken directly from *Ap.* (see *Intr.* ch. I n.54) is in itself evidence that the author's aim is not to create a wholly original character in Socrates. This writer, in other words, is aware of the tradition of Socratic characterization in which he is working.

Throughout the first seven and a half (Stephanus) pages of the dialogue (i.e., as far as 128d1) Socrates furnishes much evidence of humour and affectation. Besides the instances cited in the previous paragraph and in *Intr.* ch. I, *b*, other pertinent samples have been collected in the commentary (*pass.*). Generally speaking, Socrates' manner of expression is decidedly colloquial and lively (but see also comm. *ad* 127d2-128b7), and the παιδιὰ for which he is distinguishable in *Thg.* is the more conspicuous for its contrast with Demodocus' σπουδή (see below sec. *c*, and *Intr.* ch. I, *b*; *c*). This contrast between play and earnest can be detected at the very outset of the dialogue. Thesleff remarks (156) that Socrates exhibits a "mock-dignified adaptation of the tone of Demodokos" in 122b2-c4 and 127d2-128b6. Although this is, I think, basically right, I would extend the observation to cover 121a4-5 as well: Demodocus' clumsy opening address<sup>4</sup> is aped by Socrates' heavy ἀλλὰ καὶ ἄλλως and καὶ δὴ σοῦ γε ἔνεκα καὶ πάνυ. This early play at Demodocus' words establishes at once the opposition in the tones of Socrates and Demodocus, and entrenches the dialogue immediately in a recognizable Platonic atmosphere.

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<sup>4</sup>See below sec. *c*, and comm. *ad* 121a1-3.



It can be seen, then, that our author has done a great deal to characterize Socrates along distinctive lines. Moreover, the many points of contact that the Socrates of *Thg.* exhibits with the Platonic character show clearly and decisively where his essential affinities lie. It is necessary, however, to look in closer detail at Socrates' method of discussion and the actual doctrines and beliefs that he is made to hold in this dialogue, for the light that they shed on the authenticity of his characterization.

The result of Socrates' interrogation of Theages is a rather familiar one: Theages is made to recognize that he does not know what he thought he knew, namely, who would be likely to make him σοφός in the skill with which he is most concerned.<sup>5</sup> Yet in *Thg.* this process, in terms of both structure and content, is far from identical to the one with which we are likely to associate it in other Platonic dialogues (especially Socratic dialogues): Socratic ἔλεγχος leading to an interlocutor's state of ἀπορία.<sup>6</sup> Yet, while an elenctic, aporetic, and aporia-producing Socrates is certainly a very prominent figure in numerous Platonic works, should we expect that precisely the same character will make his presence known in this dialogue as well? We have already seen that we should not; for in *Thg.* Socrates' interlocutor is not like all the other persons whom he reduces to a condition of ἀπορία. Instead, Theages is able to acknowledge his own deficiencies; hence the requirement that he be purged of δοξασοφία is not nearly as urgent as it is in other situations. Consequently, Socrates understandably (and quite conformably with the Platonic Socrates) conducts his interrogation of Theages largely *ad hominem*; there is no search for the definition of an ethical term, nor is Socrates confronted with a con-

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<sup>5</sup>For elaboration on the points made in this and the following paragraphs, see the relevant sections of *Intr.* ch. I, b, c.

<sup>6</sup>See also Hermann, *Geschichte und System* 428-9; Steinhart 440-1; Krüger 16-7.

ceited or sophistic adversary. We need not feel therefore that the Socrates of *Thg.* is un-Platonic because he does not lead his interlocutor to ἀπορία as he does elsewhere; unless, that is, we subscribe to a theory of the Platonic dialogue which dictates strict and rigid rules about form. But, in any case, such works as *Ap.*, *Cri.*, and *Menex.* prove the futility of an approach of this kind. We only have to consider the characters and circumstances of this dialogue to recognize that Socrates has justification for behaving as he does in the first part of *Thg.*

Socrates' use of craft-analogy in *Thg.* has already been mentioned above. While the assertion that this is a trait of the Platonic Socrates is surely uncontroversial, it is nevertheless incomplete and, possibly, misleading. For the homonymous character in other Σωκρατικοὶ λόγοι also makes use of analogies with crafts, and we may assume that when the writers of these dialogues represented Socrates as employing craft-analogy, they were simply remaining faithful to the spirit of the historical Socrates (whether they realized it or not). The crucial issue for us, then, must be whether anything specifically *Platonic*, or otherwise, can be detected in the use of craft-analogy in this dialogue. In the first place, it may be labelled as Platonic that in *Thg.* Socrates' employment of craft-analogy demonstrates that the political craft resists classification with other, conventional τέχναι. As well, that the use of analogies with crafts leads to a virtual *impasse* in the discussion with Theages (but note the restrictions in the preceding paragraph) is a recurring feature of the Platonic dialogues. Likewise, it is characteristic of the Platonic Socrates, not only that he refuses to acknowledge that the sophists and politicians understand and can teach the genuine art of politics, but also that he himself does not emerge here as an expert in some τέχνη. Moreover, Theages' attribution to Socrates of the

maxim concerning the failure of the sons of successful fathers implies the latter's ignorance of the true πολιτικὴ τέχνη, and draws the Socrates of this dialogue firmly into line with the Platonic character who elsewhere expresses a similar reservation (see comm. *ad* 126d1-4).

But there are difficulties. In *Thg.*, an individual's progress within Socratic association depends, in effect, upon chance or luck (cf. 128d2 θεία μοῖρα, 130e10 παρ' ἐμοῦ ὅτι ἂν τύχῃς τοῦτο πράξαι, and see *Intr.* ch. I, *b*, *vii*), and is dictated by the whim of τὸ δαιμόνιον. As well, Socratic association, even if not outwardly extolled, is nevertheless, within this context, clearly considered to be superior to anything that others (i.e., sophists and politicians) may offer under the present circumstances. At the same time, however, nothing is said of the advantages that might accrue from the existence of an ideal, genuine τέχνη of politics, and of an individual who possesses this τέχνη (or any other, for that matter), if there were such a one. Now, it may be that in this dialogue Socratic association is considered to be simply a δεύτερος πλοῦς to association with one who can legitimately claim knowledge of the genuine art of politics. This, however, is never stated, though Socrates does caution Theages about the arbitrary nature of the progress that might be achieved in his company (130e5-10). What we find instead is that the author, through Socrates, recommends (both by the length of the section on the divine sign, and, in particular, by the story about Aristides) only one thing, namely the benefit that can be derived from an educational contact that is essentially characterized by τύχη. Is this a position which could reasonably be ascribed to the Platonic Socrates? For the most part it seems unlikely; for it is precisely the vicissitudes of τύχη that he persistently abhors and seeks to eradicate from the lives of men by advocating the supremacy of τέχνη. "Virtue is

knowledge" implies as much, and the same frame of mind animates the value attached to the hedonistic calculus in *Prt.*;<sup>7</sup> in one striking instance (*Euthd.* 279c4-280b3) Socrates argues that luck is nothing other than σοφία, and that when one possesses the latter there is no need of the former; ultimately, the desire to remove contingency and change leads to the theory of forms. Whatever may have been the role of the historical Socrates within debates on these issues, in Plato's dialogues, at any rate, he is actively involved. Yet for all of that it must be said that this picture of the Platonic Socrates will not quite suffice. In *Phdr.* Socrates' attitude changes: he openly attaches value to non-rational elements in life, for it is his conviction that madness which comes to us θεία μοίρα is responsible for the greatest blessings (244a6-8, c3). Here Socrates is able to find room for certain aspects of human life to which he would elsewhere deny any role.<sup>8</sup> Thus, while it is hard to find any common ground between, on the one hand, the Platonic Socrates who places exclusive importance on rational deliberation, and, on the other, the character in *Thg.* who demonstrates a certain satisfaction with the kind of association whose benefits depend on a power completely outside of Socrates' control, nevertheless there is a Socrates within Plato's works who, we have reason to feel, would not be unsympathetic towards the importance assigned to non-rational impulses in *Thg.*<sup>9</sup>

<sup>7</sup>See most recently M.C. Nussbaum, *The Fragility of Goodness* (Cambridge, 1986) 89-121 (esp. 109ff. on the hedonistic calculus as a piece of doctrine which Socrates seriously holds); also Crombie, *op. cit.* 232-45 (esp. 240f.); Irwin, *PMT* 102-14.

<sup>8</sup>See Nussbaum, *op. cit.* 200-33.

<sup>9</sup>Such a Socrates (the Socrates of *Phdr.*) is usually taken to be more of a Platonic creation than a faithful representation of the historical person; see, e.g., Guthrie, *HGP IV.* 417-9; Irwin, *PMT* 172-6; Nussbaum, *op. cit.* 228-33. On the other hand, it may be recalled that the ability to improve an associate in a non-rational way, and merely by his presence, seems to have been a characteristic feature of the Socrates of Aeschines of Sphettus (see *Intr.* ch. I, b, vii, and nn.72, 73).

However this may be, sympathy with a concept or disposition, and total subordination to it (such as we find in *Thg.*), are not the same thing, and it is one of the most disturbing features of the Socrates in this dialogue that the irrational element in his *συνουσία* is so predominant (see *Intr.* ch. I, *b*, *vii*). It will be helpful to consider the ramifications of this by examining the precise role in *Thg.* that chance is made to play within Socratic association. In this dialogue Socrates claims, through the reports of the young Aristides, that he is not responsible for any progress that a companion might make. Essentially, this is nothing other than Socratic ignorance (cf. 128b1f.), and, as far as it goes, it is perfectly compatible with the position Socrates assumes elsewhere in the Platonic Corpus; this is the Socrates who is no expert in any *τέχνη*. But, whereas Socrates' denial that he actually teaches usually in Plato implies an elenctic, maieutic *persona*, in *Thg.* the assertion that others do not learn from him is exemplified by a very different process, one over which Socrates apparently has no control (education by contact, see *Intr.* ch. II, *b*, *d*). Clearly, in *Thg.* Socrates' ignorance and inability to teach are part and parcel with the prominent role that he assigns to chance within his associations with others. This dialogue, in other words, introduces a new explanation for the Platonic Socrates' traditional claim that he does not teach, for the void produced by his own "incompetence" is now filled not by *μαλευτική*, but by *τύχη*; and this *τύχη*, in turn, is the effect of Socrates' inability to control the participation of *τὸ δαιμόνιον* in an educational context.<sup>10</sup> It is true that here, as elsewhere, Socratic ignorance potentially provides a means of advancement for a companion; in this instance, however, the efficacy of this ignorance is

<sup>10</sup>For the connection of divine intervention and chance made by the Socrates of Aeschines Socraticus, see T. Saunders, *Plato: Early Socratic Dialogues* (Harmondsworth, 1987) 377-9.

simply a by-product of Socrates' pervasive subjection to chance. It is therefore not the mere fact that Socrates perceives some advantage in an irrational facet of life that raises suspicions of un-Platonic characterization, but rather the use to which the element of contingency is put in this dialogue.

The sphere within which chance operates in this dialogue, and the primary role it is given over τέχνη, are unusual. But it must be pointed out that in *Thg.* the progress of an individual is not merely "what just happens," that is to say, it is not completely without cause; rather, Socrates identifies the workings of chance in his associations with the agency and arbitrary behaviour of τὸ δαιμόνιον, and this raises problems of its own. We may, first of all, put out of account certain objections that might be advanced about this section of the dialogue as it relates to Socrates' characterization. There is, first of all, no difficulty *per se* in Socrates' use of extended narrative. The eschatological myths of *Grg.*, *Phd.*, *R.*, and *Phdr.* provide the most obvious parallels for this mode of expression. Nor is Socrates' autobiographical manner a sign of inauthenticity. Apart from *Ap.*, which necessarily contains much self-revelatory material, we may look to Socrates' sketch of his early interest in natural science in *Phd.* 96a6-99d2 for a Platonic precedent. This same passage, moreover, furnishes adequate evidence of a Socrates who, like the character in *Thg.*, can speak about himself in non-ironic terms.<sup>11</sup> Again, Socrates' change of tone from playful in the first section of the dialogue to earnest in the second corresponds to a similar transmutation in *Menex.*, where there is ironic banter in

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<sup>11</sup>His tone in this part of *Thg.*, according to Hermann (*Geschichte und System* 430), Fritzsche (228-9), and Bruns (346-7), is not only serious, but boastful. According to Pangle (168), Socrates' tone changes because he is now enlarging on a topic which his superstitious rural interlocutors will understand.

the prelude, and (ostensibly at least) a resounding *gravitas* in the Funeral Speech.<sup>12</sup> That in *Thg.* Socrates chooses a series of anecdotes to express himself is somewhat more difficult to reconcile with the Socrates whom we encounter elsewhere in the Corpus (see comm. *ad* 128d1-130e4). But it is simply his subject matter, the divine sign, that represents the single significant departure from the usual custom of the Platonic Socrates. The references to τὸ δαιμόνιον in the rest of Plato contain nothing to compare with this, either in magnitude or tone. Plato, it must be noted, has sound reasons for not allowing his Socrates much space to enlarge on this topic, and for portraying Socrates, for the most part, as speaking about it in a relatively light and incidental manner (see *Intr.* ch. II, *a*). On both these points the Socrates of *Thg.* seriously contravenes regular Platonic practice.

To assert that the Socrates of *Thg.* is un-Platonic merely because he displays certain characteristics that are not found in other Platonic compositions is to commit the serious error of viewing Plato's Socrates as a homogeneous character, which he patently is not. In any event, it may be felt that the portrayal of Socrates in *Thg.* is sufficiently Platonic to override concerns about deviations from the "normal" Platonic portrait. On the other hand, if greater faith can be placed in evidence which demonstrates that the Socrates of *Thg.* adheres to certain ways of thinking which the Platonic Socrates avoids not only persistently, but also deliberately and for identifiable reasons, then we are likely to feel that there is something seriously wrong with the Socrates of our dialogue. Perhaps in the end it does not

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<sup>12</sup>See G. Kennedy, *The Art of Persuasion in Greece* (Princeton, 1963) 158-9. Kennedy's remarks on *Menex.* (158) may be equally applied to the interpretation of Socrates' tone in *Thg.*: "Elsewhere Socrates sometimes affects a serious tone when he does not mean to be taken seriously in the final analysis, but in such cases, for example in his first speech in the *Phaedrus*, the real situation is made clear before the dialogue is over." If Socrates' tone in the divine sign section of *Thg.* is anything but serious, there is no indication of this whatever.

compel the verdict that he is not the product of Plato's own hand; but, I think, it comes quite near.

*b. Theages*

Theages is a type more or less familiar in Plato (and in Xenophon's *Socratica* for that matter): a young man, ready to converse with Socrates, but unaccustomed to his manner of investigation and his irony, and in some cases eager for success in the public sphere. In this connection we are likely to think of Meno, Hippocrates in *Prt.*, Charmides, Clinias in *Euthd.*, Lysis, Alcibiades in the *Alcibiades*-dialogues, and, to a certain extent, Callicles in *Grg.*<sup>13</sup> Some scholars have however been more precise about possible affinities. They point to Thucydides and Aristides, the sons of Melesias and Lysimachus, in *La.*, as the figures who provided our author with the model for his characterization of Theages.<sup>14</sup> But since these two characters are little more than *mutae personae* in that dialogue, it is evident that much can be gained from a closer look at the characterization of Theages.

Theages, it is true, shows a number of youthful traits; this is as we should expect. He has undergone the traditional Athenian educational curriculum (122e8-10). Although he wants to become σοφός, he has no precise idea of what this may entail. He complains of his father's feigned ignorance of what he himself has often told him, and of his father's refusal to comply with his wishes (123a5-8). He is unfamiliar with Socrates' method of inquiry (see *Intr.* ch. I, *b*, *iii*),<sup>15</sup> and becomes frustrated at Socrates' playful attitude towards him (125e4). Yet he becomes despondent

<sup>13</sup>Xenophon's description of Proxenus in *An.* 2.6.16f. might also come to mind.

<sup>14</sup>See e.g. Pavlu 25-6; Krüger 27-8.

<sup>15</sup>See also Krüger 15.



when it appears to him that Socrates is refusing to associate with him, and is quick to cite the fact that he is requesting no more than what Socrates has done for others roughly his own age and in a similar position (128b7-c5). Finally, his dactylic innovation εὐχαῖσιν τε καὶ θυσίαις (131a6) may be, as Friedländer supposed (329), a demonstration of what he has learned at school.

Theages' desire for a sophistic education (122a5ff.) is shared by a number of youths in Plato's dialogues: the conventional training is simply no longer good enough. We learn that this desire originates in conversations Theages has had with some friends who have "thrown him into a state of confusion," διαταράττουσιν (121d3), an appropriate word to describe youthful enthusiasm towards a current fashion (see comm. *ad loc.*). As a result of his friends' reports, Theages has caused Demodocus a great deal of trouble (πάλαι μοι πράγματα παρέχει 121d4), and has set certain demands on his father (ἄξιῶν 121d4). But despite the occasional obstinance Theages shows towards Demodocus (see *Intr.* ch. I n.27), it would appear that he still identifies himself closely with his father (see comm. *ad* 131a4-6).

Theages' language is sometimes vivid and exuberant. Perhaps the best example of this is the sentence 125e8-126a4 Εὐξαίμην...ἐπιθυμέειν (see comm. *ad loc.*). His criticism of his father (123a5-8) is also expressed quite sharply. From 125d7 up to the commencement of the divine sign section (128d1) Theages swears νή/μὰ Δία five times, but

never before. We may infer that he has worked himself up to a fever pitch by the time Socrates begins his exposition.<sup>16</sup>

But Theages is not one-dimensionally naïve or juvenile, as some critics have imagined.<sup>17</sup> Though his knowledge of a specific Socratic tenet (the failure of the sons of successful Athenians) is, as mentioned above, not unparalleled in Plato, his willingness to express an opinion about it (126d4-7) is another matter, and sets him apart from some other youthful interlocutors in the Platonic Corpus. While Theages complains about the *παλιδιὰ* which Socrates has directed towards him, our analysis of Socrates' use of the Anacreon fragment which prompts this complaint (see **Appendix 3**) suggests that Theages' annoyance is to a great extent justified. Moreover, Theages is not simply a duplication of Alcibiades in certain *Alcibiades*-dialogues (again, as some scholars have supposed).<sup>18</sup> On the contrary, the author of this dialogue has gone to some lengths to leave the impression that Theages is, in certain ways, the antithesis of an Alcibiades figure, and that his character and capacity is different from that of young men like Alcibiades (see *Intr.* ch. I, *b*; *c*). Thus, for instance, his statement in 125e8-126a4, though admittedly conveyed in an excited tone of voice (see above), is nevertheless *not* an expression of a real desire for tyranny. This assumption leads, and has led, to some curious interpretations of Theages' character; but the passage in fact furnishes evidence of a different kind

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<sup>16</sup>For the concentration of oath-swearing, cf. Hippocrates in *Prt.* 310b9, d5, d8. Pangle (161) has also noticed Theages' repeated oath-swearing, and concludes that he swears by Zeus because he is standing in the Stoa of Zeus Eleutherios (he explains Demodocus' oath in 125b1 in the same way), and because Zeus is "the very model of the tyrannic rule of the wise" (160). A glance at a sample of the references in Brandwood's *Index s.v. Δία* will, however, show how unexceptional the oath by Zeus is in Plato, and with what little deeper significance it is expressed.

<sup>17</sup>See Krüger 14; Thesleff 156; Friedländer 149-50, 329.

<sup>18</sup>See, e.g., Hermann, *Geschichte und System* 230, 598; Steinhart 441; Pavlu 26-7; Friedländer 149 falls just short of a similar judgement.

about him (see *Intr.* ch. V, c, d). Theages' failure to supply an answer at 125d7 in response to an exceedingly simple question from Socrates about the special knowledge of *τύραννοι* has also been taken as proof that the young man is particularly dim.<sup>19</sup> But it is much better, as C.W. Müller observed (136 n.3), to interpret Theages' reticence as an indication that he actually recognizes Socrates' irony and refuses, out of annoyance, to offer the answer which, he thinks, will satisfy Socrates' expectations (see comm. *ad loc.*). Müller (137 n.10) was also right, I believe, in his evaluation of 127a1-10. Here Socrates states that he will entrust Theages to one of οἱ καλοὶ καγαθοὶ τὰ πολιτικά, that Theages will gain a fine reputation as a result, and that it will cost his father nothing. Theages then asks: is not Socrates one of οἱ καλοὶ καγαθοί?, and follows this up with a request that Socrates himself become his companion. This request, to be sure, is seriously meant, for Theages does subsequently place a good deal of importance in enlisting Socrates as his mentor. But the repartee in Theages' words should not be missed: he understands the irony in Socrates' use of καλοὶ καγαθοί, and immediately throws the phrase back upon Socrates. All this does not seem to be the sort of behaviour that is characteristic of the earlier years of adolescence. Indeed, we may perhaps suppose that, since Theages is now thinking in realistic terms about attaining success in public life, it is most likely he is at, or very near, the age of majority (i.e. 18), at which time he would be enrolled in his deme (note that Demodocus speaks of Theages' fellow demesmen, δημόται 121d2), and would be allowed to address the *ecclesia*.<sup>20</sup>

<sup>19</sup>See Krüger 16; also Pangle (152-63) on Socrates' questioning of Theages in general.

<sup>20</sup>See also comm. *ad* 122c8. H. Müller thinks along the same lines (465), but suggests 20 as the approximate age of Theages; this may be slightly too high.

Outside of *Thg.*, Theages' name occurs only twice, in *Ap.* and *R.*; these two instances, and the inferences that can be drawn from them, have been discussed in some detail in *Intr.* ch. I, c. The indication from the *Ap.* passage (from the use of the past tense ἦν) is that Theages was already dead by the time of Socrates' trial in 399. If any confidence can be placed in the portrayal of Theages as a μετράκιον at the time of the dialogue's dramatic date (409, see *Intr.* ch. V, appendix), we may gather that Theages died at a fairly young age; and this supposition may be supported by the allusion in the *R.* passage to his νοσοτροφία. Kirchner has identified the ΔΗΜΟΔΟΚΟΣ [ΑΝΑΓΥΡΑΣΙ]ΟΣ named on an Attic inscription of c. 400-350 as the son either of the Theages of our dialogue, or of his brother Paralios.<sup>21</sup>

### c. Demodocus

Demodocus has been seen as the "type" of concerned father who has the good intention of providing for his son's education, but is uncertain as to the identification of the person who will be the most likely to help him in this endeavour. Not unlike Demodocus are Lysimachus and Melesias in *La.*, and Crito in *Euthd.* (306d2ff.); we may also think of the role Socrates performs *in loco parentis* for Hippocrates in *Prt.* 316b8ff. C.W. Müller (138-9) sees in Demodocus a combination of two "fathertypes": on the one hand, he is the father who wants his son to be trained in the πολιτικὴ τέχνη, but is ignorant of the art himself (cf. Lysimachus and Melesias in *La.*); on the other hand, he is the successful politician who is yet unable to pass the political art on to his sons himself (cf. Aristides and Thucydides, the fathers of the mediocre Lysimachus and Melesias). This seems a highly schem-

<sup>21</sup>See I. Kirchner, *Prosopographia Attica I* (Berolini, 1901) 230 (§ 3465).

atic assessment of the characterization of Demodocus, and we must consider if it is an apt evaluation of our author's *modus operandi*.

It will be best to begin with Demodocus' opening words in this dialogue. Shorey criticized them as follows: "Plato could hardly have written the intolerably clumsy and scholastic first two sentences [i.e. 121a1-3] of the *Theages*."<sup>22</sup> I think it is safe to interpret this statement to mean that Demodocus' first words are evidence of incompetent writing on the part of the author of *Thg*. Clumsy they are (see comm. *ad* 121a1-3), but we have already observed that Socrates recognizes the inconcinnity of Demodocus' means of expression, and responds to it at once in an appropriately stiff manner himself. In view of this it rather appears as though the effect of Demodocus' words, as they were understood by Shorey, is deliberate.<sup>23</sup> And the purpose which they serve is, I think, to underscore the intensity of Demodocus' anxiety in the present situation, or, at any rate, to reveal the importance which Demodocus attaches to the subject which he wants to broach with Socrates (the length of his imminent monologue contributes to the same end, see below). Moreover, Demodocus' personality, as evoked by his manner of speaking, is developed with some consistency in this dialogue, yet this is not what we would expect if his first words merely represented an example of bad writing. It will be necessary to elaborate on this last point.

There is no single item of Demodocus' language which might be considered solecistic or obscure. But several combine to impart what Thesleff (156) calls a "somewhat solemn and circumstantial" manner of speaking. Apart from the first two sentences of the dialogue, there is τὸ

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<sup>22</sup>See Shorey, *WPS* 429.

<sup>23</sup>So also Friedländer 326-7; Rist (18 n.8) disagrees.

περὶ τῶν ἀνθρώπων as subject in 121c1; the hyperbaton of ἐγὼ in 121c2; the emphatic position of ἐμοὶ, and the pendant article ἡ, in 121c3; the rather unusual phrase δοκῶ γάρ μοι (121d1); the officious use of πράξειν in 122b8; the affected sound of 127b5-6 καὶ μέντοι καὶ αἰσχύνομαι λέγειν ὡς σφόδρα βούλομαι; and the heavily worded sentence 127c6-d1 (ἐγὼ...ῆς; on each of these features see the comm. *ad loc.*). Demodocus speaks in a stilted, halting fashion, and consistently so.

Demodocus' early monologue (121b1-122b1) represents his main contribution to this dialogue, and is noteworthy, structurally speaking, because a character other than Socrates rarely has a lengthy opening speech in a Platonic dialogue. The closest parallel to what we find here is Lysimachus' opening harangue in *La.*: both speeches take up approximately the same amount of their respective dialogues (about one-tenth), and both are aimed at soliciting advice from the present company concerning the future education of the speaker's son (see *Intr.* ch. I n.7). But apart from these similarities of situation and content, it is possible from a close examination to see that the two passages share little else in common.

A suitable point of departure is the criticism of Demodocus' speech made by one ancient writer. In a work attributed to Dionysius of Halicarnassus (*Rh.* 405 [= II.381.5-7 Usener-Radermacher]), we find the following judgement: παρὰ τῷ Πλάτῳ ὁ Δημόδοκος λέγει πρὸς Σωκράτην· "ἐμοὶ γάρ, ὦ Σώκρατες, ἡ τούτου τοῦ παιδὸς εἴτε φυτεῖαν εἴτε παιδοποιίαν χρὴ φάναι" [a slight adaptation of *Thg.* 121 c3-4]. τοῦτο δὲ οὐ χρὴ νομίζειν ὅτι μεγάλη τῇ φωνῇ χρήται ὁ Πλάτων, ἀλλὰ ἐπειδὴ ὁ Δημόδοκος ἐργατικὸς καὶ γεωργικὸς,

φωνὰς ἀφίησι τῆς τέχνης. The second part of the last sentence is clear as to its meaning: as Demodocus is a farmer and a worker, his language is fashioned to suit his occupation. The first part of the same sentence would seem to indicate that the passage in *Thg.* could be understood (mistakenly) as evidence that "the language which Plato is using is grandiose/impressive."<sup>24</sup> Now, the work in which these evaluations occur is probably not an authentic composition of Dionysius' (see *Intr.* ch. V, a and n.5). But, since the composition is itself a rhetorical handbook, its value as evidence for the way in which a Greek ear responded to Demodocus' opening monologue remains undiminished.<sup>25</sup> And the verdict was that the author's portrayal of Demodocus as a farmer through linguistic means was convincing and effective.

Still, [Dionysius'] testimony pertains, strictly speaking, only to Demodocus' simile between plant-rearing and child-rearing within the words that he quotes. The use of this simile would incline us to believe that his statement that Demodocus is a farmer must be correct (cf. also 121d2 εἰς τὸ ἄστυ καταβαίνοντες, 127e3 Ἀναγυρασίων τε τῶν δημοτῶν, and comm. *ad locc.*). But to what extent is our author's characterization of Demodocus as γεωργικός consistent? A passage from Arist. *Rh.* (1395a 6ff.) may be evidential. According to Aristotle, οἱ γὰρ ἄγροικοι μάλιστα γνωμοτύποι εἰσὶ καὶ ῥαδίως ἀποφαίνονται [*sc.* τὰς γνώμας]. This could be an accurate description of Demodocus' style in

<sup>24</sup>μεγάλη in this sentence can hardly mean "loud," as it usually does in similar contexts. For the meaning assigned to it in the above translation see LSJ s.v. μέγας A.II.6.

<sup>25</sup>Stallbaum (*ad* 121c) rejects outright the hermeneutical value of this piece of evidence, asserting that the passage in *Thg.* "ridiculum est et absurdum," and that Plato would have expressed himself "elegantius." Apart from the fact that Stallbaum misapprehends some of the features of Demodocus' monologue (see comm. *ad* 121b6, c2), it is questionable whether greater reliance should be placed on the feel for Greek on which Stallbaum apparently based his assessment, than on the judgements of a native Greek speaker such as [Dionysius].

the earlier part of his monologue, for his use of the simile mentioned above does make him appear γνωμοτύπος. Moreover, sententiousness is a conspicuous quality of the language of rustics in comedy (especially) and elsewhere.<sup>26</sup> Demodocus' clumsy, halting language would also seem to point up his rusticity: of the country dweller Gorgias in *Men. Dysc.*, it has been said that he speaks with "stilted formality," and that his language "always tends to stiffness."<sup>27</sup> Additionally, Demodocus' complaint about the anxieties which a husbandman must always feel is a commonplace in the mouths of farmers in Greek literature.<sup>28</sup> Finally, the dramatic circumstances of *Thg.* also lay emphasis on Demodocus' position as a rustic, in so far as they imply the familiar contrast of city and country, and dictate, in part, what will be Demodocus' attitude regarding novel and unfamiliar trends; and it does emerge that he is suspicious of the sophists, who have so animated his son's mind (see *Intr.* ch. I, b, i).

There are, therefore, sound reasons for believing that our author has taken some care to depict Demodocus along lines which could be recognized by contemporary readers as fairly typically rustic. This does not imply, however, that the portrayal of him here is also unsympathetic. Demodocus' keen interest in Theages' future, as well as the trepidation he twice expresses that his son may be corrupted (122a5, 127c2), are evidence of our author's attitude towards him. So also is the priority over financial

<sup>26</sup>See the interesting observations of A.G. Katsouris, *Linguistic and Stylistic Characterization: Tragedy and Menander* (Ioannina, 1975), esp. 104, 117-8, 132ff.; to the examples cited there add Plaut. *Most.* 72-3; Demea in Ter. *Ad.*, e.g. 855ff.; the αὐτουργός in E. *El.* 80-1 (see Denniston's n. *ad loc.*); cf. also Hor. *Sat.* II.2.1-4.

<sup>27</sup>See E.W. Handley in *Entretiens Hardt* 16 (1970) 137; Gomme-Sandbach *ad Dysc.* 272. As an (admittedly subjective) point of observation, a parallel to Demodocus' verbal style in the first half of his monologue is the stiffly pedantic comparison which Eryximachus draws (*Smp.* 186a2ff.) between the opposites good~bad ἔρως and polar opposites in science and medicine.

<sup>28</sup>Cf., e.g., *Men. Dysc.* 604ff., and see *Intr.* ch. I n.14.



considerations which Demodocus gives to his son's welfare (see comm. *ad* 121d6-122a1), and his reluctance to entrust his son to anyone at all (see comm. *ad* 127c1-2). If anything, Demodocus is, to judge by Theages' treatment of him, perhaps too indulgent.<sup>29</sup> Furthermore, though Demodocus' frame of mind might be characterized by the term σπουδῇ (see *Intr.* ch. I, *b*), he does show himself well aware of Socrates' irony when the latter is in the process of forcing Theages to realize the complexity of his desire, and, to judge by Demodocus' own words (125b1-2), he approves of Socrates' behaviour (see *Intr.* ch. I, *b*, *iv*). But, above all, the one feature about Demodocus that cannot be questioned is his sincerity. He is, surely, more than just a "type."

We know little about Demodocus as an historical figure. He is mentioned in one other passage in Plato, *Ap.* 33e7, as the father of Theages and Paralios.<sup>30</sup> Apart from his occupation and home (the deme Anagyrous, 127e3), we learn in *Thg.* that he was older than Socrates (127e1), i.e., older than 60 years of age at the dramatic date of the dialogue (409, see *Intr.* ch. V, appendix), that he had held many important offices in Athens, and that he received high honours from his demesmen (127e2ff.). It seems probable that our Demodocus is the Athenian general who, in the summer of 424, was in command, along with a certain Aristides, of οἱ ἀργυρολόγοι νῆες around the Hellespont, and organized the recapture of Antandros after it had been taken by the Mytilinaean exiles (cf. *Thuc.* 4.75.1).<sup>31</sup> It has also been judged likely that the ΔΗΜΟΔΟΚΟΣ ΑΝΑ-

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<sup>29</sup>So Steinhart 465.

<sup>30</sup>The pseudo-Platonic *Demodocus* may well be named after the Demodocus of our dialogue (see further *Intr.* ch. V n.3); there he is addressed only once and does not speak.

<sup>31</sup>See Gomme *ad Thuc.* 4.75.1; Souilhé *ad Thg.* 127e; Robin 1643. Gomme's statement that in 424 Demodocus, if the same as the character in this dialogue, was nearly 60, is a mere slip. All we know is that he was older than Socrates, who was about 45 in 424.

ΓΥΡΑΣΙΟΣ named in an Attic inscription (not the one cited in sec. *b* [*fin.*])  
is to be identified with the character in this dialogue.<sup>32</sup>

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<sup>32</sup>See Kirchner, *op. cit.* 230 (§ 3464).

#### IV. Authenticity

Discussion of the authenticity of *Thg.* has been postponed until all the larger issues pertinent to a final decision on this question were confronted. Accordingly, in each of the three preceding chapters material which was considered to be important for a fair critical assessment of the authorship of this work has been introduced, and even though in the course of these investigations I have tried to put aside explicit argumentation about authenticity in order to evaluate *Thg.* on its own terms, systematic comparisons with the evidence furnished from other Platonic works has made some preliminary judgements inevitable (this is especially the case for our author's treatment of the divine sign). Moreover, although the commentary does not assume a polemical position as regards authenticity, some of the data presented there bear directly upon the present examination. It will therefore be understood that much of what follows takes the form of a summary and application of findings made in previous chapters.

##### *a. Some ancient and modern opinions*

The authenticity of *Thg.* was never questioned in antiquity; wherever an actual reference is made by an ancient critic to the author of *Thg.*, that author is without exception Plato. The claim has been made now and then that Plutarch, who is the only individual reported to have written a commentary on *Thg.*, regarded the dialogue as spurious, or that its authenticity was in general a subject of some debate, but such arguments are based on tenuous evidence and fail to stand up to closer scrutiny (see **Appendix**

1).<sup>1</sup> *Thg.* was accepted into the canon of Platonic writings certainly by 35 A.D., and in all likelihood considerably earlier (see *Intr.* ch. V, a). Albinus (second-century A.D.) even reports (*Eisag.* 4; cf. D.L. 3.62) that *Thg.* was the first dialogue to be read by some students of Plato. In late antiquity Stobaeus (fifth-century) quotes from *Thg.* and attributes it to Plato without hesitation, as does the grammarian Priscian (sixth-century) in a direct quotation from the dialogue. Proclus (410-85), who was critical enough to reject the Platonic authorship of *Epin.*,<sup>2</sup> speaks of "Socrates in the *Theages*" without explicit mention of Plato, but since this is followed at once by "and again in the *Phaedrus*" (similarly in the preceding sentence, "in the *Theages* and the *Phaedrus*"), we may confidently surmise that he attributed both works to the same author.<sup>3</sup> Although my information is far from complete for the Renaissance, there seems to have been no question about the genuineness of *Thg.* in this period: in the fifteenth-century Ficino attributed the work to Plato;<sup>4</sup> in the sixteenth-century *Thg.* is ascribed to Plato by Jean de Serres (Serranus), in his introduction to Stephanus' edition of the dialogue (l.119-20), and both he and Francesco Patrizzi included it in their own peculiar arrangements of the Platonic Corpus.<sup>5</sup> We need have no

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<sup>1</sup>Theopompus asserted (*FGrHist* 115 F.259) that most of Plato's dialogues had been borrowed from Aristippus, Antisthenes, and Bryso; but we do not know which dialogues Theopompus was thinking of, and at any rate his comments can be disregarded as the product of an exceedingly caustic witness.

<sup>2</sup>For a detailed consideration of his arguments, see L. Tarán, *Academica: Plato, Philip of Opus, and the pseudo-Platonic Epinomis* (Philadelphia, 1975) 8-13.

<sup>3</sup>For the references in this and the preceding sentence, see the testimonia on the text *ad* 121b1-c5, 127d3-7, and 128d3.

<sup>4</sup>Cf. *Comm. in Conv. Plat.* 7.2: "Fuit enim tanta prudentia, et in praesagiendo tam perspicax, ut quisquis contra eius consilium quicquam auderet, perderetur, quod in Theage a Platone narratur."

<sup>5</sup>Serranus put it between *Phd.* and *Amat.*, while Patrizzi (*F. Patritii Nova de universis philosophia libris quinquaginta comprehensa* [Venetiis, 1593] 44ff.) placed it after *Clit.* and before *Crat.*

doubt that in this period scholars were merely following the testimony which they had received from ancient authorities.

It was, apparently, not until the nineteenth century that the authenticity of *Thg.* came to be questioned. The first critics to doubt the authorship of *Thg.* were, as far as I can ascertain, Heindorf in his 1802 edition of *Lys.* and Boeckh in 1806<sup>6</sup>. Since that time the verdict has been nearly unanimous: *Thg.* cannot have been written by Plato.<sup>7</sup> Against an army of doubters relatively few have ventured to make a stand. Socher, Knebel, and a little later Hollenberg, by asserting the authenticity of *Thg.*, were all reacting to what had become a dogma by the 1820's. Grote also upheld the claim for Platonic authorship, but he in any event defended the integrity of the Platonic Corpus as a whole; and in France, Waddington added himself to the list of supporters of Platonic authorship. The dialogue has not fared much better in the twentieth century. Friedländer put forward an eloquent, if somewhat tentative, argument for authenticity. H. Gomperz sought to emphasize the Platonic qualities of the dialogue, especially as regards the author's depiction of Socrates. O. Wichmann has attributed *Thg.* to Plato, although he does the same for *Min.*, *Alc. II*, *Iust.*, and *Virt.*, all of which have few, if any, modern supporters. The defence of the dialogue's authenticity in recent years by Fischer, Strauss, and Pangle (who has reverted to Grote's position in accepting all dialogues in the Corpus) can also be mentioned. Amongst this rather small group may also be counted H. Müller and K. Steinhardt (455-8), who in 1857 put forward the hypo-

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<sup>6</sup>L.F. Heindorf, *Dialogi quator* (Berlin, 1802), ad *Lys.* 204b8-c2; A. Boeckh, *In Platonis qui vulgo fertur Minoem eiusdem libros priores de legibus* (Halis Saxonum, 1806) 33.

<sup>7</sup>It would be pointless to attempt to rehearse the names of all who have rejected Platonic authorship. For convenient and selective lists of this kind, see Fritzsche 227; Pavlu 14-5; Souilhé 137 n.5. The following references are to the bibliography entries under the authors' last names.

thesis that 128d7-130e4 was composed by Plato, while the remainder of the dialogue was completed by another hand.<sup>8</sup>

Obviously the problem before us cannot be settled by a head-count of those who stand on the *pro* and *contra* sides of the issue. Nor can the silence of ancient writers on the question of spuriousness be accepted as evidence one way or the other. It is demonstrable that even some of the Platonic *Spuria*, which were generally reckoned as inauthentic even by ancient critics, were occasionally attributed to Plato.<sup>9</sup> On the other hand, a number of the arguments of modern critics, both for and against authenticity, must be freshly examined. Not all of these are equally cogent (a number have been dealt with in the commentary); but taken together they constitute the inherited framework by which *Thg.* is, for the most part, considered to be spurious.

#### *b. Linguistic evidence and style*

A number of peculiarities of language, considered un-Platonic or late, have been cited in the past to "prove" spuriousness. I have dealt with these piecemeal in the commentary, and it can be concluded that they are of very limited value for our present purposes (see comm. *ad* 121a1 ἰδιολογήσασθαι, 121b6 βιῶ, 121d1 δοκῶ γάρ μοι, 123b2 κάτειπε, 124b1 πριζόντων, 128b5 ποιούμαι, 129d7 ὁμοῦ τι, 131a6 εὐχαῖ-σί). A few features even tell positively against a late date, and some are highly Platonic. Thus ἀλλὰ μὴν (καὶ)...γε (130b8) is virtually absent from Hellenistic Greek, but very common in Plato; postponed ἄρα (124c2)

<sup>8</sup>See further above, *Intr.* ch. I, a. Valentin Rose, it may be noted, wavered as to the authenticity of *Thg.* (*De Aristotelis librorum ordine et auctoritate* 25), and so, to all appearances, did Guthrie (*HGP III*. 399ff., V. 392-4).

<sup>9</sup>See Tarán, *op. cit.* 7 n.23.

is encountered a good deal more frequently in Plato than in all other prose authors; the first person plural *pro* singular (προσαγορεύωμεν 122d7) seems to be a trait of the Platonic Socrates; καὶ μέντοι καὶ (127b5) appears more often in Plato than in other authors, who tend to use καὶ μέντοι; πάνυ τις (121a2) in its particular use in this dialogue can be paralleled, in classical Greek, only from Plato (see comm. *ad locc.* ). There are a great number of other features of language and turns of phrase in *Thg.* which can be compared closely with passages elsewhere in genuine Plato. These have been listed in the commentary as they occur, and need not be enumerated here. Of course, some less distinctive features may be pointed out in addition which cannot be paralleled precisely with examples from the remainder of the Platonic Corpus, but these hardly constitute evidence for inauthenticity; see, e.g., comm. *ad* 123b7 τίνα...εἶναι; 130 e1-2 πολὺ...πλεῖστον.<sup>10</sup> I might add that there are no exaggerations of recognizably typical Platonic usages, as may perhaps be expected in a deliberate forgery.<sup>11</sup>

In sum it must be concluded that no objections can be brought against *Thg.* on syntactical or grammatical grounds, or on grounds of inauthentic vocabulary. To invoke arguments claiming that *Thg.* here and there deviates from "normal" Platonic usage is in any event a highly artificial way of approaching the question of inauthenticity. Plato frequently

<sup>10</sup>Krüger (12) rightly sounds a warning against condemning words and phrases which are not found in Plato, but nevertheless do occur elsewhere in fifth and fourth century literature; see also Thesleff, *Platonic Chronology* 73.

<sup>11</sup>See R. Syme, "Fraud and Imposture" in *Entretiens Hardt 18: Pseudepigrapha I* (Vandoeuvres-Genève, 1972) 10. A prominent example of such exaggeration in a probable literary imitation is the repetitious καὶ μὲν δὴ in the speech of "Lysias" in *Phdr.* (230e6-234c5); see R. Hackforth, *Plato's Phaedrus* (Cambridge, 1952) 17; K.J. Dover, *Lysias and the Corpus Lysiacum* (Berkeley, 1968) 69-71; see also G.E. Dimock Jr., *AJP* 73 (1952) 381-96, on Plato's apparent caricature of Lysias' characteristic uses of ἀλλά in the same speech.

indulges in solecisms, employs *hapax legomena*,<sup>12</sup> and uses technical language which does not become conventional until much later.<sup>13</sup> It is obvious that Plato's prose developed continuously and never became static; there is no single Platonic style. Moreover, some caution must be exercised before trust is placed in the more objective criteria of the so-called unconscious formulae of language and features of style, the study of which was initiated and promoted by Campbell, Dittenberger, Lutoslawski, and Ritter.<sup>14</sup> For one thing, *Thg.* is a relatively short work (slightly over ten Stephanus pages), and it thus does not furnish as useful a subject for statistical study as a longer work should. Secondly, *Thg.* is a polymorphous composition: it contains both dialogue and extended narrative portions. Any statistical count based on ratios and percentages must take this into consideration. The presence of lengthy narrative portions in *Thg.* also further decreases the extent to which one can measure such things as response formulae in the correspondingly reduced dialogue segments.<sup>15</sup>

All the same, cumulative evidence from statistical study should be brought to bear on the question of style and its relation to the problem of authenticity. Accordingly, I have carried out several tests in order to observe any possible tendencies in the use of answer formulae, clausulae, etc. But since the precise value of such statistical evidence cannot yet be judged as established, I have limited its importance to this study by relegating the material to an appendix at the end of this chapter.

<sup>12</sup>See A. Fossum, *AJP* 52 (1931) 205-31.

<sup>13</sup>See R. Janko, *Aristotle on Comedy* (London, 1984) 78.

<sup>14</sup>References for this sentence: *Sophistes and Politicus* (Oxford, 1867) xxivff.; *Hermes* 16 (1881) 321ff.; *The Origin and Growth of Plato's Logic* (London, 1897) 64-193; *Untersuchungen über Platon* (Stuttgart, 1888).

<sup>15</sup>The measurement of response formulae is not nearly as accurate a method for determining date of composition, or authenticity, or both, as has been imagined; see the important arguments of K. Vretska, *WS* 71 (1958) 30-45.



Decisions about the overall style of *Thg.* cannot be reduced to numerical figures, and are of necessity founded on rather more subjective judgements and impressions, but a statement must nevertheless be made. Simply put, the style of *Thg.* has most in common with the dialogues of Plato's early period.<sup>16</sup> There is a noticeable absence from *Thg.* of what, since Campbell,<sup>17</sup> have been considered markers of Plato's "late style." Most prominent among such stylistic traits are the employment of convoluted and artificial word order and a marked avoidance of hiatus. The only evidence in *Thg.* of anything approaching a tortured order of words occurs in 128b4-6 (see comm. *ad loc.*), but even this is by no means a remarkable example. Periphrastic verb constructions (which can themselves contribute to a strained word order) have also been judged to be largely a late feature of Platonic style, and two examples of this occur in *Thg.* (123a9 and 128d2); the periphrastic nominal construction τὸ περὶ + gen./acc. as subject of a sentence (121c1) also has strong affinities with late style. This evidence can hardly overcome the general impression of early Platonic mannerisms. As well, hiatus is admitted freely in *Thg.* (see Appendix below); and on two occasions hiatus is caused by a mild disruption of normal word order (121c2 ἐγὼ, 124c2 ἄρα; cf. also 128c6 τοῦτό ἐστιν), even though such deviation from regular word order in Plato's mature works is frequently caused by a desire rather to *avoid* hiatus, as even a selective reading can show.<sup>18</sup> Further, certain linguistic items that are without doubt peculiar to Plato's late style, such as the increasing use of καθάπερ for ὥσπερ, of δῆλον ὥς for δῆλον ὅτι, and

<sup>16</sup>This has been the judgement of most scholars (including those who athetize the work), e.g. Ritter *op. cit.* 94; Pavlu 28; Friedländer 154; Vouveris 116.

<sup>17</sup>See Campbell, *op. cit.* xxxivff.; also Thesleff, *Studies* 77-88 ("onkos" style).

<sup>18</sup>See Burnet, *Platonism* (Berkeley, 1928) 55; Cherniss, *AJP* 78 (1957) 232 and n.21.

of τί μῆν; ("of course"),<sup>19</sup> are not to be found in *Thg.*, though they could easily have appeared (cf. ὥσπερ 123b1, 125c1, 125e2, 126a7, a9, δηλον ὅτι 126 b7). Such as it is, statistical analysis tends to corroborate this impression of an early Platonic style (see Appendix at the end of this chapter).

If the style of *Thg.* is to be characterized by any label, it must be said that its language is markedly colloquial (with occasional admixtures of rhetorical elements); an attempt has been made in the commentary to quantify this general observation. It is my own personal impression that the style of *Thg.* is as pervasively colloquial as any early work of Plato's; this applies not merely to any specific segment of *Thg.*, but to the dialogue as a whole, extended narrative portions as well as question and answer sections. Speaking subjectively again, I can see no similarity between the style of *Thg.* and, for instance, that of *Phlb.*, *Ti.*, or *Lg.*

### *c. Compositional techniques*

If therefore one were to base a judgement of authenticity solely on the criteria of language and style, it would have to be said that this work, transmitted as it is among Plato's genuine dialogues, is probably Plato's, and, on that assumption, that it must also in all probability be an early composition. The discussion of the structure of *Thg.* has also shown that there is nothing in the way the dialogue is constructed *per se* for which Plato could not have been responsible, and that, though the dialogue is not identical to the general pattern of works often associated with Plato's "Socratic" period, it nevertheless does share a number of similarities with his early works (see esp. *Intr.* ch I, b, v). A few other factors, such as the

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<sup>19</sup>See W. Lutoslawski *op. cit.* 103-104 (after Dittenberger), 123 (after Ritter).

use of dramatic scenery (see comm. *ad* 121a4), the establishment of a dramatic date, and characterization, would tend to reinforce this conclusion. But the situation is not as simple as this, for presumably an imitator would attempt to model his composition on the style and techniques of Plato.

In fact, the evidence of language and style is one of the greatest obstacles against judging *Thg.* to be an authentic work. The reason for this is simple: while the material brought forward in the previous section indicates that *Thg.* has much in common with Plato's early period, an examination of sources proves that *Thg.* actually draws upon some later works. Of these *Tht.*, which can be dated on internal evidence to 369 or shortly after, is the latest. Even if we leave out of account for the moment a more accurate date of composition for *Thg.*, this use of *Tht.* provides ample evidence for a serious inconsistency between the language and style of *Thg.* and the date at which it must have been written (certainly after 369). The style and techniques of composition of this work are not those of Plato in a later period of activity, the earliest time at which *Thg.* could possibly have been written.<sup>20</sup>

The evidence of sources may be considered a little further. In other chapters (I, *b*, *iii*, *v*, *vii*; *c*; II, *c*) it has been put that *Alc. I* probably supplied material for the author of *Thg.*, or that the two dialogues, at the very least,

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<sup>20</sup>One further argument that at first glance might seem relevant to the question at hand is that the relatively short length of *Thg.* can be closely paralleled only among early works, i.e., *Cri.*, *Euthphr.*, *Ion*, *Menex.*, *Hp. mi.* But, although the dialogues generally agreed to be late are mostly works of some considerable size, there is no reason why Plato in his mature years could not have composed a treatise of the length of *Thg.*, if he had a specific purpose for doing so. To assert the contrary begs too many questions, not the least of which concerns the present state of research on the chronology of Plato's works. C.W. Müller (*Die Kurz-dialoge* 32-44) attempted to show that dialogue length was used in antiquity to decide the authenticity of a work; according to him (43-4), an early editor's decision to place the *Spuria* at the end of the nine tetralogies as an appendix was motivated by a desire to show that such short works were un-Platonic *qua* short. For a response to his arguments see the review of S.R. Slings, *Mnem.* 4.31 (1978) 211-14.

share some important conceptual traits. In view of this, and on the assumption that the date commonly given for *Alc. I* is correct (345-335), a decision about the authenticity of *Thg.* is apparently at hand, as it is unlikely to have been written within Plato's own lifetime. But as some readers may not be satisfied either with inferences about the date of *Alc. I*, or, perhaps, with the assumptions about the author's use of it in composing this dialogue, I shall set it aside for the moment in our attempt to settle the question of the authenticity of *Thg.* A final decision need not rest on this piece of evidence (see *Intr.* ch. V, *g*).

Still, in another respect the use of sources in *Thg.* provides important material for determining authenticity. Although it is an oversimplification to call *Thg.* a *pastiche* (see *Intr.* ch. I, *a*), nevertheless there is some justification in so regarding it: the author has patently drawn upon a wide variety of Socratic, and mostly Platonic, works, in the composition of this dialogue. Further, allusions to other works are in some cases made using almost the *ipsissima verba* of the original passage. On numerous other occasions there is at least the appearance that the author has a Platonic passage in mind (see *Intr.* ch. I, *b*, *i-vii*; II, *d*). This does not represent Plato's regular practice; for while he does occasionally refer implicitly to another of his own works,<sup>21</sup> or very infrequently even seems consciously to repeat the wording of a passage from an earlier dialogue,<sup>22</sup> it is not his habit to draw so frequently and so transparently upon other works, as he does in *Thg.*<sup>23</sup> Whether Plato makes extensive and obvious use of the works of his contemporaries is impossible for us to determine, since most of this literature is no longer extant. But we can safely claim that he is not a composer of

<sup>21</sup>See Zeller II.1<sup>5</sup> 426 n.4, 444-5.

<sup>22</sup>E.g. *Ap.* 22c1-3 ~ *Men.* 99c2-5; *Ap.* 19e4-20a1 ~ *Prt.* 316c5-d1.

<sup>23</sup>See Fritzsche 229-30; Vouveris 116.

*centos*, and never among his indisputably genuine works are so many patent allusions to his own compositions gathered together in one place. Plato does not compose dialogues in this manner elsewhere, and I fail to see what special motive would have prompted him to do so here. The manner of composition of *Thg.* in this respect thus constitutes a significant aberration.

A word about the dramatic qualities of *Thg.*, especially as this concerns character delineation, may be in order. The earlier chapter on characterization (*Intr.* ch. III) has shown, I believe, not only that the author made a determined effort to portray his characters in a vivid manner, but also that he largely succeeded in this. Moreover, for the most part this characterization exhibits nothing on which a critic could readily fasten a label of "un-Platonic." But in his portrayal of Socrates in 128d1-130e4 the author goes astray. Suffice to say here that Socrates' change of tone in this section of the dialogue, though it is motivated by the author's desire to make the theme of his work more pointed, essentially removes from Socrates the traits which in the preceding pages allow us to compare him favourably with the homonymous character in some early Platonic dialogues. Indeed, the Socrates of the later part of the dialogue shares some important characteristics with the Socrates of Aeschines Socraticus (see *Intr.* ch. I, *b*, *vii*; *c* [with nn.72-3]; ch. III, *a* nn.9-10). As well, the qualities which had made *Thg.* dramatically effective up to this point, such as conflict and irony, are virtually done away with.<sup>24</sup> However, since this evidence is not

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<sup>24</sup>C.W. Müller (135-9) is more fully aware of the dramatic elements in *Thg.* than most scholars are, but I cannot agree with him when he says that the dramatic quality of the dialogue breaks down after 127a8-10. This does not happen until the outset of the divine sign section.

decisive as far as a final evaluation of the divine sign section itself is concerned, it must be assigned the status of cumulative evidence.

*d. Socrates' divine sign*

The representation of Socrates' divine sign in *Thg.* has predictably aroused the greatest objections against the authenticity of this dialogue. As this subject has been dealt with in detail above (**Intr.** ch. II), I shall be relatively brief in summarizing those findings which are directly concerned with the question of authenticity.

Socrates dwells on the divine sign at far greater length here than he does anywhere else in the Corpus. This in itself might be explained as the one exceptional instance where Plato decided to abandon his usual comparative reticence on the subject in favour of elaboration. But the manner of exposition is suspicious, in as much as Socrates sets forth personal information through a series of anecdotes, a form of popular biography not completely eschewed by Plato, but one which he uses with moderation (see **Intr.** ch. III, a). These anecdotes also appear to be mostly derivative as far as literary qualities are concerned, i.e., they emanate from certain hints dropped in the actual Platonic references to the divine sign, from other features in various dialogues, and possibly from contemporary discussions about historical figures (see **Intr.** ch. I, b, vii; comm. ad 128d1-130e10, 128d8-129c8, 128d8-129a1). Moreover, Socrates speaks about himself with greater assertiveness than is customary for him, and certainly than is the case elsewhere when he is on the subject of his divine sign (see **Intr.** ch. III, a). This, again, might not be considered decisive, but more disturbing is the nature of the sign as it is described in this dialogue.

One of the main findings of the earlier examination of Socrates' divine sign was that the author of *Thg.* implicitly took the position that τὸ δαιμόνιον was not to be distinguished clearly from a δαίμων, and though he preserved for the most part the language that Plato applies to the divine sign, his description, even in some of the smallest details, reflects in great measure an essentially popular view. This attitude extends also to the ascribing of functions which can be characterized as more obviously oracular than any which occurred in the rest of the Corpus. Thus in the hands of this author τὸ δαιμόνιον emerges as a phenomenon which can be located within a traditional religious framework. The survey which dealt with Platonic descriptions of the sign (*Intr.* ch. II, *a*) also demonstrated that Plato strove as far as he could to emancipate τὸ δαιμόνιον from anything which might lead a reader to identify Socrates' sign as a component within a commonplace pattern of belief. In this respect therefore the two representations, that of Plato's indisputably genuine works and that of *Thg.*, conflict with one another. This contradiction I take to be an important piece of evidence against the authenticity of *Thg.*, for the dialogue departs from the Platonic account even with regard to the details to which Plato was very careful always to limit the divine sign, such as the sign's purely negative aspect. In the face of this evidence we should be forced, in order to accomodate *Thg.* into the Corpus, to manufacture a theory such as Friedländer's (328 n.14), to the effect that Plato's descriptions of the divine sign developed from that of *Thg.* and are, essentially, refined portraits of τὸ δαιμόνιον. Notwithstanding the rather arbitrary nature of such an hypothesis, the discussion in section *c* above on the compositional techniques of this dialogue drew attention to the fact that *Thg.* must, on account of its use of sources, be later than 369. Consequently there can be no question

of a development of the Platonic divine sign from that which is presented in this dialogue. Moreover, in a number of respects the divine sign in *Thg.* has much more in common with *later* versions of the sign than it does with the Platonic account, a fact which must also cast grave suspicion on Friedländer's genetic approach. In short, the discussion in ch. II should have demonstrated that the divine sign in *Thg.* is described in a manner that is mostly un-Platonic, so far, that is, as we can discern what Plato's intentions were in his depiction of τὸ δαιμόνιον. The author of *Thg.*, through his depiction of the divine sign, demonstrates that he did not understand the full implications and subtleties of the picture which Plato drew, and drew quite consistently.

The most unusual departure in the author's representation of τὸ δαιμόνιον in *Thg.*, and one that is no less crucial to a verdict of spuriousness than are the considerations mentioned above, is his virtual identification of ἔρως with Socrates' divine sign. It would make nonsense of a good deal in Plato to argue that Plato himself ever countenanced such an identification. And the fact that this "enhancement" of the divine sign can only be paralleled, among early (i.e. not middle-Platonic or Neoplatonic) treatises, in a work (*A/c. I*) that is usually athetized for reasons other than its portrait of the sign, does not inspire confidence in the Platonic authorship of *Thg.*, nor does the possibility that the identification originated in a misapprehension of the context in which the divine sign occurs in *Phdr.* It may be granted that some Platonic traits are evident in the report which is intended to reveal the effects of the power of τὸ δαιμόνιον on Aristides, but these are superficial, and show little appreciation for the philosophical background of the accounts on which the author has drawn (see *Intr.* ch. I, *b*, *vii*; ch. II, *d*). Worse than this, Aristides' report shows an obscurity of



thought and intention on the author's part: the reader is doubtless bewildered into asking how literally or seriously the story is to be taken.<sup>25</sup> It may rightly be asked if Plato would have lost sight of his reader in this way, and indeed, comparison with related passages in *Ion* and *Phdr.* does not cast a favourable light on the author's performance in this respect. It must also be added that the author's apparent shift from the hint of a Platonic view of ἔρως as a rational impulse in 128b1ff. to what I have styled as an Aeschinean concept of ἔρως which improves not τέχνη but θεία μοίρα (see *Intr.* ch. I, *b*, *vii*) is hardly what we would expect if this work were written by Plato.

But the most decisive argument against authenticity, in my opinion, is the author's misunderstanding of the μαευτική passage to which he was so obviously looking when he composed 129e1ff. Strictly speaking, we might disregard the criticism which maintains that *Thg.* is proved spurious merely by the reminiscence in it of this passage of *Tht.* (although, as I argued above [sec.c], a collection in one place of several such reminiscences is another matter). But what cannot be similarly disregarded is the fact that the author has allowed two concepts, τὸ δαιμόνιον and ὁ θεός, which are, in Plato, very different phenomena, to be merged into a single entity. What is more, it is just this confusion of terms and concepts that seems to have caused the subsequent extension of the divine sign into its becoming an accomplice in the progress of Socrates' companions. Thus, while the fact that the description of the divine sign in *Thg.* is different from that of any other Platonic work may, even in the face of cumulative evi-

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<sup>25</sup>A review of the modern critical literature demonstrates that one may speak with some confidence about the reactions of "the reader," in as much as this part of the dialogue has been one of the greatest causes of disagreement about the meaning and authenticity of *Thg.*

dence, leave some room for doubt as to the spuriousness of the dialogue, the serious misunderstanding of Plato which the author shows in the divine sign section puts the judgement that *Thg.* was not written by Plato beyond any real doubt.

Finally, although the use of *Tht.* does not *in itself* give sufficient grounds for condemning *Thg.* as spurious, it is the particularly curious slant which the author of *Thg.* gives to the profession of ignorance in *Tht.* that marks out the correspondence in the passages as un-Platonic. In *Tht.* Socrates' profession of ignorance is very closely related to μαευτική and dialectic. In *Thg.* Socrates' ignorance (Aristides' claims to have learned nothing from Socrates) has nothing to do with μαευτική, in fact it has nothing to do with dialectic. Instead, it is the product of his reliance on chance, resulting from his inability to control the intervention of τὸ δαίμονιον. It is difficult to imagine a Socrates in Plato whose ignorance implies nothing about his use of dialectic, about the significance of self-knowledge, or, at least in middle and later works, about *anamnesis* and the transcendence of forms.

#### *e. Application of the evidence*

Modern scholarship has been almost as unanimous in condemning *Thg.* as spurious as ancient critics were in accepting it as the work of Plato. This modern verdict, which became firmly rooted in the early years of the nineteenth-century, and quickly established itself as a dogma within modern scholarship, is partly to blame for the cursory way in which the dialogue has, with few exceptions, been examined, and for the frequent uncritical repetition of the main arguments that began with Boeckh, Schleier-

macher, and Ast.<sup>26</sup> But a great many of these arguments are not valid, and they are numerous enough that it has seemed best, for the most part, to deal with them separately in the commentary. Most are in the order of objections to specific items of language and style, but, in this respect, there is little or nothing in *Thg.* that could be reckoned as distinctly un-Platonic. All the same, early Platonic style, combined with the use of later Platonic dialogues, represents a conflict of evidence which is difficult to account for, except by recourse to the argument against Platonic authorship. Nevertheless, as Plato was obviously able to move easily from one style to another (witness *Phdr.*), this line of reasoning, though highly suggestive, is not in itself final. It is however strengthened by the author's near *verbatim* references to *Ap.* and *Tht.*, as well as by some less easily discernible, but highly likely, uses of other dialogues.

To this point, then, the evidence that the author of *Thg.* is not Plato could not be considered overwhelming, but it is quite strong. The issue must be decided by the divine sign section of the dialogue; and the verdict imposed by a consideration of this part of the dialogue is that Plato could not have written *Thg.* For while we might well argue that a departure in one dialogue from Plato's treatments of a certain topic in other dialogues does not imply that a work is the product of a different hand altogether, the misunderstandings of Plato that are demonstrated from an examination of this part of *Thg.* can mean nothing other than that the author is not Plato himself. Thus, on the basis of both cumulative evidence and a consideration of specific points, the conclusion must be that Plato did not compose *Thg.*

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<sup>26</sup>For some useful observations on the way in which scholarly orthodoxy tends to perpetuate uncritical bias in dealing with the *Dubia* and *Spuria* of the Platonic Corpus, see C.W. Müller, *Die Kurzdialoge* 9-12.

But if not Plato, then who? It would be truly rash to put forward any names in answer to this question, although the explicit assignment of the work to an historical figure has indeed been attempted (see *Intr.* ch. V, *b*). It seems better to inquire what the dialogue may tell us about the author. In the first place, it is hard to believe that he was an original philosopher, nor does his understanding of Plato seem to go very deep. Although he is writing with knowledge of at least some of Plato's later works (I argue in the next chapter that *Thg.* was probably composed after Plato's death), his interests and inclinations seem to be with earlier dialogues, and appear to be largely at a literary level. We may also infer that he was a member of the Academy, for it would otherwise be difficult to account for the dialogue's presence in the *Corpus Platonicum*.<sup>27</sup> and we might say that, in his elaboration of the divine sign, he was following the common Academic pursuit of enlarging on concepts about which Plato had said little or had only dropped tantalizing hints. Moreover, that he seems to have been aware of and used Aeschines Socraticus is not unusual, since Plato himself probably did the same, and Aeschines, having been close to Socrates in his own right (cf. *Phd.* 59b8), was at any rate an excellent authority for a writer of Σωκρατικοὶ λόγοι. But it seems inappropriate and possibly anachronistic to apply the title of "forger" or "falsarius" to this author, since we cannot know if it was ever his intention to pass the work off as Plato's own (as it certainly was the intention of the writers of the Platonic epistles).<sup>28</sup> That a person such as the author of *Thg.* should have been a member of the Academy ought not to occasion any wonder. The evidence

<sup>27</sup>See Souilhé, *Platon, Oeuvres Complètes* 13.2 (Paris, 1930) ix-x; Taylor, *PMW*<sup>6</sup> 521-2; Vouveris 122; G.C. Field 49-50; C.W. Müller, *Die Kurzdialoge* 19-27; I.M. Crombie, *An Examination of Plato's Doctrines I* (London, 1962) 9.

<sup>28</sup>See C.W. Müller, *Die Kurzdialoge* 12-21; Thesleff, *Platonic Chronology* 91.

which we now possess suggests that the Old Academy must have been very heterogeneous in its membership;<sup>29</sup> and that all were not thinkers of the first rank is made amply clear by a reading of some of the other dialogues among the nine tetralogies which are generally conceded to be inauthentic (e.g. *Alc. II*, *Amat.*, *Hipparch.*, *Min.*). Some interest in prophecy at a popular level, such as is evidenced in *Thg.*, may even be inferred from the mention of a μάντις as one of Plato's pupils.<sup>30</sup> Otherwise, nothing can safely be said about the identity of the author of *Thg.*<sup>31</sup> But where the dialogue itself may have fit within the interests of the early Academy is discussed in the following chapter (sec. *b*), and some suggestions about its intentions have already been made (*Intr.* ch. I, *c*).

### Appendix: Some Stylistic Tests and Data

*Hiatus* - average of 40 incidences per Stephanus page, ranging from 21 to 54 (disregarding instances involving the *spiritus asper*, and hiatus which occurs across any point of punctuation). These statistics prove only that the author made no effort whatsoever to avoid hiatus. If the author were Plato, this would only mean that the dialogue antedates *Sph.*, since that is the first work in which Plato, following the example of Isocrates, began to eliminate hiatus.<sup>32</sup>

<sup>29</sup>See Field 35-45; Guthrie, *HGP* IV. 21ff.; Friedländer I.91; Zeller II.1<sup>5</sup> 982 n.1 for a catalogue of individuals known to have belonged to the Academy in Plato's own lifetime.

<sup>30</sup>Cf. Plu. *Dio* 22 (Miltas); but see also *Intr.* ch. V, *b*.

<sup>31</sup>Attempts to identify the author of *Thg.* with an author of other Platonic *Spuria* seem destined to remain highly speculative.

<sup>32</sup>See Blass, *Die Attische Beredsamkeit II<sup>2</sup>* (Leipzig, 1892) 458ff.; and for the conclusions drawn here see Cherniss, *op. cit.* 230-33.

*Answer formulae and language statistics* <sup>33</sup>

- ratio of affirmative answers in ναί, πάνυ γε, πάνυ μὲν οὖν to all affirmative answers (Lut. 137, §448):  $14/35 = 40\%$ . Von Arnim found that the ratio for this test in *R.*, *Phdr.*, *Tht.*, *Prm.*, *Sph.*, *Plt.*, *Phlb.*, and *Lg.*, is less than one third; in earlier dialogues the ratio is over one-third, and over one-half in *Men.*, *Euthd.*, *Grg.*, *Crat.*

- ratio of interrogatives used as affirmative answers to all interrogatives (Lut. 137, §451):  $3/100 = 3\%$ . The ratio for this test (von Arnim) comes to less than 5% only in *Chrm.*, *Men.*, *Euthd.*, *Crat.*; between 5% and 10% only in *La.*, *Grg.*, *Phd.*; 10% to 20% in *Euthphr.*, *Cri.*, *R.*, *Tht.*, *Prm.*; over 20% in *Phdr.*, *Sph.*, *Plt.*, *Phlb.*, *Lg.*

- ratio of personal pronoun answers (e.g. ἔγωγε, ἔμοιγε, δοκέῃ μοι, ἐμοὶ γοῦν δοκέῃ *vel. sim.*) to all answers (Lut. 122, §318):  $10/58 = 17.24\%$ . This test of Ritter's furnished results showing an extremely low ratio in *Phdr.*, *Prm.*, *Sph.*, *Plt.*, *Phlb.*, *Ti.*, *Crit.*, *Lg.* (less than once in sixty answers). But the incidence is much higher in earlier dialogues: once in five answers in *Euthphr.* and *Men.*, once in six in *La.*, *Euthd.*, *Grg.*, once in seven to ten in *Ap.*, *Cri.*, *Chrm.*, *Crat.*, *Tht.*, once in sixteen to eighteen in *Prt.*, *Phd.*, *R.*

- ratio of interrogatives in ἄρα to all simple interrogatives (Lut. 128, §378):  $8/100 = 8\%$ . Less than 15% in *Chrm.*, *La.*, *Lys.*, *Euthphr.*, *Cri.*, *Euthd.*, *Grg.*, *Men.*; 15%-23% in *Prt.*, *Crat.*, *Phd.*, *R.*, *Phdr.*, *Tht.*; over 24% only in *Prm.*, *Sph.*, *Plt.*, *Phlb.*, *Lg.* (Siebeck).

<sup>33</sup>For convenience, reference will be made in the following examples to the relevant pages in Lutoslawski's large collection (74-140) of statistical tests which were made by a number of scholars over a period of years.



$$9. \text{ — } \cup \cup \text{ — } \cup = 5.32\%$$

The above table of clausulae lists the same rhythms as the ones Billig applied to his study of the clausulae in *Phlb.*, *Plt.*, and *Lg.*<sup>35</sup> The total for rhythms 1.i-iii in *Thg.* is far below that of the three dialogues named above, where the total for the same clausulae ranges from about 70% to 85%, as opposed to the 46.28% of *Thg.* On the other hand, *Thg.* shows a more even distribution of the other rhythms than do *Phlb.*, *Plt.*, and *Lg.* Interestingly, the figure of 46.28% for the three predominant clausulae of Plato's latest work is almost identical with the incidence of the same clausulae in *Ti.* (45.6%), concerning which Billig remarks (249-50) that this is "indicative only of the equability of rhythm which the *Timaeus* has in common with the *Republic* and with all the other dialogues of the earlier periods." The incidence of rhythm 1.i (a) in *Thg.* (so common in the dialogues Billig analyzed) is 6.38%, a figure which is closest to that found in *Ap.*, *Chrm.*, *Euthd.*, and a few other early and middle works.<sup>36</sup> Again, the frequency of rhythm 9 in *Thg.* tends to be paralleled in earlier works.<sup>37</sup>

What conclusions can we draw from the clausulae of *Thg.*? Unfortunately this is not at all certain. We may confidently affirm, I suppose, that the use of clausulae in this dialogue has no close affinity with Plato's final period. However, the correspondence with *Ti.* in this respect suggests that an appeal to clausulae will not help us to refine our inferences about date much further. In other words *Thg.*, if Platonic, may be seen on the basis of clausulae not to be a product of Plato's final few years; but beyond that it seems to group itself among a formidable number of dialogues which span

<sup>35</sup>See *JP* 35 (1920) 225-56.

<sup>36</sup>See A.W. De Groot, *Der Antike Prosarythmus I* (Groningen, 1921) 55-6.

<sup>37</sup>*Ib.* 55-6.



a considerable time period. Moreover, it must be added that the study of clausulae has come in for some detailed criticism on more than one occasion.<sup>38</sup> Yet the safest inference we can draw from the above table of figures is that, for *Thg.*, clausulae cannot be used in settling the question of authenticity, for as Billig himself notes (250), rhythms 1.i-iii comprise 50% of the total possible metrical combinations for clausulae. Thus approximately one-half of the clausulae produced by any Greek author who did not consciously impose certain rhythms at sentence end should be represented by these rhythms. And this is precisely what we find in the case of *Thg.*; any author might have achieved the same results.

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<sup>38</sup>See H. Cherniss, *AJP* 78 (1957) 227-30, with nn. 8-9 on 228.

## V. Date of Composition

Given the nature of scholarly attitudes towards the authenticity of *Thg.*, it will come as no surprise that a consensus over its date of composition has never been reached. Suggestions have ranged from about 400 B.C.<sup>1</sup> to the second century B.C.,<sup>2</sup> but as we shall see, neither of these extremes is at all likely to be right, and my own feeling is that the true date must lie somewhere between these *termini*, closer in fact to the first limit than to the second. In this section an attempt will be made to confine the date to as narrow a period as is practicable, but the fact that we have earlier determined that *Thg.* is spurious (see *Intr.* ch. IV, *e*) makes it all the more difficult to date this work with any precision, since Plato's own lifetime cannot now be used to establish the basic chronological limits for composition. This difficulty is compounded by consideration of certain peculiarities in the dialogue's content (most notably, the section on Socrates' divine sign), and by the relative lack of testimonia from any period for this work. But despite these obstacles, *Thg.* can, I think, be fixed within a fairly precise time frame.

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<sup>1</sup>Socher 102-3 (before the death of Socrates, and perhaps Plato's first dialogue); Knebel 8-9 (basically following Socher); Friedländer 154; Fischer 3 n.1. The possibility that this dialogue could have been written before the death of Socrates is strictly precluded by the evidence furnished from the study of sources (see *Intr.* ch. IV, *e*).

<sup>2</sup>Stallbaum 226-7; Lamb 345; Souilhé (142) places it at the end of the third century or beginning of the second, while Carlini (59f.) supposes that it was written in the third.

*a. The earliest testimonia*

Let us begin with the evidence of direct ancient testimony. The earliest reference to a passage in *Thg.* is apparently in the *Ars Rhetorica* (405) traditionally attributed to Dionysius of Halicarnassus.<sup>3</sup> This would provide us with a probable *terminus ante quem* shortly before or after the beginning of our era, since it appears that Dionysius died about that time.<sup>4</sup> Unfortunately the *Ars Rhetorica* is usually considered spurious,<sup>5</sup> and inferences concerning its date are highly problematic; some time within the first-century A.D. seems generally accepted for the chapter in which the *Thg.* testimonium occurs.<sup>6</sup> The most, then, that can be said about *Thg.* on the basis of the *Ars Rhetorica* is that the dialogue was in circulation by the first century A.D. Nor is direct attestation elsewhere in ancient literature a great deal of help. There is no other testimonium for a passage in *Thg.* apart from [Dionysius] that can be confidently dated earlier than the beginning of the second century A.D.<sup>7</sup>

Particularly enigmatic (though highly suggestive) is the existing evidence for the ordering of Plato's dialogues into tetralogies. Thrasyllus, we are told (D.L. 3.56ff.), divided the dialogues into nine tetralogies, and placed *Thg.* first in the fifth tetralogy; this organization has succeeded in

<sup>3</sup>C.W. Müller (146 n.48; see also *Die Kurzdialoge* 107-8, 201-2) believes that the pseudo-Platonic *Demodocus* (dated by him at 350-260 B.C., *Die Kurzdialoge* 127-8) presupposes the existence of *Thg.*, and that περὶ ἄρετῆς 376b1-c1 (which he dates c. 260 B.C., *ib.* 260) reflects *Thg.* 125c7ff. Neither of these hypotheses can admit of proof, nor do they seem to me entirely convincing; see *Die Kurzdialoge* 108 n.1 for a list of scholars who have raised the question of a relationship between *Thg.* and *Dem.*

<sup>4</sup>See L. Radermacher, *RE* 5.934.

<sup>5</sup>Dionysius was not a writer of τέχναι; see Radermacher *op. cit.* 969; *id.*, *Dionysius Halicarnaseus* VI (Leipzig, 1929) xxiiff.

<sup>6</sup>Radermacher *RE* 5.969.

<sup>7</sup>See the Testimonia cited in the register below text; the earliest passage after [Dionysius] is probably [Plutarch] *Mor.* 568b-574f (*De Fato*), on which see **Appendix 1**.

becoming canonical.<sup>8</sup> As we know, Thrasyllus was the court astrologer/philosopher of Tiberius, and died shortly before the emperor's own death in 36 A.D.,<sup>9</sup> a fact which would furnish an unpromising upper *terminus* of c. 35 A.D. for the composition of *Thg.* But Thrasyllus did not initiate the organization of the Corpus into tetralogies: Albinus (*Eisag.* 4) remarks that Dercyllides (whose date is uncertain but is possibly to be put in the first half of the first century B.C.)<sup>10</sup> arranged the dialogues into tetralogies, and Varro too was familiar with a tetralogical ordering of the Corpus (*L.* 7.37, composed c. 45 B.C.). We cannot be certain, however, that the tetralogies of Dercyllides, or those known to Varro, possessed the same contents or order as Thrasyllus'. Moreover, Diogenes Laertius reports, on the authority of Thrasyllus (3.56), that it was Plato himself who published the dialogues in tetralogies. Matters are thrown into further confusion when Diogenes (3.61-2) reports that some (one of whom was Aristophanes of Byzantium) arranged the Corpus into trilogies. He then presents the dialogues belonging to one such organization into five trilogies (none of which includes *Thg.*), and follows this with the statement that "the rest are added individually and in no particular order" (62 τὰ δ' ἄλλα καθ' ἓν καὶ ἀτάκτως). No mention is made of *Thg.* at that point either (we are never informed what τὰ ἄλλα consisted of), but it is listed as the first member of a different arrangement into trilogies (62; the first dialogues of eight other trilogical

<sup>8</sup>The tetralogical ordering was however challenged by Albinus, and by some Neoplatonists: Albinus *Eisag.* 4 (149.13-20 Hermann); Iamblichus *ap. Anonymous Prolegomena to Platonic Philosophy* 26.12-34 = 47 Westerink; Iamblichus *ap. Proclus' Commentary on the First Alcibiades of Plato* 11.11-17 = 5 Westerink; see further M. Dunn, "Iamblichus, Thrasyllus, and the Reading Order of the Platonic Dialogues" in *The Significance of Neoplatonism* (Norfolk, Virginia, 1976) 60 and nn.11-14; A.J. Festugiere, *MH* 26 (1969) 281-96.

<sup>9</sup>Cf. Suet. *Tib.* 62.3; D.C. 58.27.1; for the identification of Thrasyllus cf. *sch. ad Juv.* 7.576.

<sup>10</sup>See Kroll, *RE* 9. 242.

orderings are listed as well);<sup>11</sup> nevertheless it cannot be taken for granted that this arrangement is contemporaneous with that of Aristophanes. Finally, it has been held that the organization into trilogies in itself presupposes a tetralogical set-up. On this hypothesis, the trilogical arrangement was a reaction against the tetralogical ordering of the dialogues, probably on the grounds that the latter arrangement tended to impose an arbitrary dramatic scheme onto the Corpus as a whole (cf. D.L. 3.50).<sup>12</sup> But again, what this (notional) earlier tetralogical arrangement might have consisted of can only be conjectured.

We know then that arrangements of the Corpus, certainly into trilogies, and possibly into tetralogies, existed before Thrasyllus gave his stamp to the one which established itself as orthodox. But to assert that *Thg.* belonged to the earliest trilogical arrangements, or to earlier tetralogical orderings does, strictly speaking, transcend the evidence;<sup>13</sup> in the one instance where we can be certain that *Thg.* belonged to a trilogical ordering, it is impossible to determine the date at which that arrangement was made. On the other hand, it is at least possible, and might indeed be considered probable, that the dialogues in Thrasyllus' tetralogical arrangement are substantially the same ones as appeared in earlier organizations,

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<sup>11</sup>No doubt these represent paideutic priority (cf. Alb. *Eisag.* 4, D.L. 3.62, Olympiodorus *Proll.* 24-6), and not the ordering in actual "editions." Hippolytus (I.19.21) has been held to be the first definite witness for a material edition of the tetralogies (see Alline 124; Pasquali 265), but see also F. Solmsen, *JCS* 6.1 (1981) 102-11.

<sup>12</sup>See Wilamowitz II.324-5; E. Bickel, *Rh Mus* 92 (1943) 94; M. Pohlenz, *Nachrichten Akad. Göttingen*, Phil.-Hist. Klasse, 99 (1952) 7; R. Pfeiffer, *History of Classical Scholarship: From the Beginnings to the end of the Hellenistic Age* (Oxford, 1968) 196-7; J.A. Philip, *Phoenix* 24 (1970) 299 n.6, 300-1. Diogenes' choice of the forceful term ἑλκουσι to describe the arranging of dialogues into trilogies (3.61) is taken to argue both for a pre-existing order of the dialogues, and for the equal arbitrariness of the trilogical ordering; but see Solmsen, *op. cit.* 110 n.21.

<sup>13</sup>Although, for example, Taylor (*PMW*<sup>6</sup> 521) and Rist (20) have not unreasonably made this assertion.

*b. Philosophical and literary background*

Evidence has been gathered in preceding chapters to indicate those works on which *Thg.* may on reasonable grounds be thought to depend. Of these works, the claims of one doubtfully Platonic dialogue, namely *Alc. I*, which to all appearances is later than any of the genuine works from which *Thg.* derives, has been considered (see *Intr.* ch. I, *b*, *iii*, *v*, *vii*; *c*). The evidence which this dialogue brings to bear on date of composition will be briefly assessed below (sec. *g*). But for the moment it will be necessary to accept *Tht.* as the latest work on which *Thg.* demonstrably depends (see *Intr.* ch. II, *b*). As this dialogue was written after (but probably not long after) 369,<sup>15</sup> this date must suffice, provisionally at least, as our *terminus post quem* for *Thg.*

Is it possible to be more precise than to assign a date of composition for *Thg.* within the period 369 B.C. to c. 35 A.D., the likely date of Thrasyllus' death? In the first place, and notwithstanding the uncertain evidence for the original constitution of the Corpus, there is surely no credible reason to place the dialogue in the Christian era, and no more cause to situate it in a period at all near to that time; no Platonic scholar has been inclined to do this, and we have already seen that there are tentative grounds for dating *Thg.* not later than Aristophanes of Byzantium. Realistically, the question confronting us must be how close to the *terminus post quem* *Thg.* can be pushed back. Inauthenticity in itself cannot be offered as an argument for a late date of composition. Even the pseudo-Platonic *Sisyphus* can hardly be much later than 350 B.C., as Aristotle probably refers to it on one

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<sup>15</sup>See, e.g., Guthrie, *HGP* V. 61-2.

occasion.<sup>16</sup> And although the *onus probandi* need not necessarily rest with those who would wish to condemn a work within the Platonic Corpus as spurious,<sup>17</sup> it should on the other hand be axiomatic that a comparatively late date can only be upheld if there is positive and irrefutable proof of this date. Such proof will usually consist of philosophical, historical, literary, or linguistic anachronism (although naturally these are not mutually exclusive categories).

For its own part *Thg.* affords little evidence on which an argument for the influence of Hellenistic philosophical movements could be erected. The only point which might prove evidential is the subject of Socrates' divine sign in *Thg.* But even here the inferences we can draw are meagre. Stoicism, we know, recognized the value of μαντική, and several Stoics wrote books on the subject.<sup>18</sup> It might be supposed that the preoccupation in *Thg.* with Socrates' sign could indicate a Stoic interest in μαντική;<sup>19</sup> and whether or not the sign as presented in *Thg.* is in fact to be identified as a form of μαντική (see further *Intr.* ch. II, *b*), it is noteworthy that Cicero (*Div.* 1.122-4) does devote some space to a consideration of it as a legitimate species of divination. Consequently, this could be accepted as evidence that Socrates' sign had become a *topos* in Stoic discussions of

<sup>16</sup>*Sis.* 388e2-389a4 ~ *EN* 1112a21-23; see Müller, *Die Kurzdialoge* 91 (*ib.* 94-104 for his dating of *Sis.*); Thesleff, *Platonic Chronology* 230.

<sup>17</sup>Syme's remarks on this point are salutary; see *Pseudepigrapha I* (*Entretiens Hardt* 18 [Genève, 1972] 9. On the whole, Lesky's comments about the Corpus are sane (*A History of Greek Literature*, Eng. tr. [New York, 1966] 512): "It is generally wrong to go far beyond the end of the 4th century; they [sc. the doubtful works within the nine tetralogies] are products of a time when the discussions at the Academy were still closely allied with the Master and ventured to imitate his manner of representation."

<sup>18</sup>Cf. Cic. *Div.* 1.6: Chrysippus two books, Diogenes of Babylon one, Antipater of Tarsus two, Posidonius five.

<sup>19</sup>So Stallbaum 226-7.

prophecy,<sup>20</sup> and that *Thg.* was influenced by, and indeed part of, this way of thinking.

Such an argument meets with insurmountable difficulties. If it were valid, it would be odd that the author never asserts that it is his intention to make a statement on μαντική. At no time is the word, or one approximating to it, used, even though Plato himself sanctioned the belief in Socrates' divine sign as a form of prophecy by applying the term μαντική to it (*Ap.* 40a4), as did Xenophon approve the belief no less clearly (*Mem.* 1.1.2-9). In fact, through Socrates the author explicitly tells the reader why he presents a series of examples that prove Socrates' ability correctly to foretell future events. They are included in order to prove that τὸ δαίμονιον exercises complete control in Socrates' associations with his companions (129e1-3; though strictly speaking this is not what they prove, see *Intr.* ch. I, *b*, *vii*); and in the final anecdote of *Thg.* (130a4-e4), any possible insinuations about μαντική are actually sloughed off (see comm. *ad loc.*; *Intr.* ch. II, *b*). Nor are the implications of Socrates' alleged μαντική ever closely bound up with what could pass for Stoic doctrine: we are told that the divine sign helped Socrates to foretell the future, but not even the slightest link is allowed to surface between this divination and

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<sup>20</sup>That this is likely the case is suggested not only by Cicero's remarks on the divine sign in connection with prophecy, but also by his report that "per multa conlecta sunt ab Antipatro quae mirabiliter a Socrate divinata sunt" (*Div.* 1.123 = *SVF* 3.249). For the position of Socrates' divine sign in Stoicism, see Willing 151-7; Maier 453. It may be noted that Stallbaum (226-7) accepted Cicero's testimony that Antipater of Tarsus "collected" stories about Socratic prophecies as evidence of a late date for *Thg.*, inferring that the author of this dialogue drew upon Antipater's "collection." But, given the earliest date at which *Thg.* is likely to have been assimilated into the Platonic Corpus (see above), and the authority with which this will probably have invested the work in the eyes of those interested in Socrates' divine sign (for the influence of *Thg.* on later discussions about the divine sign, see *Intr.* ch. II, *d*, and **Appendix** 1), it is infinitely more probable that Antipater "collected" his material from *Thg.*, as well as from other sources (see also Taylor, *PMW*<sup>6</sup> 533; Willing 179-80).



Stoic beliefs concerning fate.<sup>21</sup> And yet what is most decisive against the possibility of Stoic influence is the fact that *μαντική* is also a Platonic subject of discussion.<sup>22</sup> We are, it seems, all but compelled to accept that *Thg.* can hardly be reckoned as a Stoic document in any real sense of the term.

There is, then, no good reason to label *Thg.* as a descendant or product of one or more of the Hellenistic philosophical schools.<sup>23</sup> But an attempt to date the dialogue within the period of the early Academy encounters one recalcitrant fact, namely that there is virtually no evidence for discussion of Socrates' divine sign in the latter half of the fourth-century B.C. anything like that which we encounter in *Thg.* After *Tht.* Plato never mentions the divine sign, Aristotle is completely reticent about it in his surviving works,<sup>24</sup> and we search in vain for notice of it in the fragments of Plato's early successors.<sup>25</sup> But the lack of evidence from Aristotle and the other immediate followers of Plato may, of course, be merely symptomatic of the fragmentary nature of our evidence, and it may even be slightly misleading to search after affinities for this section only within literary fields (see *Intr.* ch. I, *b*, *vii*; II, *b*, *d* [on the possible influence of oral tradition]).

<sup>21</sup>Cf., e.g., *SVF* 2.912, 939 (Chrysippus), 943, 944, a connection further articulated by Posidonius in the doctrine of *sympatheia* (E-K 106); see J.M. Rist, *Stoic Philosophy* (Cambridge, 1969) 176-8. For a further refutation of possible dependence on Stoic doctrine, see Taylor, *PMW*<sup>6</sup> 533. Later expositors were able to read into this dialogue a connection between the behaviour of τὸ δαιμόνιον in *Thg.* (though not its mantic powers) and certain dogmas about the workings of fate (cf. [Plu.] *Mor.* 574b). This is, however, no evidence for the original intentions of the author of *Thg.*

<sup>22</sup>Cf. *Phdr.* 244a3ff., *Smp.* 202e3-203a4, *Ti.* 71e6ff., *Lg.* 759bff., 772c6ff., 914a2ff.

<sup>23</sup>For an attempt to trace the influence of Academic scepticism on *Thg.*, see below n.36.

<sup>24</sup>See Willing 148-50.

<sup>25</sup>The tale of Timarchus in Plu. *De genio Socratis* (*Mor.* 590a-592e) has been held to depend ultimately on an early Academic source (see Willing 150-1, with reff.); but this by no means implies that Socrates' divine sign played any role in the original source which is postulated. On the very uncertain evidence for an Antisthenean interest in the divine sign, see *Intr.* ch. II n.92.

Moreover, if prevailing opinions about the date of *Alc. I* are substantially correct (see below sec. *g*), that dialogue must be considered a source of information on the sign (albeit not a very abundant one) originating from the period in question (see *Intr.* ch. II, *c*). But at all events the evidence that Socrates' divine sign continued to be a theme of discussion in the early Academy is not nearly as full as we might wish.

There are however other important considerations with regard to philosophical influences. We can identify a period, still within the early Academy, in which it may be inferred that the interest of the Platonic school in Socrates' sign is likely to have been more intense than at other times. This is not the place for a full account of Xenocrates' contribution to Platonism, but it is clear that the subject of δαίμονες in general exercised the Academy during the time in which he was its head (339-314), and to a significant degree his philosophical activities are characterized by the animation of fundamental principles with a deistic element. In fact, Xenocrates gave further expression to the orthodox Platonic belief in δαίμονες as intermediate beings between gods and men (cf. *Smp.* 202d13-203a8; *Intr.* ch. II, *b*), and did much to systematize their role.<sup>26</sup> His importance to later philosophy rests, it would appear, largely on his efforts to produce a standard and internally coherent and consistent form of Platonism;<sup>27</sup> but with justification we can speak of an irrational streak permeating his approach to the philosophical tradition he inherited from Plato. Within an intellectual atmosphere of the kind that must have existed in the early Academy under Xenocrates, and undoubtedly even before he was actually its head, a work

<sup>26</sup>See Heinze, *Xenocrates* 78-123; J. Dillon, *The Middle Platonists* (Ithaca, 1977) 31-2; Guthrie, *HGP* V. 474-5; Burkert 331-2.

<sup>27</sup>See Cherniss, *Riddle* 44; F. Novotny, *The Posthumous Life of Plato* (The Hague, 1977) 22-3.

such as *Thg.* would have been a natural product.<sup>28</sup> It does not matter greatly that Socrates' divine sign is not represented in this work along recognizably strong Xenocratean lines;<sup>29</sup> it is more important that its prominence here reflects a significant interest in the sign, and so possibly in δαίμονες, within literary circles, and very probably within the Academy itself (see *Intr.* ch. IV, *d*). Socrates' divine sign will have been viewed as a notable example of a personal guardian spirit,<sup>30</sup> the intermediary according to Xenocrates' system. As I have already attempted to show (*Intr.* ch. II, *b, d*), the prominence of the divine sign and the peculiarly unique description of it in *Thg.* are most readily accounted for by regarding the portion of *Thg.* concerned with the sign as representing a link within the fairly predictable chain of development which it experienced under various influences, and over a period of several centuries. One supposition must be that one of these influences on its development from τὸ δαιμόνιον to δαίμων was the new emphasis given to δαίμονες by Xenocrates and the Academy.

The preoccupation with the divine sign in *Thg.* may thus reflect an increased fascination with this aspect of Socrates' character, as compared with the previously understated treatment of it in the remainder of the Platonic Corpus (see *Intr.* ch. II, *a*); *a priori* we might have expected, despite the general lack of evidence concerning the sign itself, that this

<sup>28</sup>So also a date of composition in the period of Xenocrates' headship has been suggested by Taylor, *PMW*<sup>6</sup> 534; Wilamowitz II.325 n.1; Brunnecke 105ff., 182-3; less decisively F. Wehrli, *Die Schule des Aristoteles 7: Herakleides Pontikos*<sup>2</sup> (Basel, 1969) 104. A similar date was considered by Stallbaum (225-6), but was summarily rejected.

<sup>29</sup>*Pace* Stallbaum 225-6; Krüger 37. Krüger's assertion that *Thg.*, if it were written under the influence of Xenocrates, ought to betray this influence manifestly, in the way in which the works of much later writers on Socrates' divine sign do (i.e. Plutarch, Apuleius, Maximus of Tyre), seems to me especially dubious in its assumptions and use of evidence. Compare the comment of Gigon quoted in *Intr.* ch. II n.91.

<sup>30</sup>Cf. also *R.* 620d6-e4, *Phd.* 107d6-7, *Ti.* 90a2-7.

would have taken place in the Academy under Xenocrates. One specific point of contact between Xenocrates' demonology and references to Socrates' divine sign in *Thg.* may be mentioned. Xenocrates held that ill-disposed δαίμονες could be propitiated by certain religious observances, and this represented an aggressive departure from Plato's own beliefs.<sup>31</sup> In a similar manner Theages is determined (131a6-7) to propitiate τὸ δαιμόνιον with prayers, sacrifices, and whatever else the μάντεις<sup>32</sup> prescribe, if τὸ δαιμόνιον is not favourable to him. Even if we exaggerate the level to which Theages is characterized in this dialogue by a youthful enthusiasm and naïveté (see *Intr.* ch. III, *b*), it is still reasonable to wonder if his statement could have been made, or indeed could have been uttered without rebuke from Socrates, before beliefs about δαίμονες of the kind Xenocrates espoused had been imposed on the Academy. In fact this is just one instance among a number in which the divine sign in *Thg.* is treated along broadly demonological (though not necessarily always Xenocratean) lines, and in which the distinction (which Plato consciously observed) between τὸ δαιμόνιον of Socrates and δαίμονες generally, has been blurred (see *Intr.* ch. II, *b, d*).

More than this, we are fortunate in possessing an important complete piece of evidence for the interests of the early Academy in intermediate divine beings. The Platonic *Epinomis* supplies a useful control over our estimate of the liberties which members of the Academy felt justified in

<sup>31</sup>For Xenocrates cf. Plu. *Mor.* 361b = fr. 25 Heinze; for Plato cf. *Euthph.* 14e10ff., *R.* 364b2ff., *Lg.* 716e2ff., 905d3-907d1, 909a8ff.

<sup>32</sup>Plato also has little good to say about these people, cf. *Phdr.* 248d7-e1, *Plt.* 290c3ff., *Lg.* 908d1ff. But strictly speaking it is in harmony with Plato's formulations about δαίμονες in *Smp.* 202e7ff. that Theages should appeal to μάντεις at this point; for the relevance of this to the author's treatment of τὸ δαιμόνιον, see *Intr.* ch. II n. 76.

taking with Plato's own demonology.<sup>33</sup> In this work the author diverges from Plato's cosmology on a critical point. In *Ti.* (39e3-41a6) it was claimed that there are four kinds of living beings; in *Epin.* (981b3ff.) a fifth kind is now postulated, consisting of the δαίμονες, the intermediate deities. And these creatures are not only introduced into an essentially Platonic cosmology in which no need for them had previously been felt, but they are made corporeal as well (984d8-e4); additionally, they can be won over with prayers (984e2-3). Since demonological innovations such as these were possible in the early Academy, there is no difficulty imagining to what lengths an adherent, especially if he was not, or not primarily, a philosopher (as the author of *Thg.* seems not to have been, see *Intr.* ch. IV, e), might go in developing further the patterns traditionally associated with Socrates' divine sign. In any event, we may regard the extent of the influence within the Academy of a systematic demonology as pervasive: henceforward belief in good and evil δαίμονες becomes orthodox Platonism.<sup>34</sup>

We can develop this line of inquiry a little further by noting an additional detail in which *Thg.* would seem to reflect a prominent feature of the Academy after Plato's death. In the early Academy the importance given to dialectic in intellectual training was gradually reduced; what came to be valued more highly was actual experience.<sup>35</sup> Now the final anecdote in *Thg.* (130a4-e4) is striking for the way in which Aristides professes to "improve" merely in proportion to physical proximity with Socrates. Else-

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<sup>33</sup>Assuming, of course, that *Epin.* is spurious (whether or not Philip of Opus was its author), and that it was composed very late in Plato's lifetime or, what is perhaps more probable, some time not long after his death; see most recently (and most fully) L. Tarán, *Academica: Plato, Philip of Opus, and the Pseudo-Platonic Epinomis* (Philadelphia, 1975) 3-47, 138-9.

<sup>34</sup>With one important exception: Plotinus rejected the existence of good and evil δαίμονες (cf. *Enn.* 3.4).

<sup>35</sup>See Zeller, II.1<sup>5</sup> 995f.

where in Plato Socrates' effect on an interlocutor may be described in physical terms, the best known example being the simile of the sting ray in *Men.* (79e7-80b2). But that dialogue leaves us with no doubt as to the source of the numbing effect Meno claims to experience, since it is ascribed to the dialectical process as it is carried out by Socrates in company with his associate. Nor does the passage in *Tht.* (151a1ff.) which mentions Aristides in a similar context and which speaks of the educative influence of the divine sign permit us to claim that the importance of dialectic is no longer for Plato what it had been, for most of what follows that interlude emerges as an actual display of Socrates' maieutic method in action. In the *Thg.* passage, on the other hand, dialectic is conspicuous by its absence; Aristides becomes a vacuous listener, bewitched by Socrates' words as Meno had been, yet contributing nothing himself to the state he eventually finds himself in. The characteristic claim is still made that the companion learns nothing directly from Socrates (130d4-5), but whereas in *Tht.* this necessarily implied Socrates' role as midwife, here it reflects the concept of improvement by a kind of "osmosis." This is a remarkable development in the context of Platonic literature (see *Intr.* ch. IV, *d*), and it is not for nothing that Socrates in *Smp.* (175d3-e6) is unable to regard with any seriousness the notion of education or improvement by physical contact. But Aristides' words are understandable if by the time *Thg.* was written the importance of dialectic in the Academy had declined. True, Socrates does exercise Theages in a dialectical manner through the first several pages of the dialogue. But that example of question and answer is more notable for its differences from, rather than its similarities with, the

forms of dialectic in other works (see *Intr.* ch. I, *b*, *vii*), and at any rate the story about Aristides remains.<sup>36</sup>

And yet a likely Xenocratean, or more generally Academic, influence clearly does not provide a full explanation for the author's account of Socrates' divine sign; for as I indicated above, while some philosophical affinities can be detected between it and what we know about Xenocrates' system, and about demonological speculation in the early Academy, these are only limited. An investigation of possible contemporary literary influences will however be more fruitful in helping to substantiate a date within the period of the early Academy, as the correspondences in this area appear to be substantial.

Several points emerge from a study of the way in which the dialogue form developed in the hands of members of the Academy other than Plato, both late in his life and after his death. Again we are restricted by the lack of surviving evidence; yet it is quite clear that for some prominent writers (e.g., Aristotle and Heraclides Ponticus), variety for its own sake increased in importance in the composition of dialogues, as demonstrated most notably through the uses of anecdote and myth (doubtless following the late examples provided by Plato's accounts of Atlantis in *Crit.* and *Ti.*).<sup>37</sup> It is patent for instance that details about Socrates' life were subjects of controversy in the early years of Aristotle's school (i.e., some time after 335-4), and these discussions must have taken the form of gossip, some-

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<sup>36</sup>Carlini (59-60) uses the above evidence to arrive at a wholly different conclusion, viz., that *Thg.* was composed in the Academy under Arcesilaus (268-41), in whose time dialectic again assumed importance. This seems wholly at odds with the evidence, and the dialogue form of *Thg.*, which Carlini takes as further proof of composition under Arcesilaus rather than in the fourth century, does not indicate what he thinks it does.

<sup>37</sup>See Hirzel, *Der Dialog I* 277-8, 323.

times scurrilous, anecdotes.<sup>38</sup> Heraclides, long a member of the Academy (until the death of Speusippus in 339), seems to have been especially bold in his use of marvellous tales which often detailed supernatural events.<sup>39</sup> We also know that he wrote on the subject of oracles,<sup>40</sup> so that his interest in prophetic utterances is guaranteed; and he seems, like Xenocrates and the author of *Epin.*, to have discussed the role of δαίμονες.<sup>41</sup> As for Aristotle, it is demonstrable that he had a penchant for beginning his dialogues *in medias res*, that the mythical element played an important part in them, and that they contained lengthy speeches which catalogued rhetorical exempla;<sup>42</sup> at least one (*Eudemus* fr. 1 Ross = Cic. *Div.* 1.25.53) spoke of prophetic dream visions. One of the best-attested features of Aristotle's dialogues is that he occasionally took part himself as a leading speaker;<sup>43</sup> Heraclides on the other hand preferred to introduce characters taken from the romantic past.<sup>44</sup> What all this evidence clearly shows is that Heraclides and Aristotle (others as well, no doubt) gave new direction to dialogue writing.<sup>45</sup> Neither were content simply to develop pale imitations of Plato's compositions; on the contrary, they both were obviously occupied

<sup>38</sup>E.g., Socrates' bigamy: cf. D.L. 2.26 (Aristotle, Satyrus, Hieronymus of Rhodes), Athen. 13.555d-556a (Aristotle, Callisthenes, Demetrius, Satyrus, Aristoxenus), Plu. *Arist.* 27 (Aristotle, Demetrius, Aristoxenus, Hieronymus); see L. Woodbury, *Phoenix* 27 (1973) 7-21.

<sup>39</sup>See F. Wehrli, *op. cit.*, e.g. fr. 76-89 (Empedocles' resuscitation of a woman who had stopped breathing; his assumption into heaven); also Gottschalk 13-36.

<sup>40</sup>Fr. 130-141, περὶ χρησμῶν and περὶ χρηστηρίων; see Gottschalk 94-5, 130-1, and in general 93ff. for Heraclides' beliefs in divine intervention.

<sup>41</sup>Perhaps to be inferred from fr. 111 Wherli; see also Zeller II.1<sup>5</sup>1038; Gottschalk 97-8.

<sup>42</sup>See Hirzel, *Der Dialog* I 275-80; Jaeger, *Aristotle*<sup>2</sup>27-31 (for Heraclides' use of rhetorical devices, see Gottschalk 9). Despite the extensive employment of long speeches, there is evidence for the retention of question and answer sections in the Platonic mode, cf. *Eudemus* fr. 6 Ross.

<sup>43</sup>Cf. Cic. *Att.* 13.19.4, *Q.fr.* 3.5.1.

<sup>44</sup>See Gottschalk 9-10.

<sup>45</sup>On the general character of the post-Platonic dialogue, see Gottschalk 9, with his references in n. 31.



with producing works which could catch a reader's attention through a new emphasis on a number of devices.<sup>46</sup>

But some wider literary preoccupations around the middle of the fourth century become still more distinct if we look beyond the dialogue genre. For not only were Heraclides and Aristotle instrumental in introducing novel emphases to dialogue composition, but it is evident that some characteristic developments in this field can be paralleled in historiography as well. Theopompus (to mention one notable example), writing early in the second half of the fourth century, took it upon himself to embellish his historical writings with anecdotes and strange tales, created a fairyland (Meropis, *FGrHist* 115 F.75), and even included as part of the eighth and ninth books of his *Phillipica* a segment designated by the title *Thaumasias* (*FGrHist* 115 F.64-77).<sup>47</sup> Within this part he related several stories about Pherecydes of Syros, who is said to have had the gift of prescience on a number of occasions: he foretold the sinking of a ship, predicted an earthquake, and knew in advance that Messene was to be captured (*FGrHist* 115 F.71 = DK7A1). Andron of Ephesus on the other hand, also a writer of the fourth century, attributed these "miracles" to Pythagoras (*FGrHist* 70 = DK7A6). Nor did Ephorus eschew the use of myth and other-worldly subjects in his universal history.<sup>48</sup>

Certain literary trends become clear. The supernatural and the irrational were no longer cast in a supporting role in either dialogue or his-

<sup>46</sup>On Aristotle's philosophical position in his dialogues, see Jaeger, *Aristotle*<sup>2</sup>24-53.

<sup>47</sup>A correspondence between Theopompus' *Thaumasias* and Aristotle's *Eudemus*, interpreted as deliberate, has actually been detected by Gigon, "Prolegomena to an edition of the *Eudemus*" in *Aristotle and Plato in the mid-fourth Century*, I. Düring and G.E.L. Owen edd. (Göteborg, 1960) 30-1.

<sup>48</sup>The historical works of Heraclides Ponticus fall generally in line with the developments described above, see Gottschalk 128-39, esp. 137.

toriography.<sup>49</sup> As to where *Thg.* fits within the activity of the years following c. 369, the *terminus post quem* established above, this can best be determined with reference to some of the surviving relevant literature discussed above. Again, the section on Socrates' divine sign must come in for conspicuous treatment. It is basically anecdotal, not to say (auto)biographical; in this it resembles some of the work of Heraclides, Aristotle, and some of the Peripatetics, and the accumulation of anecdotes for the purpose of emphasizing Socrates' arguments about his divine sign finds its counterpart in Aristotle's use of rhetorical exempla (on the Socratic anecdotal tradition in general, see comm. ad 128d1-130e4). Its subject, the divine sign, is a supernormal entity; in fact its irrationality is emphasized here far more than anywhere else in the Platonic Corpus (see *Intr.* ch. II, b, d). The comments of the preceding few pages furnish ample comparisons. The similarities between Socrates' prophecies in *Thg.* and the predictions ascribed by Theopompus to Pherecydes mentioned above are particularly striking, and we might also recall Heraclides' interest in oracles and divine intervention generally. Dittmar went so far as to attribute *Thg.* directly to Heraclides or one of his "circle."<sup>50</sup> This showed not a little temerity, and Dittmar has been justifiably criticized for his assertion;<sup>51</sup> the evidence plainly is not sufficiently extensive or persuasive. Yet he may well have simply overstated his case. If certain features about *Thg.* seem at variance

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<sup>49</sup>See Hirzel, *Der Dialog I* 333-4.

<sup>50</sup>Dittmar, *Aischines von Sphettos* (Berlin, 1912) 64; see also Taylor, *PMW*<sup>6</sup> 534 n.1, whose apparent view that the effect of Heraclides' literary approach can be detected in *Thg.* was also endorsed by Dodds in *The Ancient Concept of Progress* (Oxford, 1973) 192-3. Dittmar's hypothesis was resurrected by J.D.P. Bolton, *Aristeas of Proconnesus* (Oxford, 1962) 202 n.18. A considerable measure of influence by Heraclides on the Academy seems at any rate certain, if we can trust the report of the *Suda* (= fr. 2 Wehrli) that Heraclides was in charge of Plato's school during Plato's final visit to Sicily c. 361; there is, however, no way to substantiate this report. But that he was a prominent member of the Academy need not be doubted.

<sup>51</sup>See Gottschalk 157.

with the remaining authentic works in the Platonic Corpus, we have good reason to feel that the explanation for the anomalies lies in the influences of other writers of philosophical dialogues, Heraclides among them, apart from Plato. For *Thg.* does appear to exemplify new approaches to the writing of a dialogue, typified by the work of Heraclides and Aristotle; approaches still strongly reflecting the habits and predilections of Plato (especially in the retention of Socrates as chief interlocutor), but illustrating fresh mannerisms, techniques, and emphases. It is difficult to resist the temptation to relate *Thg.* closely to much of the literary activity around the middle of the fourth century B.C. It must be significant that, sparse as the evidence is for the fields of dialogue and historiography around this time (especially, of course, after Plato's death), the little that does survive suggests that *Thg.* possesses important specific affinities with it.

To summarize then the relevance of philosophical and literary influences in determining date of composition: No connection with Hellenistic philosophical trends is detectable in *Thg.* On the other hand, the dialogue, though written, broadly speaking, after a Platonic manner (see below, and **Intr.** ch. I, *b*, *c*; ch. IV, *c*), shows evidence of an influence emanating from the demonology which became after Plato's death a preoccupation in the Academy. This influence, however, was exerted on a literary rather than a philosophical mind, and is manifested in the author's animadversions on Socrates' divine sign. The form that the author's preoccupations in this sphere take is largely consistent with the kinds of literary composition being produced among writers of both dialogue and history in the mid-fourth century.<sup>52</sup> On this evidence therefore a date of composition roughly

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<sup>52</sup>There are reasons also to feel that the anecdote about the Sicilian expedition would not have been given literary expression until late in Plato's life or after his death; see comm. *ad* 129c8-d2.

within 360-330 B.C. suggests itself; since the dialogue still displays a measurably strong influence by Plato, a date earlier in this thirty-year stretch rather than later is perhaps more likely.

*c. Internal evidence*

One further argument for an early Hellenistic date must still be examined. Souilh  inferred<sup>53</sup> that *Thg.* 125e8-126a4, in which Theages expresses a desire to rule all mankind, or all the more "to become a god," reflects the existence of an environment in which this aspiration could have been entertained; and the historical context which naturally presents itself in this connection, Souilh  added, is that in which the deification of Alexander the Great was debated and enacted. By 324 serious discussion began in Athens as to whether Alexander should be worshipped as a god;<sup>54</sup> already in 327 Alexander had attempted to introduce the act of obeisance  $\pi\rho\omicron\sigma\kappa\acute{\upsilon}\nu\eta\sigma\iota\varsigma$ .<sup>55</sup> Souilh  assumes that Theages, or rather the author himself, has Alexander in mind when the attaining of divine status is mentioned. Presumably then, if *Thg.* is to be dated after the deification of Alexander, it must have been written later than 324 (Souilh  places it in the third century).

This argument is unconvincing for several reasons. In the first place, the notion that Alexander was the first ruler in the Greek world to receive divine honours, and was therefore the only paradigm at which Theages could be looking, can be dispensed with. Lysander was accorded divine

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<sup>53</sup>Souilh 142; also Robin 1641-2. Souilh  was anticipated by Br nncke in a brief note (182 n.3).

<sup>54</sup>Cf. *Athen.* 251b; *Din.* 1.94; *Hyper. in Dem.* 31.

<sup>55</sup>Cf. *Arr. An.* 4.10.5-12.5; *Curt.* 8.5.5-21; *Plu. Alex.* 54.3-6.

honours by the Samians;<sup>56</sup> Dion of Syracuse was deified;<sup>57</sup> and (though not a ruler) Empedocles was honoured "as a god."<sup>58</sup> Early tradition even has it that Apollo came to Plato's father, Ariston, in a dream, and warned him not to have intercourse with his wife, Perictione, until she had given birth to Plato.<sup>59</sup> This story indicates, if not a wholehearted commitment to the commonplace occurrence of deification, at any rate a greater receptivity among the Greeks to the idea of deification than is ordinarily supposed. True, the object of deification may not have been reckoned to have become a god in the strictest sense, but doubtless there was something about him which was considered god-*like*, and which therefore demanded veneration. Deification, of one kind or another, thus was not unheard of before Alexander's time, and if Theages has any particular individual in mind at 125e8ff., it need not be Alexander.<sup>60</sup>

But much more than this, I must confess to strong misgivings as to whether we ought even to imagine that the deification of any specific historical figure lies behind Theages' proclamation. His thoughts are, after all, framed in the most general terms possible, and the passage itself surely reflects quite realistically the excitement and exuberance of a young mind (see comm. *ad loc.*). Besides, if it is correct that εὐξαίμην in 125e8 is being used of an *unrealizable* wish (see comm. *ad loc.*), there can be no question of Theages' being strictly serious about his "prayer" for divine

<sup>56</sup>Duris *ap.* Plu. *Lys.* 18; the date is uncertain, see C. Habicht, *Gottmenschen und griechische Städte*<sup>2</sup> (München, 1970) 243-4.

<sup>57</sup>Plu. *Dion.* 46.

<sup>58</sup>D.L. 8.70.

<sup>59</sup>Speusippus *ap.* D.L. 3.2, cf. Olympiodorus, *Vit.Pl.* 1, p.191 Hermann; see Wilamowitz, *Aristoteles und Athen II* (Berlin, 1893) 413ff; Jaeger, *Aristotle*<sup>2</sup> 108f.

<sup>60</sup>On the whole matter of deification before Alexander, see Habicht, *op. cit.* 3-10.

status: to a large extent his words must represent a manner of speaking.<sup>61</sup> There is no real contradiction here with the comments made just above about the individuals who did achieve deification; they are the few exceptions which prove the rule, and, as I suggested, their deifications should probably be treated as hyperbolic instances of reverence. And as far as the wish to rule all men is concerned (126a1), here again there is by no means any reference to Alexander: the desire for universal rule is a *topos* which goes back as far as Homer.<sup>62</sup>

That Theages has no thoughts about Alexander will emerge more clearly if we consider for a moment the context and meaning of this passage. Theages has earlier expressed a desire to become σοφός; Socrates has progressively distorted this desire into a desire to become a tyrant; and now, after his most recent distortion through the use of an allusion to one of Anacreon's poems (see **Appendix 2**), Theages feels he must disabuse Socrates of any misconceptions about what he really longs for. Thus he says: "I might pray to become a tyrant...as, I think, you and everyone else would, and still more perhaps to become a god, but that's not what I said I desired." Two commonplaces are actually at work here: First, the belief that εὐδαιμονία is embodied ideally in the figure of the tyrant, the one who commands all he surveys. This was a belief which a majority of Greeks probably shared, in one form or another (see comm. *ad* 125e8), and so the tyrant's position was regarded as highly desirable (the general acceptability of this belief is stressed by Theages' consecutive use

<sup>61</sup>Cf. X. *Smp.* 1.15 (the jester Philippos) οὔτε γὰρ ἔγωγε σπουδάσαι ἂν δυναίμην μᾶλλον ἢπερ ἀθάνατος γενέσθαι. That the phrase εὐξάιμην ἂν was a colloquial expression seems to me likely; it occurs elsewhere (*Ax.* 366b7-8), and its survival in the New Testament (*Acts* xxvi.29), despite its optative form, may be due to its formulaic character.

<sup>62</sup>Cf. *Od.* 1.389ff. (of Telemachus); see also F. Dirlmeier, *Aristoteles, Eudemische Ethik*<sup>2</sup> (Berlin, 1969) 288, for some later examples.

of οἶμαι [not expressing diffidence] in 125e8 and 126a2). Secondly, in the popular imagination the tyrant stood only one step below the gods, and writers frequently mention the two in close proximity (see comm. *ad* 126a2-3). Likewise for Theages the first statement naturally, almost formulaically, gives rise to the second.

But Theages uses these commonplaces for his own special purpose. Clearly, in his mind it does not matter that he cannot become a tyrant or a god, for he has never said that that is what he wants. The desire might be latent in the minds of young men like him (see *Intr.* ch. I, *b*, *iii*, *v*; *c*, ch. III, *b*), but his actual words in the text do not allow us this kind of speculation, and such a desire does not represent the point at issue: Theages has no aspirations to become a tyrant. Failure to recognize this has largely led commentators astray,<sup>63</sup> for it has escaped their notice that in these lines Theages is not (as seems to be assumed) acquiescing in Socrates' irony, reluctantly affirming that ideally he would wish to be a tyrant, but that his present desire is nothing more than a timid second best. On the contrary, 125e8-126a4 perform a much different function: they serve to communicate Theages' rebuke of Socrates for his behaviour over the previous few pages, and Theages' addition of ἔτι δέ γε ἴσως μᾶλλον θεὸς γενέσθαι (126a2-3) merely carries Socrates' distortions one inevitable and predictable step further; we are doubtless justified to understand that Theages feels he is saving Socrates the trouble of extending his distortion, a

<sup>63</sup>See, e.g., Pavlu 28; Friedländer II.149-50; Krüger 9; Pangle 161-3. Pavlu (34) provides the best example of a misinterpretation of 125e8-126a4. His understanding is that Theages becomes carried away with the excitement evoked by the prospect of ruling all men, extends this to cover possible deification, and then catches himself, by expressing the words ἀλλ' οὐ τούτου ἔλεγον ἐπιθυμεῖν, before incurring divine wrath over such an hubristic wish. Nietzsche was seduced into a similar disregard of context by the gnomic quality of this passage; cf. *The Will to Power*, tr. W. Kaufmann (New York, 1967) 503 (Bk. 4, aphorism 958): "In Plato's *Theages* it is written: 'Each one of us would like to be master over all men, if possible, and best of all God.' This attitude must exist again."

thing which Socrates himself (Theages must imagine) was probably bound to do in any event.<sup>64</sup> Above all, Theages wishes to convey to Socrates that he meant what he said when he originally expressed his principal desire (viz., ἄρχειν τῶν ἐν τῇ πόλει 124a1), and that all the previous talk about tyranny has been completely misguided. The phrase εὐξαίμην... ἂν (125e8) puts this talk appropriately into a never-never land of idle fancy; Theages has had enough of tyranny, or of any other prospects the imagination might entertain. The tone of Theages' utterance is that of anger and irritation, not of wistful animation.

Consequently, the contrast Theages sets up in these lines is not really a contrast between an unrealizable, but nevertheless highly attractive and desirable, goal on the one hand, and one which can be attained on the other, as has been suggested. It is much rather a contrast between the time a young man might waste on pointless daydreams, and his much more profitable desire for something which can be achieved; and up to this point Socrates, in Theages' mind, has been simply wasting time. Hence Theages' words, taken as overt criticism and reprobation, effectively follow upon the objection against Socrates which he expressed shortly before (125e4), and which he amplifies further at 126a7-8. It is important also that 125e8-126a4 act as a transitional hinge to Socrates' more correct appreciation of what Theages is after, in so far as Socrates subsequently abandons his earlier ironical premise about Theages' desire to become a tyrant; Socrates has recognized Theages' words for what they are.

Thus Theages' prayer to become a tyrant and a god is not really a prayer (in the sense of a fervent desire) at all. Rather, it is an expression, in

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<sup>64</sup>C.W. Müller's judgement (137) of the function of ἔτι...γενέσθαι ("Die exzessive Steigerung lässt den ironischen Unterton deutlich werden") is, it seems to me, roughly consistent with the above interpretations.



the form of a commonplace, designed and adapted to show Socrates how ridiculous his whole line of questioning and argumentation has been, and to demonstrate to him that Theages' true wishes are reasonable, serious, and mature.<sup>65</sup> There is nothing here which can support a Hellenistic date for *Thg.*

*d. The evidence of Aristotle, Eudemian Ethics*

C.W. Müller has brought forward an interesting piece of evidence which, if he is correct about his assumptions, may help us to narrow the date of *Thg.* still further.<sup>66</sup> Although it is not completely inseparable from the previous discussion, it deserves full consideration in its own right.

According to Müller (143f.), there is a significant correspondence between *Thg.* 125e8-126a4 and Aristotle *EE* 1225<sup>b</sup>32-37. In *Thg.* Theages draws a distinction between prayer (εὐξαίμην e8) and desire (ἐπιθυμεῖν a3): we *pray* for what is unattainable (see comm. *ad loc.*), such as to become a tyrant or even a god, but we *desire* what is within human capacity (see sec. c). Aristotle discusses the meaning of the key term προαίρεσις by means of comparison: ἀλλὰ μὴν οὐδὲ βούλησις καὶ προαίρεσις ταυτόν· βούλονται μὲν γὰρ ἔνια καὶ τῶν ἀδυνάτων εἰδότες, οἷον βασιλεύειν τε πάντων ἀνθρώπων καὶ ἀθάνατοι εἶναι, προαίρεται δ' οὐθεὶς μὴ ἀγνοῶν ὅτι ἀδύνατον, οὐδ' ὅλως ἄδυνατόν μὲν, μὴ ἐφ' αὐτῷ δ' οἴεται πράξαι ἢ μὴ πράξαι. Müller (144) drew attention to the verbal connection between the contrasting pairs εὐξαίμην~ἐπιθυμεῖν in *Thg.* and βούλονται~προαίρεται in *EE*, both sets of words expressing wishes

<sup>65</sup>For the widespread tendency to attribute excessive naïveté to Theages, see *Intr.* ch. III, b.

<sup>66</sup>C.W. Müller 135-47; also *Die Kurzdialoge* 108 n.1.

that are and are not attainable. Interestingly, the examples Aristotle used of the impossible desire are virtually identical with their counterparts in *Thg.*: in both works it is an impossible desire to wish to rule all men (τύραννος γενέσθαι~βασιλεύειν) or to become a god (θεὸς γενέσθαι~ἀθάνατοι εἶναι).

The coincidence here is impressive, and it is tempting to concur with Müller that the correspondence is not a matter of chance. But the relationship between these two passages is anything but easy to analyze. Derivation of *Thg.* from *EE* seems at least unlikely: the one thing which all the sources of *Thg.* considered in previous chapters have in common is that they are associated with the genre of Socratic literature, and the interests of the author of *Thg.* are clearly more literary and biographical than philosophical. The *EE* would therefore be a slightly curious repository of material for this writer. As Müller himself recognized (144), Theages' "prayer" to become a tyrant or god is manifestly coherent and intelligible within its own specific context, and it thus appears on the face of it to have been fashioned specifically for the role it plays in this work rather than to have been imposed externally on its context. In *EE* on the other hand the examples of unrealizable wishes cited above are simply two among a number which Aristotle uses both before and after this one to elucidate his argument.

If we accept then that the correspondence between *Thg.* and *EE* is not fortuitous, either the latter derives from the former, or they both recall a common source. The lack of any further correspondences between *Thg.* and *EE*, or for that matter between *Thg.* and any other Aristotelian work, is some evidence that Aristotle did not have *Thg.* in mind at *EE* 1225<sup>b</sup>32-37. Further evidence is supplied by the fact that elsewhere (*EN* 1111<sup>b</sup>20-3,

*MM* 1189<sup>a</sup>5-7) the unrealizable wish (βούλησις) is simply for "immortality," whereas "to rule all men" is excluded. What is important here is that Aristotle on other occasions was conscious of a very comparable simile to the one presented in *EE*; it is therefore reasonable to infer that "to rule all men" or "to become god/immortal," or both, ranked as *topoi* of the unfulfillable desire (see also sec. *c*), which Aristotle used as he saw fit. If however we supplement this inference with the conjecture that such *topoi* originated within the Academy, and that both the author of *Thg.* and Aristotle are drawing from this common source in their respective passages, we are on dangerous grounds. Müller himself considered this possibility (145 n.45), but wisely rejected it: under normal circumstances, a Greek could not have expressed an unrealizable wish more assertively than by calling to mind the notion of transcending his own humanity (see sec. *c*). It is therefore useless, I think, to search for a specific source for this *topos*, let alone expect that we shall discover its origins in a philosophical school. Besides, the contrast which seems to be presented in *Thg.* is not, as we have seen (sec. *c*), pointedly between wishes that can and cannot be fulfilled, i.e., between what Theages would really desire and what he feels he must be contented with. Yet if the passages from *Thg.* and *EE* were closely connected, we should have expected the contrast which Aristotle establishes to be drawn in bolder outline in *Thg.* than is in fact the case.

It was Müller's verdict (145) that the passage in *EE* derives from *Thg.*<sup>67</sup> For my own part, however, I must conclude, though with some measure of diffidence, that the above passages, depending as they do on natural commonplace expressions, are most likely connected only by coincidence.

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<sup>67</sup>Müller has found a supporter in Thesleff, *Platonic Chronology* 218 n.39.

*e. Style and linguistic evidence*

A number of linguistic criteria have been cited in the past to prove a late date (or inauthenticity) for *Thg.* As I have already dealt extensively with questions of style and linguistic usage in connection with authorship (see **Intr.** ch. IV, *b*), and have concluded that this evidence, when used to prove spuriousness, cannot pass closer investigation, I will not repeat the earlier findings here. But I should mention again that, taken by themselves, style and linguistic criteria point to a date of composition early in Plato's literary career. Moreover, the structure of the dialogue follows, if anything, the schemes of some early Platonic compositions (though with significant modifications, see **Intr.** ch. I, *b*, *iii*, *v*; *c*; ch. IV, *c*). This category of evidence is therefore essentially the only one which can support an early date (i.e., *c.* 380 or earlier) for *Thg.* Still, it must be emphasized that this evidence is only useful if it can be proved that Plato is the author of this dialogue. This is, however, a conclusion that has already emerged as untenable.

*f. The theme and purpose of Thg.*

Finally, how can the purpose for which *Thg.* was written, as argued above (**Intr.** ch. I, *c*), be used as evidence for its date of composition? We have already seen that the section on the divine sign can be brought to bear on the question of date. A consideration of the overall theme of the dialogue is now required.

A summary of a few of the findings of the earlier chapter on subject and purpose is in order. Broadly speaking, *Thg.* considers, from a Socratic/Platonic point of view, the claims of alternate forms of education, characteristically described in this dialogue as "association" (συνουσία), and the

author has striven to keep this theme in the foreground from the very start of the work. Socratic association is approved, and the consequence of it is seen to be the Platonic political ideal of "improvement" of individuals. At the same time, the dramatic circumstances mark the dialogue out, at least partly, as an encouragement towards a way of life distinct from that of the sophists or politicians.<sup>68</sup>

That Socrates, the sophists, and οἱ πολιτικοί are made the chief subjects of this debate over rival educational claims, and that the dialogue is virtually confined to the problem of the relative value of these individuals as educators, suggest that *Thg.* was written under circumstances in which it was considered necessary to offer a defence of one educational ideal against the claims of others. The tone of *Thg.*, which is unmistakably apologetic, supports this inference. Such a scheme is, I believe, most intelligible in the context of the polemics waged between the Academy and Isocrates' school, for in this environment there was clearly a need to distinguish the activities and pretensions of sophist and politician from those of philosopher; the passages, for example, from *R.* and *Men.* cited in *Intr.* ch. I, c (*fin.*) indicate this, and so, more overtly, does Plato's projected trilogy *Sophist-Politicus-Philosopher*.<sup>69</sup> If this analysis of the situation in which the author worked is correct, there will certainly be little difficulty in setting *Thg.* within the last twenty years of Plato's life, and this time frame may even be extended to the death of Isocrates in 338. Moreover, the criticisms of Plato made after Isocrates' death by Theopompus, a student of

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<sup>68</sup>For the details see *Intr.* ch. I, c.

<sup>69</sup>See Guthrie, *HGP* V. 122-3.

Isocrates, argue for an environment in which a defence of the Academy would have been apposite even after 338.<sup>70</sup>

### *g. Conclusions*

Only certain kinds of evidence are of any substantial assistance in allowing us to arrive at a date of composition for *Thg.* Ancient testimonia and the evidence for the history of the Platonic Corpus can do no more than provoke hypotheses that *Thg.* is not post-Alexandrian. Some other evidence is purely negative: there is no sign that the author of *Thg.* was in any way influenced by discussions about Alexander, or that *Thg.* and Aristotle's *Eudemian Ethics* are somehow connected. Language and style point to an early date, but this evidence would be significant only if Plato were unquestionably the author of *Thg.*, and in any event its dependence on *Tht.* necessarily rules out such a date. All this evidence for the dating of *Thg.* can do little or nothing to help us identify a reasonably precise period of composition.

We are therefore left with two categories of criteria, i.e., the conclusions which can be drawn about the philosophical and literary environment in which *Thg.* was composed, and the clues furnished by the theme and purpose of the dialogue. These are, however, of considerable importance, and by far the greatest share of the evidence adduced in these fields suggests a date of composition within the middle decades of the fourth-century B.C., let us say 365-330. I have already given one or two reasons for favouring a *terminus ante quem* closer to c. 345 (sec.c, d), and even if there is no way of being certain about this time frame, I think there is merit

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<sup>70</sup>Theopompus attacked the Academy in his treatise καταδρομή τῆς Πλάτωνος διατριβῆς (*FGrHist* 115 T.48, F. 259).

in Rist's notion (19) that the years immediately following Plato's death provided excellent opportunities for the assimilation, intentional or otherwise, of spurious material under the name of Plato himself.<sup>71</sup>

I have withheld until now any consideration of the guidance *Alc. I* can offer us in specifying an accurate date. The arguments for believing that this work was a source for the author of *Thg.* can be found above (Intr. ch. I, b, iii, v, vii; ch. II, c, d). Although the evidence is not absolutely compelling, I feel it is very likely that the author of *Thg.* wrote with a knowledge of *Alc. I*; at any rate, both show strong signs of having been composed within the same philosophical milieu.<sup>72</sup> Presumably, then, such a dependence on this work will also furnish a *terminus post quem* for *Thg.* which we might hope will define the date of composition more precisely than has been otherwise possible. Yet difficulties remain. Was Plato the author of *Alc. I*? Most scholars nowadays do not believe so (and I have already given further reasons why this position is probably correct, see Intr. ch. II, c), but even at that there is no unanimity about its date, although the range 345-340 B.C. has met with approval.<sup>73</sup> But if certainty about the date of *Alc. I* is not possible, it is unlikely that it will advance our conclusions about the

<sup>71</sup>Pavlu's suggestion (*PhilWoch* 59.22 [1939] 596-7) of composition at the time of Crantor or shortly thereafter seems to me slightly late (see also Intr. ch. II n.92). It is not altogether surprising that Antisthenes rears his head in the controversy over the date of *Thg.*, given the number of supposed reactions to Antisthenes that have been detected in Plato's dialogues (see Guthrie, *HGP III*. 310-11). It is of curiosity value more than anything else that Fritzsche (230-1) believed that *Thg.*, in the manner in which it represented Aristides' claim to have "learned nothing" from Socrates (130d4), in effect corrupted the Antisthenic principle that virtue does not require teaching.

<sup>72</sup>This also was the view of Wilamowitz, *Hermes* 32 (1897) 103; Pavlu (33-4) directly opposed Wilamowitz, but the additional evidence I have advanced in Intr. ch. II, c (see also previous n.) further supports the latter.

<sup>73</sup>See, e.g., Pavlu, *WS* 31 (1909) 37; R.S. Bluck, *CQ* n.s.3 (1953) 52; Taylor, *PMW*<sup>6</sup> 522; C.A. Bos, *Interpretatie vaderschap en datierung van de Alcibiades Maior* (Culemborg, 1970) 107-12. Some upholders of authenticity are Friedländer II.231-43; C. Vink, *Platos eerste Alcibiades: Een onderzoek naar zijn authenticiteit* (Amsterdam, 1939); A. J. Festugière, *Contemplation et vie contemplative selon Platon* (Paris, 1950).

date of *Thg.* With some reluctance therefore I should prefer not to base any primary assumptions about the date of *Thg.* on this work, rather than to argue *ignotum per ignotius*.

Weighing all the available evidence, I would offer 345-335 as a conjectural period within which *Thg.* was written.

### Appendix: Dramatic Date

Taylor (533) claimed to have discovered a conflict of evidence with regard to the dramatic date of *Thg.*: "There is one glaring anachronism, a reference to the mission of Thrasyllus to Ionia in the year 409. Since *R.* [496b6ff.] manifestly speaks of Theages as a grown man, the reference to the Sicilian disaster is probably a second."<sup>74</sup> Taylor assumes that the mention in *Thg.* of Theages as a μετράκις (cf. 122c8, with n. *ad loc.*) at the putative dramatic date of the dialogue is a biographical misrepresentation. And this would probably be true, if the details of the reference to Theages in *R.* can be pressed, and if the dramatic date of 421 which he assigns (263-4) to *R.* is also the correct one. His evidence, however, is meagre and open to criticism. For Taylor attaches excessive importance to an incidental detail in *R.*, and to the dramatic date of 421 which he assigns to that dialogue. Not only may this date be disputed (see n.89), but we must also ask if Plato still had his mind firmly fixed upon any dramatic date when he came to write *R.* 496b (bk. 6). The biographical

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<sup>74</sup>For the recognition of anachronisms in Plato's dialogues in antiquity cf. Athen. 216c, 217c-218e, Ael. Ar. II.369f., 435 (Dindorf), Macrob. *Sat.* 1.1.5; for a collection of Platonic anachronisms see O. Gigon *ad Mem.* 1.3.8; and for modern discussions see E. Zeller, *AKAWB* (1873) 79-99; R. Hirzel, *Der Dialog I* (Leipzig, 1895) 18ff. Aeschines Socraticus' flagrant anachronism in presenting Xenophon, Xenophon's wife, and Aspasia together in the dialogue *Aspasia* (see Dittmar 32 n.118) may indicate that the use of anachronism approached the status of a *topos* in the Socratic dialogue.



information about Theages reported by *R.* is, I take it, historically accurate (see *Intr.* ch. I, c); but this does not compel us to believe that it is also consistent with any specific dramatic date that may be assigned to *R.* That dialogue cannot be relied upon to help us determine the age of Theages at the dramatic date of *Thg.*, and it rather looks as though Taylor has been forced into his assertion by his belief in the absolute veracity of the dramatic details of Plato's portrait of Socrates.

Our most important data for calculating dramatic date are 1) the reference to Archelaus, son of Perdiccas (124d2-3), 2) the information that the Sicilian expedition has already met with disaster (129c8f.), and 3) the statement that Thrasyllus, the Athenian general, has begun a journey to Ephesus (129d4ff.). Both 1) and 2) imply a dramatic date some time after the year 413 B.C.: Archelaus came to the Macedonian throne in 413, and the Sicilian expedition reached its disastrous conclusion in September of the same year. 3) is a certain reference to Thrasyllus' Ionian campaign and defeat at Ephesus in the summer of 409.<sup>75</sup> Since, according to Socrates, the fleet is already making its way to Ephesus at the time of the dialogue, we must assume the dramatic date to be 409 B.C. The further detail that Charmides, who was dead by 403, is still alive (128e8-9) at the time of the dramatic date, accords with this calculation.<sup>76</sup>

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<sup>75</sup>Cf. X. *HG* 1.2.6-10, Plut. *Alc.* 29.

<sup>76</sup>The statement in 124d2-3 that Archelaus has just recently attained power in Macedonia (τὸν νεωστὶ τοῦτον ἄρχοντα ἐν Μακεδονίᾳ) appears a little unusual at first glance, in so far as νεωστὶ must refer to an interval of three to four years from the dramatic date. But νεωστὶ, like some other expressions of time (e.g. πάλαι, cf. Lat. *nuper*), can be applied colloquially to represent merely a vague temporal relation. For parallels one might cite the use of νεωστὶ in three Herodotean passages, 2.49, 7.143, and 7.148, where all the appearances of νεωστὶ cover a period considerably longer than the three to four years in *Thg.* (see A.S. Evans, *AJP* 108 [1987] 382-4; Dodds, *Euripides, Bacchae*<sup>2</sup> [Oxford, 1960] xx).

There are notably few of Plato's dialogues whose dramatic dates can be established nearly as precisely as that of *Thg.* The dialogues which focus on Socrates' trial or make reference to it (*Euthph.*, *Ap.*, *Cri.*, *Phd.*, *Tht.*) naturally form a single category in this respect. Dramatic dates which can probably be fixed with reasonable precision belong to *La.* (between 424 and 418), *Chrm.* (about 432), *Men.* (402), and *Prt.* (433-2, despite an anachronism at 327d3-4 concerning Phaerecrates' comedy *Savages*).<sup>77</sup> Some other dialogues can be located very tenuously at 409 B.C. or thereabouts. *Phdr.* seems to occur around 410;<sup>78</sup> *R.* may be set between 411 and 409, but there is room for doubt;<sup>79</sup> and the dramatic date of *Euthd.* cannot be established precisely, but it may fall around 410.<sup>80</sup> What this data seems to suggest is that Plato's concern to establish internally coherent dramatic dates for his dialogues was greatest in the early and early-middle compositions, when it was still his purpose to provide realistic and historical settings in which his Socrates, not as yet transformed to the degree that he would be in later works, might conduct his conversations. In these works Plato at least seems to have been aiming for the appearance of historical veracity.<sup>81</sup> Thus when the author of *Thg.* came to supply his work with a precise dramatic date, it was the pattern furnished by those earlier dialogues that he had in mind. This evidence perhaps suggests that our author sought to construct his work in such a way as to evoke, as far as his theme and purpose allowed, an impression that *Thg.* was a

<sup>77</sup>But see J. Walsh, *CQ* n.s.34 (1984) 101-6.

<sup>78</sup>See R. Hackforth, *Plato's Phaedrus* (Cambridge, 1952) 8.

<sup>79</sup>See Guthrie, *HGP* IV. 437-8.

<sup>80</sup>*ib.* 267.

<sup>81</sup>See F.M. Cornford, *Plato's Cosmology* (London, 1937) 5.

"Socratic" work in its own right (see further **Intr.** ch. I, *b*, *iii*, *v*, *c*; ch. III, *a*; ch. IV, *b*, *c*).

## Textual Transmission

Two of the three catalogues of Plato manuscripts compiled this century, those of Post and Brumbaugh-Wells, list 34 which contain all or part of *Thg.*<sup>1</sup> The most complete catalogue, that of Wilson, lists only 31, but adds the other three under the category of miscellaneous extracts.<sup>2</sup> Two further items in Wilson's list of extracts prove to contain a small portion of *Thg.* (R.M. 16 C 25.A; Madr.1.36; see below); I have found in addition a part of *Thg.* in another ms. not mentioned in the above catalogues (Vat.113).<sup>3</sup> This brings the number of medieval witnesses of *Thg.* to 37; and, while there is no guarantee that portions or, perhaps, all of the dialogue are not to be found in other mss., the possibility that such findings would shed any significant light on the text is at least slight.<sup>4</sup> The remarks in section *a* of this chapter are based on full collations of all but one of these 37 mss., both from examination *in situ*,<sup>5</sup> and from inspection of photographic reproductions.<sup>6</sup> Since conclusions cannot be safely drawn from Bekker's silence, or from Stallbaum's very sketchy report of the mss. he collated, rather full in-

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<sup>1</sup>L.A. Post, *The Vatican Plato and its Relations* (Middletown, 1934) 65-92; R.S. Brumbaugh and R. Wells, *The Plato Manuscripts: A New Index* (New Haven, 1968) 143-4.

<sup>2</sup>N.G. Wilson, *Scriptorium* 16 (1962) 386-95, esp. 394, 395.

<sup>3</sup>I am grateful to the Greek Index Project at the Pontifical Institute of Mediaeval Studies, University of Toronto, for drawing this ms. to my attention.

<sup>4</sup>The following mss. in Wilson's catalogue might contain fragments of *Thg.* (I cite by Wilson's numbers [395]): 55, 82, 103, 115, 141, 175, 178, 221.

<sup>5</sup>Ven.App.Cl.4.1 (T), Ven.184, Ven.186, Ven.189.

<sup>6</sup>Either microfilm, photograph, or photostat; photographic facsimile (Leiden, 1898) was used for the collation of Clarkianus 39 (B).

formation is given for much of this evidence; the results which are arrived at concerning ms. affiliations are summarized (as far as possible) in a *stemma codicum* (though small extracts of the dialogue generally resist such classification, and are not included). Standard sigla will be employed, where practicable; but, to avoid confusion, some secondary mss. have been given sigla which are intended to be self-explanatory.<sup>7</sup>

In addition to the manuscript tradition, the indirect tradition of *Thg.* is considered (sec. *b*), as well as the scholia to this dialogue (sec. *c*). The Latin translation of Ficino and early printed editions (Aldine, Basel, Stephanus) have been collated, and are examined in a separate section (sec. *d*). This review of textual evidence concludes with a brief statement about modern editions of the dialogue and the method of the present edition (sec. *e*). It should be added that R.A. Pack does not list any papyrus discoveries for *Thg.* up to the middle of the 1960's,<sup>8</sup> and I have been unable to trace any finds made since that time.<sup>9</sup>

#### *a. Medieval Manuscripts*<sup>10</sup>

**M** Cesena - *Malatestianus* D 28.4. Date is disputed: Rostagno thought s.xii (Jowett-Campbell II.69, 157), Maas s.xiii or xiv (Dodds 49); s.xiv (or later) seems most likely since for tetr. 1-7 and *Spuria* it is a descendant of Par.1808, which is dated to s.xiii (see Par.1808). Contents:

<sup>7</sup>Note also that in the following discussions corrections by the original scribe are represented by siglum plus superscript c (x<sup>c</sup>); later correctors are represented by superscript numbers, beginning with 2 (x<sup>2</sup>).

<sup>8</sup>*The Greek and Latin Literary Texts from Graeco-Roman Egypt*<sup>2</sup> (Ann Arbor, 1965).

<sup>9</sup>Volume 52 of *The Oxyrhynchus Papyri* (London, 1984) brings up to date all identified Platonic papyri in the holdings of the Egypt Exploration Society (see Preface).

<sup>10</sup>The format generally adhered to in each of the examinations of mss. is as follows: siglum; location of ms.; catalogue name; date (I have usually followed accepted datings of mss.); Platonic contents and position of *Thg.*; previous collations for *Thg.*, with important bibliographical data; and discussion of readings and affiliations of the ms. itself.

tetr.1-7, *Spuria*, 8.1, Timaeus Locrus, 8.3-9.1, *Carm. Aur.*, *R.* Previously uncollated for *Thg.*, but described by Campbell in *JP* 11 (1882) 195-200, who collated it for *R.* That M derives from Par.1808 was first suggested by Schanz (*Platocodex* 104), and subsequently shown to be true for *Grg.* by Dodds (49-51), and for tetr. 4 by Carlini (35). For *Thg.* the following readings are evidential: 124b1 οἶμαι *om.* Par.1808 M; 125a6 κατηγορήκέ Par. 1808 M, κατείρηκέ BTW; 125d7 οἶδ' *om.* Par.1808 M, *s.l. add.* M<sup>c</sup>; 127 d7 αὐτὸν *post* πολίτην *add.* Par.1808 M. Since Par.1808 is earlier than M (see below on Par.1808), it, rather than M, must be the source of these readings. It is doubtful however that M is, as Dodds supposed (49 n.3), a direct copy of Par.1808. Rather, some peculiarities shared by M and Par.1809 (apart from the characteristic Par.1808 readings that they both display) suggest that these two mss. are related; and E. Berti (*Hermes* 97 [1969] 430-1) has proved by M's omission of a full line of Par.1809 in *Cri.* 49c3-5 (no homoeoteleuton) that for that dialogue at least the line of descent is from Par.1809 to M. Though there is no reason to doubt this same derivation for M in the case of *Thg.* as well, the positive evidence is not as extensive as might be desired, and some caution must be exercised in its evaluation. M and Par.1809 share the following errors: 122c2 αἰσθόμεθα M Par.1809 (W), αἰσθώμεθα M<sup>c</sup> Par.1808 BT; 123a7-8 πρὸς ἐμὲ μάχεται τε καὶ *om.* M Par.1809, *add.* M<sup>c</sup>; 127a2 ὅπη M Par.1809 (W), ὅποι Par.1808 BT; 130a4 ὅτ' οὐδ' M Par.1809, ὅτ' οὐδ' M<sup>c</sup> Par.1808 (BTW). It is only fair to say that all these errors could have arisen independently in M and Par.1809 (note homoeoteleuton in the omission in 123a7-8). Moreover, the fact that in three of these four instances the original hand in M supplies the correct reading would induce one to believe that these corrections were made simply by a check of the

exemplar. But the addition of οἷδ' in 125d7 by M<sup>c</sup> (interestingly enough, the same correction is made in Ang.107 and Flor.b) suggests that this and other corrections have taken place against a ms. other than the exemplar. With due reservation I would suggest that M is, in *Thg.* as in *Cri.*, an offspring of Par.1809 (for proof that Par.1809 is not a copy of M, see Par.1809). If, then, M descends from Par.1809, it will be best to assume, as Berti has done with regard to *Cri.*, that it descends *via* an intermediary. The variant στρατείας in 129d8 (*i.m.*) shows that this intermediary had been contaminated with readings from W or B; Berti postulated from evidence for *Cri.* that the intermediary was a member of the W tradition. This assumption of a stage between Par.1809 and M would explain why M can preserve the true reading where Par.1809 goes astray: 122c7 μέντοι M *recte*, μέν τι Par.1809; 126d1 σε M *recte*, γε Par. 1809; and a few other readings preserved in M, but not found in Par.1809, possibly point to this intermediary: 123e10 μουσικῇ M Par.1812 Urb.80 *recte*, μουσικῆς Par. 1809 (BTW); 128c1 ἐθέλη M *et recc. (recte)*, ἐθέλοι Par.1809 (BTW); 130e2 καθήμην M *et recc.*, καθοίμην Par.1809 (BTW); 130e8 παιδευθῆναι M (*sed i.m.* γρ. παιδεύεσθαι), παιδεύεσθαι Par.1809 (BTW). The fact that the variant παιδευθῆναι (130e8) occurs only in M and Urb.80 (both times alongside παιδεύεσθαι) suggests that M's intermediary is in some way related to Urb.80 (which has also been contaminated from W or one of its offspring).

**Flor.a** Florence - *Laurentianus* 59.1. Date: s.xiv; the oldest ms. containing the complete works of Plato (although *Eryx.* is not included). Collated by Stallbaum (a), whose report is highly selective. Flor.a preserves the readings and omissions that are most characteristic of Par.1808: 124b1 οἶμαι *om.* Flor.a Par.1808; 125a6 κατηγορήκέ Flor.a Par.1808;

125d7 οἷδ' *om.* Flor.a Par.1808; 127d7 αὐτὸν *post* πολίτην *add.* Flor.a Par.1808. In fact, Flor.a rarely deviates from Par.1808; there are only three separate errors: 123a6 δὲ *om.* Flor.a; 123b3 ἦ *om.* Flor.a; 123c6-9 ἄνώνυμος...πότερον *om.* Flor.a. On the basis of this evidence, it is probable that for *Thg.* Flor.a is a direct copy of Par.1808; that Flor.a does not preserve quite the same order of dialogues as Par.1808 and includes matter not found in Par.1808 need not cast any serious doubt on this conclusion. Flor.a is in its own turn the parent of the sub-family Flor.c o Ven.189 Pal.175 Fic.

**Flor.b** Florence - *Laurentianus* 85.6. Date: s.xiii according to Post (66) and Wilson (387), but in Dodds' opinion not later than 1355, "and probably not very much earlier" (48). Contains tetr.1-6, *Ion*, *Clit.*, *Tim.*, *Hp. ma.* and *mi.*, *Menex.*, *R.* 1, 2. Collated for *Thg.* by Stallbaum, who did not publish full collations; siglum **b** Stallbaum, **Flor** Dodds. Schanz thought that Flor.b descended from T through Par.1808 (*Platocodex* 56), and Dodds demonstrated that this is true of *Grg.* (48-53). The same derivation can be proved for *Thg.* (note also Par.1808 is older): cf. 124b1 οἶμαι *om.* Flor.b Par.1808; 125a6 κατηγορήκέ Flor.b Par.1808; 125d7 οἷδ' *om.* Flor.b Par.1808, *add. s.l.* Flor.b<sup>c</sup>; 127d7 αὐτὸν γενέσθαι ἀγαθὸν Flor.b, αὐτὸν ἀγαθὸν γενέσθαι Par.1808<sup>c</sup> (αὐτὸν *s.l.*), ἀγαθὸν γενέσθαι BTW. Moreover, Dodds (49) was clearly right when he suggested that Flor.b is an indirect derivative of Par.1808. As a matter of fact, it is probably the case that Flor.b and Neap.337 descend independently from a copy of Par.1808; the evidence for a correspondence between the two, and for the independence of Neap.337 from Flor.b, is gathered below (see on Neap.337). Likewise, there is evidence to show that Flor.b is not a copy of Neap.337, for it sometimes preserves a true reading against Neap.337:



125e8 μὲν Flor.b, *om.* Neap.337; 126a1 μάλιστα μὲν πάντων ἀνθρώπων Flor.b (*recte*), πάντων μὲν ἀνθρώπων μάλιστα Neap.337; 128c3 ἐπειδὴ Flor.b (*recte*), ἐπεὶ Neap.337; cf. also 123b3 ἐπεθύμεις Flor.b Coisl.155 (*recte*), ἐπιθυμεῖς *ceff.*; 125d11 ἐπίστασθαι Flor.b (*recte*), ἐπιστήσασθαι Neap.337; 126e4 ἀτιμάζοι Flor.b (*recte*), -ει Neap.337; 127a2 σοι Flor.b (*recte*), σε Neap.337; 127a9 μοι Flor.b (*recte*), μὴ Neap.337; 128b1 οὐδὲν Flor.b (*recte*), οὐδὲ Neap.337.

**Flor.c** Florence - *Laurentianus* 85.9. Date s.xv, one of only three extant complete Plato mss. (the others are Flor.a and Ven.184); the contents are arranged in the order tetr.1-7, *Spuria*, and the remainder in a slightly disrupted order. Collated by Stallbaum: siglum **c**. Flor.c descends from Flor.a (see Hiller, *Hermes* 10 [1876] 173; Schanz, *Platocodex* 60f., 95). It contains the characteristic readings of Par.1808 preserved in Flor.a (see above on Flor.a), as well as the omissions attributable to Flor.a at 123a6 δὴ, and at 123c6 ἀνώνυμος...c9 πρότερον; at 123b3, where Flor.a omits ᾧ, Flor.c prints ᾧ, but omits οἱ which follows that word in our texts (itacism?). Apart from this, it adds a number of errors, e.g. 122b3 ἥτις Flor.c, ἥτισοῦν Flor.a; 124d3 τούτων ἡγῆ Flor.c, ἡγῆ τούτων Flor.a; 127d3 μάλιστα σοι Flor.c, μάλιστ' ἄν σοι Flor.a; 130d3 ἔφη ἑρῶ Flor.c, ἑρῶ ἔφη Flor.a; but it corrects Flor.a at 121d5 in a trivial reading (αὐτῶν Flor.a, αὐτὸν Flor.c), and its omission of τι at 128b8 represents, I think, the true reading (see comm. *ad loc.*). It is almost certainly a direct copy of Flor.a, and is the source of Ven.189 (see below).

**Flor.i** Florence - *Laurentianus Conv. Sopp.* 54. Date s.xiv; contains Alb. *Eisag.*, tetr.1-3, 4.1, 5.2 (138a1-139d2 missing) -4, *Thg.* up to 122e6 ὧσιν. Collated by Stallbaum (siglum **i**), who wrongly continues to attribute a couple of readings to it after 122e6 (unless more of the ms. was ex-

tant when he collated it). The folio leaves which contain *Thg.* have been heavily damaged, and at various places it is impossible to determine (at least from microfilm) what the scribe has written. Post (67) suggests a connection with Flor.b, but from the limited evidence which I have this can hardly be confirmed. Flor.i agrees with T in two trivial instances, 121c2 τὰ ἄλλα Flor.i T, τὰ ἅλλα BW; 122a1 τούτων Flor.i T, τοῦτον BW. Conversely, it agrees with W at 121d5 αὐτὸν Flor.i W, αὐτῶν BT; and with BW at 122a1 μέλει, μέλλει T; again these are minor agreements. At 122c2 Flor.i *may* read συνηθείας, which would associate it closely with W, but I cannot be certain. However, although there are no other indications of affiliation for the portion of this ms. containing *Thg.*, J.A. Philip (*Phoenix* 22 [1968] 291) has made it probable that Flor.i descends from W for *Sph.*, so the same line may possibly be traced for *Thg.* as well.

**Flor.o** Florence - *Laurentianus Conv. Sopp.* 180. Date: s.xv; contains Ti. Locr., *Ti.*, tetr.4-6, 8.4, 9, *Epigr.* Collated by Stallbaum: siglum **o**. The general opinion about Flor.o, that it is a copy of Flor.a (see Schanz, *Platocodex* 60-1; Post 38), is certainly true of *Thg.* It reproduces the characteristic readings of Par.1808, from which Flor.a descends (see on Flor.a), as well as the three omissions of Flor.a: 123a6 δὴ *om.* Flor.a o; 123b3 ἦ *om.* Flor.a o; 123c6 ἀνώνυμος...c9 πότερον *om.* Flor.a o. Flor.o also introduces some of its own omissions and disjunctive readings, e.g., 121b7-c1 καὶ δύσκολος *post* γίγνεται *transp.* Flor.o; 122b4 βουλευή Flor.o (Ven.186 184), συμβουλευή *cett.*; 125a5 τε *om.* Flor.o; 127c6 ἤδη *om.* Flor.o; 127c8 δέοι Flor.o (M), δέη *cett.*; 130b4 ἀκούω *post* Σώκρατες *transp.* Flor.o (Par.1811). The three errors above which are shared by other secondary mss. are likely coincidental.

**Voss. Gr.54** Leiden - *Vossianus Graecus* 54. Date: s.xv-xvi. Contains excerpts from numerous dialogues, but for *Thg.* only the proverb in 122b2-3 is quoted, in the adapted form ἱερὸν συμβουλὴ χρῆμα λέγεται εἶναι; a very abbreviated version of the scholion to this passage is also included. As this abbreviated scholion is found only in T and its descendants, and the second title περὶ σοφίας which is given here is the reading in T (περὶ σωφροσύνης BW), Voss.Gr.54 may perhaps go back to some offspring of T.

**R.M. 16 C 25.A** London - *Royal Manuscripts* 16 C 25.A. Date: s.xvi. Contains small excerpts from 25 Platonic works; of *Thg.* only 121b1 πάντα - c1 ἀνθρώπων was copied. It cites *Thg.* as περὶ σοφίας, the subtitle preserved in T alone; otherwise there are no indications of its source, and no new readings of note (but see following ms.).

**Madr.1.36** Madrid - *Plut.* 1.36. Date: 1480, in the hand of Constantine Lascaris (see Wilson 388). As far as I can tell, the selections from Plato in this ms. are identical to those in R.M. 16 C 25.A. The *Thg.* selection is the same (121b1-c1), and both here and in the London ms. we find καλὴ *pro* πολλῇ in b7. The two mss. are obviously related (this ms. may be the source of the preceding one), and it would appear that we are dealing here with a recension of a Renaissance anthology.

**Escor.** Madrid - *Escorialensis* Υ.Ι.13. Date: s.xiii. It has previously been collated for tetr.4 (Carlini), 1.2 (see W.S.M. Nicoll, *CQ* n.s.16 [1966] 76-7), and 2.2 (see W. Hicken, *CQ* n.s.17 [1967] 98-102), but not for *Thg.*; nor have I been able, despite repeated attempts, to obtain reproductions for the part of the ms. which contains *Thg.* It seems likely, however, that Escor. is the ultimate source of the gemelli Par.1811 and Par.1812 (*q.v.*); see Nicoll, *Gnomon* 37 (1965) 755 n.4.

**Ambros.329** Milan - *Ambrosianus* 329 (F.19 Sup.). Date: s.xv, with the signature and in the hand of Marsilio Ficino. Contains excerpts of many Platonic dialogues in a very jumbled order, along with some extraneous matter; *Thg.*, of which 128d2-130e7 was copied (the divine sign section; not surprisingly, considering Ficino's demonological interests), is sandwiched between *Smp.* and *Ion*. The ms. has not been collated for any dialogue, but Post (71) suggested a possible connection with *Flor.c.* I can find no substantiating evidence for this. In fact, for *Thg.* Ambros.329 does not seem to be specifically related to any extant ms., except for T, with which it is clearly affiliated: cf. 129d8 πραγματείας Ambros.329 T, στρατείας BW (*et i.m.* Ambros.329); 130c5 αἴσθωμαι Ambros.329 *i.m.* γρ. T, αἰσθάνωμαι W, αἰσθάνομαι BT; 130d4 μὲν *om.* Ambros. 329 T; they also share the reading πρὸς με at 129b4 (πρὸς ἐμέ BW). The marginal variant στρατείας reveals, however, that Ficino either was using a contaminated copy of T (perhaps cf. also προύλιπεν Ambros.329 W, προύλειπεν BT), had access to a copy of B or W, or, in any case, to a ms. with B or W readings. Ficino evidently found obtrusive the collocation ἐπὶ...ἐπὶ at 129d4 (see also comm. *ad loc.*), for in Ambros.329 we encounter the senseless, but apparently deliberate, ἐπεὶ γὰρ τι ἐπὶ στρατείαν ἐξορμήσαν νίωνος, and in his Latin translation (see below, Fic.) he offers *In expeditionem namque exiit Neonus* (ἐπεὶ γὰρ τῇ ἐπὶ στρατείαν ἐξορμῇ Σαννίωνος *cett.*).

**Ambros.409** Milan - *Ambrosianus* 409 (G.69 Sup.). Date: s.xv, written in the hand of John Docianus (see M. Vogel, V. Garthausen, *Die griechischen Schreiber des Mittelalters und der Renaissance in Beihefte zum Zentralblatt für Bibliothekswesen* 33 [1909] 169f.); Post (71) and Wilson (388), who list the contents as tetr.1, *Thg.*, conflict with Brumbaugh-

Wells (45), who catalogue only *Phd.*, *Thg.* Previously uncollated. Ambros. 409 clearly derives from T, cf. 123a7 ἔτι καὶ ἕτερα Ambros.409 T, ἕτερα W *et i.m. vet.b.*, ἔτι B; 124a6 τῶν τρυγόντων Ambros.409 T<sup>c</sup>, τρυγόντων BTW; 129d8 πραγματείας Ambros.409 T, στρατείας BW; 130d4 μὲν *om.* Ambros.409 T. It shares a few readings with Par.1812 (and some other mss.): 124d2 τοῦτον Ambros.409 Par.1812 Urb.80, τούτων *cett.*; 126d3 οἱ *om.* Ambros.409 Par.1812, *s.l. add.* Par.1812<sup>c</sup>; 126d4 ἔσεσθαι Ambros.409 Par.1812 1811 Lobc. Ven.1029 (οἴεσθαι *i.m.* Par.1812, αἱ *et θ s.l. add.* 1811); 128d7 ἡμῖν Ambros.409 Par.1812, ὑμῖν *cett.*; 129d6 εἶη Ambros.409 Par.1812, ἴοι *cett. et s.l.* Ambros.409. Any connection, however, must be incidental, since Ambros. 409 does not descend from T *via* Par.1808, as Par.1812 does (see below), and while the possibility that some horizontal contamination has occurred in these two mss. from sources which possessed common readings or variants cannot be excluded, I would suggest that Ambros.409 is not closely related to any extant ms. of *Thg.*, except for T itself. The evidence for possible contamination from W or B is extremely meagre: 121d5 αὐτὸν Ambros.409 W *recte*, αὐτῶν BT; 122a1 μέλει Ambros.409 BW *recte*, μέλλει T; 122a1 τοῦτον Ambros.409 B<sup>c</sup>W *recte*, τούτων T; 130c2 ἀνθρώπῳ Ambros.409 B, ἀνθρώπων TW *recte*; 130c5 αἰσθάνωμαι Ambros.409 W, αἰσθάνομαι BT. Only 130c2 appears at all suggestive.

**Neap.91** Naples - *Neapolitanus* 91 (Il.C.32). Date: s.xv. Contains only excerpts of dialogues; for *Thg.*, 121c3-5 (φοβῶ), 122a2, 122d6-7, 125e8-126a3, and 126d1-7. Like TW it preserves ἡ δὲ at 121c4 (ἡ *om.* B), but, other than the second title περὶ σοφίας (T), there are no other signs of affiliation. The fact that it omits μὲν at 125e8 with Ven.184 186 Vat.1029

(*sed i.m. add.*) *et* Vat.2218 merely shows that the mistake was a very easy one to make.

**Neap.337** Naples - *Neapolitanus* 337 (III.E.15). Date: s.xiii; contains tetr.1-6. Uncollated for *Thg.*, though Post suspected a connection with Flor.b. Like Flor.b it preserves the characteristic readings of Par.1808 at 124b1, 125a6, 125d7, and 127d7; in the latter instance it inverts the word order as Flor.b had done: αὐτὸν γενέσθαι ἀγαθὸν Neap.337 Flor.b, αὐτὸν ἀγαθὸν γενέσθαι Par.1808 (ἀγαθὸν γενέσθαι BTW). But there are many other correspondences apart from this one: e.g., 122b3 σύμβουλον Neap.337 Flor.b, συμβουλή *cett.*; 122e9 ἐνταῦθα Neap. 337 Flor.b, ἐνθάδε *cett.*; 123b6 ὃν Neap.337 Flor.b, ὦν BTW; 125d13 καὶ σὺ *post* συνουσίας *transp.* Neap.337 Flor.b; 126d5 ἂν *om.* Neap. 337 Flor.b; 126e1 ἀγαθὸς ἐπιθυμεῖν Neap.337 Flor.b, ἐπιθυμεῖν ἀγαθὸς *cett.*; 128e5 μοι *post* δαιμονίου *transp.* Neap.337 Flor.b; 129 a7 μὲν Neap.337 Flor.b, μέντοι *cett.*; 130d7 πολὺ μᾶλλον *post* ὦν (d8) *transp.* Neap.337 Flor.b. Taken together, these readings prove that Post's hypothesis was right; but full comparison of the two should allow us to take this further. There are two main reasons why Neap.337 cannot be a copy of Flor.b. First, Neap.337 preserves the full set of *sch. vet.*, none of which are in Flor.b. Second, Neap.337 sometimes preserves the truth against Flor.b: 124d6 ἄρξαντα Neap.337, κατάρξαντα Flor.b; 126b4 αὖ Neap.337, αὖθις Flor.b; 127b5 καὶ μέντοι καὶ Neap.337, καὶ μέντοι Flor.b. In addition, Neap.337 is probably the older of the two. Yet neither is Flor.b likely to be a copy of Neap.337 (see above on Flor.b). It appears therefore that the two mss. are gemelli, descending from a lost copy of Par.1808.

**B** Oxford - *Clarkianus* 39. Date: s.ix (895), written by John the Calligrapher for Arethas; contains tetr.1-6 in tetralogical order. Collated by Bekker, Burnet, and most fully by Schanz. Being the oldest extant ms. containing *Thg.* (Par.1807 [A] is slightly older, but contains only tetr. 7-8, *Epigr.*, *Spuria*), B is *a priori* a primary witness. The following is a sample of readings which are peculiar to B and its derivatives: 121c4-5 γέγονε [νευ *a.c.*] δὲ τροφῇ B, γέγονεν, ἡ δὲ τροφῇ TW; 123a7 ἔτι B (ἔτε—ρα *i.m. vet.b.*), ἕτερα W, ἔτι καὶ ἕτερα T; 127c6 ὡς *om.* B (*i.m. add. b.*); 127e6 ὅτι χρῶο, τι (*sic*); 129d7 γελαῖν (*i.e.* γ' ἐλαῖν) B, ἐλαῖν TW; 130a4 ἔμαθεν B, ἔπαθεν TW. Once in B, where an uncial error is probably to be detected, the restored reading will be seen to agree in truth with an indirect witness: 127d6 τέ τ' ἦν B, τε εἴην Priscianus; the variant readings at 130e8 (οἷ T *recte*, ὅτ' B, ἃ τ' W) may also represent the confusion of uncial characters.

Since the main departure of the present edition from earlier editions consists in my report of B, it will be well to set forth in some detail where the differences lie. Most importantly, past editions have failed to distinguish the correcting hands of this ms. Schanz's collation, which is notable for its detail, relegates all corrections and variants to the siglum "b," regardless of the age or source. Burnet explicitly set out to rectify this obvious deficiency (see *Praef.* to OCT III), yet numerous errors persist in his apparatus. Souilhé drew upon Burnet for his report of B, but only succeeded in obscuring matters further by identifying all corrections and variants with the siglum "B<sup>2</sup>". Yet it is misleading to classify all early editorial activity under the same siglum. In B the original hand has been responsible for the addition of interlinear and marginal variants, for corrections *in textu* which are made by erasure or over an existing reading, and for changes, add-

itions, and deletions of breathings and accents. The work of this hand must be carefully distinguished from that of the second, contemporary correcting hand (generally believed to be that of Arethas himself; see Dodds 36 and n.2), as the above editors have failed to do on a systematic basis. In the apparatus therefore I have designated the changes made by the original scribe with the siglum B<sup>c</sup>, while Burnet's B<sup>2</sup> is reserved exclusively for the activity of the second hand (evidence of which is actually rare in this dialogue). Detailed collation has also shown that, while Burnet alone has made the effort to distinguish early and later hands, he does err occasionally; for example, although he recognizes the presence of a hand from s.x-xi and designates it as "vet.b" (for this hand [rare in B], see Greene, *Scholia Platonica* xv), nevertheless he fails to attribute the marginal variant ἑτέρα in 123a7 to it, as he clearly should have done; vet.b was also responsible for ἄν s.l. in 130c2, and not B<sup>2</sup>, as Burnet believed; the hand which squeezed in δ' at 128d5 was B<sup>c</sup>, I think, rather than b; and the alteration of final αι to ε (*recte*) in 129a1 βούλεσθαι was made by b, not B<sup>2</sup>. Other places where Burnet's report is misleading have been tacitly corrected in the present apparatus. And even though Burnet's report of B was necessarily restricted, it is to be regretted that it is not more complete, for Schanz's collations do not supplement it fully. I have therefore sought to document the evidence of B in as much detail as possible.

Burnet remarked (CQ 8 [1914] 231-2; cf. Alline 238-41) that the correcting hand B<sup>2</sup> usually adjusts the text to conform with W; and he concluded that B<sup>2</sup> had a congener of W before him. Since B<sup>2</sup> is responsible for only two readings of any substance in *Thg.*, there can be no confirmation of this theory; but the evidence is suggestive. At the beginning of the dialogue B<sup>2</sup> has supplied the (obviously false) subtitle περὶ σωφρο-



σύνης, which happens also to be the reading of W; and in 130e1 B and T have δῆ, but B<sup>2</sup> has added δὲ *s.l.*, the reading of W. Conversely, I see no evidence in B<sup>c</sup> for a close affiliation with W; where B<sup>c</sup> either emends the text of *Thg.*, adds a variant, or makes good an omission, the result is usually agreement with both T and W; only in 129d5 does B<sup>c</sup> alone offer the true reading, where τὸ is added *s.l.* There is no proof, for *Thg.* at least, that B<sup>c</sup> is the product of anything but a check of the exemplar of B.

Later hands in B, however, sometimes display a connection with W: 123a7 ἕτερα W *et i.m. vet.b*; 125e3 ἐν τῇ W, καὶ τῇ BT, *sed ἐν s.l. add. b*; and at times (admittedly minor instances) b preserves, along with other *recentiores*, a true reading against BTW: 123d13 οὐχ αὕτη b, οὐκ αὐτὴ BTW; 125a6 βουλευόμεθα b, ὀμέθα BTW. However, it would be rash to ascribe any independent authority to the later correcting hands of B, although each case, perhaps, should be decided on its own merits.

Despite the age and importance of this ms., for *Thg.* it is the ancestor of only Vat.226 and Urb.32 (Dodds 37 offers an explanation for this lack of influence on the Platonic mss. tradition).

**Par.1808** Paris - *Parisinus Graecus* 1808. Date: s.xiii, containing tetr.1-7, *Spuria*, *Carm. Aur.*, *Ti. Locr.* (as far as 103c7). Post has argued (53) that all mss. which arrange their dialogues in the order tetr.1-7 + *Spuria* derive from Par.1808 since that order is first encountered in this ms. Collated by Bekker, and by Dodds for *Grg.*: sigla **B** Bekker, **Par** Dodds. Schanz (*Platocodex* 47-52) demonstrated for a series of dialogues (not *Thg.*) that Par.1808 descends from T. That such a pedigree is true of *Thg.* as well is beyond any reasonable doubt. Par.1808 preserves the most characteristic readings and omissions of T: 123a7 ἔτι καὶ ἕτερα Par. 1808 T; 124a6 τῶν τρυγώντων Par.1808 T<sup>c</sup>; 129d8 πραγματείας

Par.1808 T; 130c5 αἴσθωμαι Par.1808 *ex* αἰσθάνομαι (BTW), αἴσθωμαι *i.m.* γρ. Par.1808 T; 130d4 μὲν *om.* Par.1808 T. The discrepancies between the two are moreover few enough to encourage the supposition that Par.1808 is a direct copy of T (*pace* Schanz, *Platocodex* 52). Where Par.1808 diverges, it does so in simple matters, or by apparently deliberate effort: e.g., 122a1 μέλει *fec.* Par.1808 (BW) *ex* μέλλει (T); 122a1 τοῦτον *fec.* Par.1808 (BW) *ex* τούτων (T); 124b1 οἶμαι *om.* Par.1808; 125 a6 κατείρηκέ BTW, κατηγόρηκέ Par.1808; 125d7 οἶδ' *om.* Par.1808; 130c7 προύλειπεν BT, προύλιπεν W Par.1808.

The scribe corrected his work in the process of transcription (e.g. 122a1 above), and, apparently at a somewhat later stage, made a few other very minor changes in the original text (Par.1808<sup>c</sup>; these are distinguished by a lighter ink): 123e3 ἦ Par.1808 (BTW), ἦ Par.1808<sup>c</sup>; 124c2 ἄρα *ex* αρα Par.1808<sup>c</sup>; 127d7 αὐτὸν *s.l. post* πολίτην *add.* Par.1808<sup>c</sup>; 130c2 τ' ἦ Par.1808, τ' ἦν BW Par.1808<sup>c</sup>. I have not been able to substantiate Bluck's suspicions (in his edition of *Men.* [141 n.2]) that the particular correcting hand of Par.1808 which is so active in certain dialogues (e.g. *Grg.*, see Dodds 50-1) has also been at work in *Thg.* (nor do I see definite evidence of any hand but the first), though the scribe who altered αἰσθάνομαι to αἴσθωμαι at 130c5 may be this elusive scholar.

For the influence of Par.1808 on the ms. tradition of *Thg.* (a majority of the mss. of this dialogue descends from Par.1808), see the *stemma codicum* below.

**Par.1809** Paris - *Parisinus Graecus* 1809. Date: s.xv, containing tetr.1-7, *Spuria*, Ti. Locr., *Carm. Aur.*, and in a later hand *Clit.* (to 408d3). Collated for *Thg.* by Bekker: siglum C. Schanz was the first to indicate derivation of Par.1809 from Par.1808 (*Platocodex* 53-6, 73-7; *Hermes* 11

[1876] 109f.); this line of descent is true of *Thg.*, as Par.1809 preserves the characteristic readings and omissions of Par.1808 for this dialogue (*q.v.*). Evidence for the proposition that M derives from Par.1809 has already been given above on M. But, whatever the explanation for the similarities between the two mss., the following render it at least doubtful that Par.1809 could be a copy of M: 122e3 ὅστις σε Par.1809, ὅστισε (*sic*) M; 126a8 οἱ ἐν τῇ Par.1809 *recte*, ἐν τῇ M; 126c3 ἐπεὶ δὲ δὴ Par.1809 *recte*, ἐπειδὴ δὲ δὴ M (W); 131a5 αὐτὸ Par.1809 *recte*, αὐτοὶ M; cf. also 123e10 μουσικῆς Par.1809 (BTW), μουσικὴ M *recte*.

**Par.1811** Paris - *Parisinus Graecus* 1811. Date: s.xiv; contains tetr. 2-5.2, 6.3-4, 7, 1, 5.3-6.2. Collated by Bekker: siglum E. Par.1811, like Par.1812, of which it is a gemellus (both preserve the same curious order of contents; see further on Par.1812), derives from Par.1808: cf. 121b4 οἶμαι *om.* Par.1808 1811; 125a6 κατηγορήσέ Par.1811, κατηγορήκέ Par.1808, κατείρηκέ BTW; 125d7 οἶδ' *om.* Par.1808 1811. That Par.1811 is not a copy of Par.1812 is illustrated from the following: 122e3 σε Par.1811 *recte*, *om.* Par.1812; 122e9 ἄπερ Par.1811 *recte*, ὥσπερ Par.1812; 127a9 εἶ Par.1811 *recte*, *om.* Par.1812; 127e4 οὐδενὸς Par.1811 *recte*, οὐδέν Par.1812; 128a3 τε Par.1811 *recte*, *om.* Par.1812. The primary interest of Par.1811 is that it was the main source for the Aldine edition of Plato (at least for *Thg.*); see below on Ald.

**Par.1812** Paris - *Parisinus Graecus* 1812. Date: s.xiv; contains tetr. 2-5.2, 6.3-4, 7, 1, 5.3-6.2. Collated by Bekker: siglum F. Three readings indicate derivation from Par.1808: 124b1 οἶμαι *om.* Par.1808 1812; 125a6 κατηγορήσέ Par.1812, κατηγορήκέ Par.1808, κατείρηκέ BTW; 125d7 οἶδ' *om.* Par.1808 1812, *s.l. add.* Par.1812<sup>2</sup>. The ms. exhibits numerous other omissions and errors (some corrected by the scribe, others

by a later hand [Par.1812<sup>2</sup>]), and it is impossible to narrow down its parentage any further. It is certainly not a direct copy of Par.1808. In fact, it and Par.1811 are closely related: they both preserve the same contents, in the same curious order, and share the following conjunctive readings and omissions: 122c2 αἰσθόμεθα Par.1812 1811 (W), αἰσθώμεθα *cett.*; 122e9 παιδεύονται Par.1812 1811, πεπαίδευνται BTW; 123b6 σοφώτερος Par.1812 1811, σοφὸς BTW; 123c2 ἂν Par.1812 1811, αὖ BTW; 123e2 *et* 3 ἧ, *sed* ἧ *s.l.* Par.1812 1811; 124a8 ἀρχόμεθα Par.1812 1811, ἄρχομεν BTW; 125d9 σὺ *om.* Par.1812 1811, *s.l. add.* Par.1812; 126b9 ἂν *om.* Par.1812 1811; 126d4 ἔσεσθαι Par.1812 1811, οἴεσθαι *i.m.* Par.1812, αἰ *et* θ *s.l.* Par.1811, αἰσθέσθαι BTW; 127b7 σε *om.* Par.1812 1811, *s.l. add.* Par.1812; 128c2 ἐμῶν *om.* Par.1812 1811; 129b6 τύχη Par.1812 1811, τύχῳ BTW; 130b2 με οὖν Par.1812 1811, οὖν με BTW. The dates of the two mss. cannot be used to lend support to a hypothesis of the derivation of one from the other (they are both placed in s.xiv), but at all events Par.1812 is unlikely to be a copy of Par.1811. The following is a sample of disjunctive readings: 121c5 δεδιότι Par.1812 *recte*, διότι Par.1811; 121c8 δὴ Par.1812 *recte*, *om.* 1811; 123c6 δὴ Par. 1812 *recte*, *om.* Par.1811; 124b3 μὲν Par.1812 *recte*, *om.* Par.1811; 126a8 *alt.* οἱ Par.1812 *recte*, *om.* Par.1811. On the independence of Par.1811 from Par.1812, see above on Par.1811. My conclusion must be that Par.1812 and 1811 are gemelli (see also Schanz, *Philol.* 35 [1876] 664f.); collation of Escor. (see above) could well indicate that it is the parent of these two. Par.1812 further shows some affinities with W, but in small matters: 121d5 αὐτὸν W Par.1812 *recte*, αὐτῶν BT; 122a1 μέλει Par.1812 BW *recte*, μέλλει T; 122a1 μακρὸν Par.1812 W, μικρὸν BT *et* γρ. *i.m.* Par.1812<sup>2</sup> *recte*; 130c5 αἰσθάνωμαι Par.1812 W, αἰσθάν-

ομαι BT; 130c7 προύλιπεν Par.1812 W, προυλείπεν BT. Without exception these correspondences can, I think, be ascribed to coincidence.

**Coisl.155** Paris - *Coislinianus* 155. Date s.xiv; contains tetr.1-8.1. Collated by Bekker: siglum Γ. Schanz established the dependence of Coisl.155 on T (*RhMus* 32 [1877] 483-4; *Platocodex* 40-3), and for *Thg.* this can be proved by its sharing the most characteristic readings of T (*q.v.*). Coisl.155 is of interest primarily for the numerous readings, marginal and interlinear variants, and corrections (all apparently by the original hand), which it introduces into the text. The following have a claim to consideration as good, or at least, in varying degrees, plausible readings: 122d2 ὀρθότερον Coisl.155, ὀρθότατον *cett.*; 123b3 ἐπιθυμεῖς Coisl.155 BTW, ἐπεθύμεις Coisl.155<sup>c</sup> Flor.b; 123b6 συνιστάναι Coisl.155 BTW, συστήσαι Coisl.155<sup>c</sup>; 125a1 ἔπεμψεν Coisl.155, ἔπεμπεν *cett.*; 125a7 ἔστιν οἷ Coisl.155 BTW, ἐς τίνα Coisl.155<sup>c</sup>, ἐς τίνος *edd.*; 125b3 καὶ *ante* διαπυθώμεθα *add.* Coisl.155; 126d6 μηδένα Coisl.155, μηδέν *cett.*; 127a6 ἀνθρώποις *om.* Coisl.155; 129a2 ἔρεσθαι Coisl.155 BTW, ἔρεσθε Coisl.155<sup>c</sup>, ε *s.l. add.* W; 130c2 τ' ἦ Coisl.155 Par.1808 ( *et recc.*); 131a8 ἀντείποις Coisl.155, ἀντείπης *cett.* But that Coisl.155 preserves traces of a second witness independent of T can be excluded absolutely: not only are some of the above readings inferior to the general testimony of our tradition (esp. 125a1, 125b3, 126d6, 131a8), but the others could easily be supplied with a little good sense on the part of the scribe or a corrector (esp. 123b3, 129a2). Moreover, Coisl.155 sometimes presents readings which are manifestly false, e.g., 122d7 προσαγορεύσαιμεν; 122d9 ἦ (*sic*) *ante* τὸ *add.*; 127e3 καὶ *post* τε *add.*; 128c8 καὶ *om.* Quite clearly this is all the work of an active (and occasionally

ingenious) Byzantine scholar, and nothing more. The descent of Coisl.155 from T may be indirect, as Schanz supposed (*Platocodex* 43).

**Lobc.** Prague - *Radnice* VI F.a.1 (*Lobcovicianus*). Date: s.xiv, contents identical to W (for a facsimile page see E. Gollob, *SB Wien* 146.7 [1903] 109). Collated by Schneider for *R.*, for which Lobc. is said to be a direct copy of W (see Schanz, *Platocodex* 62, 100f.; Alline 237; Post 32), but uncollated for *Thg.* It is beyond doubt that Lobc. descends from W for *Thg.* as well, for it preserves the significant readings, omissions, and transpositions that appear in W, but not in BT: e.g., 122b1 συμβουλευέσθαι *post* χρή *add.* Lobc. W; 122c2 συνηθείας Lobc. W, συνουσίας BT (*recte*); 122c8 τι *om.* Lobc. W; 122e10 γράμμα Lobc. W, γράμματά BT; 123a4 καὶ *om.* Lobc. W; 123a5-6 αὐτῷ ἐγὼ Lobc. W, ἐγὼ αὐτῷ BT; 125e3 ἐν Lobc. W, καὶ BT; 126d5 προδοῦναι Lobc. W, παραδοῦναι BT (*recte*); 128a5 τούτους *om.* Lobc. W; 130e8 οἷ τ' W Lobc., οἷ T (*recte*), ὅτ' B; at both the beginning and end of the dialogue the subtitle περὶ σοφίας has been made *i.r.* from an original περὶ σωφροσύνης (so W and B). Lobc. adds many of its own errors in addition, e.g., 124a1 ἔμοιγε...124a2 πόλει *om.*; 126d2 τούτων *om.*; 128e7 τρόπον Lobc., χρόνον BTW; 129e9 καὶ...130a3 ἐπιδιδόασιν *om.* Lobc. is closely related to Vat.1029, and more will be said about the precise relationship of Lobc. to W when we come to that ms. But it should be stated that Lobc. can hardly be a copy of Vat.1029, as a selection of evidence shows: 121b7 χαλεπὴ καὶ δύσκολος Lobc. (*recte*), δύσκολος καὶ χαλεπὴ Vat. 1029; 121c3 εἴτε φυτεῖαν εἴτε παιδοποιῖαν δεῖ αὐτὴν Lobc. (*recte*), εἴτε φυτεῖαν χρή εἴτε παιδοποιῖαν αὐτὴν Vat.1029; 124e1 οὕτω πειρῶ Lobc. (*recte*), πειρῶ οὕτω Vat.1029; 128e1 ἐτύγχανε Lobc. (*recte*), ἀναχανεν (*sic*) Vat.1029; 129c2-3 αὐτὸν ἠνάγκασα

Lobc. (*recte*), ἡνάγκασα αὐτὸν Vat.1029; 130d4 μὲν Lobc. (*recte*), *om.* Vat.1029.

**Ang.107** Rome - *Angelicanus Graecus* 107 (*olim* Ang. C.1.4). Date: s.xiv; contains tetr.1-7, *Spuria*, *Car. Aur.*, Ti. Locr. Collated by Bekker: siglum *u*. Post's assertion (55) that Ang.107 derives from Par.1808 is proved for *Thg.* by full collation of the two mss. Ang.107 follows Par.1808 in the following places: 124b1 οἶμαι *om.* Ang.107 Par.1808; 125a6 κατηγορήκέ Ang.107 Par.1808; 125d7 οἶδ' *om.* Ang. 107 Par.1808, *s.l. add.* Ang. 107<sup>2</sup> (a later hand). The scribe has corrected Ang.107 to conform with Par. 1808 at 122a1 τούτων Ang.107 *et* Par.1808, τούτον (*sic*) *i.r. fec.* Ang. 107, τοῦτον Par.1808<sup>c</sup>; while Ang.107<sup>2</sup> has brought it still further into line with corrections and additions in Par.1808: 123e3 ἡ Ang.107 Par.1808, ἡ Ang.107<sup>2</sup> Par.1808<sup>c</sup>; 124c2 ἄρα Ang.107, ἀρα Par.1808, ἄρα Ang.107<sup>2</sup> Par.1808<sup>c</sup>; 127d7 αὐτὸν *post* πολίτην *s.l. add.* Par.1808<sup>c</sup> Ang.107<sup>2</sup>; 130c2 τ' ἡ Ang.107 Par.1808, τ' ἦν Ang.107<sup>2</sup> Par.1808<sup>c</sup>. But the ms. against which Ang.107 was corrected was not Par.1808 itself after correction, as the following indicate: 125a6 βουλευόμεθα Ang.107 Par.1808, ὠμέθα Ang.107<sup>2</sup>; 125d7 οἶδ' *s.l. add.* Ang.107<sup>2</sup>; 128b8 τε *eras.* Ang.107<sup>2</sup> (see comm. *ad loc.*). The later correcting hand has also supplied readings at various points where trivial errors have been made by the original scribe. Ang.107 is characterized by several simple omissions, e.g., of συ 122b7, καὶ σὺ 125d13, τῶν 125e6, καὶ *post* πολλοῖς 126 b10, καὶ 130a1; but I can find no compelling evidence to suggest that it is not a direct copy of Par.1808 (so also Carlini [39-41] for tetr. 4).

**Vat.113** Vatican - *Vaticanus Graecus* 113. Catalogue gives s.xiii-xiv as the date. Only 121a1-122c6 (οὕτω) is preserved. With TW it has ἡ δὲ in 121c4; with BW it has μέλει and τοῦτον (B<sup>c</sup>) in 122a1; and with BT

it has αὐτῶν in 121d5. Clearly this is not sufficient evidence to base any conclusion upon, although συνουσίας in 122c2 strongly suggests that W (which reads συνηθείας) or one of its offspring was not the source.

**Vat.226** Vatican - *Vaticanus Graecus* 226. The date of this ms. is uncertain because of the apparently archaizing hand in which it is written. Its catalogue date is s.xii, but Post (56-7) put it possibly in s.xiv, and not prior to s.xiii, while Schanz thought s.xv (*Philol.* 35 [1876] 649). Collated by Bekker (siglum Θ). Vat.226 and Vat.225 (Bekker Δ, same hand) together form a two-volume Plato (complete except for *Epp.* and tetr.9); Vat. 226 contains tetr.5-6.2, 8.3, 7, *Spuria*, tetr.8.1-2. Schanz (*ib.* 645ff.) derived Vat.226 (as well as tetr.6.4 and tetr.2-4 in Vat.225) from B; and that B is the immediate ancestor of Vat.226 for *Thg.* is beyond doubt. Vat.226 omits 123c9 -σθα...c11 ὄνομα ἔγωγε, a full line in B (no homoeoteleuton). Moreover, it follows B in many small details, often in manifest error (following also B<sup>c</sup> corrections), e.g., 121c4 γέγονε δὲ B Vat.226, γέγονεν, ἡ δὲ TW; 123a7 ἔτι B Vat.226, ἕτερα W (*i.m. vet.b*), ἔτι καὶ ἕτερα T; 125c4 ἡρώμεθα B Vat.226, -ομεθα TW *et b*; 125d6 ποῖα ἂν B Vat.226, ποῖα ἂν TW; 126e6 ὅτι χρῶ ὅτι (*sic*) B, ὅτι χρῶ ὅτι Vat. 226, ὅτι χρῶ TW; 127b1 λέγεις *om.* B Vat.226; 127c6 ὡς *om.* B Vat.226; 128e2 νεμαίαν B Vat.226, νεμέαν TW; 129a5 ταῦτα B Vat. 226, ταυτί TW; 129d7 γελᾶν B Vat.226, ἐλᾶν TW; 130a4 ἔμαθεν B Vat.226, ἔπαθεν TW; 130e6 ὅτ' B Vat.226, οἷ T, οἷ τ' W. It is most likely the original hand which is responsible for the minor changes in 121a2 κἄν εἰ Vat.226, κἄν ἦ Vat.226<sup>c</sup> Vat.1030 Ald.; 121d3 διαταράτουσιν Vat. 226, τ *s.l. add.* Vat.226<sup>c</sup>; 122d7 προσαγορεύομεν Vat.226, -ωμεν Vat. 226<sup>c</sup>; 123b3 οἱ *om.* Vat.226, *add.* Vat. 226<sup>c</sup>; 124a7 ἀλοώντων Vat.226, *spir. asp.* (B) *fec.* Vat.226<sup>c</sup>; 126b1 τίνος BT Vat.226, τίνας Vat.226<sup>c</sup> W; 129c8 ἀπο-



στήναι (*sic*) Vat.226, ἀποστήσαι Vat.226<sup>c</sup>. All the above changes could easily have been made either independently by the scribe or through a comparison with the exemplar, and it is probable that the scribe had only B in front of him.

**Vat.1029** Vatican - *Vaticanus Graecus* 1029. Date s.xiv, contains tetr.1-8.3, 9.2-4, *Deff.*, *Spuria*. Collated by Bekker: siglum Gothic r, Bude V, Post R. Vat.1029 descends from W, but the precise relationship between the two mss. is uncertain, despite Post's lengthy but inconclusive discussion (30-5). The problem at issue (as Post himself realized), is the connection of Vat.1029 to Lobc. The former preserves all the characteristic W readings found in the latter (see on Lobc.), which settles the question of derivation from W for Vat.1029. But Vat.1029 and Lobc. also exhibit identical readings against W at a number of places, for instance, at 124a1-2, 126d2, 128e7, and 129e9 mentioned above on Lobc. Since it has already been shown in the discussion of Lobc. that Lobc. is unlikely to be a copy of Vat.1029, it remains to consider the opposite possibility. In fact, there is little to suggest that for this dialogue at least the exemplar of Vat.1029 was not Lobc., for there are only three places where the former preserves the true reading against the latter: 123b4 καὶ ἐγὼ is repeated in succession by Lobc., but occurs only once in Vat.1029; 129a2 ἔρυσθε Vat.1029 W<sup>c</sup> (*recte*), -θαί Lobc. BTW; 130e6 ἦ Vat.1029 (*recte*), εἶη Lobc. W. The first of these mistakes by Lobc. could have been easily recognized and avoided by Vat.1029, and it would have been a small matter for him to produce the correct subjunctive in the third case. The second correction appears a little more difficult to attribute to the scribe's own good sense, as the infinitive is not obviously out of the question (see comm. *ad loc.*); but the same correction from infinitive to imperative does occur independently

in Coisl.155 as well. There is, however, one matter which it is hard to account for. In Lobc. the original hand has subtitled *Thg.* περὶ σωφροσύνης at the beginning and end of the dialogue, but in both places has written περὶ σοφίας over an erasure. The scribe in Vat.1029 has gone through exactly the same process at the beginning of the dialogue, but has let περὶ σωφροσύνης stand at dialogue end. That both mss. show an erasure and change of subtitle in the original hand suggests an exemplar in each case which gave περὶ σοφίας as a variant; the variant was taken up by Lobc. twice, and by Vat.1029 once. I suggest then that Vat.1029 and Lobc. derive independently from a copy of W, though confirmatory evidence would have been welcome. Such an hypothesis would at any rate explain why Vat.1029 has the correct ἔρεσθε against ἔρεσθαι of Lobc., since the exemplar would presumably have reproduced from W the variants αι and ε. As well, it might account for the correct φθονεῖς τε in Lobc. Vat.1029, against φθονεῖσθαι of W. But whereas this is the sole reading of Vat.1029, it appears *i.r.* in Lobc., replacing an original φθονεῖσθαι; perhaps the model for Lobc. Vat.1029 reproduced the W reading, but supplied the true reading as a variant *s.l.* or *i.m.*

**Vat.1030** Vatican - *Vaticanus Graecus* 1030. Date: s.xv; contains tetr.2-5.2, 6.3-7.4, 1, 5.3-6.2. Collated by Bekker: siglum Gothic S. Vat. 1030 derives ultimately from Par.1808, whose characteristic readings are repeated, except for 127d7 (which was introduced *s.l.* by Par.1808<sup>c</sup>); at 125a6 Vat.1030 reads κατηγορήσέ *pro* κατηγορήκέ of Par.1808. The most likely parent of Vat.1030 is Par.1811. The contents of the two mss. are identical, and Vat.1030 shares the following peculiarities with Par. 1811 (a selective list): 121c5 διότι Par.1811 Vat.1030, δεδιότι *cett.*; 123b2 ἐστίν *om.* Par.1811 Vat.1030; 123b4 ἐρωτῶν Par.1811 Vat.1030,

ἀνερωτῶν *cett.*; 123b6 παρ' ᾧ ἂν σοφώτερος Par.1811 Vat.1030, παρ' ᾧν ἂν σὺ σοφὸς BTW; 123b7 ταύτην *ante* αὐτὴν *add.* Par. 1811 Vat.1030; 124b3 μὲν *om.* Par.1811 Vat.1030; 124d6 ἄρξασθαι Par.1811 Vat.1030, ἄρξαι *cett.*; 125b8 τι *om.* Par.1811 Vat.1030, *s.l.* *add.* Par.1811<sup>2</sup>; 126b9 ἂν *om.* Par.1811 Vat.1030; 126d4 ἔσεσθαι Par.1811 Vat.1030 (αὶ *et* θ *s.l.* Par.1811); 127b7 σὲ *om.* Par.1811 Vat.1030; 127e3 ἀναγυρουσίων Par.1811 Vat.1030, -ασίων *cett.*; 128b4 γε *post* σμι- κροῦ *transp.* Par.1811 Vat.1030; 130b2 με οὖν Par.1811 Vat.1030, οὖν με *cett.* The relative ages of these two mss., as well as disjunctive errors in Vat.1030 (e.g., 125a4 πέμψειν Vat.1030, πέμπειν Par.1811 *recte*; 126 c6 πολιτικοῦς Vat.1030, πολιτικὰ Par.1811 *recte*), indicate derivation of Vat.1030 from Par.1811 (probably direct).

**Vat.2218** Vatican - *Vaticanus Graecus* 2218. Date: s.xv; contains tetr.2.4-5.1, ending at *Thg.* 129a7 τί. ᾠ. Collated for tetr.4 by Carlini (35), but not previously collated for any other dialogues. Carlini's conclusion that Vat.2218 derives from M fully concurs with my own comparison of the two mss. Vat.2218 omits 122b5 βουλευσαίτο...b7 ἐγώ τε, which comprises a full line in M (no homoeoteleuton). It follows M in close detail, e.g., 123d3 ἡ *s.l.* *add.* M Vat.2218; 126a8 *alt.* οἱ *om.* M Vat.2218; and it adds some mistakes of its own, e.g., 122c9 οὐ *om.*; 123b7 με Vat.2218, μοι *cett.*; 124b5 γε Vat. 2218, τε *cett.*; 125a1 ματρὶ (*sic*); 126a3 ἴσθι Vat.2218, ἴσως *cett.*; 126 a9 γε *om.* Vat.2218.

**Barb.270** Vatican - *Barberinus Graecus* 270. Date usually not given, but perhaps s.xv (Carlini 33; Wilson 390); contains tetr.1-3.2, 3.4, 4.3-6.2, 6.4, 7.2-4, *Eryx*. Collated for *Thg.* by Bekker: siglum y. Schanz (*Hermes* 11 [1883] 111f.) suggested derivation from Par.1809, and this was proved to be true for tetr.4.3-4 (Carlini 33) and for *Cri.* (Berti, *Hermes* 97

[1969] 431), and is very likely for *Thg.* as well (note that both mss. are almost certainly by the same hand; see Wilson 390). Barb.270 preserves, apart from all the characteristic readings of Par.1808 that Par.1809 has itself faithfully reproduced (see Par.1809), a few novelties first found in Par.1809 (Ottob.332, which will be discussed next, is also recorded here): 123a7 πρὸς...a8 καὶ *om.* Par.1809 (and M) Barb.270 Ottob.332; 126d1 γε Par.1809 Barb.270 Ottob.332, σε *cett.*; 130a4 ὁ τοοῦν Par.1809 Barb.270 Ottob.332, ὁ τουοῦν *cett.* Additionally, several scribal errors have crept in, which firmly exclude the derivation of Par.1809 from Barb.270, e.g., 123e12 γυμναζόντων Barb.270 Ottob.332, γυμναζομένων *cett.*; 124d8 κάκισ Barb.270 Ottob.332, βάκισ *cett.*; 126d5 οὔν *om.* Barb.270 Ottob.332; 127e4 οὐδέν Barb.270 Ottob.332, οὐδενὸς *cett.*; 129a2 τιμάχου Barb.270 Ottob.332, τιμάρχου *cett.* It is the source of Ottob.332 (below).

**Ottob.332** Vatican - *Ottobonianus Graecus* 332. Date: s.xvi, containing tetr.1.2, 1.4, 4.4, *Thg.*, 7.3. Previously uncollated for *Thg.* Ottob.332 reproduces Barb.270 in almost every detail (see the latter for shared readings and conjunctive errors). It is undoubtedly a direct copy of Barb.270; the opposite derivation is excluded by the age of the two mss., and by the following errors which Ottob.332 adds: 123c3 τίνέστιν (*sic*) Ottob.332, τίς ἐστιν *cett.*; 127c7 τοὺς Ottob.332, τὰ *cett.*; 130b4 χαλεπαίνεις Ottob.332, ἔειν *cett.*

**Pal.175** Vatican - *Palatinus Graecus* 175. Date: s.xv, in the hand of John Scutariotes, who also copied the companion volume Pal.177 (tetr. 9.1-3); contains tetr.8.3, 4-5.2, 8.4. Collated by Bekker: siglum Gothic **e**. As Post noted (38-9), Pal.175 descends from Flor.o; in addition to containing the omissions of Flor.a which Flor.o reproduces, it also preserves readings

which Flor.o introduces at 122b4, 125a5, 127c6, and 127c8 (see Flor.o). There are, moreover, other indications of its derivation: 123c6 τυγχάνει Flor.o *sed* σ *s.l.* (τυγχάνεις BTW), τυγχάνει ὁ Pal.175; 127b8 φόφ-ερων (*sic*) Flor.o (perhaps because of a change of line after φο-) Pal.175; 129d4 στρατεία Flor.o Pal.175, στρατείαν BTW. Pal. 175 also adds some of its own false readings: e.g., 122b5 θειότερον Pal.175, θειοτέρου *cett.*; 125d6 ποῖαν Pal.175, ποῖα ἂν Flor.o; 127e1 ἥ Pal.175, εἶ *cett.* However, the fact that Pal.175 reinstates the correct word order καὶ δύσκολος γίγνεται in 121b7-c1 against Flor.o (γίγνεται καὶ δύσκολος), and ἀκούω ὦ Σώκρατες (ὦ Σώκρατες ἀκούω Flor.o) encourages the assumption that Pal.175 is not a direct copy of Flor.o, but descends *via* an intermediary ms.

**Urb.32** Vatican - *Vaticanus Graecus* 32. Date: not later than 1444 A.D., since it is in the hand of Leonardo Bruno Aretinus (1369-1444); contains *Spuria* (excluding *Deff.*, *Iust.*), tetr.8.1, 7.1-2, *Thg.*, 5-6.1 (up to 273a6). Collated by Bekker, but not for *Thg.*: siglum Gothic I. Urb.32 derives from Vat.226 for *Thg.*, which follows Post's conclusions about the source of this ms. for *Spuria* (59). The following conjunctive errors prove a close connection between the two mss.: 123c9 -σθα...c11 ὄνομα ἔγωγε *om.* Vat. 226 Urb.32; 125c11 ναί *om.* Vat.226 Urb.32; 125e1 κυανης (*sic*) Vat.226 Urb.32; 127e2 ἥρξας (*sic*) Vat.226 Urb.32; 127e3 ἀπὸ Vat.226 Urb.32, ὑπὸ *cett.*; 127e7 οἰόνται (*sic*) Vat.226 Urb.32; 130d7 καὶ...d8 οἰκήματι *om.* Vat.226 Urb.32; 130e1 ἄλλοσε...e2 ὁπότε *om.* Vat.226 Urb. 32. Furthermore, Urb.32 adds a number of its own errors, e.g., 127b7 καλεπῇ (*sic*); 123c1 εἰς *ante* ταύτην *add.* Urb.32; 125c14 τὶ τῶν Urb. 32, τῶν τί *cett.*; 125d1 παλαίων (*sic*) Urb.32, παλαίειν *cett.*; 128a4

ῶν Urb.32, ῶ *cett.*; 130d6 οἰκεία Urb.32, οἰκία *cett.*; 130e6 ἐπιδόσεις Urb.32, ὥσεις *cett.* It is, in all likelihood, a direct copy of Vat.226.

**Urb.80** Vatican - *Urbinas Graecus* 80. Date: s. xiv-xv; contains tetr. 4.4, *Thg.*, 5.4, 3.3 (to 236b2), *Ax.*, 4.2. Collated by Carlini for *Alc.* // and *Amat.* (46), but uncollated for *Thg.* Urb.80 has been damaged by damp along the upper portion of its folio leaves, obscuring the first few lines of several pages, and rendering it difficult, and impossible in some places, to read accurately from the photographs which I have used. In any event, for *Thg.* it is demonstrably contaminated. A number of its readings indicate derivation from T: 123a7 ἔτι καὶ ἕτερα Urb.80 T, ἔτι B, ἕτερα W; 124a6 τῶν *ante* τρυγόντων *add.* Urb.80 T<sup>c</sup>; 129b4 πρὸς με Urb.80 T, πρὸς ἐμὲ BW; 129d8 πραγματείας Urb.80 T, στρατείας BW; 130d4 μὲν *om.* Urb.80 T. But συνηθείας *pro* συνουσίας in 122c2 must suggest that Urb.80 descends from a ms. which had been contaminated with W readings, since συνηθείας is characteristic of that ms. alone, and occurs only in mss. closely affiliated with it (i.e., in Lobc., Vat.1029, and perhaps Flor.i). While other readings do not prove W contamination, they are at least suggestive: 121d5 αὐτὸν Urb.80 W, ὦν BT; 126b1 τίνας Urb.80 W, τίνος BT; 127a2 χρήσεται Urb.80 W, ἑται BT; 130c5 αἰσθάνωμαι Urb.80 W, ὀμαι BT; 130b7 προύλιπεν Urb.80 W, προύλειπεν BT. On a few occasions Urb.80, along with other secondary mss., preserves a true reading against BTW: 123e10 μουσικῇ Urb.80 Par.1812 (*i.m.*) M; 124d2 τοῦτον Urb.80 Par.1812 Ambros.409; 125a6 βουλευώμεθα Urb.80 b M Par.1811 1812 Ven.186 Vat.1029 Ang.1072 Flor.o; 126a5 δὴ Urb.80 Flor.b Neap.337. All of these are simple corrections, and it would be folly to suggest that they point to a source independent of BTW. In fact, Urb.80 (or its parent) shows a tendency to normalize (cf. 121a3

ἐνεκα Urb.80, ἐνεκεν BTW; 122c9 ἐπιθυμῇ Urb.80 Ven.186, -εῖ BTW), and (apparently deliberately) to offer its own conjectures: e.g., 122a6 σοφῶν Urb.80, σοφιστῶν *cett.*; 123d2 φιλοσοφίαν Urb.80, σοφίαν *cett.*; 124e3 αὐτῶν Urb.80, αὐτὴν *cett.*, αὐτῶν *ci.* Baiter; 126b9 ἀκοντιστὰς Urb.80, ἀκοντιστικοὺς *cett.*; 128d7 αὐτῶν Urb.80, ὑμῖν *cett.*; 130e8 παιδευθῆναι Urb.80 M, παιδεύεσθαι BTW *et i.m.* γρ. Urb.80 M. This last reading would seem to indicate that Urb.80 and the source of M are somehow related (see above on M); otherwise, however, I can find no secondary witness with which Urb.80 is closely related. Urb.80 is also equipped with learned marginal notes which do not appear in other mss., e.g., at 124d8-9 (on Bakis, Sibyl, and Amphilytus), where reference is made to Aelius Aristides (2.46 Behr, ὑπὲρ ῥητορικῆς) and Flavius Josephus (ἀρχαιολογία Ἰουδαϊκὴ 1.118).

**T** Venice - *Venetus App. Cl.* 4.1. Traditionally dated to s.xi-xii (e.g. Schanz, *Platocodex* 1; Post 81), but recently identified positively as the work of Ephraim μοναχός (see B.L. Fonkich, *Thesaurismata* 16 [1979] 158; A. Diller, *CP* 75 [1980] 322-4; R. Barbour, *Greek Literary Hands* [Oxford, 1981] 14, with a specimen of Ephraim's hand), thus bringing the date of this ms. down to about 950 (Schanz in *RhMus* 33 [1878] 303, and Burnet in *CR* 19 [1905] 297, already suspected an earlier date for T). Contains *Ti.* Locr. (copied by Johannes Rhosus), tetr.1-8.2 (to 389d7, then completed by a s.xv-xvi hand; *Ti.* is added by a hand of s.xvi). Collated by Bekker and fully by Schanz, on whom both Burnet and Souilhé relied. Schanz however misreports the contents of T in a number of places: e.g., 121a3 ἐνεκεν *re vera* T (ἐνεκα has made its way into the editions of Burnet and Souilhé on Schanz's authority); 122b6 *pr.* αὐτοῦ is a correction for an original αὐτοῦ, probably by the scribe himself (*T<sup>c</sup>*); 124a6 τῶν (*per comp.*

s./.) is the work of T<sup>c</sup>, I believe, not a later hand (t); 124a6 τρυγώντων was originally τρυγόντων (so also a number of derivative mss.), but ω ex o t; 125c7 δὲ *re vera* T (not δαὶ; so also 125e5); 125c10 τῶν μαγειρικῶν *i.m.* γρ. T (but attributed only to *apographa* by Schanz, and to W by Burnet); 126b5 καὶ οἷς εἰσὶ τε ἵπποι καὶ χρῶνται *i.m.* γρ. T (not t); 130b1 ἀπεχθείας *re vera* T (not ἀπεχθείας); 130c5 αἴσθωμαι *i.m.* γρ. T (only in Coisl.155 according to Burnet).

T is commonly supposed to have been copied from A (Par.1807, containing tetr.8-9, *Spuria*) when the latter was complete (see Schanz, *Platocodex* 77f.; Alline 214f.; A. Jordan, *Hermes* 13 [1878] 477f.; Dodds 37f.), though this has in the past been disputed (see Burnet, *CQ* 8 [1914] 231; A.C. Clark, *The Descent of Manuscripts* [Oxford, 1918] 413; Greene, *Scholia Platonica* xxxiv-v). Such a derivation for T would in itself be a persuasive argument for treating it as a primary witness, a position which Schanz first held, and which has since won general acceptance. Moreover, if T is a copy of the lost volume of A, then there is a strong presumption that T represents a tradition that derives from a sixth-century Alexandrian ms. (see Westerink, *ICS* 6.1 [1981] 112-15). Dodds (38-9) and Bluck (130) noted relatively small differences between B and T in *Grg.* and *Men.*; but much larger discrepancies exist between the two mss. in other dialogues (see Kral, *WS* 14 [1892] 188). The most reasonable explanation for this is the one suggested by Dodds (38-9): B and T descend from different hyparchetypes, but each has been contaminated with readings characteristic of the other (appearing originally perhaps as marginal or interlinear variants), more systematically in some dialogues than in others. For one probable instance of this kind, cf. *Thg.* 123a7: ἕτερα W (*recte*), ἔτι B, ἔτι καὶ ἕτερα T (where ἔτι may have been a marginal variant in



the hyparchetype of T, and was conflated with ἕτερα). 129d8 also has separative value: πραγματείας T, στρατείας BW. Other readings in T distinguish it from BW, though do not by themselves prove primary authority: 130d4 μὲν *om.* T, *hab.* BW; cf. *app. crit.* 121c2, 122a1, 129b4 (see sec. c below on the internal relationship of BTW). T will be treated as a primary witness in this edition of *Thg.*

The influence of T on the mss. tradition of *Thg.* was pervasive. It is the ancestor of most surviving transcriptions of this dialogue.

**Ven.184** Venice - *Venetus* 184. Date: s.xv, tetr. 1-9, *Epigr.*, *Spuria* (minus *Deff.*, *Eryx.*), one of only three Plato mss. containing all nine tetralogies (Flor.a c are the others). This sumptuous ms. was written for Bessarion by Johannes Rhosus (see Alline 209, 307). Collated by Bekker: siglum Ξ, Schanz E. Post asserted (40) that Ven.184 derives from Ven.186 for tetr.1-8; such an ancestry will perfectly explain certain peculiarities in Ven.184: 121d3 διαταράττουσιν Ven.186, but τ added above *pr.* τ, διατταράττουσιν (*sic*) Ven.184 (the second τ in διαττ— has been squeezed in); 122a9 ἀκήκουας (*sic*) Ven.184 186; 122b4 συμβουλεύη Ven.186, but συμ— obliterated, βουλεύη Ven.184; 122c9 ἐπιθυμῇ Ven.184 186, ἐπιθυμεῖ *cett.*; 125c10 μαγειρῶν Ven.186 (BTW), ικ *s.l.*, μαγειρικῶν Ven.184; 125e6 ἀρχῆς Ven.184 186, ἀρχοῖς *cett.*; 129d4 στρατεία Ven.184 186, στρατείαν *cett.*; 129e3 ἐναντιόνται Ven.184 186, ἐναντιοῦται Ven.184<sup>2</sup> (*cett.*). Ven.184 also adds some of its own errors: 122c5 λέγεις Ven.184, λέγειν *cett.*; 123d13 πλείων Ven.184, πλοίων *cett.*; 127a3 τε Ven.184, γε *cett.*; 130a6 ὁλόγῳ (*sic*) Ven.184, ὀλίγῳ *cett.*; 131a4 βουλευόμεθα Ven.184, —σόμεθα *cett.* Ven.184 contains numerous additions and corrections by Bessarion, especially in matters of punctuation and breathing; Rhosus also supplies corrections

here and there. This ms. was long held to be the primary source of the Aldine Plato, although that honour is now usually (but wrongly for *Thg.*) given to Ven.186 (see on Ald.).

**Ven.186** Venice - *Venetus* 186. Date: s.xv; contains tetr.1-3.1, followed by the remainder of the Platonic Corpus, except for *R.*, *Crit.*, and tetr.9, very much out of the regular tetralogical order; *Thg.* appears between *Amat.* and *Lys.* Previously uncollated for *Thg.* Ven.186 is written in four hands, of which *Thg.* is in the fourth. There are copious corrections and notes by Bessarion throughout, and several strata of these can be detected by the various shades of ink. Post supposed (58-9) that Ven.186 was the source of the Aldine Plato, but the matter is not that simple (see below on Ald). Up to *Hp. mi.* (the first hand) it is a copy of Ven.189 (see Schanz, *Platocodex* 89f.); Post seems to extend this to embrace Ven.186 in general (58), but the derivation of *Thg.* must be different. For this dialogue, Ven.186 goes back to T, but not through Par.1808, as it ultimately should if Ven.189 were its source. As a matter of fact it has none of the characteristic readings of Par.1808 (*q.v.*). It does, however, preserve the peculiar T readings: 123a7 ἔτι καὶ ἕτερα T Ven.186, ἔτι B, ἕτερα W; 129d8 πραγματείας T Ven.186, στρατείας BW; 130d4 μὲν *om.* T Ven.186, *hab.* BW; there are also trivial agreements between Ven.186 and T, e.g., 121c2 τὰ ἄλλα T Ven.186, τᾶλλα BW; 129b4 πρὸς με T Ven.186, πρὸς ἐμὲ BW. A number of fairly simple corrections by the original scribe, Bessarion, and possibly one or more other hands, may show contamination in the exemplar of Ven.186, or correction of Ven.186 against a ms. other than the exemplar, but independent editorial activity is not out of the question: 122a1 μέλει BW Ven.186 (*recte*), μέλλει T; 122a1 τούτων T Ven.186, τοῦτον BW Ven.186<sup>2</sup>; 122c9 ἐπιθυμῇ Ven.186

Urb.80, —εἰ BTW; 123 b6 ἐθέλει T W Ven.186 (*ut vid.*), ἐθέλη B Ven. 186<sup>2</sup>; 123e2, 3 ἡ BTW Ven.186, ἥ Ven.186<sup>2</sup> (*et recc.*); 124c12 αὐτοῦ T Ven.186 (αὐτοῦ BW), αὐτῇ Ven.186<sup>2</sup>; 125a6 βουλευόμεθα Ven.186 (*et recc.*), —ομεθα BTW; 126b1 τίνας W Ven. 186 (*recte*), τίνος BT; 127a2 χρήσεται W Ven.186, χρήσηται BT Ven.186<sup>2</sup>; 127d6 τ' ἦν W Ven. 186, τε ἦν Bessarion *i.m.* (T); 130c5 αἰσθάνωμαι W Ven.186, —ομαι BT; 130c7 προύλιπεν W Ven.186, προύλειπεν BT. Other features however seem to point more directly to some degree of contamination: 129c1 διαλείπων TW Ven.186, *sed* ι *s.l.* Ven.186<sup>2</sup>, διαλιπὼν B; 129 d8 πραγματείας T Ven.186, στρατείας BW *et i.m.* γρ. Ven.186<sup>2</sup>. It appears that Ven.186 either descended from a copy of T which was contaminated with some B and W readings, or was itself subjected to horizontal transmission.

**Ven.189** Venice - *Venetus* 189. The traditional date of Ven.189 has been given as s. xiv (e.g. Wilson 387), but since it is a copy of Flor.c, which is put at s.xv, one of these dates should be revised. Ven.189 contains tetr.1-3.1, 6.3-7.1, 3.3, 8.3, 4.1-2, *Ax.*, *Iust.*, *Virt.*, *Dem.*, *Sis.*, *Halc.* (contents identical to those of Y [Vienna, Phil. Gr. 21]), then follow *Hp. mi.*, *Mx.*, *Ion*, *Clit.*, *Phdr.*, *Criti.*, *Phlb.*, and tetr.4.3-6.2. Collated by Bekker: siglum Σ, S Schanz and most editors since. In *Thg.* the connection of Ven.189 with Flor.c is indicated by common omissions at 123a6 δῆ; 123b3 οἱ; 123c6 ἀνώνυμος...c9 πότερον; 128b8 τι; and by shared errors at 122b3 ἥτις Flor.c Ven.189, ἥτισοῦν *cett.*; 124d3 τούτων ἡγῆ Flor.c Ven.189, ἡγῆ τούτων *cett.*; 127d3 μάλιστα σοι Flor.c Ven.189, μάλιστ' ἄν σοι *cett.*; 130d3 ἔφη ἐρῶ Flor.c Ven.189, ἐρῶ ἔφη *cett.* As a descendant of Flor.c, Ven.189 contributes a number of its own errors and omissions, e.g., 123a6 αὐτῷ *om.*; 124c6 δῆ *om.*; 124c7 τούτων *om.*;

125c2 γὰρ *pro* ἄν; 127a4 σοι *pro* σε; 127c6 εἴδῃ *pro* ἦδῃ; 127e3 τε *om.*; 129b4 ἔφη *om.* In 127c6 τοῦτο, the reading preserved by Ven.189 in truth against all other mss., was merely a simple correction by the scribe.

**W** Vienna - *Vindobonensis suppl. gr. 7*. The date of the earliest part of this ms. (in which part *Thg.* is contained) has been a subject of some dispute, and suggestions have covered a period of about 200 years, e.g., s.xii Aline (237); s.xi Post (90) and Diels (*Berl. Sitzb.* [1906] 749), also the catalogue date; 950-1050 Maas (in Dodds 39). W contains tetr.1-3, then tetr.4-7, excluding *Alc. II*, out of the tetralogical order; a later hand has added *Clit.*, *R.*, and *Ti.* Burnet's very sketchy report of W was based on information related to him by Král (OCT III, *praef.*). Souilhé alone collated W fully for *Thg.*, yet he twice tacitly corrects Burnet where Burnet is actually right, i.e., 123a3 ἔνεκεν W, ἔνεκα Souilhé; 130e8 ἅ τ' Souilhé, οἳ τ' Burnet; once his report is correct where Burnet's is slightly misleading (126c3 Burnet's *app. crit.* should read ἐπειδὴ δὲ δὴ). Souilhé's report of W is otherwise generally accurate (note however 123e14 γε *om.* W; 129d4 καλοῦ *re vera* W [Καλοῦ Souilhé]); but he ignores the fact that a number of readings in W are *i.r.*, and possibly hide a genuine variant. My report of W will render as complete an account as possible (see sec. *e*).

On the various correcting hands in W, see R. Hensel, *Vindiciae Platonicae* (Berlin, 1906) 41-52 (with special reference to *Tht.* and *Plt.*); to the seven listed there Bluck (in his ed. of *Men.* [132-3]) adds an eighth. From my photographs I see no evidence for a later corrector in the case of *Thg.*, but for (perhaps) 127b3 χαριεῖ W, *sed* ἦ *ex* εἶ. It is clearly the first hand (the copyist) which has added the marginal variants and scholia in 122e8, 125c4, c5, 126b5, 127c8, and e3.

Král (WS 14 [1892] 161-208) demonstrated that W is independent of B and T in *Thg.*, as it is for the other dialogues of tetr.1-7. The evidence he brought forward for *Thg.* is small but, I believe, decisive. Independence from BT: 123a7 ἕτερα W (*recte*), ἕτι B (ἕτερα vet.b), ἕτι καὶ ἕτερα T; independence from T: 129d8 στρατείας BW, πραγματείας T; 130d4 ἔμαθον μὲν BW, μὲν om. T. To this list may be added 122c2 συνουσίας BT (*recte*), συνηθείας W, which may well have been originally a gloss, either in the exemplar of W, or earlier (see comm. *ad loc.*). In this edition W will be treated as a primary witness.

For *Thg.* only Vat.1029, Lobc., and (possibly) Flor.i descend directly from W.

#### *Appendix: The BTW Relationship*

The preceding survey of mss., in so far as B, T, and W have emerged as the only witnesses which can rightly be regarded as primary, essentially reinforces the *opinio communis* which has prevailed since Burnet's edition. All other mss. are manifestly derivative, and any aid which they may provide in constituting a text of *Thg.* is merely the result of independent conjecture as exercised on a given mss. Whether the first correcting hand in B (B<sup>2</sup>) is to be allowed as a primary source cannot be decided from this dialogue alone, but, at any rate, in this case its contribution is exceedingly meagre.

That the relationship between BTW is close enough to permit us to speak of them as comprising a ms. "family," deriving ultimately from a single hyparchetype, is supported by shared readings which are demonstrably false. Such are 123e10 μουσικῆς BTW, μουσικῇ M Par.1812 Urb.80 *recte*; 127c6 τοῦτον BTW, τοῦτο Ven.189 *recte*; 128a6 πάνυ

πολὺν BTW *false*; 129a3 εὐθὺ τοῦ δαιμονίου BTW *false*; and several emendations and deletions, if correct, support the same view, cf. 128a6 προσκατατιθέντας BTW, προκατατιθέντας *ego*; δοκεῖ τι ἔτι BTW, δοκεῖ ἔτι Flor.b c *et* Ang.gr.107 (*sed* τι ἔτι *ante ras.*); 130b7 τὸ ἀνδράπαδον BTW, τὸ *del.* Cobet.

Burnet (CQ 8 [1914] 231) and Alline (238f.) urged that W represents an older tradition of the text than either B or T, and thus stands in an intermediate position, from which B and T have diverged. If this is true, we could feel some confidence in treating WB and WT agreements with greater respect than agreements between BT. There are reasons, however, why such a dogma cannot be mechanically applied in the case of *Thg.* For one thing, we cannot decide with any degree of certainty the relationship in this dialogue between the three primary witnesses; indeed, the difference between W on the one hand, and BT on the other, is not profound, and there is no firm indication that two mss. consistently side against the third. Only two readings show agreement between two mss. in a significant reading against a third, i.e., 122c2 where BT agree in truth in the reading συνουσίας against συνηθείας of W; and 129d8 where T preserves πραγματείας, the reading adopted in the present text, against στρατείας of BW. No conclusions can be drawn from this evidence. Still less revealing is the agreement of two witnesses against a third in places such as 121c4 ἡ *om.* B, *hab.* TW; 123a5 ἐγὼ αὐτῷ BT, αὐτῷ ἐγὼ W; 125e3 καὶ BT, ἐν W; 126d4 οὖν ἂν TW, ἂν οὖν B; 129a4 σταδιοδρομῶν BT, -δρόμος W; 129b4 πρὸς ἐμὲ BW, πρὸς με T; the departure of one witness from the other two in instances of these kinds does not constitute proof of a separate strand within the BTW tradition. In the case of

*Thg.* no primary ms. is demonstrably more closely related to a second than it is to a third.

There is another reason why it proves to be impossible to determine successfully the internal relationship between B, T, and W; namely, the evidence that in *Thg.*, as in other dialogues, collusion must have been occurring already among the respective ancestors of our three primary witnesses. 123a7 is, I think, an indication of this (ἕτερα W, ἕτι B, ἕτι καὶ ἕτερα T); see above on T. We can possibly detect evidence of the relative unity of the BTW family through 130e8: οἷ T, ὅτ' B, οἷ τ' W. One of two possibilities presents itself here: either the hyparchetype preserved OI with T written as a variant *s.l.*; B and T then selected among variants, while W conflated; or the exemplar of W presented both readings, possibly one as a variant. Hence each reading must be examined on its own merits, and in any given instance one ms. may be right against the other two. We can only guess at the amount of contamination present in the tradition when our first mss. make their appearance.<sup>11</sup>

#### *b. The Indirect Tradition*

Since, according to Diogenes Laertius (3.62) and Albinus (*Eisag.* 4), some learners began their study of Plato with *Thg.*, we might expect extant quotations of the dialogue by ancient authors to be fairly numerous. They are not, however; nor are those that do survive of any great assistance for the editor of *Thg.* The testimonia of several ancient authors have been cited in previous editions, notably in those of Stallbaum, Fritzsche, Burnet, and Souilhé. All the passages which they collectively cite (Dionysius, [Plutarch], Aelian, Clement, Priscian, Stobaeus) will be entered in the

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<sup>11</sup>On this question see N. Wilson, *CQ* n.s.10 (1960) 202-4.

register directly below the text of the present edition, along with all other testimonia I have been able to gather. Though no claim to exhaustiveness can be made here, the catalogue that has been formed does, I believe, take into account most surviving testimonia.

The results are not particularly impressive. Only Priscian supplies us with a true reading against the main tradition (127d6), but the correction is a simple one, and the reading probably lies behind a transcriptional error in B (see comm. *ad loc.*). On a couple of occasions the indirect tradition supports the text of the main tradition against a modern conjecture (128b5, 129e8-9). Several quotations preserve a correct  $\delta\epsilon$  at 128d5 along with B<sup>c</sup>T (*om.* W), but there is little significance in this. The variants presented by different quotations are usually inferior to the readings of mss. (e.g. 128d2, d5), and the only instance in which an indirect witness agrees with the evidence of one primary ms. against the other two (128e3 omission of an article by W and Aelian) is probably merely a matter of coincidence.

Despite such paucity of information, the evidence for the quotation of *Thg.* by later authors is documented fully in the pages of the text, and variants are cited in the *apparatus* where appropriate. Instances in which an ancient author paraphrases a passage in *Thg.* are indicated in the list of testimonia by *cf.*; where an ancient author merely alludes to a specific passage in *Thg.*, the abbreviation *resp.(icit)* is used.

### c. *Scholia*

Like the other dialogues of tetr.1-6, two sets of scholia are preserved for *Thg.* One group, the so-called *Arethae scholia*, is found only in B, and is represented for this dialogue by a single scholion on 126b1 (on the



phrase παρὰ τίνος). This scholion attempts to defend a variant reading as an Atticism, but is in fact simply an instance of the grammatical and syntactical misapprehensions which are to be found not infrequently in this set. Despite the title given to these scholia, they were undoubtedly not all compiled by Arethas himself (see Greene, *Scholia Platonica* xxiii; Dodds 36), though they were transcribed by him into B.

In *Thg.* the *scholia vetera* are more abundant than the *Arethae scholia* (though this is not the case with every dialogue, e.g. *Grg.* and *Tht.*). In B they have been added by a later hand (vet.b), of s.x-xi according to Schanz and Allen, which is at work only in *Thg.* and *Chrm.* (see Greene, *op.cit.* xv). In reality, only one of the *scholia vetera* is preserved in B (122e8); the putative scholion on 125c4 registered by Greene (112) is merely a *varia lectio* (γρ.) which appears in TW as well as B, and should not have been included in his collection (see, however, Greene xxxvi). The full set of *scholia vetera* is contained only in T (the original hand, Greene xvi), and the notes are written in small uncial characters. W has the *scholia vetera* on 122e8, 127c8, and 127e3. The scholion on 127c8 is actually comprised of two distinct parts in T, and W basically preserves the first, briefer version. The *scholia vetera* in W are in the same hand as that of the original scribe.

Neither the *scholia vetera* nor the *Arethae scholia* are of any importance in constituting the text of *Thg.*, nor are they exegetically valuable. Burnet collected the source-attributions for the *scholia vetera* on *Thg.* that were ultimately catalogued in Greene's *apparatus* (Greene xiii), and I have nothing to add to the information gathered there. Such as they are, they do not throw any light on the extent to which *Thg.* was read and studied at the time that the various scholia were compiled; indeed, two of the scholia

(121a1, 127c8) may well have been appropriated from the *scholia vetera* on passages in other dialogues.

#### d. Early Printed Editions

**Ald.** Venice - Aldine edition (September, 1513); the *editio princeps* of the complete works of Plato, edited by Marcus Musurus. For *Lg.* and *Epin.* the source of Ald. may be Ven.187 (Post 3, 41-4), and so also for *Ti. Locr.* (see W. Marg, *Timaeus Locrus: De Natura Mundi et Animae* [Leiden, 1972] 79). Ven.184 was long considered to be the source of Ald. for many other dialogues (see Jowett-Campbell II.93; Alline 316); Post (58-9) passed the honour to Ven.186, from which Ven.184 was copied. But these assertions were never based on complete collations, and whatever may be true for other works in the Corpus, in *Thg.* Ven.186 cannot be the parent (or at least the sole parent) of Ald. The ms. which displays greatest affinity with Ald. is Par.1811; the following are some conjunctive readings: 121a3 ἔνεκα Ald. Par.1811 Urb.80, ἔνεκεν *cett.*; 121c6 οὖν *om.* Ald. Par.1811; 122e9 παιδεύονται Ald. Par.1811 1812, πεπαίδευνται *cett.*; 123b4 ἐρωτῶν Ald. Par.1811, ἀνερρωτῶν *cett.*; 123b6 παρ' ᾧ Ald. Par.1811, παρ' ᾧν *cett.*; 123b7 ταύτην *ante* αὐτὴν *add.* Ald. Par.1811; 124a8 ἀρχόμεθα Ald. Par.1811 1812, ἀρχομεν *cett.*; 124b3 μὲν *om.* Ald. Par.1811; 125d9 σὺ *om.* Ald. Par.1811; 126a8 αἱ *et* θ *s.l.* Ald. Par.1811, αἰσθέσθαι *cett.*; 126d9 παρέχει Ald. Par.1811, παρέχοι *cett.*; 127e3 ἀναγυροῦσίων Ald. Par.1811, ἀναγυρασίων *cett.*; 128b4 πλὴν γε μικροῦ γε Ald. Par.1811, πλὴν γε μικροῦ *cett.*; 130b2 με οὖν Ald. Par.1811, οὖν με *cett.*; 130b4 ἀκούω *post* ᾧ Σώκρατες *transp.* Ald. Par.1811; 130c2 με Ald. Par.1811, μὲν *cett.*; 130e10 τύχοι Ald. Par.1811 1812.

But Aldus himself claimed to have relied on more than one ms. (cf. his preface: *Musurus Cretensis...qui hos Platonis libros accurate recognovit cum antiquissimis conferens exemplaribus...*), and the positing of Par.1811 as source of Ald. will not account for all the facts. Ald. sometimes preserves a true reading against Par.1811, e.g. 123b2 ἐστὶν *om.* Par.1811, *hab.* Ald.; 123b6 σοφὸς Ald., σοφώτερος Par.1811; 127b7 σὲ *om.* Par.1811, *hab.* Ald.; 128c2 ὀλίγω Ald., ὀλίγων Par.1811; 129a5 ὑμῖν *om.* Par.1811, *hab.* Ald. Of the four mss. which Alline (316) believed to be the source of Ald., one (Monac.237) does not contain *Thg.*, while no traces are to be found in Ald. of two others (Flor.b and Par.1809). It is just possible that Ven.184 (as Alline thought, see above), or Ven.186 (which shows the kind of physical wear to be expected from a printer's copy), is another source. This would account for a number of readings: 122c9 ἐπιθυμεῖ Ald. (BTW), *sed* ἦ *s.l.* Ald., —ἦ Ven.186 184 (Urb.80); 125c2 μαγειρικῶν Ald. Ven.186<sup>2</sup> 184, μαγειρῶν Par.1811 (BTW); 125d7 οἷδ' *om.* Par.1811, *hab.* Ald. Ven.186 184 (BTW); 127b3 χαριῇ Ald. Ven.186<sup>2</sup> 184, χαριεῖ Ven.186, εἰ *s.l.* Ald.; 128d3 ἦ Ald. Ven.186 184, ἦ Ven.186<sup>2</sup>, “ *s.l.* Ald.; 130c5 αἰσθάνωμαι Ald. Ven.186 184 (W). It would be difficult to proceed any further than this, but it is salutary to observe that Musurus used at least four mss. in producing the Aldine Aristophanes (see K. Zacher, *Bursian* 71 [1892] 30-2), and for *Thg.* Aldus, or Musurus, or both, are likely to have employed other materials besides Par.1811 and Ven.186 or 184. Musurus may in fact have been capable of some good readings of his own; but there is nothing in Ald. which does not otherwise occur in our extant mss.

**Bas.<sup>1</sup>** Basel - First Basel edition (March 1534), edited by Ioannes Oporinus (Johann Herbst) *apud I. Valderum*. The editor has done little

more than copy the Aldine *editio princeps* (on the tendency to constitute early printed editions on the basis of already-existing editions, see E.J. Kenney, *The Classical Text* [Berkeley, 1974] 10 n.3). Where Bas.<sup>1</sup> differs from Ald., as it rarely does, it does so in manifest error: e.g., 121a2 καὶ Bas.<sup>1</sup>, δὲ *cett.*; 123a5 οὕτως Bas.<sup>1</sup>, οὕτως *cett.*; 123a6 σὺ Bas.<sup>1</sup>, σὲ *cett.*; 125b4 δὴ *om.* Bas.<sup>1</sup>; 129b3 ἐπιστάσθην Bas.<sup>1</sup>, ἡπιστάσθην *cett.* The sole exception is the simple correction at 123e10 μουσικῇ Bas.<sup>1</sup> *recte*, μουσικῆς Ald. (BTW). Further, where Ald. adds a variant *s.l.*, Bas.<sup>1</sup> in almost every instance ignores this reading where it is to be preferred, or follows the variant in Ald. where that variant is false.

**Bas.<sup>2</sup>** Basel - Second Basel edition (March 1556), edited by Marcus Hopperus *apud Henricum Petrum*. The preface advertises the method of this edition: *Nam vir ille virtutibus et praestanti doctrina clarus, Arnoldus Arlenius, ad eruendos, vindicandos, et restaurandos bonos auctores, diis ita volentibus, quasi natus, nactus superioribus annis in Italia quaedam manuscripta Platonis exemplaria, conferre cum iis Vualderianum (cui et Aldinum respondebat) coepit: a quibus cum discrepare id in locis aliquot multis animadvertisset, ac desiderari non pauca in excuso vidisset, a capite ad calcem usque corrigere et annotare ea quae occurebant errata, quantum fieri potuit, omnia haud destitit. Deprehendit autem quaedam, ut dixi, omissa, quaedam contra redundare, quaedam denique inversa et transposita. cuius equidem generis errores (ut leviores quasi innumeros nunc taceam) plus quam mille, collatione ea facta, annotavit.* Despite these words, Bas.<sup>2</sup> is decidedly inferior to either Ald. or Bas.<sup>1</sup>, although it does follow the latter quite closely. Where Bas.<sup>2</sup> attempts to "correct" a reading, it usually makes matters worse, e.g., 121a5 ἔνεκεν ποιῆσαι Bas.<sup>2</sup>, ἔνεκα καὶ πάνυ *cett.*, evidently looking to 121a3 in the ms. with

which he was comparing previous editions (Schanz, *RhMus* 33 [1878] 615, suggests this ms. was T); 121c7 ἔστι μὲν οὖν ἄλλα γὰρ Bas.<sup>2</sup>, where the editor has restored οὖν omitted in 121c6 by Ald. and Bas.<sup>1</sup>, but in the wrong place; 125a3 ὅτι Bas.<sup>2</sup>, ὅθι *cett.*; 126c1 χρῶντε Bas.<sup>2</sup>, χρῶν-ται *cett.*; 128d6 ἀνακοινῶνται Bas.<sup>2</sup>, -ῶται *cett.* It does however improve on Ald. Bas.<sup>1</sup> in 127a4 ὅς σοι Bas.<sup>2</sup> *recte*, ὅσοι Ald. Bas.<sup>1</sup>, and in 127e3 ἀναγυρασίων Bas.<sup>2</sup> *recte*, ἀναγυρουσίων Ald. Bas.<sup>1</sup>.

**Steph.** Paris - Edition of Henri Estienne (Stephanus; 1578, the "Vulgate" edition) with accompanying Latin translation by Jean de Serres (Ioannes Serranus). Stephanus in his preface assures his reader that this work will be a *critical* edition: *Ac quum varia ex veteribus libris auxilia conquisivissem, hanc in eorum usu cautionem adhibui, ut quae lectiones praecedentium editionum, Aldinae, Basiliensis, Louvaniensis (quae est duntaxat librorum De legibus) ferri posse viderentur, in ista etiam retinerentur, diversis margini adscriptis: in earum autem locum quae οὐδὲν ὑγιὲς haberent, (quarum etiam nonnulla ne a Ficino quidem agnoscuntur) diversa illae ex vetustis petitaе libris substituerentur. ut omittam quae ex iisdem adiecta fuerunt, ut remedia locis antea mutilis et decurtatis afferentur.* (He proceeds briefly to discuss his use of conjecture and marginal notation.) In fact this edition constitutes a marked advance on its three predecessors, and Stephanus shows himself to be a capable editor of Plato. Thus in 121c6 he restores οὖν to its correct place; 124a8 ἄρχομεν Steph. *recte*, ἀρχόμεθα Ald. Bas.<sup>1</sup> <sup>2</sup>; 126d4 αἰσθέσθαι Steph. *recte*, ἔσεσθαι Ald. Bas.<sup>1</sup> <sup>2</sup>; 126d9 παρέχοι Steph. *recte*, -ει Ald. Bas.<sup>1</sup> <sup>2</sup>; and he offers certain plausible or true readings *i.m.* (some by conjecture, others doubtless as variants found in other mss.), e.g., 121d1 δοκεῖ γάρ μοι Steph., δοκῶ γάρ μοι *cett.*; 122d7 προσαγορεύωμεν Steph. *recte*

(BTW), -εύομεν Ald. Bas.<sup>1 2</sup>; 127a5 ἀναλώσεις *ci.* Steph. *recte* (BTW), -σαις Ald. Bas.<sup>1 2</sup>; 127b8 ἀπαλλάξετε Steph. *recte* (BTW), -ατε Ald. Bas.<sup>1 2</sup>; 129a2 ἔρεσθε Steph. *recte*, ἔρεσθαι Ald. Bas.<sup>1 2</sup>; 130d3 μέν τι νῆ τοὺς θεοὺς Steph., μὲν νῆ τοὺς θεοὺς *cett.* (he is also responsible for the word separation at 129e9 accepted into most texts). Alline's assertion (317), that Stephanus used Par.1811 as the main source for his edition, is not true, since the many traces of that ms. in Steph. are simply the result of this edition's dependence on Ald., which does draw on Par.1811 (see above).

**Fic.** Florence - Latin translation by Marsilio Ficino (1485, 28 years before the Aldine *editio princeps*; for the purpose of this collation I have used the 1539 Basel edition of the translation). I shall restrict my comments about this translation, since Ficino is frequently loose in his rendering of the Greek, and it is not always a simple matter to determine if this is an attempt to achieve clarity, or if in fact it is a reflection of the text he had before him. In any event, Ficino's exemplar was clearly Flor.a or one of its descendants (cf. M Sicherl, *Scriptorium* 16 [1962] 51): 123c6ff. Ficino omits c6 ἀνώνυμος...c9 πότερον (*Quam igitur nunc cupis? Utrum illam quidem nosti nomen autem ignoras? vel nomen etiam tenes?*), which is the pattern in Flor.a and its offspring Flor.c o Ven.189; 123a6 *quasi* Fic., ὥς Flor.a c o Ven.189, but ὥς δὲ *cett.*, for which we would have expected *quasi vero* or *quasi scilicet*. Apart from these features it is difficult to argue from specific points of detail. But the possibility that Ficino used a copy of Flor.a no longer extant must be seriously considered. For example, in 123b3 he writes *At si cuperes*, implying εἰ ἐπεθύμεις in his exemplar (Coisl.155 Flor.b, ἐπιθυμεῖς *cett.*); 125a6 *consultemus* Fic., βουλευώμεθα *recc.*, βουλευόμεθα Flor.a c o Ven.189; 125d7 *nescio* Fic., οἶδ'

*om.* Flor.a c o Ven.189; 127b8 *obsecro liberetis* Fic., ἀπαλλάξατε *recc.*, —ετε Flor.a c o Ven.189; 129d4 *In expeditionem nanque exiit Neonus Cali filius* Fic., ἐπὶ γὰρ τῇ ἐπὶ στρατείαν ἐξορμῇ Σαννίωνος τοῦ καλοῦ Flor.a c Ven.189, Σαννέωνος Flor.o. But Ficino was constrained, unlike an ordinary scribe, to turn Greek into intelligible Latin, and therefore could have arrived at correct readings by his own divination. Further, Ficino did not feel compelled to translate a passage if he could not understand it; cf. 129a3 ἡνίκα ἀποθανούμενος ἦει εὐθὺ τοῦ δαιμονίου *codd.*, *cum iam moriturus esset* Fic., omitting εὐθὺ τοῦ δαιμονίου, which merely proves that he could derive no more sense from this crux than modern editors have been able to do (see **Appendix 3**). It is difficult to know what to make of 122a7-8: ᾧ ἂν ἐγὼ μάλιστα ἐβουλόμην περὶ τῶν τοιούτων μέλλων πράξειν συμβουλευσασθαι *codd.*, *quem quidem hac in re mihi consultorem maxime cupiebam* Fic. Did Ficino read δῇ (*quidem*) for ἂν (*ci.* Cobet)?

#### *e. Modern Editions*

Bekker's edition of 1826 represents the first advancement on Stephanus' Vulgate text. Bekker was aware of and utilized far more mss. (13) than Stephanus had done, but he followed no scientific principles in producing his edition, nor did Stallbaum (1836), who added several mss. to the total number of those collated which contained *Thg.* Baiter's Zurich edition (1839) relies exclusively on previous editions, as does the Teubner edition of Hermann (1873).

Up to this point the authority of B was recognized, and editors followed it as far as possible. However, since the Clarkianus was viewed as the *codex optimus*, little systematic attention was paid to the possibility

that other mss. might be primary witnesses, until Schanz proved the value of T, and founded his edition (Tauschnitz, 1882) on the basis of both B and T. Burnet took account of these two mss. for his edition of the dialogue (1903), and reported a third witness as well, the Vienna ms. W. But Burnet did not collate W for himself, and his account of it is incomplete. Souilhé's edition (1930) basically reproduces the reports of B and T in Burnet, but furnishes a much fuller catalogue of the readings in W.

The present edition of *Thg.* differs from previous editions in a number of ways. In the first place, it is based on a consideration of all known mss. of the dialogue (except Escor.), and of all but a very small number of printed editions; it also takes into account the indirect tradition to a fuller extent than has previously been done. It has been possible therefore to record the earliest authority or authorities for any reading that is accepted into the text. In the second place, this edition departs from the most widely used editions in a number of the readings that are adopted in the text itself (see the list following the text for a catalogue of the departures from Burnet and Souilhé). It is perhaps most important, however, that the reports of our primary witnesses, BTW, are intended to be as full as possible. The reports of these mss. by Burnet and Souilhé were never meant to be exhaustive; and, although I have already spoken about the different kinds of inaccuracy in earlier collations of BTW which the present reports attempt to remedy (see above on B, T, and W), a brief word about the scope of the *apparatus criticus* of this edition as it differs from those of Burnet and Souilhé seems in order. Virtually all variants in BTW are recorded: apparent *minutiae* of an orthographic kind are noticed (e.g., ἀεί~αἰεί, ἦ~ῆ, δέ~δαί, -ῆ~-ει in second person singular middle); all erasures where a change in reading has been effected are listed (as far as



this has been possible to judge where photographs alone have been used); and all variants added *i.m.* or *s.l.* are entered in the apparatus. I have been rather more selective on details such as word separation and accent; but where a scribe or corrector in B, T, or W has altered a ms. on such a point, this fact is stated; so too where a particular accentuation is introduced by a modern editor (indicated usually by "*edd.*"). This edition also returns to nineteenth-century editorial practice in printing ξυν— or ξυγ— where the primary witnesses favour this spelling, and in recording variations in this spelling among our primary witnesses.<sup>12</sup> Where editorial activity of one kind or another has taken place in B, T, or W, I have always attempted to distinguish the earliest hand from contemporary or later correctors. Moreover, secondary mss. will be mentioned in the *apparatus* only when a reading in one has been accepted into the text, or has anticipated a modern correction, and not as a source of variants. While the *apparatus* is for the most part positive, it has not seemed necessary to record the readings of all three primary witnesses when confusion is unlikely to occur.

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<sup>12</sup>For the evidence and justification of this method, see J. Kerscheneiner, *Münchener Studien zur Sprachwissenschaft* 12 (1956) 28-41.



## SIGLA

<b>B</b>	<i>Clarkianus</i> 39 (895 A.D.), ff. 277r-282r
<b>B<sup>c</sup></b>	idem post correctiones manus primae
<b>B<sup>2</sup></b>	eiusdem vetus diorthotes (fortasse Arethas)
<b>vet.b</b>	manus saeculi x-xi (R <sup>2</sup> Schanz)
<b>b</b>	eiusdem manus recentiores
<b>T</b>	<i>Venetus App. Cl.</i> 4.1 (c. 950), ff. 130r-132r
<b>T<sup>c</sup></b>	eiusdem vetus diorthotes (eadem atque manus prima)
<b>t</b>	eiusdem manus recentiores
<b>W</b>	<i>Vindobonensis Suppl. Gr.</i> 7 (s. xi [?]), ff. 494r-499r
<b>W<sup>c</sup></b>	eiusdem vetus diorthotes (eadem atque manus prima)

Hic illic codices recentiores citantur

<b>Par.1808</b>	<i>Parisinus Gr.</i> 1808
<b>Par.1811</b>	<i>Parisinus Gr.</i> 1811
<b>Par.1812</b>	<i>Parisinus Gr.</i> 1812
<b>Coisl.155</b>	<i>Coislinianus Gr.</i> 155
<b>Vat.1029</b>	<i>Vaticanus Gr.</i> 1029
<b>Vat.1030</b>	<i>Vaticanus Gr.</i> 1030
<b>Pal.175</b>	<i>Palatinus Gr.</i> 175
<b>Urb.80</b>	<i>Urbinas Gr.</i> 80
<b>Ang.107</b>	<i>Angelicanus Gr.</i> 107 (olim C.1.4)
<b>Ven.184</b>	<i>Venetus</i> 184
<b>Ven.186</b>	<i>Venetus</i> 186
<b>Ven.189</b>	<i>Venetus</i> 189
<b>Flor.b</b>	<i>Laurentianus</i> 85.6
<b>Flor.c</b>	<i>Laurentianus</i> 85.9
<b>Ambros.329</b>	<i>Ambrosianus</i> 329 (F 19 Sup.)
<b>Ambros.409</b>	<i>Ambrosianus</i> 409 (G 69 Sup.)
<b>M</b>	<i>Malatestianus</i> D 28.4
<b>Neap.337</b>	<i>Neapolitanus</i> 337
<b>Lobc.</b>	<i>Radnice</i> VI F.a.1 ( <i>Lobcovicianus</i> )
<b>Ficino</b>	Marsilii Ficini interpretatio in linguam latinam, Laurenti, 1485
<b>Stephanus</b>	Henrici Stephani (Henri Estienne) editio, Parisiis, 1578
<b>codd.</b>	omnium codicum consensus
<b>s.l.</b>	lectio supra lineam
<b>i.m.</b>	lectio in margine
<b>i.m. γρ.</b>	varia lectio in margine cum nota γρ(άφεται)
<b>i.r.</b>	lectio in rasuram
<b>a.c.</b>	lectio ante correctionem
<b>p.c.</b>	lectio post correctionem
<b>comp.</b>	lectio in compendio

## ΘΕΑΓΗΣ

St. I

ΔΗ. ὦ Σώκρατες, ἐδεόμην ἅττα σοι ἰδιολογήσασθαι, εἰ σχολή· κἂν εἰ ἀσχολία δὲ μὴ πάνυ τις μεγάλη, ὅμως ἐμοῦ ἔνεκεν ποίησαι σχολήν.

121a

ΣΩ. Ἀλλὰ καὶ ἄλλως τυγχάνω σχολάζων, καὶ δὴ σοῦ γε ἔνεκα καὶ πάνυ. ἀλλ' εἴ τι βούλει λέγειν, ἔξεστιν.

5

ΔΗ. Βούλει οὖν δεῦρο εἰς τὴν τοῦ Διδὸς τοῦ ἐλευθερίου στοὰν ἐκποδὼν ἀποχωρήσωμεν;

ΣΩ. Εἰ σοὶ δοκεῖ.

ΔΗ. Ἴωμεν δὴ. ὦ Σώκρατες, πάντα τὰ φυτὰ κινδυνεύει τὸν αὐτὸν τρόπον ἔχειν, καὶ τὰ ἐκ τῆς γῆς φυόμενα καὶ τὰ ζῶα τὰ τε ἄλλα καὶ ἄνθρωπος. καὶ γὰρ ἐν τοῖς φυτοῖς ῥῆστον ἡμῖν τοῦτο γίγνεται, ὅσοι τὴν γῆν γεωργοῦμεν, τὸ παρασκευάσασθαι πάντα τὰ πρὸ τοῦ φυτεῦειν καὶ αὐτὸ τὸ φυτεῦσαι· ἐπειδὴ δὲ τὸ φυτευθὲν βιώ, μετὰ τοῦτο θεραπεία τοῦ φύντος καὶ πολλὴ καὶ χαλεπὴ καὶ δύσκολος γίγνεται. οὕτω δὲ ἔχειν ἔοικε καὶ τὸ περὶ τῶν ἀνθρώπων· ἀπὸ τῶν ἐμαντοῦ ἐγὼ πραγμάτων τεκμαίρομαι καὶ ἐς τᾶλλα. καὶ γὰρ ἐμοὶ ἢ τοῦ ὕεος τουτουί, εἴτε φυτεῖαν εἴτε παιδοποιίαν δεῖ αὐτὴν ὀνομάζειν, πάντων ῥῆστη γέγονεν, ἢ δὲ τροφὴ δύσκολός τε καὶ αἰὲ ἐν φόβῳ περὶ αὐτοῦ δεδιότι. τὰ μὲν οὖν ἄλλα πολλὰ ἂν εἶη λέγειν, ἢ δὲ νῦν παροῦσα ἐπιθυμία τούτῳ πάνυ με φοβεῖ—ἔστι μὲν γὰρ οὐκ ἀγεννής,

b

5

c

5

121b1 πάντα - c5 δεδιότι = Stobaeus II.31.60 (= II.212.2-13 W-H)

121c3 καὶ - c4 ὀνομάζειν cf. Dionysium Halicarnasenseum *Rh.* 405 (= II.381.5-7 Usener-Radermacher)

**Tit.** Θεάγης ἢ περὶ σοφίας **T et Diogenes Laertius 3.59 (F):** Θεάγης ἢ περὶ σωφροσύνης **B<sup>2</sup>W:** περὶ φιλοσοφίας **B<sup>2</sup> (i.m.), Diogenes Laertius 3.59 (BP)** || **121a1** ἰδιολογήσασθαι *codd.*: διαλογίσασθαι **Cobet** || δὲ *codd.*: ἀλλὰ **Cobet:** γε **Ast** || τις **T:** τίς **BW** || **a3** ἔνεκεν *re vera* **BTW** || **a7** ἐκποδὼν *edd.*: ἐκποδῶν **BTW** || **a8** εἰ σοὶ *edd.*: εἴ σοι **BTW** || **b1** *post* δὴ *punct.* **Cobet:** *post* Σώκρατες *codd.* || **b3** ἄνθρωπος **Schanz:** ἄνθρωπος *codd.*, **Stobaeus** || **b6** ἐπειδὴν *codd.*: ἐπὶ **Stobaeus** || **c2** τᾶλλα **BW:** τὰ ἄλλα **T, Stobaeus** || **c3** τουτουί *codd.*: τούτου **Stobaeus** || **c4** γέγονεν ἢ δὲ **TW, Stobaeus:** γέγονεν δὲ **B (alt. v eras.)** || **c5** αἰὲ **BW:** αἰεὶ **T: om. Stobaeus** || **c6** πολλὰ ἂν *codd.*: πολὺ ἂν ἔργον **Cobet** ||

σφαλερὰ δέ-ἐπιθυμεῖ γὰρ δὴ οὗτος ἡμῖν, ὦ Σώκρατες, ὥς  
 φησι, σοφὸς γενέσθαι. δοκῶ γάρ μοι, τῶν ἡλικιωτῶν τινες d  
 αὐτοῦ καὶ δημοτῶν, εἰς τὸ ἄστν καταβαίνοντες, λόγους τι-  
 νὰς ἀπομνημονεύοντες διαταράττουσιν αὐτόν, οὓς ἐζήλω-  
 κεν καὶ πάλαι μοι πράγματα παρέχει, ἀξιῶν ἐπιμεληθῆναί  
 με ἑαυτοῦ καὶ χρήματα τελέσαι τινὶ τῶν σοφιστῶν, ὅστις 5  
 αὐτὸν σοφὸν ποιήσει. ἐμοὶ δὲ τῶν μὲν χρημάτων καὶ ἔλατ-  
 τον μέλει, ἡγοῦμαι δὲ τοῦτον οὐκ εἰς μικρὸν κίνδυνον ἵεναι 122  
 οἷ σπεύδει. τέως μὲν οὖν αὐτὸν κατεῖχον παραμυθούμενος·  
 ἐπειδὴ δὲ οὐκέτι οἷός τέ εἰμι, ἡγοῦμαι κράτιστον εἶναι  
 πείθεσθαι αὐτῷ, ἵνα μὴ πολλάκις ἄνευ ἐμοῦ συγγενόμενός  
 τῷ διαφθαρῇ. νῦν οὖν ἤκω ἐπ' αὐτὰ ταῦτα, ἵνα τῷ τούτων 5  
 τῶν σοφιστῶν δοκούντων εἶναι συστήσω τουτονί. σὺ οὖν  
 ἡμῖν εἰς καλὸν παρεφάνης, ὦ ἂν ἐγὼ μάλιστα ἐβουλόμην  
 περὶ τῶν τοιούτων μέλλων πράξειν συμβουλευσασθαι. ἀλλ'  
 εἴ τι ἔχεις συμβουλεύειν ἐξ ὧν ἐμοῦ ἀκήκοας, ἔξεστί τε  
 καὶ χρή. b

ΣΩ. Ἀλλὰ μὲν δὴ, ὦ Δημόδοκε, καὶ λέγεται γε συμ-  
 βουλή ἱερὸν χρήμα εἶναι. εἴπερ οὖν καὶ ἄλλη ἥτισοῦν  
 ἐστὶν ἱερά, καὶ αὕτη ἂν εἴη περὶ ἧς σὺ νῦν συμβουλεύῃ· 5  
 οὐ γὰρ ἔστι περὶ ὅτου θειοτέρου ἂν ἄνθρωπος βουλευσαιο  
 ἢ περὶ παιδείας καὶ αὐτοῦ καὶ τῶν αὐτοῦ οἰκείων. πρῶτον  
 μὲν οὖν ἐγὼ τε καὶ σὺ συνομολογήσωμεν τί ποτε οἰόμεθα  
 τοῦτο εἶναι περὶ οὗ βουλευόμεθα· μὴ γὰρ πολλάκις ἐγὼ  
 μὲν ἄλλο τι αὐτὸ ὑπολαμβάνω, σὺ δὲ ἄλλο, κᾶπειτα πόρρω c  
 που τῆς συνουσίας αἰσθώμεθα γελοῖοι ὄντες, ἐγὼ τε ὁ συμ-  
 βουλεύων καὶ σὺ ὁ συμβουλευόμενος, μηδὲν τῶν αὐτῶν  
 ἡγοῦμενοι.

122b2συμβουλή -3 χρήμα *resp. Proclus in Alc. 183.16 (= 85 Westerink)*

c8 ὥς φησι *edd.*: ὥς φησι T: ὥς φησὶ BW || d1 δοκεῖ γάρ μοι *ci.*  
*Stephanus*: δοκεῖν γάρ μοι Cobet: δοκῶ γάρ Beck || τινες B:  
 τινὲς TW || d5 ἑαυτοῦ BW *et* (ἐ *s.l. fec.*) T<sup>c</sup>: αὐτοῦ T || d6 αὐτόν  
 W: αὐτῶν BT || καὶ *secl.* Cobet (*om. Ambros.409*) || 122a1 μέλει  
 BW: μέλλει T || τοῦτον B<sup>c</sup> (*alt. o i.r. ex w*) *et* W: τούτων BT ||  
 μικρὸν BT: μακρὸν W || ἵεναι <ιόντα> *ci. Knebel* || a2 σπεύδει  
 <σπεύδοντα> Schanz || a3 οὐκέτι οἷος (οὐκ ἔτος *corr.*) T || a7  
 ἂν *codd.*: δὴ Cobet: "*quidem*" *vertit* Ficino || a8 <τι> πράξειν Cobet ||  
 b1 *post* χρή *add.* συμβουλευσασθαι W || b4 σὺ νῦν BT: νῦν σὺ  
 W || συμβουλεύῃ BTW: -ει (ει *ex η*) B<sup>c</sup> || b5 θειοτέρου (ρο *per*  
*litt.*) W || b6 *pr.* αὐτοῦ T<sup>c</sup>W: αὐτοῦ BT || *alt.* αὐτοῦ B: αὐτοῦ TW ||  
 c1 ὑπολαμβάνω *codd.*: -βάνων Cobet || c2 που BT: ποῦ W ||  
 συνουσίας BT: συνηθείας W || αἰσθώμεθα BT: -όμεθα W ||

ΔΗ. Ἀλλὰ μοι δοκεῖς ὀρθῶς λέγειν, ὦ Σώκρατες, καὶ 5  
ποιεῖν χρὴ οὕτω.

ΣΩ. Καὶ λέγω γε ὀρθῶς, οὐ μέντοι παντάπασί γε·  
σμικρὸν γάρ τι μετατίθεμαι. ἐννοῶ γὰρ μὴ καὶ ὁ μει-  
ρακίσκος οὗτος οὐ τούτου ἐπιθυμεῖ οὐδ' ἡμεῖς αὐτὸν οἰόμεθα  
ἐπιθυμεῖν ἀλλ' ἑτέρου, εἴτ' αὖ ἡμεῖς ἔτι ἀτοπώτεροι ὦμεν d  
περὶ ἄλλου του βουλευόμενοι. ὀρθότατον οὖν μοι δοκεῖ  
εἶναι ἀπ' αὐτοῦ τούτου ἄρχεσθαι, διαπυνθανομένους ὅτι καὶ  
ἔστιν οὐδ' ἐπιθυμεῖ.

ΔΗ. Κινδυνεύει γοῦν οὕτω βέλτιστον εἶναι ὥς σὺ λέγεις. 5

ΣΩ. Εἰπέ δὴ μοι, τί καλὸν ὄνομα τῷ νεανίσκῳ; τί αὐτὸν  
προσαγορεύωμεν;

ΔΗ. Θεάγης ὄνομα τούτῳ, ὦ Σώκρατες.

ΣΩ. Καλὸν γε, ὦ Δημόδοκε, τῷ ἡεῖ τὸ ὄνομα ἔθου καὶ  
ἱεροπρεπές. εἰπέ δὴ ἡμῖν, ὦ Θεάγες, ἐπιθυμεῖν φῆς σοφὸς e  
γενέσθαι, καὶ ἀξιοῖς σου τὸν πατέρα τόνδε ἐξευρεῖν ἀν-  
δρὸς τινος συνουσίαν τοιούτου ὅστις σε σοφὸν ποιήσῃ;

ΘΕ. Ναί.

ΣΩ. Σοφοὺς δὲ καλεῖς πότερον τοὺς ἐπιστήμονας, περὶ 5  
οὗτο ἀν' ἐπιστήμονες ὦσιν, ἢ τοὺς μὴ;

ΘΕ. Τοὺς ἐπιστήμονας ἔγωγε.

ΣΩ. Τί οὖν; οὐκ ἐδιδάξατό σε ὁ πατήρ καὶ ἐπαίδευσεν  
ἄπερ ἐνθάδε οἱ ἄλλοι πεπαίδευνται, οἱ τῶν καλῶν κάγαθῶν  
πατέρων ἡεῖς, οἷον γράμματά τε καὶ κιθαρίζειν καὶ παλαί- 10  
ειν καὶ τὴν ἄλλην ἀγωνίαν;

ΘΕ. Ἐμέ γε.

ΣΩ. Ἔτι οὖν οἶει τινὸς ἐπιστήμης ἐλλείπειν, ἧς προσ- 123  
ῆκει ὑπὲρ σοῦ τὸν πατέρα ἐπιμεληθῆναι;

ΘΕ. Ἐγώ γε.

ΣΩ. Τίς ἐστὶν αὕτη; εἰπέ καὶ ἡμῖν, ἵνα σοι χαρισώμεθα.

ΘΕ. Οἶδεν καὶ οὗτος, ὦ Σώκρατες—ἐπεὶ πολλάκις ἐγὼ 5  
αὐτῷ εἶρηκα—ἀλλὰ ταῦτα ἐξεπίτηδες πρὸς σὲ λέγει, ὥς δὴ  
οὐκ εἰδὼς οὐδ' ἐγὼ ἐπιθυμῶ· τοιαῦτα γὰρ ἕτερα καὶ πρὸς ἐμέ  
μάχεται τε καὶ οὐκ ἐθέλει με οὐδενὶ συστήσαι.

ΣΩ. Ἀλλὰ τὰ μὲν ἔμπροσθέν σοι ἦν πρὸς τοῦτον ῥηθέν-  
τα ὥσπερ ἄνευ μαρτύρων λεγόμενα· νυνὶ δὲ ἐμὲ ποιήσαι b

c8 τι om. W || d1 εἴτ' B<sup>c</sup> (acc. fec.): εἴτ' B || d2 του T: τοῦ BW ||  
ὀρθότατον BT: -ώτατον W || d6 καλὸν secl. ci. Balter, Wagner: καὶ  
Richards || d7 προσαγορεύωμεν BT: -εύομεν W: -εύω Richards ||  
d8 τούτῳ (acc. ex ou fec.) W || e3 σοφὸν (ν per litt., fort. s) W || e6 ἢ b  
(acc. fec.): ἢ B || e8 καὶ ἐπαίδευσεν secl. Cobet || e10 γράμματα  
BT: γράμμα W || 123a1 ἐλλείπειν B<sup>c</sup> (ei ex i fec.) et TW: -λιπειν  
B || a4 καὶ om. W || a5 οἶδεν B (ν del. b) || ἐγὼ αὐτῷ BT: αὐτῷ  
ἐγὼ W || a7 ἕτερα W et (i.m.) vet.b: ἔτι B: ἔτι καὶ ἕτερα T || a8  
οὐδενὶ BT: οὐδὲν W ||

- μάρτυρα, καὶ ἐναντίον ἐμοῦ κάτειπε τίς ἐστὶν αὕτη ἡ σοφία  
 τῆς ἐπιθυμείας. φέρε γάρ, εἰ ἐπεθύμεις ταύτης ἢ οἱ ἄνθρωποι  
 τὰ πλοῖα κυβερνῶσιν, καὶ ἐγὼ σε ἐτύγχανον ἀνερωτῶν·  
 "Ἦθ' θέαγες, τίνας ἐνδεῆς ὦν σοφίας μέμφῃ τῷ πατρὶ ὅτι  
 οὐκ ἐθέλει σε συνιστάναι παρ' ὧν ἂν σὺ σοφὸς γένοιο;" 5  
 τί ἂν μοι ἀπεκρίνω; τίνα αὐτὴν εἶναι; ἄρα οὐ κυβερνη-  
 τικήν;  
 ΘΕ. Ναί.  
 ΣΩ. Εἰ δὲ ἐπιθυμῶν ταύτην τὴν σοφίαν εἶναι σοφὸς ἢ  
 τὰ ἄρματα κυβερνῶσιν εἴτ' ἐμέμφου τῷ πατρί, ἐμοῦ αὖ  
 ἐρωτῶντος τίς ἐστὶν αὕτη ἡ σοφία, τίνα ἂν ἀπεκρίνω αὐ-  
 τὴν εἶναι; ἄρ' οὐχὶ ἡνιοχικήν;  
 ΘΕ. Ναί. 5  
 ΣΩ. Ἦς δὲ δὴ νῦν τυγχάνεις ἐπιθυμῶν, πότερον ἀνώ-  
 νυμὸς τίς ἐστὶν ἢ ἔχει ὄνομα;  
 ΘΕ. Οἶμαι ἔγωγε ἔχειν.  
 ΣΩ. Πότερον οὖν αὐτὴν μὲν οἶσθα, οὐ μέντοι τό γε  
 ὄνομα, ἢ καὶ τὸ ὄνομα; 10  
 ΘΕ. Καὶ τὸ ὄνομα ἔγωγε.  
 ΣΩ. Τί οὖν ἔστιν; εἰπέ.  
 ΘΕ. Τί δὲ ἄλλο, ὦ Σώκρατες, αὐτῇ ὀνομά τις φαίη ἂν  
 εἶναι ἄλλ' ἢ σοφίαν;  
 ΣΩ. Οὐκοῦν καὶ ἡ ἡνιοχία σοφία ἐστίν; ἢ ἀμαθία  
 δοκεῖ σοι εἶναι;  
 ΘΕ. Οὐκ ἔμοιγε. 5  
 ΣΩ. Ἀλλὰ σοφία;  
 ΘΕ. Ναί.  
 ΣΩ. Ἦι τί χρώμεθα; οὐχ ἢ ἵππων ἐπιστάμεθα ζεύγους  
 ἄρχειν;  
 ΘΕ. Ναί. 10  
 ΣΩ. Οὐκοῦν καὶ ἡ κυβερνητικὴ σοφία ἐστίν;  
 ΘΕ. Ἐμοιγε δοκεῖ.  
 ΣΩ. Ἦρ' οὐχ αὕτη ἢ πλοίων ἐπιστάμεθα ἄρχειν;  
 ΘΕ. Αὕτη μὲν οὖν.  
 ΣΩ. Ἦς δὲ δὴ σὺ ἐπιθυμείς ἡ σοφία τίς ἐστίν; ἢ τίνας 15  
 ἐπιστάμεθα ἄρχειν; e

**b2** ἐναντίον B<sup>c</sup> (ο ex ras. ω fec.) et TW: -ίων B || **b3** ἐπεθύμεις  
 Coisl.155<sup>c</sup> Flor.b: ἐπιθυμείας BTW || **b5** ὦν B<sup>c</sup> (acc. fec.): ὦν B ||  
 μέμφῃ W et (η s.l.) B<sup>2</sup>: -ει BT || **b6** ἐθέλει TW: -η B || συ (υ l.r.) B ||  
**c7** τίς BT: τις W || ἢ b (acc. fec.): ἢ B || **c10** ἢ b (acc. fec.): ἢ B || **c12**  
 ἔστιν edd.: ἐστὶν BTW (et punct. post εἰπέ) || **d3** ἡνιοχία T et W  
 (ἡ, ν ex μ fec.): -χία B || ἢ b (acc. fec.): ἢ B || **d6** σοφία BW: σοφία T ||  
**d13** οὐχ αὕτη vet.b: οὐκ αὐτὴ BTW || **d15** ἢ B<sup>c</sup> TW: η B || τίνας B:  
 τινος TW ||

- ΘΕ. Ἐμοὶ μὲν δοκεῖ, ἥ τῶν ἀνθρώπων.  
 ΣΩ. Μῶν ἥ τῶν καμνόντων;  
 ΘΕ. Οὐ δῆτα.  
 ΣΩ. Ἰατρικὴ γὰρ αὕτη ἐστίν· ἥ γάρ; 5  
 ΘΕ. Ναί.  
 ΣΩ. Ἄλλ' ἥ τῶν ἀδόντων ἐπιστάμεθα ἐν τοῖς χοροῖς  
 ἄρχειν;  
 ΘΕ. Οὐ.  
 ΣΩ. Μουσικὴ γὰρ αὕτη γε; 10  
 ΘΕ. Πάνυ γε.  
 ΣΩ. Ἄλλ' ἥ τῶν γυμναζομένων ἐπιστάμεθα ἄρχειν;  
 ΘΕ. Οὐ.  
 ΣΩ. Γυμναστικὴ γὰρ αὕτη γε;  
 ΘΕ. Ναί. 15  
 ΣΩ. Ἄλλ' ἥ τῶν τί ποιούντων; προθυμοῦ εἰπεῖν ὥσπερ  
 ἐγὼ σοὶ τὰ ἔμπροσθεν.  
 ΘΕ. Ἦι τῶν ἐν τῇ πόλει, ἔμοιγε δοκεῖ. 124  
 ΣΩ. Οὐκοῦν ἐν τῇ πόλει εἰσὶν καὶ οἱ κάμνοντες;  
 ΘΕ. Ναί, ἀλλ' οὐ τούτων λέγω μόνον, ἀλλὰ καὶ τῶν  
 ἄλλων τῶν ἐν τῇ πόλει.  
 ΣΩ. Ἐὰρ γε μανθάνω ἣν λέγεις τέχνην; δοκεῖς γάρ μοι  
 λέγειν οὐχ ἥ τῶν θεριζόντων ἐπιστάμεθα ἄρχειν καὶ τρυγ-  
 ώντων καὶ τῶν φυτευόντων καὶ σπειρόντων καὶ ἀλοώντων·  
 αὕτη μὲν γὰρ γεωργικὴ, ἥ τούτων ἄρχομεν. ἥ γάρ;  
 ΘΕ. Ναί.  
 ΣΩ. Οὐδέ γε οἶμαι ἥ τῶν πριζόντων καὶ τρυπώντων καὶ 5  
 ξεόντων καὶ τορνευόντων ξυμπάντων ἐπιστάμεθα ἄρχειν,  
 οὐ ταύτην λέγεις· αὕτη μὲν γὰρ οὐ τεκτονικὴ;  
 ΘΕ. Ναί.  
 ΣΩ. Ἄλλ' ἴσως ἥ τούτων τε πάντων καὶ αὐτῶν τῶν 5  
 γεωργῶν καὶ τῶν τεκτόνων καὶ τῶν δημιουργῶν ἀπάντων  
 καὶ τῶν ἰδιωτῶν καὶ τῶν γυναικῶν καὶ ἀνδρῶν, ταύτην ἴσ-  
 ως λέγεις τὴν σοφίαν.  
 ΘΕ. Ταύτην πάλαι, ὦ Σώκρατες, βούλομαι λέγειν.  
 ΣΩ. Ἐχεις οὖν εἰπεῖν, Αἴγισθος ὁ Ἀγαμέμνονα ἀπο- 5  
 κτείνας ἐν Ἄργει ἄρα τούτων ἦρχεν ὦν σὺ λέγεις, τῶν τε

e2 ἥ Ven.186<sup>2</sup> Par.1811 1812 Flor.a b Vat.1029 Lobc. Coisl.155.: ἥ  
 BTW || e3 ἥ Ven.186<sup>2</sup> Par.1808<sup>c</sup> Coisl.155.: ἥ BTW || e10 μουσικὴ M  
 Par.1812 Urb.80: μουσικῆς BTW || e14 γε om. W || e15 ναί om. W ||  
 e17 ἐγὼ σοὶ B: ἐγὼ σοι TW || 124a5 ἄρα B: ἄρα TW || a6  
 τρυγώντων BW et (ω ex o fec.) t: -όντων T || τῶν (comp.) ante  
 τρυγόντων s.l. add. T<sup>c</sup> || a7 ἀλοώντων TW: ἀλ- B || b1 πριόν-  
 των Cobet || b2 τορνευόντων (pr. τ p.c.) W || c2 ἄρα BW: ἄρα T ||



- δημιουργῶν καὶ ἰδιωτῶν καὶ ἀνδρῶν καὶ γυναικῶν συμπάν-  
των, ἢ ἄλλων τινῶν;
- ΘΕ. Οὐκ, ἀλλὰ τούτων. 5
- ΣΩ. Τί δὲ δὴ; Πηλεὺς ὁ Αἰακοῦ ἐν Φθίᾳ οὐ τῶν αὐτῶν  
τούτων ἦρχεν;
- ΘΕ. Ναί.
- ΣΩ. Περίανδρον δὲ τὸν Κυψέλου ἄρχοντα ἐν Κορίνθῳ 10  
ἤδη ἀκήκοας γενέσθαι;
- ΘΕ. Ἐγώ γε.
- ΣΩ. Οὐ τῶν αὐτῶν τούτων ἄρχοντα ἐν τῇ αὐτοῦ πόλει;
- ΘΕ. Ναί. d
- ΣΩ. Τί δὲ Ἀρχέλαον τὸν Περδίκκου, τὸν νεωστὶ τοῦτον  
ἄρχοντα ἐν Μακεδονίᾳ; οὐ τῶν αὐτῶν ἡγῆ τούτων ἄρχειν;
- ΘΕ. Ἐγώ γε.
- ΣΩ. Ἰππίαν δὲ τὸν Πεισιστράτου ἐν τῇδε τῇ πόλει 5  
ἄρξαντα τίνων οἶει ἄρξαι; οὐ τούτων;
- ΘΕ. Πῶς γὰρ οὐ;
- ΣΩ. Εἵποις ἂν οὖν μοι τίνα ἐπωνυμίαν ἔχει Βάκισ τε  
καὶ Σίβυλλα καὶ ὁ ἡμεδαπὸς Ἀμφίλυτος;
- ΘΕ. Τίνα γὰρ ἄλλην, ὦ Σώκρατες, πλὴν γε χρησμφδοί; 10
- ΣΩ. Ὅρθως λέγεις. ἀλλὰ καὶ τούσδε μοι οὕτω πειρῶ  
ἀποκρίνασθαι, τίνα ἐπωνυμίαν ἔχει Ἰππίας καὶ Περίανδρος  
διὰ τὴν αὐτὴν ἀρχήν;
- ΘΕ. Οἶμαι μὲν τύραννοι· τί γὰρ ἄλλο;
- ΣΩ. Οὐκοῦν ὅστις ἐπιθυμεῖ τῶν ἀνθρώπων τῶν ἐν τῇ 5  
πόλει συμπάντων ἄρχειν, τῆς αὐτῆς ἀρχῆς τούτοις ἐπι-  
θυμεῖ, τυραννικῆς, καὶ τύραννος εἶναι;
- ΘΕ. φαίνεται.
- ΣΩ. Οὐκοῦν ταύτης ἐπιθυμεῖν σὺ φῆς;
- ΘΕ. Ἐοικέν γε ἐξ ὧν ἐγὼ εἶπον. 10
- ΣΩ. ὦ μιανέ, τυραννεῖν ἄρα ἡμῶν ἐπιθυμῶν πάσαι  
ἐμέμφου τῷ πατρὶ ὅτι σε οὐκ ἔπεμπεν εἰς διδασκάλου 125  
τυραννοδιδασκάλου τινός; καὶ σύ, ὦ Δημόδοκε, οὐκ αἰσχύνῃ

124d9 *resp. Timaeus Lex. s.v. ἡμεδαπός* (= 74 Ruhnkenius)

c4 ἢ b (*acc. fec.*): ἢ B || c6 δὲ BW: δαὶ B<sup>c</sup> (αι *i.r. ex e*) et T || c12  
αὐτοῦ B: αὐτοῦ TW || d2 δὲ BW: δαὶ B<sup>c</sup> (αι *i.r. ex e*) et T || τοῦτον  
Urb.80 Ambros.409 Par.1812: τούτων BTW: *secl. ci. Stephanus* || d3  
ἡγῆ W et (η *s.l.*) B<sup>2</sup>: -εἶ BT || d6 τίνων BT: τίνα W || d8 Σίβυλλα  
(β *p.c.*) W || e3 αὐτὴν BTW: αὐτῶν Urb.80: αὐτῶν *ci. Baiter* || e9  
ἐπιθυμεῖν TW et (ν *s.l.*) B<sup>c</sup>: -εἰς B || e10 ἔοικά Shorey || 125a1  
διδασκάλου *secl. Schleiermacher*: διδασκαλεῖον Sydenham || a2  
αἰσχύνῃ (η *s.l.*) B<sup>2</sup>: -εἰ BTW ||

πάλαι εἰδὼς οὐ ἐπιθυμεῖ οὗτος, καὶ ἔχων ὅθι πέμψας αὐτὸν  
δημιουργὸν ἂν ἐποίησας τῆς σοφίας ἧς ἐπιθυμεῖ, ἔπειτα  
φθονεῖς τε αὐτῷ καὶ οὐκ ἐθέλεις πέμπειν; ἀλλὰ νῦν—ὄρᾳς;— 5  
ἐπειδὴ ἐναντίον ἐμοῦ κατείρηκέ σου, κοινῇ βουλευόμεθα  
ἐγὼ τε καὶ σὺ ἐς τίνος ἂν αὐτὸν πέμποιμεν καὶ διὰ τὴν  
τίνος συνουσίαν σοφὸς ἂν γένοιτο τύραννος;

ΔΗ. Ναὶ μὰ Δία, ὦ Σώκρατες, βουλευόμεθα δῆτα, ὥς 10  
δοκεῖ γέ μοι βουλῆς δεῖν περὶ τούτου οὐ φαύλης.

ΣΩ. Ἔασον, ὠγαθέ. διαπυθώμεθα αὐτοῦ πρῶτον ἱκανῶς.

ΔΗ. Πυνθάνου δῆ.

ΣΩ. Τί οὖν ἂν εἰ Εὐριπίδῃ τι προσχρησαίμεθα, ὦ Θέαγες; 5  
Εὐριπίδης γάρ πού φησιν—

σοφοὶ τύραννοι τῶν σοφῶν συνουσίᾳ.

εἰ οὖν ἔροιτό τις τὸν Εὐριπίδην· "ᾧ Εὐριπίδῃ, τῶν τί 10  
σοφῶν συνουσίᾳ φῆς σοφοὺς εἶναι τοὺς τυράννους;" ὥσπερ  
ἂν εἰ εἰπόντα—

σοφοὶ γεωργοὶ τῶν σοφῶν συνουσίᾳ,

ἡρόμεθα "τῶν τί σοφῶν;" τί ἂν ἡμῖν ἀπεκρίνατο; ἄρ' ἂν 5  
ἄλλο τι ἢ τῶν τὰ γεωργικά;

ΘΕ. Οὐκ, ἀλλὰ τοῦτο.

ΣΩ. Τί δὲ εἰ εἶπε—

σοφοὶ μάγειροι τῶν σοφῶν συνουσίᾳ,

εἰ ἡρόμεθα· "τῶν τί σοφῶν;" τί ἂν ἡμῖν ἀπεκρίνατο; οὐχ 10  
ὅτι τῶν τὰ μαγειρικά;

ΘΕ. Ναί

ΣΩ. Τί δ' εἰ—

125b7 σοφοὶ...συνουσίᾳ *resp.* Aulus Gellius 13.19.1 ["Plato in *Theaeteto*" (*sic*)]

a3 ὅθι *codd.*: ὅποι Bekker: οἱ Cobet || a5 φθονεῖς τε BT: φθον—  
εἶσθαι W || a6 βουλευόμεθα (ω ex ο) b et Ven.186 Par.1811 1812  
M<sup>c</sup> Ang.107<sup>2</sup> Vat.1029 Urb.80 Flor.o: —όμεθα BTW || a7 ἐς τίνος ex  
ἐς τίνα (*corr.* Coisl. 155) *fec.* Bekker: ἐστὶν οἱ B: ἔστιν οἱ B<sup>c</sup> (*acc.*  
*fec.*) et TW || a8 τίνος B<sup>c</sup> (*acc. fec.*): τινὸς B || b1 βουλευόμεθα  
BT: —όμεθα W || b2 γέ BW et (γ i. r.) T<sup>c</sup>: δέ a.c. T (*ut vid.*) || b3  
διαπυθώμεθα BT: —όμεθα W || b5 τι *edd.*: τί BTW || προσ—  
χρησαίμεθα BT: —όμεθα W || b6 πού φησιν *edd.*: που φησὶν B  
(φήσιν B<sup>c</sup>) et TW || b7 συνουσίᾳ *edd.*: —σία BTW (*et sic* c1, c13,  
d4) || c3 συνουσίᾳ T: —σια BW || c4 ἡρόμεθα TW et (ο ex ω *fec.*) b:  
ἡρώμεθα B || τί ἂν ἡμῖν ἀπεκρίνατο BTW: τί ἂν οἶει αὐτὸν  
ἀποκρίνασθαι *i.m.* γρ. T et (οἶη) W et vet.b || c7 δὲ TW et B (*ut vid.*):  
δαὶ (αι *i.r.* ex ε) B<sup>c</sup> || c8 συνουσίᾳ T: —σια BW || c10 τῶν τὰ  
μαγειρικά Hirschig: τῶν μαγείρων BTW: τῶν μαγειρικῶν *i. m.*  
γρ. TW ||

- σοφοὶ παλαισταὶ τῶν σοφῶν συνουσίᾳ  
εἶπεν, εἰ ἡρόμεθα· "Τῶν τί σοφῶν;" ἄρα οὐκ ἂν τῶν  
παλαίειν ἔφη; d
- ΘΕ. Ναί.
- ΣΩ. Ἐπειδὴ δὲ εἶπε—  
σοφοὶ τύραννοι τῶν σοφῶν συνουσίᾳ,  
ἡμῶν ἐρωτῶντων· "Τῶν τί σοφῶν λέγεις, ὦ Εὐριπίδη;" 5  
τί ἂν φαίη; ποῖ' αὖτε εἶναι ταῦτα;
- ΘΕ. Ἀλλὰ μὰ Δί' οὐκ οἶδ' ἔγωγε.
- ΣΩ. Ἀλλὰ βούλει ἐγὼ σοι εἴπω;
- ΘΕ. Εἰ σὺ βούλει.
- ΣΩ. Ταῦτ' ἐστὶν ἅπερ ἔφη Ἀνακρέων τὴν Καλλικρίτην 10  
ἐπίστασθαι· ἢ οὐκ οἶσθα τὸ ᾄσμα;
- ΘΕ. Ἐγώ γε.
- ΣΩ. Τί οὖν; τοιαύτης τινὸς καὶ σὺ συνουσίας ἐπιθυμεῖς  
ἀνδρὸς ὅστις τυγχάνει ὁμότεχνος ὡς Καλλικρίτη τῇ Κυάν- e  
ης καὶ ἐπίσταται τυραννικά, ὥσπερ ἐκείνην ἔφη ὁ ποιητής,  
ἵνα καὶ σὺ ἡμῖν τύραννος γένη καὶ τῇ πόλει;
- ΘΕ. Πάσαι, ὦ Σώκρατες, σκώπτεις καὶ παίζεις πρὸς με.
- ΣΩ. Τί δέ; οὐ ταύτης φῆς τῆς σοφίας ἐπιθυμεῖν ἢ 5  
πάντων ἂν τῶν πολιτῶν ἄρχοις; τοῦτο δὲ ποιῶν ἄλλο τι ἢ  
τύραννος ἂν εἴης;
- ΘΕ. Εὐξαίμην μὲν ἂν οἶμαι ἔγωγε τύραννος γενέσθαι,  
μάλιστα μὲν πάντων ἀνθρώπων, εἰ δὲ μή, ὥς πλείστων· καὶ 126  
σύ γ' ἂν οἶμαι καὶ οἱ ἄλλοι πάντες ἄνθρωποι—ἔτι δέ γε  
ἴσως μᾶλλον θεὸς γενέσθαι—ἀλλ' οὐ τούτου ἔλεγον ἐπι-  
θυμεῖν.
- ΣΩ. Ἀλλὰ τί δὴ ἐστὶ ποτε οὗ ἐπιθυμεῖς; οὐ τῶν 5  
πολιτῶν φῆς ἄρχειν ἐπιθυμεῖν;
- ΘΕ. Οὐ βίᾳ γε οὐδ' ὥσπερ οἱ τύραννοι ἀλλ' ἐκόντων,  
ὥσπερ καὶ οἱ ἄλλοι οἱ ἐν τῇ πόλει ἐλλόγιμοι ἄνδρες.
- ΣΩ. Ἄρα γε λέγεις ὥσπερ Θεμιστοκλῆς καὶ Περικλῆς  
καὶ Κίμων καὶ ὅσοι τὰ πολιτικὰ δεινοὶ γεγόνασιν; 10
- ΘΕ. Νῆ Δία τούτους λέγω.
- ΣΩ. Τί οὖν εἰ τὰ ἱππικὰ ἐτύγχανες ἐπιθυμῶν σοφὸς

d6 φαίη TW *et* (η s.l.) B<sup>2</sup>: φαίην B || ποῖ' αὖ *scripsi*: ποῖα ἂν TW:  
ποῖα ἂ B: ποῖα Hermann: "*fort.* ποῖα δὴ" Burnet || d7 ἔγωγε TW *et*  
(γω s.l.) B<sup>c</sup>: ἔγε B || d10 καλλικρίτην Ambros.409 Ang.107:  
-κρήτην BTW || d11 ἢ b (*acc. fec.*): ἦ B || ᾄσμα B, ι *add.* B<sup>c</sup> (*i.e.*  
ᾠσμα) || d13 σὺ BT: *om.* W || e1 καλλικρίτη Ambros.409: -κρήτη  
BTW || κυάνης B: κυανῆς TW || e3 σὺ (υ i.r.) B || καὶ τῇ BT: ἐν τῇ  
W *et* (ἐν s.l.) b || e5 δὲ TW: δαὶ B || 126a5 δὴ Flor.b Neap.337 Urb.80:  
δὲ BTW: δαὶ B<sup>c</sup> (αι i.r. ex e) || a9 ἄρα T: ἄρα B: ἄρά W ||

γενέσθαι; παρὰ τίνας ἂν ἀφικόμενος ᾤηθης δεινὸς ἔσεσθαι ἵππεύς; ἢ παρ' ἄλλους τινὰς ἢ τοὺς ἵππικούς;

ΘΕ. Μὰ Δία οὐκ ἔγωγε.

ΣΩ. Ἀλλὰ παρ' αὐτοὺς αὖ τοὺς δεινοὺς ὄντας ταῦτα, καὶ οἷς εἰσὶν τε ἵπποι καὶ χρῶνται ἐκάστοτε καὶ οἰκείοις καὶ ἄλλοτρίοις πολλοῖς.

ΘΕ. Δῆλον ὅτι.

ΣΩ. Τί δὲ εἰ τὰ ἀκοντιστικὰ σοφὸς ἐβούλου γενέσθαι; οὐ παρὰ τοὺς ἀκοντιστικούς ᾤου ἂν ἐλθὼν σοφὸς ἔσεσθαι τούτους, οἷς ἔστι τε ἀκοντῖα καὶ πολλοῖς καὶ ἄλλοτρίοις καὶ οἰκείοις ἐκάστοτε χρῶνται {ἀκοντίοις};

ΘΕ. Ἐμοιγε δοκεῖ.

ΣΩ. Λέγε δὴ μοι· ἐπεὶ δὲ δὴ τὰ πολιτικὰ βούλει σοφὸς γενέσθαι, οἷε παρ' ἄλλους τινὰς ἀφικόμενος σοφὸς ἔσεσθαι ἢ τοὺς πολιτικούς τούτους, τοὺς αὐτοὺς τε δεινοὺς ὄντας τὰ πολιτικὰ καὶ χρωμένους ἐκάστοτε τῇ τε αὐτῶν πόλει καὶ ἄλλαις πολλαῖς, καὶ Ἑλληνίσι προσομιλοῦντας πόλεις καὶ βαρβάροις; ἢ δοκεῖς ἄλλοις τισὶν συγγενόμενος σοφὸς ἔσεσθαι ταῦτα ἄπερ οὔτοι, ἀλλ' οὐκ αὐτοῖς τούτοις;

ΘΕ. Ἀκήκοα γάρ, ὦ Σώκратες, οὓς σέ φασι λέγειν τοὺς λόγους, ὅτι τούτων τῶν πολιτικῶν ἀνδρῶν οἱ ὑεῖς οὐδὲν βελτίους εἰσὶν ἢ οἱ τῶν σκυτοτόμων· καὶ μοι δοκεῖς ἀληθέστατα λέγειν ἐξ ὧν ἐγὼ δύναμαι αἰσθέσθαι. ἀνόητος οὖν ἂν εἴην εἰ οἰοίμην τινὰ τούτων ἐμοὶ μὲν ἂν παραδοῦναι τὴν αὐτοῦ σοφίαν, τὸν δὲ ὑὸν τὸν αὐτοῦ μηδὲν ὠφελῆσαι, εἴ τι οἷός τ' ἦν εἰς ταῦτα ὠφελεῖν ἄλλον ὀντιναοῦν ἀνθρώπων.

ΣΩ. Τί οὖν ἂν, ὦ βέλτιστε ἀνδρῶν, χρήσαιο σαυτῷ, εἴ σοι ἐπειδὴ γένοιτο ὑὸς τοιαῦτα πράγματα παρέχοι, καὶ φαίη μὲν ἂν ἐπιθυμεῖν ἀγαθὸς γενέσθαι ζωγράφος, καὶ μέμφοιτο σοὶ τῷ πατρὶ ὅτι οὐκ ἐθέλεις ἀναλίσκειν εἰς αὐτὸν τούτων αὐτῶν ἕνεκα ἀργυρίον, τοὺς δὲ δημιουργοὺς αὐτοῦ τούτου, τοὺς ζωγράφους, ἀτιμάζοι τε καὶ μὴ βούλοιτο παρ' αὐτῶν μαθάνειν; ἢ τοὺς ἀύλητάς, βουλόμενος ἀύλητῆς γενέσ-

**b1** παρὰ τίνας W: παρὰ τίνος B<sup>c</sup> (et sic Ar.sch.) et T: παρά τινος B || **b2** ἢ B: ἢ TW et b || **b5** οἷς εἰσὶν τε ἵπποι *l.m.* γρ. TW: οἷ εἰσί τε ἵππικοι BTW || **b8** δὲ B (ut vid.) et W: δαὶ B<sup>c</sup> (αι *i.r.* ex e) et T || **b10** ἔστι W: ἐστὶ T: ἐστίν B || **c1** ἀκοντίοις *secl.* Hirschig || **c3** ἐπεὶ δὲ δὴ BT: ἐπειδὴ δὲ δὴ W || **c5** δεινοὺς (o *per litt.*) W || **c6** αὐτῶν B: αὐτῶν TW || **c8** ἢ b (*acc. fec.*): ἢ B || τισὶν BT: τισὶ W et (v *del.*) b || **d1** οὓς σέ φασι *edd.*: οὓς σε φασὶ TW: οὓς σέ φασιν B || **d4** οὖν ἂν TW: ἂν οὖν B || **d5** παραδοῦναι BT: προδοῦναι W || **d6** *pr.* αὐτοῦ B: αὐτοῦ TW || <ἂν> ὠφελῆσαι Hirschig || **d8** χρήσαιο (αι *i.r.*) B || σαυτῷ *codd.*: αὐτῷ Schleiermacher: *secl.* Fritzsche || **d9** τοιαῦτα *codd.*: τοσαῦτα Richards || **e1** ἂν *codd.*: δὴ *ci.* Richards || **e2** σοὶ *edd.*: σοι BTW || ἐθέλεις *codd.*: -οις Richards ||

θαι, ἢ τοὺς κιθαριστάς; ἔχοις ἂν αὐτῷ ὅτι χρῶο καὶ ὅποι πέμπους ἄλλοσε μὴ ἐθέλοντα παρὰ τούτων μανθάνειν;

ΘΕ. Μὰ Δία οὐκ ἔγωγε.

ΣΩ. Νῦν οὖν ταῦτα ταῦτα αὐτὸς πρὸς τὸν πατέρα ποιῶν 127  
θαυμάζεις, καὶ μέμφῃ εἰ ἀπορεῖ ὅτι σοι χρήσεται καὶ ὅποι πέμψη; ἐπεὶ Ἀθηναίων γε τῶν καλῶν κάγαθῶν τὰ πολιτικὰ ὅτῳ ἂν βούλῃ συστήσομέν σε, ὅς σοι προῖκα συνέσται· καὶ ἅμα μὲν ἀγύριον οὐκ ἀναλώσεις, ἅμα δὲ πολὺ μᾶλλον 5  
εὐδοκιμήσεις παρὰ τοῖς πολλοῖς ἀνθρώποις ἢ ἄλλῳ τῷ συνῶν.

ΘΕ. Τί οὖν, ὦ Σώκρατες; οὐ καὶ σὺ τῶν καλῶν κάγαθῶν εἰ ἀνδρῶν; εἰ γὰρ σύ μοι ἐθέλοις συνεῖναι, ἐξαρκεῖ καὶ οὐδένα ἄλλον ζητῶ. 10

ΣΩ. Τί τοῦτο λέγεις, θέαγες; b

ΔΗ. ὦ Σώκρατες, οὐ μέντοι κακῶς λέγει, καὶ ἅμα μὲν ἔμοι χαριῇ· ὡς ἐγὼ οὐκ ἔσθ' ὅτι τούτου μείζον ἂν ἔρμαιον ἡγησαίμην, ἢ εἰ οὗτός τε ἀρέσκοιτο τῇ σῇ συνουσίᾳ καὶ σὺ ἐθέλοις τούτῳ συνεῖναι. καὶ μέντοι καὶ αἰσχύνομαι λέγειν 5  
ὡς σφόδρα βούλομαι. ἀλλ' ἐγὼ ἀμφοτέρων ὑμῶν δέομαι, σέ τ' ἐθέλειν τούτῳ συνεῖναι καὶ σὲ μὴ ζητεῖν ἄλλῳ μηδενὶ συγγενέσθαι ἢ Σωκράτει· καί με πολλῶν καὶ φοβερῶν ἀπαλλάξετε φροντίδων. ὡς νῦν πάννυ φοβοῦμαι ὑπὲρ τούτου μή 10  
τινὶ ἄλλῳ ἐντύχῃ οἷω τοῦτον διαφθεῖραι. c

ΘΕ. Μηκέτι νῦν, ὦ πάτερ, ὑπὲρ γ' ἐμοῦ φοβοῦ, εἴπερ οἷός τ' εἰ πεῖσαι τοῦτον τὴν ἐμὴν συνουσίαν προσδέξασθαι.

ΔΗ. Πάννυ καλῶς λέγεις. ὦ Σώκρατες, πρὸς σὲ δ' ἂν 5  
ἤδη εἴη ὁ μετὰ τοῦτο λόγος· ἐγὼ γάρ σοι ἔτοιμός εἰμι, ὡς διὰ βραχέων εἶπείν, καὶ ἐμὲ καὶ τὰ ἐμὰ ὡς οἷόν τε οἰκειότατα παρέχειν, ὅτου ἂν δέῃ ἔμβραχυ, ἐὰν θεάγῃ τουτονὶ ἀσπάζῃ τε καὶ εὐεργετῇς ὅτι ἂν οἷός τε ᾦς. d

ΣΩ. ὦ Δημόδοκε, τὸ μὲν ἐσπουδακέναι σε οὐ θαυμάζω, εἴπερ οἷει ὑπ' ἐμοῦ μάλιστ' ἂν σοι τοῦτον ὠφελῇσθαι—οὐ

127d3 οὐ - d7 ὠφελῇσαι = Priscianus *Inst.* XVIII.99 (= III.253.9-12 Keil)

e6 χρῶο TW: χρῶ | ὅ, τι B (*nov. fol. incip.*) || ὅποι BT: ὅπη W || e7 τούτων BT: τοῦτον W || 127a2 μέμφῃ W: -ει BT || χρήσεται BT: -εται W || a3 πέμψη Vat.2218 (*corr. Bekker*): πέμποι BTW || a4 βούλῃ (ἢ *i.r. ex ei*) W: βούλει BT || ὅς σοι TW: ὅς σοι B || a6 ἀνθρώποις BTW: *secl. Hirschig (om. Coisl.155)* || b1 λέγεις TW *et i.m. b: om. B* || b3 χαριῇ (ἢ *ex ei*) W<sup>c</sup>: -εἰ BTW || ἔρμαιον BT *et W<sup>c</sup> (acc. fec.)*: ἔρμαῖον W || b4 τε BT: *om. W* || ἀρέσκοιτο B<sup>c</sup> (*εσκ i.r. ex κεσ fec.*) *et W et i.m. γρ. T: ἀρκέσοιτο BT* || c2 διαφθεῖραι BT: διαφθαρήναι W || c6 τοῦτο Ven.189: τοῦτον BTW || ὡς TW *et i.m. b: om. B* || c8 ἔμβραχυ *secl. Ast* ||

γὰρ οἶδα ὑπὲρ ὅτου ἂν τις νοῦν ἔχων μᾶλλον σπουδάξοι ἢ  
 ὑπὲρ ὑέος αὐτοῦ ὅπως ὡς βέλτιστος ἔσται—ὁπόθεν δὲ ἔδοξέ  
 σοι τοῦτο, ὡς ἐγὼ ἂν μᾶλλον τὸν σὸν ὑὸν οἶός τ' εἶην  
 ὠφελῆσαι πρὸς τὸ πολίτην ἀγαθὸν γενέσθαι ἢ σὺ αὐτὸς, καὶ  
 ὁπόθεν οὗτος ψήθη ἐμὲ μᾶλλον ἢ σὲ αὐτὸν ὠφελήσῃν, τοῦ-  
 το πάνυ θαυμάζω. σὺ γὰρ πρῶτον μὲν πρεσβύτερος εἰ ἐμοῦ,  
 ἔπειτα πολλὰς ἤδη ἀρχὰς καὶ τὰς μεγίστας Ἀθηναίοις ἤρ-  
 ξας, καὶ τιμὰ ὑπὸ Ἀναγυρασίων τε τῶν δημοτῶν πολὺ μάλ-  
 ιστα καὶ ὑπὸ τῆς ἄλλης πόλεως οὐδενὸς ἦττον· ἐμοὶ δὲ  
 τούτων οὐδὲν ἐνορᾷ οὐδέτερος ὕμῶν. ἔπειτα εἰ ἄρα τῆς μὲν  
 τῶν πολιτικῶν ἀνδρῶν συνουσίας θεάγης ὅδε καταφρονεῖ,  
 ἄλλους δὲ τινὰς ζητεῖ οἷ παιδεύειν ἐπαγγέλλονται οἷοί τε  
 εἶναι νέους ἀνθρώπους, ἔστιν ἐνταῦθα καὶ Πρόδικος ὁ Κεῖ-  
 ος καὶ Γοργίας ὁ Λεοντίνος καὶ Πῶλος ὁ Ἀκραγαντίνος καὶ  
 ἄλλοι πολλοί, οἷ οὕτω σοφοί εἰσιν ὥστε εἰς τὰς πόλεις ἰόν-  
 τες πείθουσι τῶν νέων τοὺς γενναιοτάτους τε καὶ πλουσι-  
 ωτάτους—οἷς ἔξεστιν τῶν πολιτῶν ᾧ ἂν βούλωνται προῖκα  
 συνεῖναι—τούτους πείθουσιν ἀπολείποντας τὰς ἐκείνων  
 συνουσίας αὐτοῖς συνεῖναι, προκατατιθέοντας ἀργύριον  
 πάνυ πολὺ μισθόν, καὶ χάριν πρὸς τούτοις εἰδέναι. τούτων  
 τινὰς εἰκὸς ἦν προαιρεῖσθαι καὶ τὸν ὑὸν σου καὶ αὐτὸν σέ,  
 ἐμὲ δ' οὐκ εἰκός· οὐδὲν γὰρ τούτων ἐπίσταμαι τῶν μακαρ-  
 ῶν τε καὶ καλῶν μαθημάτων—ἐπεὶ ἐβουλόμην ἂν—ἀλλὰ καὶ  
 λέγω δήπου αἰεὶ ὅτι ἐγὼ τυγχάνω ὡς ἔπος εἰπεῖν οὐδὲν ἐπι-  
 στάμενος, πλην γε μικροῦ τινος μαθήματος, τῶν ἐρωτι-  
 κῶν. τοῦτο μέντοι τὸ μάθημα παρ' ὄντινον ποιῶμαι δει-  
 νὸς εἶναι καὶ τῶν προγεγονότων ἀνθρώπων καὶ τῶν νῦν.

128b2 ἀλλὰ - 5 ἐρωτικῶν *resp. Proleg. Plat. Phil.* 11.4.5 (= 23 West-  
erink)

128b5 τοῦτο - 6 εἶναι *cf. Aristaenetum* I.4.41-2 (Mazal)

**d5** αὐτοῦ *edd.*: αὐτοῦ BTW || ὅπως (ω *i.r. ex o, ut. vid.*) B *et* (ως *eras., sed comp. s.l.*) T || **d5** ἔδοξέ σοι *codd.*: σοι ἔδοξε Priscianus || **d6** ἂν *secl. Cobet*: δὴ Richards || τ' εἶην *edd. ex* τε εἶην Priscianus (*iam correxerat Ast*): τε τ' ἦν B: τε ἦν T: τ' ἦν W || **d8** ὠφελήσῃν BT: ὠφελήσειεν W (*ult. ε punct. del.*) || **e1** μὲν (*i.r.*) B || **e3** τε BT: τε καὶ W || **e7** τε εἶναι BT: τ' εἶναι W || **e8** κεῖος BW: κῖος T || **128a5** τούτους BT: *om.* W || ἀπολείποντας *codd.*: ἀπολιπόντας Cobet || **a6** προκατατιθέοντας *scripsi*: προσκατατιθέοντας *codd.* || ἀργύριον πάνυ πολὺ Beck ("multum" *pro* πολὺ *vertit* Ficino): ἀγύριον πάνυ πολὺν *codd.*: πάνυ πολὺν Schanz: ἀργύριον πάμπλου Cobet || **b3** αἰεὶ B: αἰεὶ TW: αἰεὶ (*acc. fec.*) b || **b5** ποιῶμαι *codd. et Aristaenetus*: οἷομαι *vel* προσποιῶμαι *anon. ap. Stallbaum*: ἀντι-  
 ποιῶμαι Fritzsche: ἡγοῦμαι Cobet ||

ΘΕ. Ὅρᾱς, ὦ πάτερ, ὅτι Σωκράτης οὐ πάνυ μοι δοκεῖ  
 ἔτι ἐθέλειν ἐμοὶ συνδιατρίβειν—ἐπεὶ τό γ' ἐμὸν ἔτοιμον,  
 εἴαν οὗτος ἐθέλῃ—ἀλλὰ ταῦτα παίζων πρὸς ἡμᾶς λέγει. c  
 ἐπεὶ ἐγὼ οἶδα τῶν ἐμῶν ἡλικιωτῶν καὶ ὀλίγῳ πρεσβυτέρων  
 οἱ πρὶν μὲν τούτῳ συνεῖναι οὐδενὸς ἄξιοι ἦσαν, ἐπειδὴ δὲ  
 συνεγένοντο τούτῳ, ἐν πάνυ ὀλίγῳ χρόνῳ πάντων βελτίους  
 φαίνονται ὢν πρότερον χείρους. 5

ΣΩ. Οἶσθα οὖν οἷον τοῦτό ἐστιν, ὦ παῖ Δημοδόκου;

ΘΕ. Ναὶ μὰ Δία ἔγωγε, ὅτι, εἴαν σὺ βούλῃ, καὶ ἐγὼ  
 οἶός τ' ἔσομαι τοιοῦτος γενέσθαι οἷοίπερ καὶ ἐκεῖνοι.

ΣΩ. Οὐκ, ὡγαθέ, ἀλλὰ σε λέληθεν οἷον τοῦτ' ἐστιν, ἐγὼ d  
 δέ σοι φράσω. ἔστι γάρ τι θεία μοῖρα παρεπόμενον ἐμοὶ  
 ἐκ παιδὸς ἀρξάμενον δαιμόνιον. ἔστι δὲ τοῦτο φωνή, ἥ  
 ὅταν γένηται αἰεὶ μοι σημαίνει, ὃ ἂν μέλλω πράττειν, τού-  
 του ἀποτροπήν, προτρέπει δὲ οὐδέποτε· καὶ εἴαν τις μοι τῶν 5  
 φίλων ἀνακοινῶται καὶ γένηται ἡ φωνή, ταῦτόν τοῦτο,  
 ἀποτρέπει καὶ οὐκ ἐᾷ πράττειν. καὶ τούτων ὑμῖν μάρτυρας  
 παρέξομαι. Χαρμίδην γὰρ τουτονὶ γιγνώσκετε τὸν καλὸν  
 γενόμενον, τὸν Γλαύκωνος· οὗτός ποτε ἐτύγχανεν ἐμοὶ e  
 ἀνακοινούμενος μέλλων ἀσκήσειν στάδιον εἰς Νεμέαν, καὶ

128d2 ἔστι - d5 οὐδέποτε cf. Clementem Alexandrinum Strom. I.133.3  
 (= II. 82.28-83.3 Stählin-Früchter); resp. Calcidius in Ti. 221 (= 199.1-4  
 Waszink)

128d2 ἔστι - d7 πράττειν = Calcidius in Ti. 287-8 (= 263.20-264.2  
 Waszink); cf. Fr. Comm. in Arist. Rh. 325.6-9 (Rabe)

128d3 (φωνή) sqq. resp. Hermias Alexandrinus in Phdr. 94 (= 67.27-29  
 Couvreur); resp. Olympiodorus in Alc. 21.9 (= 16 Westerink)

128d3 ἔστι - 4 σημαίνει cf. Proclum in Alc. 79.17-19 (= 35 Westerink)

128d3 ἥ - e4 διεκώλυόν cf. Aelianum VH 8.1 (= 92.18-93.4 Dilts)

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b7 ὅτι codd.: ὁ Cobet (et post πάτερ signum interrogationis posuit) ||  
 μοι secl. H. Müller, Richards || δοκεῖ ἔτι Flor.b et c (unde Ven.189) et  
 Ang.107 (τι ante ἔτι eras.): δοκεῖ τι ἔτι BTW: δοκεῖ τι Bekker (sic  
 Pal.175) || c1 ἐθέλῃ M Vat.1029 Par.1811 Coisl.155<sup>c</sup> Neap.337 Ambros.  
 409: ἐθέλοι BTW || ἀλλὰ - c5 χείρους Demodoco trib. b || c5  
 ἐφαίνοντο Schleiermacher || d1 ἀλλὰ σε TW: ἀλλὰ σὲ B || ἔστιν  
 W: ἐστὶν BT || d2 θεία (ι s.l. add.) T || παρεπόμενον codd.: παρα-  
 πεμπόμενον Fr. Comm. in Arist. Rh.: παραγινόμενον Clemens || d4  
 αἰεὶ B<sup>c</sup> (α i.r.): αἰεὶ B (ut vid.) et TW et Fr. Comm. in Arist. Rh. || τούτου  
 ἀποτροπήν codd.: τοῦτο ἀποτρέπειν Fr. Comm. in Arist. Rh. || d5  
 δὲ T et (δ' i.t.) B<sup>c</sup>, Clemens Alexandrinus, Fr. Comm. in Arist. Rh., Calcidius  
 (ut vid.): om. BW || τίς B<sup>c</sup> (acc. fec.): τίς B: τίς TW || e1 γενόμενον  
 codd.: λεγόμενον Cobet || ἐτύγχανεν TW et (ν s.l.) b: ἐτύγχανε  
 B || e2 νεμέαν TW: νεμαίαν B ||



εὐθὺς αὐτοῦ ἀρχομένου λέγειν ὅτι μέλλοι ἀσκεῖν ἐγένετο ἡ  
 φωνή, καὶ ἐγὼ διεκώλυόν τε αὐτὸν καὶ εἶπον ὅτι "Λέγοντός  
 σου μεταξύ γέγονέ μοι ἡ φωνή ἡ τοῦ δαιμονίου· ἀλλὰ μὴ 5  
 ἄσκει." "Ἰσως," ἔφη, "σημαίνει σοι ὅτι οὐ νικήσω· ἐγὼ δὲ  
 καὶ μὴ μέλλω νικᾶν, γυμνασάμενός γε τοῦτον τὸν χρόνον  
 ὠφελήσομαι." ταῦτα εἰπὼν ἤσκει· ἄξιον οὖν πυθέσθαι  
 αὐτοῦ ἃ αὐτῷ ξυνέβη ἀπὸ ταύτης τῆς ἀσκήσεως. εἰ δὲ βού- 129  
 λεσθε, τὸν Τιμάρχου ἀδελφὸν Κλειτόμαχον ἔρεσθε τί εἶπεν  
 αὐτῷ Τίμαρχος ἡνίκα ἀποθανούμενος ἦι {εὐθὺ τοῦ δαιμον-  
 ίου}, ἐκεῖνός τε καὶ Εὐαθλος ὁ σταδιοδρομῶν ὃς Τίμαρχον  
 ὑπεδέξατο φεύγοντα· ἔρεϊ γὰρ ὑμῖν ὅτι εἶπεν αὐτῷ ταυτί. 5

ΘΕ. Τί;

ΣΩ. "ὦ Κλειτόμαχε," ἔφη, "ἐγὼ μέντοι ἔρχομαι ἀπο-  
 θανούμενος νυνί, διότι Σωκράτει οὐκ ἤθελον πείθεσθαι. "τί  
 δὴ οὖν ποτε τοῦτο εἶπεν ὁ Τίμαρχος; ἐγὼ φράσω. ὅτε  
 ἀνίστατο ἐκ τοῦ συμποσίου ὁ Τίμαρχος καὶ Φιλήμων ὁ 6  
 φιλημονίδου ἀποκτενοῦντες Νικίαν τὸν Ἡροσκαμάνδρου,  
 ἡπιστάσθην μὲν αὐτῷ μόνῳ τὴν ἐπιβουλήν, ὁ δὲ Τίμαρχος  
 ἀνιστάμενος πρὸς ἐμὲ εἶπεν, "Τί λέγεις," ἔφη, "ὦ Σώ-  
 κρατες; ὑμεῖς μὲν πίνετε, ἐμὲ δὲ δεῖ ποι ἐξαναστήναι· ἤξω 5  
 δὲ ὀλίγον ὕστερον, ἐὰν τύχω." καὶ μοι ἐγένετο ἡ φωνή,  
 καὶ εἶπον πρὸς αὐτόν, "Μηδαμῶς," ἔφην, "ἀναστής· γέγονε  
 γάρ μοι τὸ εἰωθὸς σημεῖον τὸ δαιμόνιον." καὶ ὃς ἐπέσχε.  
 καὶ διαλιπὼν χρόνον αὐθις ὠρμάτο ἰέναι, καὶ ἔφη· "Εἴμι 6  
 δὴ, Σώκρατες." αὐθις ἐγένετο ἡ φωνή· αὐθις οὖν αὐτὸν  
 ἠνάγκασα ἐπισχεῖν. τὸ τρίτον, βουλόμενός με λαθεῖν,  
 ἀνέστη οὐκέτι εἰπὼν μοι οὐδὲν ἀλλὰ λαθὼν, ἐπιτηρήσας  
 ἄλλοσε τὸν νοῦν ἔχοντα· καὶ οὕτως ᾤχετο ἀπιὼν καὶ διε- 5  
 πράξατο ἐξ ὧν ἦι ἀποθανούμενος. ὅθεν δὴ τοῦτο εἶπεν  
 πρὸς τὸν ἀδελφὸν ὅπερ νῦν ὑμῖν ἐγώ, ὅτι ἴοι ἀποθανού-  
 μενος διὰ τὸ ἐμοὶ ἀπιστῆσαι. ἔτι τοίνυν περὶ τῶν ἐν Σικ-  
 ελίᾳ πολλῶν ἀκούσεσθον ἃ ἐγὼ ἔλεγον περὶ τῆς διαφθορᾶς 6

**e3** ἡ BT: *om.* W *et* Aelianus || **e8** ὠφελήσομαι Cobet || **129a1**  
 βούλεσθε **b** (*alt.* ε *ex* ι) *et* TW: βούλεσθαι B || **a2** ἔρεσθε (*ult.* ε *s.l.*)  
 W<sup>c</sup> (*ci.* Stephanus): ἔρεσθαι BTW || **a3** ἦι (*i.r.*) B<sup>c</sup> *et* (*i.r.*) Wet T: εἴηι  
*i.m.* B || εὐθὺ τοῦ δαιμονίου *seclust*: †εὐθὺ τοῦ δαιμονίου†  
 Burnet: εὐθὺ τοῦ δημίου *vel* εὐθὺ τοῦ δημοσίου *emend.* Baiter:  
 εὐθὺ {τοῦ δαιμονίου} Souilhé || **a4** σταδιοδρομῶν BT: σταδιο-  
 δρόμος W || **a5** εἶπεν BT: εἶπον W || ταυτί TW: ταῦτα B || **a7**  
 κλειτόμαχε TW *et* (εἰ *ex* ι) B<sup>c</sup>: κλιτόμαχε B || **b4** ἀνιστάμενος  
 (*ras. inter* αἰ *et* μ, *fortasse* με, *et i.m. vitii nota*) B || πρὸς ἐμὲ BW: πρὸς  
 με T || **b5** πίνετε (*alt.* ε *i.r.*) B || ποι TW: ποῖ B || **c1** διαλιπὼν B:  
 διαλείπων TW || **c7** ἴοι (*pr.* ι *i.r.*) B || **c8** τῶν TW: τὸν B || **d1**  
 διαφθορᾶς BT: διαφορᾶς W ||



τοῦ στρατοπέδου. καὶ τὰ μὲν παρεληλυθότα τῶν εἰδότην  
 ἔστιν ἀκοῦσαι· πείραν δ' ἔξεστι νυνὶ λαβεῖν τοῦ σημείου εἰ  
 ἄρα τί λέγει. ἐπὶ γὰρ τῇ ἐπὶ στρατείαν ἐξορμῇ Σαννίωνος  
 τοῦ καλοῦ ἐγένετό μοι τὸ σημεῖον, οἴχεται δὲ νῦν μετὰ  
 Θρασύλλου στρατευσόμενος εὐθὺς Ἐφέσου καὶ Ἰωνίας. ἐγὼ  
 οὖν οἶομαι ἐκείνον ἢ ἀποθανεῖσθαι ἢ ὁμοῦ τι τούτῳ γ' ἔλᾶν,  
 καὶ περί γε τῆς πραγματείας τῆς ἄλλης πάνυ φοβοῦμαι.

Ταῦτα δὲ πάντα εἰρηκὰ σοι, ὅτι ἡ δύναμις αὕτη τοῦ  
 δαιμονίου τούτου καὶ εἰς τὰς συνουσίας τῶν μετ' ἐμοῦ συν-  
 διατριβόντων τὸ ἅπαν δύναται. πολλοῖς μὲν γὰρ ἐναν-  
 τιούται, καὶ οὐκ ἔστι τούτοις ὠφελῆθῆναι μετ' ἐμοῦ δια-  
 τρίβουσιν, ὥστε οὐχ οἷόν τέ μοι τούτοις συνδιατρίβειν.  
 πολλοῖς δὲ συνεῖναι μὲν οὐ διακωλύει, ὠφελοῦνται δὲ οὐ-  
 δὲν συνόντες. οἷς δ' ἂν συλλάβῃται τῆς συνουσίας ἡ τοῦ  
 δαιμονίου δύναμις, οὗτοί εἰσιν ὧν καὶ σὺ ἥσθησαι· ταχὺ  
 γὰρ παραχρῆμα ἐπιδιδόασιν. καὶ τούτων αὖ τῶν ἐπιδι-  
 δόντων οἱ μὲν καὶ βέβαιον ἔχουσι καὶ παραμόνιμον τὴν  
 ὠφελίαν· πολλοὶ δέ, ὅσον ἂν μετ' ἐμοῦ χρόνον ᾧσιν, θαν-  
 μάσιον ἐπιδιδόασιν, ἐπειδὴν δέ μου ἀπόσχωνται, πάλιν οὐ-  
 δὲν διαφέρουσιν ὁπουοῦν. τοῦτό ποτε ἔπαθεν Ἀριστείδης ὁ  
 Λυσιμάχου υἱὸς τοῦ Ἀριστείδου. διατρίβων γὰρ μετ' ἐμοῦ  
 πάμπλου ἐπεδεδώκει ἐν ὀλίγῳ χρόνῳ· ἔπειτα αὐτῷ στρα-  
 εία τις ἐγένετο καὶ ᾗχετο ἐκπλέων, ἥκων δὲ κατελάμβανε  
 μετ' ἐμοῦ διατρίβοντα Θουκυδίδην τὸν Μελησίου υἱὸν τοῦ  
 Θουκυδίδου. ὁ δὲ Θουκυδίδης τῇ προτεραίᾳ μοι δι' ἀπεχ-  
 θείας ἐν λόγοις τισὶν ἐγεγόνει· ἰδὼν οὖν με ὁ Ἀριστεί-  
 δης, ἐπειδὴ ἡσπάσατό τε καὶ τᾶλλα διελέχθη, "Θουκυδίδην

129e7 οἷς - e9 ἐπιδιδόασιν = [Plutarchus] *Mor.* 574b (= III.458.17-22 Pohlenz-Siebeking)

130a1 βέβαιον - a2 ὠφελίαν = *Lex.Vind. s.v.* παραμόνιμον (= 143.1-2 Nauck)

d3 ἔστιν *edd.*: ἐστὶν TW: ἐστὶν B || d4 ἄρα BTW: ἄρά B<sup>c</sup> || τὶ  
*edd.*: τί BTW || d5 καλοῦ *re vera* W || τὸ *s.l.* B<sup>c</sup>: *om.* BTW || d6  
 Θρασύλλου BT: -ύλου W || στρατευσόμενος BT: -εούμενος W ||  
 γ' ἔλᾶν (*fec. Hermann*) *ex* γελᾶν B: ἔλᾶν TW || d8 πραγματείας  
 T: στρατείας BW: στρατιᾶς Cobet || e3 ἅπαν *codd.*: πᾶν Cobet ||  
 e7 συλλάβῃται (αι *i.r., ut vid.*) B || συνουσίας TW: ξυν- B || e8  
 ταχὺ γὰρ παραχρῆμα *codd. et* [Plutarchus]: ταχὺ γὰρ <καὶ>  
 παραχρῆμα Papanikolaou || e9 αὖ τῶν Stephanus: αὐτῶν *codd.* ||  
 130a2 ὠφελίαν B *et Lex.Vind.*: -εῖαν TW || a4 ἔπαθεν TW: ἔμαθεν  
 B || a5 υἱὸς *secl. Ast* || a7 τις T: τίς BW || a8 μελησίου BW:  
 μελισίου T || υἱὸν *secl. Ast* || b1 ἀπεχθείας TW *et* (ει *ex i.*) B<sup>c</sup>:  
 -θείας B ||

δέ," ἔφη, "ἀκούω, ὦ Σώκρατες, σεμνύνεσθαι ἅττα πρὸς σε καὶ  
 χαλεπαίνειν ὡς τὶ ὄντα." "Ἔστι γάρ," ἔφην ἐγώ, "οὕτως." 5  
 "Τί δέ, οὐκ οἶδεν," ἔφη, "πρὶν σοὶ συγγενέσθαι οἶον ἦν  
 ἀνδράποδον;" "Οὐκ ἔοικέν γε," ἔφην ἐγώ, "νῆ τοὺς  
 θεοὺς." "Ἀλλὰ μὴν καὶ αὐτός γε," ἔφη, "καταγελάστως  
 ἔχω, ὦ Σώκρατες." "Τί μάλιστα;" ἔφην ἐγώ. "Ὅτι," c  
 ἔφη, "πρὶν μὲν ἐκπλεῖν, ὁτπρὸν ἀνθρώπων οἶός τ' ἦ διαλέ-  
 γεσθαι καὶ μηδεὶν δὲ χείρων φαίνεσθαι ἐν τοῖς λόγοις, ὥστε  
 καὶ ἐδίωκον τὰς συνουσίας τῶν χαριεστάτων ἀνθρώπων,  
 νυνὶ δὲ τούναντίον φεύγω ἂν τινα καὶ αἰσθάνωμαι πεπαι- 5  
 δευμένον· οὕτως αἰσχύνομαι ἐπὶ τῇ ἐμαυτοῦ φαυλότητι."  
 "Πότερον δέ," ἦν δ' ἐγώ, "ἐξαίφνης σε προύλιπεν αὕτη  
 ἡ δύναμις ἢ κατὰ σμικρόν;" "Κατὰ σμικρόν," ἦ δ' ὅς.  
 "Ἡνίκα δέ σοι παρεγένετο," ἦν δ' ἐγώ, "πότερον μαθόντι d  
 παρ' ἐμοῦ τι παρεγένετο ἢ τινι ἄλλῳ τρόπῳ;" "Ἐγώ σοι  
 ἐρῶ," ἔφη, "ὦ Σώκρατες, ἄπιστον μὲν νῆ τοὺς θεοὺς, ἀληθὲς  
 δέ. ἐγὼ γὰρ ἔμαθον μὲν παρὰ σοῦ οὐδὲν πώποτε, ὡς αὐτὸς  
 οἴσθα· ἐπεδίδουν δὲ ὁπότε σοι συνείην, κἂν εἰ ἐν τῇ αὐτῇ 5  
 μόνον οἰκίᾳ εἴην, μὴ ἐν τῷ αὐτῷ δὲ οἰκήματι, μᾶλλον δὲ  
 ὁπότε ἐν τῷ αὐτῷ οἰκήματι, καὶ ἔμοιγε ἐδόκουν πολὺ μᾶλλον  
 ὅποτε ἐν τῷ αὐτῷ οἰκήματι ὣν λέγοντός σου βλέποίμι πρὸς  
 σέ, μᾶλλον ἢ ὁπότε ἄλλοσε ὁρώην, πολὺ δὲ μάλιστα καὶ e  
 πλεῖστον ἐπεδίδουν ὁπότε παρ' αὐτόν σε καθήμην ἐχόμενός  
 σου καὶ ἀπτόμενος· νῦν δέ," ἦ δ' ὅς, "πᾶσα ἐκείνη ἡ ἔξις  
 ἐξερρήκεν."  
 "Ἔστιν οὖν, ὦ Θεάγες, τοιαύτη ἡ ἡμετέρα συνουσία· ἐὰν 5  
 μὲν τῷ θεῷ φίλον ᾖ, πάννυ πολὺ ἐπιδώσεις καὶ ταχύ, εἰ δὲ  
 μή, οὔ. ὅρα οὖν μή σοι ἀσφαλέστερον ᾖ παρ' ἐκείνων τινὶ  
 παιδεύεσθαι οἷ ἐγκρατεῖς αὐτοὶ εἰσι τῆς ὠφελίας ἦν

b4 πρὸς σε *edd.*: πρὸς σὲ BTW || b5 ὡς τὶ *edd.*: ὡς τι BTW || b6  
 δὲ BW: δαὶ B<sup>c</sup> (αι *i.r. ex e*) et T || πρὶν σοὶ *edd.*: πρίν σοι BTW ||  
 b7 τὸ ἀνδράποδον *codd.*: *corr.* Cobet || γε (γ *ex κ*) W<sup>c</sup> || νῆ *codd.*:  
 μὰ Cobet || b8 αὐτός BT: αὐτό W || c2 ἀνθρώπων TW: ἀνθρώπῳ  
 B: ἂν *s.l. vet. b* || ἦ Par.1808 (*a.c.*) et *corr.* Coisl. 155: ἦ T: ἦν BW || c5  
 αἰσθάνωμαι W: αἰσθάνομαι BT: αἰσθῶμαι *i.m. γρ.* T || c7  
 προύλιπεν W: προύλειπεν BT || c8 ἦ b (*acc. fec.*): ἦ B || d2 ἦ b  
 (*acc. fec.*): ἦ B || τινι BTW: τινὶ b: τίνι Wagner (*fort. recte*) || d4  
 μὲν BW: *om.* T || παρὰ σοῦ BTW: παρὰ σου Burnet || d7 οἰκήματι  
 TW: δὲ οἰκήματι B || e1 ὁρώην BT: ὁρώμην W || δὲ W et (*s.l.*) B<sup>2</sup>:  
 δὴ BT || e2 καθήμην M Urb.80 Ang.107<sup>c</sup> Vat.1029 1030 Lobc. Par.  
 1811 Ambros.329: καθοίμην BTW || e6 ἦ BT: εἶη W || e7 ἦ BT: εἶη  
 W || e8 οἷ T: ὅτ' B: οἷ τ' W || ὠφελίας BT: -είας W ||

ὠφελοῦσι τοὺς ἀνθρώπους μάλλον ἢ παρ' ἐμοῦ ὅτι ἂν  
τύχης τοῦτο πράξαι.

10

ΘΕ. Ἐμοὶ μὲν τοίνυν δοκεῖ, ὦ Σώκρατες, ἡμᾶς οὕτωςι  
ποιῆσαι, ἀποπειραθῆναι τοῦ δαιμονίου τούτου συνόντας  
ἀλλήλοις. καὶ ἐὰν μὲν παρείκη ἡμῖν, ταῦτα βέλτιστα·  
εἰ δὲ μή, τότε ἤδη παραχρῆμα βουλευσόμεθα ὅτι δράσομεν,  
εἴτε ἄλλω συνεσόμεθα, εἴτε καὶ αὐτὸ τὸ θεῖον τὸ σοὶ γιγνό-  
μενον πειρασόμεθα παραμυθεῖσθαι εὐχαῖσί τε καὶ θυσίαις  
καὶ ἄλλω ὅτῃ ἂν οἱ μάντις ἐξηγῶνται.

131

5

ΔΗ. Μηκέτι πρὸς ταῦτα ἀντεῖπης, ὦ Σώκρατες, τῷ  
μειρακίῳ· εὖ γὰρ λέγει Θεάγης.

ΣΩ. Ἄλλ' εἰ δοκεῖ χρήναι οὕτω ποιεῖν, οὕτω ποιῶμεν.

10

**e9** ἐμοῦ *codd.*: ἐμοὶ Hermann || **e10** τύχη *codd.*: *corr.* Bekker || **131a3**  
ταῦτα βέλτιστα *secl. cl.* Hirschig || **a8** τῷ B, *secl. add.* B<sup>c</sup> ||

## Departures from the texts of Burnet (OCT) and Souilh   (Bud  )

	This edition	Burnet and Souilh�� (agreement between B. and S. is assumed, unless other- wise indicated)
121a3	��νεκεν	��νεκα
125a1	διδασκ��λου	{διδασκ��λου}
125c10	τ��ν τ�� μαγειρικά	τ��ν μαγείρων
125d6	ποῖ' αὖ	ποῖα ἂν
126c1	{��κοντίοις}	��κοντίοις
126d4-5	οὖν ἂν	ἂν οὖν
127a3	πέμπη	πέμποι
128a6	προκατατιθέντας	προσκατατιθέντας
128b7	��τι (also S.)	�� B.
128b7-8	δοκεῖ ��τι (δοκεῖ {τι} ��τι B.)	δοκεῖ τι {��τι} S.
129a3	{εὐθ�� τοῦ δαιμονίου}	τ�� εὐθ�� τοῦ δαι- μονίου† B.: εὐθ�� {τοῦ δαιμονίου} S.
129d8	πραγματείας	στρατι��ς
130b7	��νδράποδον	τ�� ��νδράποδον
130c2	��νθρώπων	��νθρώπων
130e10	τ��χης	τ��χη

Further disagreements in breathing, accent, punctuation, orthography, and  
ν *epheikustikon* in: 124a7, 124d2, 126b10, 126d1, 128e1, 130d4, 130e2.

## COMMENTARY

**Title.** Θεάγης: For variations of title in some testimonies to this dialogue, see the *app. crit.* (the mss. of Diogenes Laertius also offer discrepancies in subtitles for *Smp.*, *Phdr.*, and *Alc. II*); and on the variants περὶ σοφίας and περὶ φιλοσοφίας see **Intr.** ch. I, *b, i; vii.* περὶ σωφροσύνης must be an intrusion from the subtitle appended to *Chrm.*, where this second title is appropriate. The mistake is understandable as a purely mechanical error, since *Chrm.* follows *Thg.* in the tetralogical order, but we can only guess at the actual process which gave rise to the error.

On the place of *Thg.* within the tetralogical canon, see **Intr.** ch. V, *a.* The subtitles attached to the Platonic works of the nine tetralogies (the *Spuria* have no such alternate titles) may be very old: R.G. Hoerber (*Phronesis* 2 [1957] 18-20) assigns their origin to the fourth-century B.C., and possibly to Plato himself; J.A. Philip (*Phoenix* 24 [1970] 302) supposes that both the subtitles and the classification of dialogues by philosophical character derive ultimately from an early Academic or Peripatetic source of the fourth-century, since the division according to philosophical "type" suggests a dependence on *diairesis*, which had fallen out of use after the end of the fourth-century; see also Wilamowitz II.324f.; A.H. Chroust, *Hermes* 93 (1965) 42-6. It is true that there are a few relatively early references to Platonic dialogues by use of subtitle alone: Aristotle (*Rhet.* 1415<sup>b</sup>30) refers to *Menex.* with the words ἐν τῷ ἐπιταφίῳ, and both the author of

*Ep.* 13 (363a7) and Callimachus (*Epigr.* 23.4 Pfeiffer) mention *Phd.* as περὶ ψυχῆς; and a tradition for subtitles of written works can certainly be detected from as early as the fifth century, witness Gorgias' περὶ τοῦ μὴ ὄντος ἢ περὶ φύσεως. But I cannot believe that Plato was responsible for the double-titles and philosophical classification of his dialogues; not only are the vast majority of subtitles not attested before Thrasyllus, but those scholars who wish to trace them to Plato must reckon, as they invariably do not, with the fact that their hypothesis necessarily implies that Plato considered each treatise to be confined to a single theme, and that he intended his readers to approach the dialogues with the preconceptions imposed by these subtitles (for an attempted explanation see Ryle, *Plato's Progress* [Cambridge, 1966] 35-6). Later Platonists may have found no difficulty in treating Plato's dialogues as thematically unitary (cf. *Anonymous Prolegomena to Platonic Philosophy* 38f. [Westerink]), but it is hard to accept that Plato himself tried to achieve this result. Dodds' conclusion that the subtitles are "Alexandrian at earliest" (*Gorgias* 1 n.1) seems secure.

**121a1-8.** Demodocus greets Socrates in the agora of Athens, and urgently requests Socrates' advice on a pressing matter. The two of them, along with Demodocus' son Theages, withdraw to the Stoa of Zeus Eleutherios.

In this short introductory portion not only do we learn that Socrates is in a familiar haunt, the agora, but more importantly two features of the dialogue are established. First, Demodocus is sincerely troubled by what he has to discuss with Socrates (see on a1 and a2-3); we must therefore not lose sight through the veil of Socrates' playful and often ironic behaviour in coming pages that this concern, soon to be elaborated, ought to be

taken seriously as a central theme. Second, Demodocus feels no hesitation in sharing his anxieties with Socrates, an indication, only vague at this point, that Socrates holds an honoured position in Demodocus' eyes and is somehow considered to be on a different level from the sophists whom he will mention very shortly (122a5-6). See further *Intr.* ch. I, *b*, *i*.

**121a1.** ὦ Σώκρατες: The first sentence of a Platonic dialogue (at any rate, those in dramatic form) usually contains a vocative, e.g. *La.*, *Euthd.*, *Prt.*, *Grg.*, *Men.* But in this instance the vocative is notable for its initial position, denoting a degree of agitation on the part of the speaker; see Gildersleeve I.1-7 (for the commencement of a dialogue with a vocative, cf. *Phdr.* 227a1, *Alc. I* 103a1, *Alc. II* 138a1). Demodocus demonstrates a proclivity towards placing the vocative in this position, cf. 121b1 (see *ad loc.*), 127b2, 127c5 (first Demodocus' response to his son, then an address to Socrates, initiated by the vocative); in 125b1 the vocative is preceded only by the emphatic oath Ναὶ μὰ Δία.

**a1.** ἐδεόμην: Translators and commentators have been unable to agree on the force of the imperfect, and generally take it in one of two ways: 1) as a plain imperfect, e.g. "I was wanting to" (Lamb), "I have been needing to" (Pangle; cf. Ficino, Wagner). This interpretation implies that Demodocus' intention all along has been to find Socrates and consult with him, which would certainly explain the more clearly his great relief at the prospect of enlisting Socrates as advisor (cf. 122a7, a9-b1, 127b3-5, with nn. *ad loc.*). And while it is slightly anacolouthic for Demodocus to say "I was wanting to have a private talk with you, if you have some leisure time" (σχολή), it is no more unusual than other features of his language, both in the first two sentences of the dialogue, and elsewhere (see *Intr.* ch. III, *c*; some translators circumvent this disjointedness by substituting present for

imperfect: "I want to speak with you in private" [Burges], or "cupio quaedam privatim tecum loqui" [Ast]). 2) Others (e.g. Knebel, Schleiermacher, Cousin) take the verb as a potential imperfect without ἄν, on the analogy of ἐβουλόμην (on which see Goodwin, *MT*<sup>2</sup> 157-8) and the common potential ἔδει without ἄν (*ib.* 151ff.). There are, however, no parallels for this use of δέομαι, either in Plato or any other author, and it is doubtful whether ἐδεόμην could mean "I would like to" (ἐδεόμην ἄν does occur, though; cf. Lyc. fr.6.1) The most natural interpretation follows along the lines of the first analysis.

**a1.** ἰδιολογήσασθαι: Only here in the Corpus; the ἰδιολογ- stem is both rare and otherwise late in Greek, cf. Ph. 1.197, Chariton 4.6, 6.7, Str. 17.1.12, Clem. Rom. *Hom.* 4.9.1 Cobet proposed διαλογίσασθαι, but ἰδιολογήσασθαι of all mss. must be the true reading: Demodocus wishes to speak *privately* (ἰδιο-) with Socrates, and for this reason asks if he would like to step out of the traffic (ἐκποδὼν a7, see also n. *ad loc.*). There can hardly be an objection (as, e.g., Ast, *Leben* 497; Stallbaum 223; Steinhart 464; against them now Thesleff, *Platonic Chronology* 75) to this obviously *ad hoc* formation, especially as it is employed by Demodocus, whose language frequently draws attention to itself (see *Intr.* ch. III, c). Taylor remarked (*PMW*<sup>6</sup> 534) that the cognate ἰδιολογία appears as early as Epicurus (*Ep.* 2.36 Usener), but the word is by no means a certain conjecture there for ἤδη ἁλογία of all mss.

**a2.** εἰ σχολή· κἄν εἰ ἀσχολία: For the introductory appeal to σχολή/ἀσχολία, cf. *Phdr.* 227b8-11, *Prt.* 335c3-6, *Phd.* 58d2, *Ion* 530 d9-10, *Hp. ma.* 281a1-3, *Iust.* 374b1f., *Sis.* 387b6. The phraseology is fairly stereotyped, and natural enough in the present context; we need not



infer (e.g., with Heidel 54 n.7; Robin 1642) a dependence here on any of the above works.

**a2-3.** καὶν . . . σχολήν: I agree with Shorey (*WPS* 429) that this sentence is, as it stands, stilted and clumsy; but I disagree with his assertion that Plato could not be responsible for it. Stilted language is a feature of Demodocus' *persona* in this dialogue, and here it serves a specific function in his characterization (see *Intr.* ch. III, c, where I have argued that Socrates' heavy response in a4-5 is uttered in mock-imitation of Demodocus; also the following n.). Shorey (*ib.* 649) makes the same criticism of the first sentence of *Epin.* ("...an indication of spuriousness, unless we assume that senility had set in after the *Laws*"), but see now the comments of Tarán *ad Epin.* 973a1-5.

**a2-3.** καὶν εἰ . . . ποίησαι: καὶν εἰ is little different from καὶ εἰ (KG I.244; Goodwin, *MT*<sup>2</sup> 65; Riddell §255), although the αἰν component of καὶν may denote the general conditional nature of its sentence (cf. 130d5; see Thompson *ad Men.* 72c6). Whereas καὶν εἰ is often followed in the apodosis by a second αἰν (e.g. *La.* 184d8f., *Prt.* 318c4ff., *Grg.* 514d3f., *Lys.* 208b3), here its appearance in the apodosis is precluded because of the imperative ποίησαι (cf. *Prt.* 328a8-9; in a similar vein *Sph.* 267d8f). We are perhaps to understand therefore that Demodocus had originally intended to frame the apodosis in the form "I should like you to make some time for me" (i.e., optative + αἰν), but substituted the aorist command instead.

In the combination καὶ . . . δέ (n.b. καὶν . . . δέ a2, see Denniston, *GP*<sup>2</sup> 202), καί seems usually to be connective, "and" (*ib.* 199), not adverbial ("even") as here; moreover, I have been unable to trace another instance of καὶν εἰ . . . δέ in Plato or elsewhere. This apparently singular

use of the particle combination may be looked upon as a textual difficulty in a sentence which is otherwise suspected because the actual meaning of its protasis seems somewhat obscure (καὶ ἢ found in some *recentiores* [Par.1811 Vat.226 Ambros.409] is no improvement, and is probably merely an itacism). Some surgery has consequently been applied to the text: Ast suggested γε *pro* δέ, a common enough uncial confusion, but one which does nothing to smooth the sentence out as he wished it to do; Cobet proposed ἀλλὰ *pro* δέ, which provides for a neater construction, though ἀλλὰ seems too strong an adversative here. Yet fluidity in this sentence is neither necessary nor desirable. Difficulties are removed if we understand μὴ...μεγάλη to be an afterthought added somewhat illogically by an anxious and tentative speaker: "But even if you have business - which is not all too important - nevertheless...". Most translators take the words basically in this way: Ficino's "Opus habebam, O Socrates, quaedam privatim tecum communicare, si quidem otium sit, vel etiam negotium, modo non omnino magnum" is adequate, the renderings of Lamb, "even if there is some demand, which is not particularly important, on your time...", and of Schleiermacher, "Und hättest du auch ein Geschäft, ist es nur nicht gar zu wichtig...", rather better; many facilitate the construction by supplying a conjunction, e.g., "mais qui ne soit pas tout à fait important" (Robin 1284), "à moins qu'elle ne soit trop importante" (Souilhé), but this is not strictly necessary.

**a2.** πάνυ τις: Cf. *Phdr.* 228b5 (πάνυ τις codd., πάνυ τι *POxy.*), *Tht.* 150d1 (πάνυ τις B, πάνυ τι TW *PBerol.*); editors are divided between respective readings in these two passages. τις may well have arisen by dittography in the *Tht.* passage (τις σοφός), but in the *Phdr.* passage it is defensible (as Verdenius saw, *Mnem.* 4.8 [1955] 266) as

*lectio difficillior*, and there is no cause for suspecting our text, although it must be noted that the collocation is rare, and another singular feature of Demodocus' language. In fact, instances of  $\pi\acute{\alpha}\nu\upsilon\ \tau\iota\varsigma$ , where the two words clearly belong together in sense (i.e., where  $\pi\acute{\alpha}\nu\upsilon$  does not modify a verb), are restricted to the three passages given above, until the time of Libanius, Lucian, and Athenaeus.  $\tau\iota\varsigma$  "gives a light accentuation to the quality denoted by the adjective" (DeVries *ad Phdr.* 228b5); for  $\tau\iota\varsigma$  strengthening or weakening (depending on the context), see KG I.663-4; Schwyzler-Debrunner II.215; LSJ s.v. A.II.8; Thesleff, *Studies on Intensification in Early and Classical Greek* (Helsingfors, 1954) 194.

**a3.**  $\acute{\epsilon}\nu\epsilon\kappa\epsilon\nu$  (BTW) has been misreported by all editors since Burnet ( $\acute{\epsilon}\nu\epsilon\kappa\alpha$  occurs only in a few apographs, e.g. Par.1811, Urb.80).  $\acute{\epsilon}\nu\epsilon\kappa\epsilon\nu$  is rare, but does occur in the Corpus, e.g. *Chrm.* 165a5 (text suspect), *Grg.* 468a5, 499e9, *Smp.* 210e6, *Plt.* 300a4, *Phdr.* 259d7; and it is supported by fourth-century Attic inscriptions, see LSJ s.v.  $\acute{\epsilon}\nu\epsilon\kappa\alpha$ . Its presence may be thought suspicious only two lines before the much more common  $\acute{\epsilon}\nu\epsilon\kappa\alpha$  (a5; so Fritzsche 235 n.6), yet it is rather appropriate to Demodocus' generally unusual language that he should employ a little-used form (see also on a1  $\acute{\epsilon}\delta\epsilon\acute{o}\mu\eta\nu$ , a1  $\iota\delta\iota\omicron\lambda\omicron\gamma\eta\sigma\alpha\sigma\theta\alpha\iota$ , a2  $\kappa\grave{\alpha}\nu\ \epsilon\iota\ldots\delta\grave{\epsilon}$ , a2  $\pi\acute{\alpha}\nu\upsilon\ \tau\iota\varsigma$ ).

**a3.**  $\pi\omicron\iota\acute{\iota}\eta\sigma\alpha\iota$ : The aorist imperative is slightly more polite and less overbearing than the present.; see W.F. Bakker, *The Greek Imperative* (Amsterdam, 1966) 43-6, 54.

**a4-5.**  $\text{'}\text{Α}\lambda\lambda\grave{\alpha}\ldots\pi\acute{\alpha}\nu\upsilon$ : Socrates' initial words are nearly as cumbersome and stiff as Demodocus'; see the following nn., and *Intr.* ch. III, a.

**a4.**  $\text{'}\text{Α}\lambda\lambda\grave{\alpha}$ : Assentient (see Denniston, *GP*<sup>2</sup> 17).  $\sigma\chi\omicron\lambda\acute{\alpha}\zeta\omega\nu$  echoes  $\sigma\chi\omicron\lambda\acute{\eta}\nu$  on the preceding line (a3); the repetition after assentient  $\acute{\alpha}\lambda\lambda\acute{\alpha}$

(ποίησαι σχολήν *virtually* = σχόλασαι, cf. *Ion* 530d9; see KG I.106, 322) is especially frequent in Plato (Denniston, *loc. cit.*).

**a4.** καὶ ἄλλως following upon Ἀλλὰ produces a slightly contrived jingle; cf. *Phdr.* 240a9 and DeVries *ad loc.* But for καὶ ἄλλως, cf. *La.* 181 a5, *R.* 458a7, 495b2, *Phd.* 116c4, *Prm.* 141b7.

**a4.** τυγχάνω: The element of coincidence or chance occasionally dictates the dramatic circumstances of other dialogues, cf. *Lys.* 203a3 (συνέτυχον), *Tht.* 142a6 (ἐνέτυχον), *Smp.* 174a3 (ἐντυχεῖν), *Prm.* 126a2 (ἐνετύχομεν), *Eryx.* 392a1 (ἐτυγχάνομεν); also X. *Mem.* 3.2.1 (ἐντυχῶν), *Smp.* 1.4 (συντετύχηκα); Aeschin. *Socr. Miltiades* (*POxy.* 2889.1-2 ἐτύγχανεν); and for an apparent imitation in later Greek philosophical writing, cf. Ceb. *Tabula* 1 (ἐτυγχάνομεν); see Friedländer I.158-9; D. Grene, *Man in his Pride* (Chicago, 1960) 139. As the meeting in this dialogue is not planned (see also on 122a7 εἰς καλὸν), so a similar dramatic pretence is often maintained in the earliest dialogues (cf. also X. *Smp. init.*); but the pretence tends to be thrown off in later works that are less dramatic and more overtly-philosophical, e.g. *Crat.*, *Sph.-Plt.*, *Ti.*, *Phlb.*, *Lg.*

**a4.** καὶ δὴ: "especially," marking "the transition from general to particular" (Denniston, *GP*<sup>2</sup> 249, though he wrongly [*ib.* 250] connects καὶ in a5 with this καὶ δὴ [see following n.]).

**a5.** καὶ πάνυ is a well-established combination of emphasis (see, e.g., H. Thesleff, *Studies on Intensification in Early and Classical Greek* [Helsingfors, 1954] 75); there is no reason somehow to connect it closely with καὶ δὴ in a4, as Denniston suggests (see above a4 n.). καὶ πάνυ is semantically related to καὶ μάλα, καὶ σφόδρα, καὶ κάρτα, etc. (on which see Denniston, *ib.* 317-8), and like them the usage is probably collo-

quial (see Thesleff 89, on καὶ μάλα). For the same emphasis at sentence or clause ending, cf. *Men.* 94e5-95a1, *Prt.* 361e2, *Phd.* 64b4.

**a5.** ἄλλ': Denniston confines the iteration of ἄλλά to clearly-defined rhetorical instances (hypophora, *GP*<sup>2</sup> 10-11), or to commands and exhortations (*GP*<sup>2</sup> 15); but it is common in the context of dialogue, e.g. *Phd.* 63e6, *R.* 338c2-3; see KG II.283; S. Trenkner, *Le Style KAI* 15 n. 4.

**a5.** ἔξεστιν: An appropriately stiff and conventional acquiescence to Demodocus' oddly-phrased opening request.

**a6-7.** βούλει...ἀποχωρήσωμεν: Another colloquialism, common in Plato; see Stevens 60-1.

**a6.** δεῦρο: Apparently Socrates, Demodocus, and Theages are already very near to the Stoa itself at the inception of the dialogue.

**a6-7.** τὴν τοῦ Διὸς τοῦ ἐλευθερίου στοᾶν: As the setting of a dialogue cf. *Eryx.* 392a1-2 (the only other mention of this stoa in the Corpus), X. *Oec.* 7.1, Aeschin. *Socr. Miltiades* (*POxy.* 2889.1-7); and for a stoa as dramatic scenery in a philosophical discussion, cf. Plu. *De Sera* (*Mor.* 548b, an unspecified stoa), Luc. *JTr.* (16, Stoa Poikile); also Zeno's conversations in the Stoa Poikile. On this somewhat stereotyped use of dramatic setting, see Hirzel, *Der Dialog II* 258, 198, / 558 n.3, who posited the existence, based on works such as the above, of a distinct dialogue sub-genre which he called the "Tempel-dialog."

On the location of the Stoa of Zeus Eleutherios, formerly identified with the Stoa Basileios (e.g. H.A. Thompson, *Hesperia* 6 [1937] 64-76, 225-6; *id.*, *The Athenian Agora*<sup>2</sup> [Athens, 1962] 61-4), see Thompson and Wycherley, *The Athenian Agora* 14 [1972] 83-90; Wycherley dates it to about 430 B.C. (*The Athenian Agora* 3 [1957] 30), which would make it a late construction in the Periclean building program. It was apparently con-

structed to commemorate the Greek victory in the Persian Wars (cf. *sch. vet. ad Eryx*. 392a; Plut. *Arist.* 20.4); but Hypereides offered an alternative explanation for the title of the Stoa (see Wycherley, *The Athenian Agora* 3. 26, 28, s.vv. *Etym. Magnum*, Harpokration, Suidas).

**a7.** ἐκποδῶν: Despite *Ap.* 17c7f. and 21e3-22e5, Socrates usually (as deliberately here) conducts his conversations out of the way of the direct confusion of the agora (shelter was one of the main functions of the stoai, see Wycherley, *How the Greeks Built Cities* [London, 1962] 110ff.), which must have been among the noisiest areas of Athens.

**a8.** εἰ σοὶ δοκεῖ: The formulaic expression requires an apodosis to be supplied, such as οὕτω χρὴ ποιεῖν; cf. *Crat.* 387a3 (no apodosis); apodosis expressed, e.g., at *Smp.* 175b4, *Tht.* 145c6, *Prt.* 362a1. εἰ σοὶ δοκεῖ + apodosis (whether explicitly included or not) always implies acquiescence to a request or action contemplated (see Barrett *ad E. Hipp.* 507-8).

**121b1-122b1.** Socrates, Demodocus, and Theages withdraw to the stoa. Following a simile between plant-rearing and child-rearing, and the difficulties involved in each, Demodocus explains the source of his present anxiety: Theages wants to be trained by a sophist. Demodocus asks Socrates' advice.

In structural terms, Demodocus' monologue is notable for its length (see *Intr.* ch. III, c); on the purposes served and the effects produced by this opening speech, see the discussion in *Intr.* ch. I, b, i.

**b1-c5.** Ἰωμεν...δεδιότι: The education~husbandry simile is a commonplace; cf. *Euthphr.* 2d1-4, *Prt.* 325d5-7, *Tht.* 167a4-c2, *R.* 491d1-e3, *Phdr.* 267b1ff., *Ti.* 77a3-7, *Lg.* 765e1-766a1; see Shorey, *TAPA* 40 (1909) 189ff.; also P. Louis, *Le métaphores de Platon* (Paris, 1945) 95-100,

208-9 (Fritzsche's objections to the simile as un-Platonic [230] are therefore wide of the mark). The origins of the simile are perhaps irretrievable, but it can hardly be right to call it (with Guthrie, *HGP III*. 168, and Jaeger, *Paideia* <sup>2</sup> 309f.) a sophistic *topos* (see M.C. Nussbaum, *The Fragility of Goodness* [Cambridge, 1986] 1 and 422 n.3 with references). For pre- and post-Platonic examples, cf. Antiphon DK 87B60, Hp. *Lex* 3, Plut. [?] *Mor.* 2b; also Plu. *Mor.* 528c.

**b1.** Ἰωμεν δῆ. ὦ Σώκρατες: So Cobet punctuates against BTW, which offer a full stop only after Σώκρατες. The following arguments are in his favour: 1) it is consonant with Demodocus' agitated state of mind that he should place the vocative in the less common initial position of a sentence (see on 121a1); 2) the vocative is somewhat bald if it stands alone with the simple hortatory Ἰωμεν δῆ; 3) Demodocus is addressing not only Socrates in the words Ἰωμεν δῆ, but his son Theages as well (although it may be argued that Socrates is the individual with whom Demodocus is most concerned at this point). The fact that Stobaeus begins his quotation of 122b1-c5 at πάντα cannot be used as proof against this punctuation: he is concerned to de-personalize the passage, and, as far as this goes, is little interested that the addressee is Socrates. The testimony of our mss. on points of punctuation is, of course, arbitrary.

The asyndeton in Ἰωμεν δῆ. ὦ Σώκρατες indicates the movement of the *dramatis personae* from the place of preliminary discussion to the Stoa itself. The device has been labelled "awkward" (Steinhart 442, Heidel 54 n.6; see also Stallbaum *ad loc.*), and it does seem somewhat abrupt. Fritzsche adduces *Phd.* 91c6 as a parallel, but no physical movement is implied in the asyndeton there. Other dialogues do however com-

mence in one location and continue in another: cf. *Prt.* 310a8-314c2 (introductory conversation), 314c3ff. (arrival at Callias' house), *Smp.* 174aff., *Phdr.* 227aff.

**b1.** τὰ φυτᾶ: "Living things," "creatures" (LSJ s.v. φυτόν II.1). Schleiermacher's objection (349) that this meaning of the word is un-Platonic is unfounded, cf. *Sph.* 233e8-9. Socher (94) had already answered Schleiermacher's criticisms, though somewhat differently.

**b2.** καὶ: Best taken as explanatory; see Verdenius, *Mnem.* 4.8 (1955) 14-5, 277-8; *Mnem.* 4.9 (1956) 249.

**b3.** τὰ τε ἄλλα καὶ: "and in particular," laying all the emphasis on ἄνθρωπος following.

**b3.** ἄνθρωπος Schanz, ἄνθρωπος codd., Stobaeus. Schanz's emendation, by the simplest of restorations, must be correct: τῶν ἀνθρώπων c1 suggests that the collective singular is demanded here, and it is at any rate required for Demodocus' gnomic statement. Plato shows a predilection for the generic use of the singular ὁ ἄνθρωπος/ἄνθρωπος (the latter a colloquial form according to DeVries, *Studia Platonica: Festschrift für Hermann Gundert* [Amsterdam, 1974] 90), cf. *Ap.* 29a7, *Prt.* 321c5, 322a3, *Grg.* 495e8, 503c8, 516b6, *Crat.* 399c3; see also Gildersleeve II.256. The generic use of the anarthrous singular seems, on the other hand, to be somewhat poetic, cf. *Prt.* 321c7, d3, d4, e3, *R.* 619b1 (though this last instance is not necessarily generic, as LSJ claim [s.v. ἄνθρωπος I.2])

**b6.** ἐπειδὴν δὲ τὸ φυτευθὲν βιωῖ: Stallbaum objected to the application of βιωῖ to non-human life as un-Platonic. But the φυ- root has been used four times within the last three lines, and unless it is to be repeated once more here (i.e., φυτεύει), the author will have to find



another verb; βιῶ presents itself at once. Moreover, this use of βιῶ arises largely because the author is giving free rein to the education~husbandry simile, and an incidental confusion of terms and blurring of semantic distinctions occur easily; one side of the metaphor simply merges with the other.

**b7.** θεραπεία τοῦ φύντος: For θεραπεία in an agricultural context, cf. *Tht.* 149e2; *X. Oec.* 20.12. It frequently appears in medical contexts as well (see LSJ s.v. II), and it seems likely that Plato extended θεραπεία into the educational sphere (as "care of the soul," cf. e.g. *Chrm.* 157a3, b3-4, *Prt.* 312b8-c1, *La.* 185e4) by analogy with θεραπεία literally understood (cf. *Chrm.* 156e6-157c6).

**b7.** χαλεπή καὶ δύσκολος: The collocation also in *Phdr.* 246b4, *Lg.* 922b5; cf. *R.* 407b7, c1.

**c1.** τὸ περὶ τῶν ἀνθρώπων: The neuter article τὸ (without accompanying noun) + περὶ + gen. (acc.), used as subject or predicate, is clearly a mannerism of Plato's later periphrastic style ("onkos" style, see *Intr.* ch. IV, b): among early works it occurs only in *La.* 182c1, but once in *Phd.* and *Phlb.*, twice in *Smp.*, *Crat.* and *Tht.*, about half a dozen times in *R.*, *Sph.*, *Plt.*, *Tim.*, and about twenty times in *Lg.* (see also P.T. Stevens, *CQ* 30 [1936] 211-12). It has, I think, a particularly stiff and circumstantial flavour coming from Demodocus; ὁ ἄνθρωπος/οἱ ἄνθρωποι or τὰ ἀνθρώπινα would have been the most direct way of expressing basically the same thing.

**c1-2.** ἀνθρώπων· ἀπὸ τῶν...τεκμαίρομαι: The asyndeton is explanatory, but the classification of it as "rhetorical usage" (Denniston, *GPS* 114) is not particularly helpful. For τεκμαίρομαι within a sen-

tence which is itself introduced by asyndeton, cf. Pi. fr. 152.4-5; [A.] *PV* 336; similarly *Grg.* 487b7-c1.

**c2.** ἀπὸ . . . τᾶλλα: A rare construction, the use of which here has been said (Taylor, *PMW*<sup>6</sup> 533 n.4; Stallbaum 224) to be a direct borrowing from *Tht.* 206b6 (εἰ δεῖ ἀπὸ τούτων τεκμαίρεσθαι καὶ εἰς τὰ ἄλλα); and this is just possible, considering the author's use of *Tht.* elsewhere (see *Intr.* ch. II, *b*). But τεκμαίρεσθαι ἀπὸ/ἐκ τινος is quite common, e.g. *Smp.* 204c2, *Phd.* 108a5; *X. Mem.* 3.5.6, 4.1.2. Moreover, Stallbaum's arguments against the grammar of this passage are vitiated not only by the *Tht.* passage, but also by his failure to distinguish τεκμαίρεσθαι τι ἐκ/ἀπὸ τινος (which he thinks would be the purer form) from the present construction τεκμαίρεσθαι εἰς τι ἐκ/ἀπὸ τινος (similarly Carugno). For these can hardly be considered identical: the former means "to infer something on the basis of something else," whereas the construction in *Thg.* signifies "to apply an inference drawn from one thing to something else."

**c2.** τῶν . . . πραγμάτων: Sc. γεωργικῶν (Fritzsche).

**c2.** τῶν ἑμαυτοῦ ἐγὼν πραγμάτων: The hyperbaton of ἐγὼν serves to emphasize the personal nature of Demodocus' judgement by the resultant juxtaposition of the pronoun with ἑμαυτοῦ (cf. the emphatic position of ἐμοὶ c3, which goes with ῥάστη c4).

**c2.** ἐς τᾶλλα: I.e. ἐς τὰ τῶν ἄλλων (so Stallbaum, Carugno *ad loc.*).

**c3.** ἐμοὶ: See on c2 τῶν . . . πραγμάτων.

**c3.** ἡ τοῦ ὑέος τουτουί: The pendent article is quite rare, but not unparalleled in Plato, cf. *Ap.* 20e6-7 τῆς γὰρ ἐμῆς, εἰ δὲ τίς ἐσ-

τιν σοφία καὶ οἷα, μάρτυρα ὑμῖν παρέξομαι κτλ.; also D. 18.20 (remarkably close phraseology); see KG I.597.

**c3. φυτεῖαν:** The extension of the word to the production of children is unobjectionable because of the simile in which it is involved (see above on b1). The metaphorical sense of φυτεύειν is also common, see LSJ s.v. I.2.

**c5. φόβω ... δεδιότι:** Often coupled as virtual synonyms, e.g. *Euthphr.* 12b10-c1, *Phlb.* 12c1, *Lg.* 648a1, though they are made the subject of ὀνομάτων ὁρθότης by Prodicus (*Prt.* 358d5-e1). The two words are closely linked as far back as Homer (in the personification of Deimos and Phobos, *Il.* 15.119).

**c5. ἐν φόβῳ:** "Plena timoris" (Knebel *ad loc.*), cf. *R.* 578e5-6; for the use of ἐν see LSJ s.v. II.2.

**c6. τὰ ... λέγειν:** The mss. reading is to be preferred over Cobet's πολὺ ἂν ἔργον εἶη λέγειν, cf. *Plt.* 271e3-4 ἄλλα θ' ὅσα τῆς τοιαύτης ἐστὶ κατακοσμήσεως ἐπόμενα, μυρία ἂν εἶη λέγειν.

**c6. μὲν οὖν:** Enough of comparisons; Demodocus must move on now to tell Socrates precisely what is troubling him.

**c6-d1. ἡ δὲ ... σοφὸς γενέσθαι:** Demodocus' present apprehension derives from one fact alone: Theages wishes to become σοφός. The communication of Demodocus' distress is enhanced by sentence structure, viz., the climactic postponement, arousing the reader's curiosity, of the crucial phrase σοφὸς γενέσθαι, along with the intervening personal address ὦ Σώκρατες (c8), the dative ἡμῖν (c8), and the parenthetical ὥς φησι (c8-d1).

**c7-8. οὐκ ἀγεννής, σφαλερὰ δέ:** See below on d1 σοφὸς.

**c7.** οὐκ ἀγεννής: The litotes is fairly common in Plato (ten times in the Corpus); the meaning is basically "worthwhile," though "not ignoble," as an expression of social values and behaviour, is doubtless present as well (so Lamb ["not an ill-bred desire"], Schleiermacher ["unedel ist sie freilich nicht"], Souilhé ["Car ce n'est pas une envie vulgaire"], Amplo ["nobilissimo"]). The vague ambiguity is consistent with Demodocus' characterization; see below on d1; **Intr.** ch. III, c; ch. I, b, i.

**c7-8.** γὰρ...γὰρ: For the successive γάρ's, where the first is parenthetical, see Denniston, *GP*<sup>2</sup> 65; Trenkner, *Le Style KAI* 15.

**c8-d1.** ἐπιθυμεῖ...σοφὸς γενέσθαι: Not unnaturally, this aspiration is often in Plato applied to youths, e.g. *Phd.* 96a7 (of Socrates as a young man), *Men.* 91a3 (a passage similar to our own in context: Anytus is scandalized that Meno should wish to be trained by a sophist in his bid to become σοφός).

**c8.** ἡμῖν: Ethic dative, an informal idiom (see Thesleff 82).

**d1.** σοφός: This dialogue is ostensibly περὶ σοφίας (see above on "Title"; but also **Intr.** ch. I, c), and we are to hear more of σοφός/σοφία throughout the course of Socrates' conversation with Theages. But the initial use here of either of the pair is notable for its obscurity. σοφός itself can possess, even simultaneously, several fields of reference, practical, theoretical, moral, political (see, e.g., B. Snell, *Die Ausdrücke für den Begriff des Wissen in der vorplatonischen Philosophie* [Berlin, 1924] 1-20; Guthrie, *HGP III.* 27ff.; F. Maier, *Der ΣΟΦΟΣ-Begriff. Zur Bedeutung, Wertung und Rolle des Begriffes von Homer bis Euripides* [Diss. Munich, 1970]; Dover, *GPM* 119-21); the precise meaning on a given occasion is elucidated and determined only by the context in which the word is found. Since σοφός can admit of such a wide range of meanings, our inclination

at d1 is to ask "σοφός at what?", which is precisely the question Socrates puts to Theages at 123b3ff. and 125b8ff. But Demodocus' obscurity in his use of the word is not only intelligible, it is also wholly consistent with his character. For Demodocus is thinking here of σοφός in terms related to a σοφιστής (cf. d5, 122a6), but since he never gives any indication that he actually knows just what a sophist is or what a sophist does (other than the fact that this person is a professional, cf. d5-122a1; see on 122a5-6), his use of σοφός naturally reflects this confusion. We are probably justified in understanding that Demodocus uses the term σοφιστής below in a non-specific sense, i.e. "one who is σοφός" (so Robin 1642; see H. Sidgwick, *JP* 4 [1872] 66ff.); and if σοφιστής in that case is translated as "intellectual" in the pejorative sense that the English can bear (thus σοφός as "clever," "smart"), we can well recognize how the conventional Demodocus stands with regard to his son's desire to become σοφός (cf. Cleon's attitude [Thuc. 3.37.4] to the new politicians whom he describes as σοφώτεροι). Demodocus may not know exactly what Theages means when he speaks of this desire, but the ambiguity of the word renders the associations in his mind as anything but favourable. His evaluation of this desire therefore is that it is οὐκ ἀγεννής, σφαλερὰ δέ: quite commendable so far as it goes, but dangerous because Theages may be corrupted (cf. 122a5, 127c2). Demodocus' frame of mind reflects popular suspicions about the sophists and about σοφοί generally; see *Intr.* ch. I, *b, i*; Guthrie, *HGP* III. 37-9; G.B. Kerferd, *The Sophistic Movement* (Cambridge, 1981) 19-22.

**d1.** δοκῶ γάρ μοι: The evidence of all mss. has been considered uncertain. The parenthetic use of γάρ is of course well-established (see Denniston, *GP*<sup>2</sup> 68-9; Schwyzer-Debrunner II.705-6), and there is no difficulty with parenthetic δοκῶ followed by a finite verb rather than a sub-

stantive clause (cf. *R.* 460c1, *Prm.* 126b4). But parenthetic δοκῶ μοι is said to be a different case altogether (Krüger 12-3), and to be impossible in Plato; according to Krüger (13), it became common only in middle comedy. Emendations have consequently been suggested (δοκεῖ γάρ μοι Stephanus as a conjecture *i.m.*, δοκεῖν γάρ μοι Cobet, δοκῶ γάρ Beck). But in the face of *Ap.* 36a7 (Μέλητον μὲν οὖν, ὡς ἐμοὶ δοκῶ, καὶ νῦν ἀπέφευγα κτλ.), *Men.* 71c4 (Μὴ μόνον γε, ᾧ ἐταῖρε, ἀλλὰ καὶ ὅτι οὐδ' ἄλλω πω ἐνέτυχον εἰδότε, ὡς ἐμοὶ δοκῶ), and *R.* 339d4-5 (Τί λέγεις σύ; ἔφη – Ἄ σὺ λέγεις, ἔμοιγε δοκῶ), these suspicions about the text do not seem well-founded. I can trace, however, no precise parallel for parenthetic δοκῶ γάρ μοι.

**d1-2.** τῶν ἡλικιωτῶν τινες αὐτοῦ καὶ δημοτῶν: Cf. *Ap.* 33e1 Κρίτων οὐτοσί, ἐμὸς ἡλικιώτης καὶ δημότης.

**d2.** δημοτῶν: Demodocus' deme is Anagyrus (127e3), of the phyle Erechtheis (cf. *Suda s.v.* Ἀναγυράσιος; *sch. vet. ad* 127e, giving the deme as Αἰαντίς, cannot be right). Located south of the Piraeus on the south-east foot of Mt. Hymettus, between the demes Halai Aixonides and Thorai (Str. 9.1.21), Anagyrus appears to have been a coastal deme of considerable size and importance (see Gomme, *The Population of Athens in the Fifth and Fourth Centuries B.C.* [Oxford, 1933] 56ff.). On Anagyrus, see C.W. Eliot, *Coastal Demes of Attica* [Toronto, 1962] 35-46.

**d2.** εἰς τὸ ἄστυ: Athens, cf. *Smp.* 172a2, *Menex.* 243e4. That Theages and Demodocus have come to Athens for the purpose of Theages' education is reminiscent of similar sojourns, directed more deliberately than here towards acquiring Socrates or Plato as teachers, which are mentioned in other sources, e.g. D.L. 6.3.9.10, Arist. *Nerinthos*, fr. 1 Ross.

More importantly, this sets up an essential contrast and conflict within the dramatic circumstances of the dialogue (see *Intr.* ch. I, *b*, *l*).

**d2.** καταβαίνοντες: As a term employed by Plato to indicate geographical orientation, καταβαίνειν properly refers to movement either 1) from an inland region towards the sea (e.g. *R.* 327a1, 328c6, *Tht.* 142a6) or 2) from a higher to a lower elevation (e.g. *Phdr.* 278b8-9, *Lg.* 678c2). Since the deme Anagyrous lies on the coast, and is situated at the foot of Mt Hymettus (see on d2 δημοτῶν), it may be assumed that the use of καταβαίνειν here conforms to 2), although the present application of the term does not seem wholly consistent (Fritzsche however compares the late Alciph. 2.28.1 εἰς ἄστυ καταβὰς).

**d2-3.** λόγους...αὐτόν: Since these reports have inspired Theages to search out a sophist to become his teacher (121d5, 122a6), the λόγοι in question can be plausibly taken to refer to sophistic speeches or ἐπιδείξεις, or at any rate to a discussion with a sophist or sophists. For the intense excitement which the sophists could arouse in a young man (cf. d3 διαταράττουσιν and n.), cf. *Phdr.* 227d6-228a4 (Lysias' speech contains all the marks of a sophistic *epideixis*), *Prt.* 310a8ff. (as in our passage, Hippocrates' information about Protagoras is at second-hand).

**d3.** διαταράττουσιν: ταραττώ and related forms can indicate supernatural interference (see Dodds, *G. and I.* 51 n.3), and the word more generally (as here) denotes a very high pitch of emotional arousal or confusion (δια- is intensificatory).

**d4.** πάλαι...παρέχει: 123a5-8 represent Theages' confirmation and articulation of this statement.

**d5.** χρήματα τελέσαι τινὲ τῶν σοφιστῶν: Plato always distinguishes the sophists from Socrates by the fact that the sophists

charged fees for their services, a point which he frequently stresses (for a list of passages, see E.L. Harrison, *Phoenix* 18 [1964] 191 n.44). In fact, the mere mention of sophists is usually enough to prompt a comment on fees from Plato, and "sophist" is likewise inextricably linked with professionalism in Xenophon (*Mem.* 1.6.13), Isocrates (15.155), and Aristotle (*SE* 165<sup>a</sup>21, *EN* 1164<sup>a</sup>30); cf. also *Ar. Nu.* 98. The debate over the amount which the sophists charged for their services seems largely misconceived. Figures vary from one authority to another, and indeed from one sophist to another (for a collection of the relevant testimonia, see Vlastos, *JHS* 95 [1975] 159-60). The difficulty modern scholars have experienced in reconciling the data seems curious; the fees a sophist charged would depend primarily on his reputation, and this would allow for a great deal of scope in what he demanded (professional services in modern times are no different). We need not assume that there was a standard sophistic fee.

**d5-6.** ὅστις αὐτὸν σοφὸν ποιήσει: We are no doubt to understand that Demodocus is repeating what Theages has told him, and what Theages in turn has heard from his companions. The sophists are frequently depicted in Plato as promising to make others σοφοί (e.g. *Prt.* 310d6f., *Euthd.* 273d3f.); the Athenian reaction to this claim must have been mixed, contrast Nicias' attitude of acceptance to innovative methods of education (*La.* 181d8ff.) and Callias' enormous expenditures on sophistic education for his sons (*Ap.* 20a4ff., *Crat.* 391b11-c1), with the hostile position taken by Laches (*La.* 183c3ff.) and Anytus (*Men.* 91c1-5). On the other hand, Demodocus does not seem to know quite what to make of the sophists' claims (see on 121d1). To Plato's Socrates, however, σοφία must have a rational foundation (*Men.* 99b4f.; cf. also *Alc. I* 118c3ff.); but the close association here of payment of fees with the promise to impart



wisdom should leave the reader with no doubt as to the attitude with which Socrates will contemplate Demodocus' difficulty (see *Intr.* ch. I, *b*, *iii-vi*; *c*).

**d6.** ποιήσει: Modal future, "who can make him wise" (see *KG* I.175).

**d6-122a1.** ἐμοι...καὶ ἔλαττον μέλει: Cobet wished to delete καὶ ("importuna copula"; it is absent from the apograph Ambros.409). But καὶ must be adverbial here (emphatic, see Denniston, *GP*<sup>2</sup> 316ff., *ib.* 319 for emphatic καί with comparatives). The sense is "I'm actually *less* concerned with the money...," i.e., Demodocus is laying stress upon an attitude which he considers worthy of emphasis. Socrates elsewhere approves this frame of mind, cf. *La.* 201a2f., *Euthd.* 306d6-e3, *Ap.* 29d7ff., *Phd.* 78a5f.

**a1.** ἡγοῦμαι...κίνδυνον: Demodocus states the actual reason for his trepidation: he is anxious for the welfare of his son. κίνδυνον recalls σφαλερά in 121c8. *Prt.* 313a1-2 is verbally and contextually close to our passage: οἴσθα εἰς οἶόν τινα κίνδυνον ἔρχη ὑποθήσων τὴν ψυχὴν; cf. also *La.* 187b1 for κινδυνός applied to the training of the young. For οὐ μικρὸς κίνδυνος, cf. *Crat.* 436b2, *R.* 467b2.

**a1-2.** ἰέναι οἷ σπεύδει: This phrase, along with the surrounding words, literally = "I think he is entering into considerable danger where he is hastening" (so Lamb, Wagner, Robin, Schleiermacher); it is clear enough what this is supposed to mean: Theages is in danger *by hastening (going)* where he is hastening. Yet a number of translators have felt uncomfortable with the lack of Greek word(s) to represent the italicized items (cf. Ficino, Ast, Cousin, Burges, Müller, Souilhé); and some editors would supply a circumstantial participle to make the sense explicit: thus Schanz emended to ἰέναι οἷ σπεύδει σπεύδοντα, while Stallbaum and Fritzsche proposed (without printing) ἰέναι ἰόντα οἷ σπεύδει,

comparing *Phd.* 58e5-6 (on constructions of the kind οἱ σπεύδει σπεύδοντα, see H.W. Johnstone, *Glotta* 58 [1980] 49ff.). Emendation, however, seems a rather drastic measure, as brachylogy involving the ellipse of a participle is not at all uncommon, see KG II.565; Schwyzer-Debrunner II.709; Riddell §246; see also Knebel *ad loc.*

**a2.** σπεύδει: Of a rash eagerness, cf. *Cri.* 45c6, *Prt.* 361b1.

**a2.** μὲν οὖν marks the transition to Demodocus' statement of what he has actually tried to do under the present difficult circumstances.

**a2.** παραμυθούμενος: Of fatherly encouragement also in *Menex.* 247e5, *Sph.* 230a2.

**a4-5.** ἵνα μὴ...συγγενόμενός τῳ διαφθορῇ: Cf. 127c1-2. For this statement as an expression of Demodocus' essentially traditional patterns of thought, see *Intr.* ch. I, *b*, *i*, and n.16. The vague τῳ would seem to refer to a sophist, as they are mentioned immediately before and after (121d5, 122a6), but Demodocus' uncertainty in his use of terms in any event reflects his confusion. At the same time we cannot but be reminded of one of the charges for which Socrates lost his life, viz., ἀδικεῖν τοὺς τε νέους διαφθείροντα κτλ. (*Ap.* 24b9; cf. *X. Mem.* 1.1.1; see *Intr.* ch. I, *c*); elsewhere the same charge is imputed to the sophists, e.g. *Prt.* 318d7-9, *Men.* 91e3; also *Ar. Nu.* 921-8 (of the ἀδικὸς λόγος).

**a4.** πολλάκις: "Perchance," as often after μή, cf. 122b8; see Riddell §143.

**a5.** ἐπ' αὐτὰ ταῦτα: Our author is flexible in his use of plural pronouns, cf. 122a8, 125d6, 126e2-3, 131a8; see Gildersleeve II.206-7; Riddell §41-2. For the singular ἐπ' αὐτὸ τοῦτο cf. *Euthd.* 274a10.

**a5-6.** τούτων...εἶναι: "One of those who have the reputation of being sophists"; cf. *Ap.* 21b9 τῶν δοκούντων σοφῶν εἶναι; *E. Med.*

1225-6; also generally *Grg.* 472a2, *Euthd.* 303c8. Demodocus' words contain, I think, a pejorative flavour and reflect his general distrust of the sophists (cf. the coinage *δοξόσοφοι* at *Phdr.* 275b2); see *Intr.* ch. III, c. Lucian probably had this passage in mind in *Rh.Pr.* 1 (*ἔρωτᾷς... ὅπως... σοφιστῆς εἶναι δόξεις*; in *Rh.Pr.* 2 he also uses the proverb which occurs in 122b2-3. Lucian tends to quote or allude to authors near the beginning of his works, see G. Anderson, *BICS* 25 [1978] 97-8).

**a6.** *συστήσω*: *Vox propria* for entrusting one into the care of an educator (cf. 123a8, b6, 127a4, *La.* 200d2; *X. Smp.* 4.63) or of a specialist generally (*Chrm.* 155b2).

**a7.** *εἰς καλὸν*: "Opportunely," "at just the right time" (colloquial, see Stevens 38); the dramatic pretence of coincidence is sustained, see on 121a4 *τυγχάνω*. For the phrase cf. *Hp. ma.* 286c5, *Men.* 89e9, *Euthd.* 275b4, *Smp.* 174e5; also *S. OT* 78, *E. Heracl.* 728-9, *Men. Dysc.* 773, *Sam.* 280.

**a7.** *παρεφάνης*: Juxtaposed with *εἰς καλὸν*, the word almost suggests the "epiphany" of a god (see Dodds *ad Grg.* 527e2); *παρα-* signifies that Socrates is at hand to render assistance. Demodocus speaks in equally emotive terms in 127b3 (*ἔρμαιον*). *Euthd.* 275b2-4 (though ironic) provides a striking verbal and contextual parallel for the relief Demodocus experiences in finding someone who can assist in his son's education: *φοβούμεθα δὲ περὶ αὐτῷ* (cf. *Thg.* 121c5 *ἀεὶ ἐν φόβῳ*, c7 *φοβεῖ*)... *μή τις φθῇ ἡμᾶς* (cf. *Thg.* 122a4 *ἄνευ ἐμοῦ*)... *καὶ διαφθείρη* (cf. *Thg.* 122a5 *διαφθαρῇ*). *σφὼ οὖν ἤκετον εἰς κάλλιστον* (cf. *Thg.* 122a7 *εἰς καλὸν*).

**a7.** *ὦ ἂν ἐγὼ... ἐβουλόμην*: For *ἂν* Cobet would read *δὲ*, assuming a classic uncial error; and he may have been anticipated by

Ficino, who translated *quem quidem hac in re mihi consultorem maxime cupiebam* (where *quidem* might possibly represent δὲ in Ficino's exemplar; but see "Fic." in **Text. Trans.**). Cobet was apparently troubled by the fact that the indicative ἐβουλόμην, rather than the optative, stands in the potential clause; but for ἐβουλόμην ἄν as the virtual equivalent of βουλοίμην ἄν, see Schwyzer-Debrunner II.347; Goodwin *MT*<sup>2</sup> 158; and cf. 128b2. ἄν here not unnaturally gravitates to the beginning of the relative clause to emphasize the potentiality of Demodocus' wish, even though this causes its juxtaposition with the relative pronoun; cf. *Ap.* 38d4 ἴσως με οἴεσθε...ἀπορίᾳ λόγων ἐαλωκέναι τοιούτων οἷς ἂν ὑμᾶς ἔπεισα κτλ. Riddell observed (§68) numerous similar instances where ἄν is juxtaposed with a relative pronoun in optative potential clauses, though the particle actually adheres to the verb.

**a8.** πράξειν: Cobet supplies a formal object for the verb by reading τι πράξειν, postulating the common lipography of τι before π. This however yields rather lame sense, and it is better to understand περὶ τῶν τοιούτων as belonging ἀπὸ κοινοῦ with both συμβουλεύσασθαι and μέλλων πράξειν (see *KG* II.560). The resultant meaning of πράξειν ("negotiate," "do business"; for πράττειν περὶ τίνος cf. *X. HG* 6.3.3) is a good touch of characterization; see **Intr.** ch. III, c.

**a9-b1.** ἔξεστί τε καὶ χρή: Cf. *Phd.* 117c1-2. χρή implies moral compulsion, i.e., Socrates is bound by friendship; see G. Redard, *Recherches sur XPH, XPHΣΘAI* (Paris, 1953) 47ff.

**b2-e1.** Socrates now answers Demodocus' request. Advice is sacred, he admits, but first we must ensure that we are talking about the same thing. Demodocus agrees, but Socrates adds that they also have to guar-

antee that Theages himself has the same subject in mind. Socrates asks for Theages' name.

On the main purposes served by this brief interplay between Socrates and Demodocus, see *Intr.* ch. I, *b, ii*. It also conveys the impression that this is a typically "Socratic" Socrates with which we will have to deal; cf. (with nn.) b2-3, b5-6 (education a sacred thing), b6-8 (the necessity for defining subject of discussion). Whether these first impressions are lasting is of course another matter (see *Intr.* ch. III, *a*).

**b2.** Ἀλλὰ μὲν δή: Although the precise force of the combination is slightly elusive here, I think that "substantiation of condition" is a more accurate description than "assentient" (the terms are Denniston's [*GP*<sup>2</sup> 394]; he suggests that either in this case might be right). Demodocus had just imposed an element of obligation on Socrates (a9-b1): as a friend Socrates must advise him, if he is able. Socrates' response is to exalt the nature of advice: "Why yes, Demodocus, they *do* say advice is a sacred thing." This effectively acknowledges the demand Demodocus has just made, generalizes its validity (λέγεται), and justifies its propriety by going it one better. Wagner's translation ("Es heisst ja überhaupt auch, lieber Demodokos, dass Rath eine heilige Sache sei") is superior to most.

**b2.** καὶ...γε: καὶ is adverbial (asseverative); for καὶ...γε (here stressing λέγεται) see Denniston, *GP*<sup>2</sup> 158.

**b2-3.** συμβουλὴ ἱερὸν χρῆμα εἶναι: A proverb, as λέγεται indicates, and as the *sch. vet. ad loc.* tells us (παροιμία); it occurs also in *Ep.* 5.321c5; cf. *Epich.* fr.228 Kaibel; *Ar. Amphiareus* fr. 33; *X. An.* 5.6.4; *Luc. Rh.Pr.* 1.3, *Ind.* 25.3; *Iamb. VP* 85; see Shorey, *WPS* 661, for further references. The proverb is explained by the *sch. vet.* in two ways, the first of which is rather muddled and contrived (the gist is that advisors [οἱ συμ-

βουλευόντες] have a duty to tell the truth [ἀψευδεῖν] and to offer the best advice they can [τὰ βέλτιστα κατὰ τὴν αὐτῶν γνώμην συμβουλεύειν]; they are like those who give advice in temples [τὰ ἱερά], and who must advise καθαρῶς καὶ ἀδόλως; therefore συμβουλή is a sacred trust). The alternative explanation probably comes nearer the true intent: the proverb is simply a praise (ἔπαινος) of συμβουλή, on the grounds that it is θεία καὶ ὑπὲρ ἄνθρωπον (cf. θειοτέρου b5). However this may be, Socrates' use of this kind of language in connection with the topic of education is not at all unusual. Elsewhere he speaks of instruction or philosophy as initiation into mysteries, humorously in *Tht.* 155e3 and *Euthd.* 277d6-e3, but in a more serious tone at *Smp.* 209e3-210a2; cf. *Phdr.* 249c6ff., *Grg.* 497c3; also *Ar. Nu.* 143, 824.

**b3.** χρῆμα: In a proverbial-type expression, cf. *Ion* 534b3-4; *Hdt.* 3.53. As a predicate to a masculine or feminine subject, χρῆμα appears colloquial, see Tarrant, *CQ* 40 (1946) 111; Stevens 20; *KG* I.60.

**b3-4.** εἴπερ οὖν καὶ ἄλλη ἡτισοῦν...καὶ αὕτη: The meaning is "this *above all* etc."; the phraseology is formulaic, cf. *La.* 197c5-7; *Grg.* 451b1-3, *Phd.* 66a7-8; see *KG* II.573-4.

**b3-4.** καὶ...καὶ: Corresponsive (see Denniston, *GP*<sup>2</sup> 324-5).

**b3.** ἄλλη and αὕτη (b4) refer most immediately to συμβουλή (b2), but they also anticipate παιδείας on b6; the construction is *ad sensum* rather than purely logical.

**b4-6.** οὐ γὰρ...οἰκείων: The education of the young, and the selection of a suitable teacher, were no doubt of primary importance to the historical Socrates; cf. *La.* 185a3ff., 186a3-187b8, *Hp. ma.* 285b5f., *Prt.* 310d5-314c2, 318b1-d4, *Grg.* 514a5-d1, *Euthd.* 274d4ff., *R.* 376-412; *X. Ap.* 21 (where however Socrates sloughs off any irony in claiming to be the

greatest of teachers). Heidel's contention (54 n.7) that the present passage recalls *Lg.* 765d8-766a4 seems to be founded entirely on the occurrence there of *θειότατον* (766a3).

**b5.** *περὶ ὅτου θειοτέρου*: Attraction of an antecedent into the relative clause (inverse attraction) is quite common in Plato; see Riddell §191; also *KG* II.417 (incorporation of nominative antecedent into relative clause).

**b6-8.** *πρῶτον μὲν...βουλευόμεθα*: The insistence to define and determine the subject of inquiry as a preliminary for discussion is highly Socratic; cf. *La.* 185b6-c1, *Phdr.* 237c1ff., 264a4f., *Grg.* 457c4f., *Smp.* 199c3f.; see also on c3-4.

**b8-c2.** *μή...ὑπολαμβάνω...αἰσθώμεθα*: The use of *μή* with an independent subjunctive in cautious assertions is an almost exclusively Platonic idiom before Aristotle; see Riddell §59 ("presumptive use"); Goodwin *MT*<sup>2</sup> 92; Thompson *ad Men.* 89c5. It has been denied, however, that *μή* in this construction can have anything but a prohibitive meaning (see C.D. Chambers, *CR* 10 [1896] 151), but here at least the tentative force of a "cautious assertion" (reinforced by *πολλάκις* b8, see on 122a4) is more consonant with Socrates' general method of inquiry. If this construction is colloquial, as Burnet surmises (*ad Ap.* 39a6), it is surprising that other examples of its application are not more abundant outside of Plato.

**c1.** *ὑπολαμβάνω*: "Frequently of an ill-grounded opinion" (LSJ s.v. III.1); cf. *Crat.* 410b6, *Grg.* 458e5, *Prt.* 341a6. Cobet's *ὑπολαμβάνων* is possible (cf. 123c1-2 and n.), but unnecessary (cf. *Phd.* 90b4-8, *R.* 338a8-b1, *Phlb.* 14a1-4; for the construction "finite verb-ἔπειτα-finite verb" see Dover in *Classical Contributions: Studies in Honour of Malcolm Francis McGregor* [New York, 1981] 24).

**c1.** κᾶπειτα: A colloquialism (see Stevens 47; S. Trenkner, *Le Style KAI* 12-3); cf. in a similar vein 125a4 ἔπειτα and n.

**c1-2.** πόρρω που τῆς συνουσίας: Sc. προβεβηκότες (Knebel). For πόρρω που + genitive, cf. *Phd.* 96e6, *R.* 499c9, 598b6, 610e3, *Euthphr.* 4b1.

**c2.** συνουσίας (BT) must be right, against συνηθείας of W. A possible explanation for the reading in W is that it was originally a gloss *i.m.* or *s.l.* entered by an over-scrupulous (Christian) scribe attempting, upon the first occurrence in the dialogue of the thematic συνουσία (see *Intr.* ch. I, *b, vii; c*), to obviate for the reader the possible (and common) sexual meaning of the word (for instances of Christian sentiments manifested in the *Arethae scholia* see Greene, *Scholia Platonica* xxiii n.7, with references).

**c2.** γελοῖοι ὄντες: Socrates frequently voices similar warnings or apprehensions about appearing ridiculous in discussion; cf. d1 below, *Euthd.* 279 c9-d2, *R.* 506d7-8, *Smp.* 199a7-b2, *Tht.* 181b1-3; see DeVries, *Mnem.* 4.38 (1985) 380. It is fanciful to suppose (with Pangle 152-3) that the care taken here not to appear ridiculous is meant by the author to represent the obverse of the dramatic situation of *Ar. Nu.*, and that this is therefore part of a "rebuttal" of Aristophanes' picture of Socrates.

**c3-4.** μηδὲν τῶν αὐτῶν ἡγούμενοι: A close parallel is *La.* 198a7-b5, esp. b3-4. Socrates here insists on determining the subject of discussion in order to prevent his arguing at cross-purposes with Demodocus and Theages. Elsewhere (particularly in the early dialogues) this is one important reason for his demand for definitions: Socrates endeavours to set some order to the obvious confusion caused by different individuals' different applications of certain moral terms; what he was after of course



was an immutable meaning for each term. But it will be noticed that, although here Socrates does seek to define certain terms of reference, no definition is arrived at; he does not ask "What is σοφία?", but rather "What does Theages mean by σοφία?", or "At what does he want to become σοφός?" For this modification of the structure of the early Platonic dialogue, see *Intr.* ch. I, *b*, *iii*, *v*; ch. III, *a*.

**c5-6.** Ἀλλά...οὕτω: So also, in a similar context, Melesias expresses ready agreement with Socrates' suggestions (*La.* 185a8, a10, b5).

**c5.** Ἀλλά: Assentient (see Denniston, *GP*<sup>2</sup> 18).

**c6.** ποιεῖν χρὴ οὕτω: As οὕτω usually precedes the word it modifies (see LSJ s.v. οὕτως B), the order οὕτω χρὴ ποιεῖν (or χρὴ οὕτω ποιεῖν) would appear to be the natural one, cf. *Smp.* 175b4, *R.* 328b3, 435a4, *Prt.* 362a1, 397a4; but the identical order is found once, in *R.* 435a4. The formula may be a stylistic marker: it seems that Plato in his early dialogues favoured this combination to indicate acceptance of a proposal, whereas in later works ταῦτ' ἔσται (ἔσται ταῦτα, ἔσται τάδε) tended to predominate; see DeVries, *Mnem.* 4.16 (1963) 286-7, who calls the formula colloquial.

**c7.** Καὶ λέγω...παντάπασί γε: *La.* 195c5 Καὶ γὰρ λέγει γέ τι, οὐ μέντοι ἀληθές γε is strikingly close.

**c7.** Καὶ λέγω γε ὁρθῶς: The combination καὶ...γε picks up ὁρθῶς from c5; cf. *La.* 195c3-5, and Dover *ad Nu.* 293. The particles preserve independent force (see Denniston, *GP*<sup>2</sup> 159): καὶ is emphatic (adverbial), γε is limitative ("What I say is correct, as far as it goes; however...").

**c8.** σμικρὸν γάρ τι μετατίθεμαι: A common vehicle of irony for Socrates, cf. *Chrm.* 173d8, *Euthphr.* 13a1, *Prt.* 328e3-4, 329b6, *Smp.*

201c2, *Tht.* 145d5-e9 (similarly 128b2-4 below); and a natural form of understatement, cf. *Ar. Lys.* 97-8. Socrates' "one small change" is concerned with nothing less than Theages himself and the object of his present desire.

**c8-d2.** ἐννοῶ...βουλευόμενοι: It is faultless, dramatically speaking, that Socrates should now draw Theages into the conversation, and indeed that he should extend the principle of the need to start from agreed premises (cf. 122b6-8 and n.). But there is a further motive, important to the theme of the dialogue, for his directing the conversation away from Demodocus and turning it exclusively towards Theages (though Heindorf [see Hollenberg 354] viewed this as a structural defect); cf. also 125b3 and n., and *Intr.* ch. I, b, ii.

**c8.** ἐννοῶ...μή: Translators generally interpret these words in one of two ways: a) as an expression of precaution, "I am worried lest..." (Ast, Fritzsche; for ἐννοῶ as *verbum cavendi*, cf. *X. An.* 3.5.3, 4.2.13; ἐνθυμ-οῦμαι undergoes a similar extension of meaning in *Hp. ma.* 300d2-3); b) as introducing an indirect question, "I wonder whether..." shading into "It occurs to me that..." (so most other commentators and translators, as well as Denniston, *GP*<sup>2</sup> 298; for μή = "whether" see Riddell §61-2). The first possibility seems rather strong to me; one expects Socrates to proceed in the dialogue's early stages as the tentative examiner, withholding final judgement on the present situation until all facts are made known.

**c8.** μή καὶ: The combination has a colloquial flavour, and is apparently more common in Plato and Xenophon than in other authors (see Denniston, *GP*<sup>2</sup> 298).

**c8-9.** μαιρακίσκος: Theages is also called νεανίσκος in d7 and μαιράκιον in 131a9; the three terms are basically interchangeable. A

good many of Socrates' interlocutors and companions are of such an age as to be designated by these words, e.g., Charmides (*Chrm.* 154b5), Theaetetus (*Tht.* 144c8), Phaedrus (*Phdr.* 257c8), Hippocrates (*Prt.* 318a6), Simmias and Cebes (*Phd.* 89a3), Agathon (*Smp.* 198a2). But the flexibility with which the terms are generally used prevents us from drawing any conclusions about Theages' precise age. The Greeks commonly applied the word *μειρακίσκος* to youths between the ages of fourteen and twenty-one (see F.A. Beck, *Greek Education: 450-350 B.C.* [London, 1964] 95 n.6; M.L. Clarke, *Higher Education in the Ancient World* [London, 1971] 3), relying as they did upon the hebdomadic theory which divided ages into periods of seven years (cf. Solon fr.27.3ff. W.; [Hipp.] *Hebd.* 5; Arist. *Pol.* 1336<sup>b</sup>40ff.; Gel. 3.10). Such age divisions tend however to be arbitrary (see T. Hopfner, *Das Sexualleben der Griechen und Römer I* [Prague, 1938] 225-37), and, again, can tell us little about Theages. On the other hand, at 122e10 we learn that Theages has finished his "primary" education, which implies that he is at least 16, the age at which this education was usually completed (see A.D. Booth, *Classical Views* 4 [1985] 274-80); and there is circumstantial evidence that he may be closer to 18 (see *Intr.* ch. III, *b*).

**c9-d1.** ἐπιθυμεῖ . . . ὥμεν: Editors usually prefer the subjunctive ἐπιθυμῇ here (a "normalization" in Urb.80 and [independently] by Bessarion in Ven.186), but the indicative (*lectio difficillior*) is sound. Socrates is apprehensive that Theages does *in fact* (indicative) desire something different, and that he and Demodocus may later turn out (subjunctive ὥμεν) to be ridiculous in consequence of this. For a similar switch from indicative to subjunctive, cf. E. *Ph.* 92ff.; and for μή + indicative cf. *Lys.*

216c1, *Tht.* 145b10-c1; *S. El.* 581; see Schwyzer-Debrunner II.676; Goodwin *MT*<sup>2</sup> 133-4.

**d1.** εἴτ' αὖ: For εἴτα denoting inconsequentiality, see on 125a4 ἔπειτα. αὖ (reinforced by ἔτι ἀτοπώτεροι on the same line) refers back to 122b6-c4 and the similar provisions and apprehensions there.

**d1.** ἀτοπώτεροι: See on 122c2 γελοῖοι ὄντες; and for ἄτοπος used of misguided dialectical procedure, cf. *Chrm.* 167c4.

**d2.** ὀρθότατον: As compared with ὀρθῶς c5, c7.

**d3.** διαπυνθανομένους: Sc. ἡμᾶς from the preceding clause; cf. *Crat.* 397c4-6.

**d3-4.** ὅτι καὶ ἔστιν: "What exactly it is that he desires." καὶ stresses that the information desired is supplementary to what has already been investigated and determined, but this adverbial usage merges with the emphatic use of καί (examples in Denniston, *GP*<sup>2</sup> 313).

**d5.** Κινδυνεύει...λέγεις: As Demodocus' original desire was merely to take counsel with Socrates (121a1-3, 122a6-b1), Socrates' suggestion now to turn his attention exclusively to Theages elicits a slightly more hesitant acceptance (cf. γοῦν) from Demodocus than he offered at c5-6.

**d6-7.** Εἰπὲ...προσαγορεύωμεν: For Socrates' not knowing the name of a young interlocutor, cf. *Lys.* 204e1ff., *Tht.* 144c8.

**d6.** τί...νεανίσκῳ: The passage has been variously emended (see *app. crit.*), and Heidel (55) considers the phraseology an example of "affected style." Fritzsche (*ad loc.*) was clearly thinking along correct lines when he characterized d7-e1 generally as "lusus ex more Platonis," but he should have been more precise. We often find Socrates commenting upon, or taking a keen interest in the beauty of his young interlocutors (e.g.

*Chrm.* 155c7ff., *Lys.* 206e9ff., *Alc.* I 104a4ff., *Smp.* 213c6ff.), and, while καλὸν here modifies ὄνομα, the adjective must be prompted by Theages' appearance (cf. the use of καλῶς in *Alc.* I 108c6-7). The underlying process of thought for Socrates is "Theages is καλός; his name must therefore be καλόν" (for the Greek belief that names reflect the circumstances, personality, or particular characteristics of an individual, see R. Hirzel, "Der Name", *Abhandlungen der Sächsischen Akademie* 36.2 [1918-21]). That this hypallage carries with it an air of mock-solemnity is suggested by Socrates' imminent play on Theages' name in e1 (see n. *ad loc.*). Moreover, Socrates' response in d10 (καλόν γε) to Demodocus' answer (d9) to the present question is a confirmation of the initial use of καλόν ("yes it is a fine name you have given your son").

**d7. προσαγορεύωμεν:** Richards, commenting that only Socrates, Demodocus, and Theages are present, suggested the singular προσ-αγορεύω. But Plato sometimes uses the plural of a single person, cf. *Euthphr.* 12e2-4, *Men.* 75b8, *Clit.* 408d2, *Tht.* 161e5; see KG I.83f.; Schwyzer-Debrunner II.243. In 130e5 Socrates says ἡ ἡμετέρα συνουσία, which cannot include Theages or anyone else, since the statement is not prospective (n.b. ἔστιν e5). Socrates' occasional use of the plural to implicate another speaker in his own conclusions (e.g. *La.* 196c10-d1) is rather different (see Jowett-Campbell 195; L. Reinhard *Die Anakolouthē* 139 and n.1). The use of the plural *pro* singular goes back to Homer (see P. Chantraine, *Grammaire Homérique II* [Paris, 1963] 33-4).

Another objection to προσαγορεύωμεν, first voiced by Schleiermacher (349), has been directed against its application here to a personal name. Strictly speaking, προσαγορεύειν can be used in calling someone βασιλεύς, ἱατρός, κυβερνήτης, etc., or καλός, σοφός, etc., but

never in Plato is it used to identify a person by a proper name, for which purpose ὀνομάζειν or καλεῖν would normally be expected. But this objection is only superficially valid, since the appearance of προσαγορεύειν actually provides the key to Socrates' intentions. The point of d6-e1 is that Theages' name is a sign of the essence of the person, and is consequently more than simply a proper name; it designates an attribute of him, much like adjectives such as καλός, etc. (see on e1 ἱεροπρεπές).

**d9.** Καλόν γε: γε is exclamatory (see Denniston, *GP*<sup>2</sup> 127), and probably slightly frivolous in tone (for καλόν γε used in this way, cf. *Hp. ma.* 282e9, and Denn. *GP*<sup>2</sup> 128). The pun at the end of the sentence would seem to articulate this tone further.

**e1.** ἱεροπρεπές: The only instance of the word in the Corpus, but obviously called into use here solely for a pun on Theages' name. It is not a coinage, however, since it occurs already in *X. Smp.* 8.40. ἱεροπρεπές literally = "holy-seeming"; Θεάγης = either "god-leading," from the components θεός and ἄγειν/ἡγεῖσθαι (see E. Fraenkel, *RE* 32.1620, 1621; slightly differently Müller [466] "ὄν θεὸς ἄγει"); or "god-revering," from θεός and ἄγος/ἄζομαι (see Fritzsche *ad loc.*; cf. Hsch. s.v. Θεάγης, where the word is glossed θεοσεβής).

There are of course abundant instances in Plato of word-play in general (e.g. *Crat. pass.*; see also D. Tarrant, *CQ* 40 [1946] 109-17, *id. CQ* 52 [1958] 158-60); for some examples of a play on a personal name, cf. *Crat.* 398d2ff., 394c2ff., *Smp.* 174b4, 185c4, *Ap.* 25c1-4, *Phd.* 94a4-5. Plato shows an interest in etymology for its own sake (see R.K. Sprague, *Plato's Use of Fallacy* [London, 1962] 61 n.3).

**122e1-123b3.** Socrates now draws Theages into the conversation and probes him playfully. Theages wishes to become σοφός (e1-2); he

agrees that the σοφοί are identical with οἱ ἐπιστήμονες (e5-7); since he has been educated he too is ἐπιστήμων (e8-12; and by implication already σοφός). But there is still some ἐπιστήμη which he lacks, and of which his father is quite aware, despite the reticence of the latter. Socrates asks that Theages tell him what this ἐπιστήμη is.

The introduction of a new interlocutor is an obvious method of formally marking the commencement of a new section (see G. Billings, *The Art of Transition in Plato* [Chicago, 1920] 16). Within the first sentence of this section Socrates frames a question which establishes the priority of issues for his subsequent interrogation, viz., that Theages wishes to become σοφός (which leads naturally to the question of the kind of σοφία Theages desires), and that he wants to secure a teacher who will help him to achieve his goal. Socrates' questioning in 122e1-123b3 is of the overtly sportive kind that we frequently encounter in the preliminary discussion of a dialogue, e.g. *Lys.* 204b1-205d4, *Euthd.* 273c1-274a9, *Hp. ma.* 281b5ff., *Menex.* 234c1-235c5, *Men.* 70a5ff., *Phdr.* 227b9-228c5; but its purpose is much more fundamental than this, see **Intr.** ch. I, *b*, *iii*.

**e2.** σου is unusual, both because of its position and because the dative would be expected. But σου is *lectio difficilior*, and Fritzsche compares *Men.* 94d7, *Amat.* 138e6.

**e2-3.** ἐξευρεῖν...τοιοῦτου: The sentence stumbles somewhat at this point; ἐξευρεῖν ἀνδρά τινα τοιοῦτον κτλ. would certainly run more smoothly. But συνουσία + objective genitive is common (cf. *Prt.* 318b6, *Alc. I* 119a2-3, *Smp.* 219d8), and συνουσία possesses a thematic importance for the dialogue (see **Intr.** ch. I, *b*, *vii*; *c*).

**e5-6.** Σοφούς...τοὺς μή: For the identification of σοφία/σοφός with ἐπιστήμη/ἐπιστήμων, cf. *Ap.* 22d2, *La.* 194d8-195a1, *Euthd.* 276

a8-b1, 281b1-6, *Tht.* 145e3-6, *R.* 350b3; also *X. Mem.* 4.6.7; *E. Supp.* 842-3; see B. Snell, *Die Ausdrücke für den Begriff des Wissens in der Vorplatonischen Philosophie* (Berlin, 1924) 86ff.; J. Lyons, *Structural Semantics* (Oxford, 1963) 96, 227-8.

**e5-6.** περὶ...ᾧσιν: Socrates adds this qualification concerning the limits of knowledge of one who is ἐπιστήμων because he is about to cite the special, limited areas in which Theages himself might be considered ἐπιστήμων (e8-11). The formula "one is σοφός in that at which one is ἐπιστήμων" (sc. "and ἀμαθής in that at which one is ἀνεπιστήμων") is recited in similar terms by Nicias in *La.* 194c8ff. as something he has "often heard Socrates say"; cf. also *Alc. I* 125a1ff.: each person is ἀγαθός in that at which he is φρονίμος (and πονηρός in that at which he is ἄφρων); and this leads (as in our dialogue) to a discussion of the special quality that marks out the possessor of the τέχνη of politics.

**e8.** οὐκ ἐδιδάξατο...καὶ ἐπαίδευσεν: Cobet proposed to delete καὶ ἐπαίδευσεν, "namque ἐδιδάξατο est per alios docuit, ἐπαίδευσεν docuit ipse. Sed neque γράμματα neque κιθαρίζειν neque παλαίειν filius a patre docebatur." But Riddell (§87) and Thompson (*ad Men.* 93d2) demonstrated long ago that the meaning "to get a thing done by another" does not belong to the middle voice *qua* middle; the active can express the meaning just as readily. Hence ἐπαίδευσεν = "had you educated."

**e9.** πεπαίδευνται BTW, παιδεύονται Par.1811 (whence Ald. Steph.) 1812 Vat.1030. The latter reading looks like a scribal emendation rather than a simple misreading, but πεπαίδευνται is sound, since it can be taken as a gnomic perfect, see Goodwin *MT*<sup>2</sup> 53-4; Gildersleeve I.111; Jowett-Campbell 173-4. Cf. Stallbaum *ad loc.*: "Semper et instituti sunt et



instituuntur, i.e. instituti solent." On the other hand, Socrates may be referring specifically to Theages' peers (οἱ ἡλικιωτοὶ 121d1) who have been educated contemporaneously with him.

**e9-10.** τῶν καλῶν καὶ ἀγαθῶν πατέρων: On Socrates' employment of this expression, see **Intr.** ch. I, *b*, *iii*. οἱ καλοὶ καὶ ἀγαθοί is used initially in the fifth-century as an expression denoting not only someone whose actions are morally praiseworthy (cf. *Grg.* 474c9-d2), but who is also of a certain social class and behaves in a way that befits his position (for its use in connection with wrestling and music, cf. *Ar. Ra.* 727-9). For discussions of the phrase, see H. Wankel, *KALOS KAI AGATHOS* (Diss. Warburg, 1961) 77-83; K.J. Dover, *GPM* 41-5; A.W. Gomme, *CQ* 47 (1953) 65-8; G.E.M. de Ste Croix, *The Origins of the Peloponnesian War* (London, 1972) 358-9, 371-6; see also n. on 127a3.

**e10.** γράμματα τε καὶ κιθαρίζειν καὶ παλαίειν: The traditional components of an Athenian "primary" education, undertaken up until the age of about 16 (see n. on c8-9); cf. *Chrm.* 159c3-d2, *Prt.* 312b1-2, 325d7-326c3, *Alc. I* 106e6, 118c8-d4, *Men.* 94b5; *X. Mem.* 4.2.6; *Ar. Ra.* 727-9, *Nu.* 964, 973. The three subjects were taught in successive stages, not concurrently (see A.D. Booth, *Classical Views* 4 [1985] 274-80). Pavlu (26) claims that our passage derives directly from *Alc. I* 106e6, but since the educational components catalogued here represent standard practice (especially as depicted by Plato), this possibility can only be considered if we look beyond the mere similarity of wording (see **Intr.** ch. I, *b*, *iii*).

**e11.** τὴν ἄλλην ἀγωνίαν: Cf. *Alc. II* 145c10 τῆς ἄλλης ἀγωνίας, *Grg.* 456d1, *R.* 618a8-b1.

**123a1.** ἐλλείπειν: ἐλλίπειν (B) is possible, but the durative (B<sup>c</sup>TW) is clearly superior.

**a2.** ἐπιμεληθήναι echoes Demodocus' words in 121d4; cf. 121b7  
θεραπεία.

**a5-8.** Οἶδεν...συστήσαι: This passage has caused needless difficulty among some commentators, who have addressed themselves to two problems: 1) to what does the pronoun ταῦτα (a6) refer; 2) where in the dialogue has Demodocus feigned ignorance (a6-7 ὥς δὲ οὐκ εἰδὼς οὐ ἐγὼ ἐπιθυμῶ). As for 1), Knebel recognized (*ad loc.*; he was followed by Stallbaum *ad loc.*) that ταῦτα must refer back to 122d5, where Demodocus assents to Socrates' condition that they should first investigate exactly what Theages desires. Theages now maintains that there is no need to do this, since Demodocus knows what he wants. Schleiermacher (349) framed 2) as an objection to an apparent structural discontinuity: how can Theages imply that Demodocus has anywhere demonstrated anything but an understanding of his aspirations ("...dieser sich gar nicht so geäußert hat, als wisse er nicht was sein Sohn wolle, sondern vielmehr erscheint ihm das Weisewerdenwollen als etwas ganz bekanntes und eindeutiges")? This latter criticism results from a failure to appreciate the perspective of a5-8, for ὥς δὲ οὐκ εἰδὼς need not imply that Demodocus did in fact feign ignorance, but only that Theages here *thinks* that his father is pretending not to know anything about his intentions. In large measure Socrates' ensuing discussion with Theages (123b3ff.) forces him to recognize his father's prudence, and to realize how unclear he himself is about what he desires. In effect Theages will be made to recognize the difficulties which Demodocus probably already perceives (see *Intr.* ch. I, b, iii). Hence Theages' remark need hardly be accepted as a true description of actual circumstances and of Demodocus' state of mind. Stallbaum's solution (*ad loc.*) to the second problem (121a1-122d4 were spoken privately

between only Socrates and Demodocus, which thus accounts for a6-7 ὥς...ἐπιθυμῶ) is fanciful and ought to be rejected utterly.

**a6.** ὥς δὲ: Ironical, cf. Lat. *quasi vero* (see Jowett-Campbell 205-6; Denniston, *GP*<sup>2</sup> 230).

**a7.** τοιαῦτα γὰρ ἕτερα καὶ W, ἔτι καὶ ἕτερα καὶ T, ἔτι καὶ B. W's text was virtually unknown to nineteenth-century editors, who unanimously subscribed to the reading of T. But T here likely represents a conflation of the B and W readings. I have little doubt that W preserves the true reading (so Burnet, and all editors since); for the independent use of τοιαῦτα ἕτερα (internal accusative with μάχεται; Knebel [*ad loc.*] however understands λέγων with the phrase), cf. *Prt.* 326a4 ἕτερα τοιαῦτα.

**a8.** μάχεταί τε καὶ οὐκ ἐθέλει: It is tempting to take these words as a hendiadys ("he obstinately refuses"), but πρὸς ἐμὲ (a7), belonging with μάχεταί, mark μάχεταί as a distinct and independent component within the sentence. For the figurative application of μάχεται to verbal disagreements, cf. *Amat.* 134b7; also ἀντιβολοίης *Eryx.*398e7.

**a8.** τε καὶ: Probably explanatory, cf. τε...καὶ in 125a5; see Verdenius, *Mnem.* 4.8 (1955) 275; *id.*, *Mnem.* 4.9 (1956) 252; Gonda, *Mnem.* 4.7 (1954) 199.

**a8.** συστήσαι: See on 122a6.

**a9-b1.** τὰ μὲν...ἦν...ῥηθέντα...λεγόμενα: The periphrastic ἦν...ῥηθέντα deliberately balances λεγόμενα (rather than ἐρρήθη...λεγόμενα); the aorist aspect establishes the fact of the action without specification, while the present describes the circumstances under which the repeated action took place (i.e. ἄνευ μαρτύρων); see W.J. Aerts, *Periphrastica* (Amsterdam, 1965) 30-1. The periphrastic construc-

tion is also used to lay emphasis on a part of the sentence other than the verb (see Gonda, *Mnem.* 4.12 [1958] 97-9); here the simile ὥσπερ ἄνευ μαρτύρων is conspicuous: hence (somewhat literally) "It was without witnesses, as it were, that what was spoken earlier to him was being uttered." Generally speaking, the periphrastic construction (cf. 128d2-3) is a feature of Plato's later style (see Jowett-Campbell 53; Thesleff 84).

**b1.** ὥσπερ ἄνευ μαρτύρων: The simile seems to suggest legal processes; this impression is supported by b2 ἐναντίον ἐμοῦ κάτειπε (see n. *ad loc.*). Such a simile may have been suggested to Socrates by Theages' πρὸς ἐμὲ μάχεται a7-8 (see on a8).

**b1-2.** νυνὶ . . . μάρτυρα: Socrates assumes the role of witness also in *Grg.* 472c1, and there is a latent irony in this. For it implies that, ignorant as he is, he has nothing to contribute to the proceedings; yet in what follows Socrates obviously behaves as anything but simply μάρτυς (see *Intr.* ch. III, a). Usually Socrates furnishes someone or something else as a witness to what he says, e.g. *Ap.* 20e6-8, *Grg.* 472b6, *Lys.* 215c7, *Smp.* 215 b7.

**b2.** ἐναντίον ἐμοῦ κάτειπε: The language continues the simile begun by μάρτυρα (b1): for ἐναντίον of μάρτυρες speaking before a jury, cf. *Lg.* 953e6; D. 27.18, 41, 30.19, 24, 27 (*et saep.*); Isocr. 17.23; *Lys.* 17.2; Ar. *Ec.* 448. κατεῖπεν occurs only seven times in the Corpus, and only here does it stand simply as a strengthened form of εἰπεῖν ("reveal"), the meaning "denounce" being present in every other Platonic instance. This meaning of κατεῖπεν is not exceptional elsewhere (cf. MacDowell *ad Ar. Vesp.* 54: "...a usual compound for making public some information which has previously been confined to a privileged few"). But here our author was prompted to use it, I think, because of its frequency in forensic

oratory: Isocrates has *κατελπείν* in the sense of "reveal" in all instances but one (17.55), Demosthenes once in three occurrences, Lysias four in seven. The suspicions of Heidel (56 n.12) and Ritter (94) as regards this form are without foundation.

**123b3-e17.** Socrates begins to question Theages about the precise σοφία that he desires. If Theages wanted to become σοφός at the σοφία by which one commands ships, the σοφία would be helmsmanship; if the σοφία by which one steers chariots, it would be chariot-driving. In response to Socrates' demand for a specific name from Theages, the young man falls back upon the vague "σοφία." Thereupon Socrates lists numerous crafts which can all be called σοφίαι, and which all involve ἄρχειν, but which are too imprecise for determining the σοφία Theages is after.

Socrates' first two examples of σοφία introduce the notion of κυβερνᾶν (b4, c2), which quickly leads to the identification of σοφία with ἄρχειν (of which κυβερνᾶν is a species, see c2 n.). For the structure of the argument in this section, see *Intr.* ch. I, b, *iii*.

**b3.** φέρε γάρ: Rather rare in the Corpus, occurring only six times elsewhere; φέρε δὲ is much commoner.

**b3-7.** εἰ...ἀπεκρίνω: Double protases (εἰ ἐπεθύμεις... καὶ...ἐτύγχανον ἀνερωτῶν) are quite frequent in Plato (cf. the triple protasis in 123c1-4); often they summarize, as here, a hypothetical conversation, e.g. *Hp. ma.* 289c9-d2, *Prt.* 311b5-c1, *Grg.* 453 c5-8, *Tht.* 147a1-5; see Bluck *ad Men.* 72a7-b2. For the mixed condition (imperfect/aorist), cf. 126a12-b2.

**b3.** ἐπεθύμεις Coisl.155 Flor.b, the simple correction for ἐπιθυμῆις of BTW, is guaranteed by the parallel imperfect ἐτύγχανον in b4.

**b4.** τὰ πλοῖα κυβερνῶσιν: Socrates' reasoning from analogy very early in a dialogue is familiar, e.g. *Grg.* 448b4ff., *La.* 185c5ff., *R.* 335c2ff. For κυβερνῶσιν see on b7 κυβερνητικήν; and on the use of craft-analogy in this part of the dialogue, see *Intr.* ch. I, b, iii.

**b6.** συνιστάναι: See on 122a6.

**b6.** παρ' ὧν ἂν σὺ σοφὸς γένοιο: For γίγνεσθαι παρὰ + genitive cf. *Menex.* 236e1-3 (γίγνεσθαι virtually the passive of ποιεῖν, see K.G. I.99). For the ellipse of the antecedent (here τούτοις), cf. 129c6; also X. *Mem.* 1.2.6 διὰ τὸ ἀναγκαῖον αὐτοῖς εἶναι διαλέγεσθαι παρ' ὧν {ἂν} λάβοιεν τὸν μισθόν.

**b7.** τί ἂν μοι ἀπεκρίνω: The aorist does not represent a past act, but, preserving fully its aspectual force, signifies a potential instantaneous and momentary act. This use of the aorist *in apodosi*, where the verb in the protasis is an imperfect denoting a present unreal condition, is mainly a Platonic idiom (see Goodwin *MT*<sup>2</sup> 151; also Schwyzer-Debrunner II.348). That the aorist in such cases is employed suppositiously must be true, but that its reference is to a future act (so Goodwin and Schwyzer-Debrunner), is question-begging, since the verb is purely hypothetical.

**b7.** τίνα αὐτήν εἶναι: Although the abrupt switch to *oratio obliqua* would perhaps not be out of place in a narrative passage, and may capture the colloquial flavour of conversation, it nevertheless strikes an unusual note in the context of Socratic dialectic (for a similar anacolouthon cf. 125d5); for, although the construction is perfectly understandable and natural enough, there seem to be few convincing parallels for this peculiarity; cf. *Lg.* 740b6ff., 753b4ff., 890b3ff.; see Reinhard, *Die Anakoluthe* 123f. Conversely, extended *oratio obliqua* in Plato is frequently broken by brief spots of *oratio recta* (see D. Tarrant, *CQ* n.s. 5 [1955] 222-4).

**b7.** κυβερνητικήν: A favourite τέχνη for Socrates in his analogies, e.g. *Euthd.* 279e4-6, *Ion* 537c6-7, *Chrm.* 173b1, *Grg.* 511c9ff., *R.* 341c9-10, 346a7-8. But the choice of this craft at this point in the dialogue seems to have been carefully made, see c2 n., and *Intr.* ch. I, b, iii.

**c1-3.** Εἰ...ἐρωτῶντος: Virtually a triple protasis, cf. *Phd.* 67e6ff., *Clit.* 408e3-409a1; Goodwin *MT*<sup>2</sup> 193-4; KG II.487-8.

**c2.** τὰ ἄρματα κυβερνῶσιν: This phrase has been criticized as paradoxical, since, strictly speaking, we should expect ἐλαύνειν or ἡνιόχεῖν in place of κυβερνᾶν, a verb which normally, one would imagine, belongs in a sea-faring context (see Schleiermacher 349; Stallbaum *ad loc.*; Fritzsche *ad loc.*; Heidel 55 n.1). Yet, as Fritzsche himself did not fail to remark (citing examples), κυβερνᾶν often occurs in an extended, poetical sense, and to Fritzsche's list Heidel added examples of a quasi-metaphorical use of κυβερνᾶν. In fact, κυβερνᾶν in our passage is unassailable, for as Taylor pointed out (*PMW*<sup>6</sup> 534 n.4), the phrase τὰ ἄρματα κυβερνᾶν is closely paralleled in *Lg.* 640e5ff.

Stallbaum, however, raised a second and more serious objection to what he called "haec eiusdem verbi in re dissimili iteratio," i.e., Socrates seems deliberately to use κυβερνᾶν consecutively in b4 and c2 despite the fact that this involves him in both regular and extended uses of the word within a brief interval. But the author's motives for doing this are closely connected with the theme and structure of this part of the dialogue: since Socrates will proceed to equate σοφία with ἄρχειν in its political sense (e.g. 124a3-4), and since this accords with Theages' ultimate goal, it is probably correct to detect behind the preoccupation here with the use of κυβερνᾶν a veiled allusion to the metaphor of the ship of state; that Socrates had a predilection for calling politics ἡ τῶν ἀνθρώπων κυβερ-

νητική is asserted confidently by the author of *Clit.* (408b3-4), and Plato frequently compares politics to helmsmanship, or the politician to a helmsman, e.g. *Plt.* 272e3f., 297e8-12; see P. Louis, *Les métaphores de Platon* [Paris, 1945] 155f.; the metaphor is traditional, see K.M. Kaiser, *Das Bild des Steuermannes in der antiken Literatur* (Erlangen, 1954). On this passage see *Intr.* ch I, b, iii.

**c2.** εἴτ' preceded by a participle (ἐπιθυμῶν) and followed by a finite verb (ἐμέμφου) is colloquial; see Stevens 47; KG II.83; Dodds *ad Grg.* 457b5.

**c3.** ἀπεκρίνω: See on b7 above.

**c4.** ἡνιοχικήν: Another common craft in Socratic analogies, cf. *Ion* 538b5, *Grg.* 516e3f.

**c5.** Ναί: Plato seldom allows a character to answer in successive replies with the same word or phrase, as our author permits Theages here (Ναί b9); so also d7 and d10 (Ναί), 124a9 and b4 (Ναί), 125c11 and d2 (Ναί). See Thesleff 38 ("...somewhat more examples of this in the earliest dialogues than later [e.g. *Ion* 537c-e, 538b, *Hipp. mi.* 373d, 374d, 375c]").

**c6.** Ἡς δὲ δὴ...ἐπιθυμῶν: Cf. d15 Ἡς δὲ δὴ σὺ ἐπιθυμῶν εἶς. δὲ δὴ is regularly used by Plato when he arrives at the application of a line of argument or series of examples, cf. 126c3, *Ion* 538b7, *Prt.* 311d1, *Grg.* 475a8, 485d1, *Men.* 78d1; see Denniston, *GP*<sup>2</sup> 259; Adam *ad R.* 378 a1.

**c6-7.** πότερον...ὄνομα: Elsewhere Plato's Socrates states deliberately that he is less concerned with the name of a σοφία, τέχνη, or ἐπιστήμη, than he is with its effects or efficacy, cf. *R.* 533d4-e2; also *Lg.* 864a8-b2; see Bluck *ad Men.* 75e1; Burnet *ad Phd.* 64c2. But, despite the initial emphasis here (see on δὲ δὴ c6 and c9-10 n.), it will emerge, as



Socrates moves onto the question of τέχνη, that the name of the σοφία only represents a starting point; see *Intr.* ch. I, *b*, *iii*.

**c9-10.** μὲν...οὐ μέντοι: As a substitute for οὐ δὲ, οὐ μέντοι lays all the stress of the sentence on τὸ ὄνομα c9-10 (see Denniston, *GP*<sup>2</sup> 369-70; Riddell §162); see on c6-7.

**c12.** τί οὖν ἔστιν; εἰπέ: An imperative form of λέγω, as a self-contained sentence following a direct question, and as a character's final statement, is no doubt colloquial, and probably signifies impatience, cf. *Ar. Nu.* 200, *Eq.* 131; it also appears now and then in the earlier works of Plato, e.g. *Grg.* 470a4, *Men.* 74a1, *Chrm.* 165e2, *Prt.* 353a6, 357c8-d1.

**d1-2.** Τί...σοφίαν: This inept reply to Socrates' question prepares us for the extensive process of induction which follows, as Socrates undoubtedly feels that his method of argument should be as explicit as possible for Theages (see *Intr.* ch. I, *b*, *iii*). Though the fullness of this list of τέχναι can be roughly paralleled in other, indisputably genuine, works of Plato (e.g. *Grg.* 449c9ff., *R.* 332c5-333d8), such lengthy instances of induction are uncommon (see Robinson, *PED*<sup>2</sup> 33-4), and Schleiermacher (173) objected to the sheer length and tedium of this process as a marker of un-Platonic style. In response, Grote (432 n. e), comparing *Plt.* 285c8-286c3, where Plato defends the use of long passages involving collection and division in *Sph.* and *Plt.* (e.g. *Sph.* 218eff., 261bff., *Plt.* 258dff., 279bff.) as being propaedeutic to the investigation of more crucial issues, maintained that d3-124e10 (esp. d3-124b9) possess pedagogical value. Needless to say, a debate of this kind will never admit of an answer which is satisfying to all sides. It is, however, of greater significance that in *Alc. I* 125b9-d3 not only are a number of the same τέχναι listed as appear at this stage of *Thg.*, but their order of presentation is very similar, and they

are used (as here) to arrive at a conclusion about the πολιτικὴ τέχνη. Thus in *Alc. I* we encounter the catalogue ἵππων (b10)...καμνόντων (b14)...πλεόντων (b16)...θεριζόντων (b18)...χοροδιδασκαλική (d3); while in *Thg.* there are (in addition to some other items) ἵππων (123d8)...καμνόντων (e3)...πλοίων (d13)...θεριζόντων (124a6, occurring in analogies only here and in the *Alc. I* passage cited above)...μουσική (123e10). Although the evidence that the author of *Thg.* here drew his material from *Alc. I* is not secure, as has been held (Pavlu 29-31; Heidel 55 n.8; Brünneke 102-3; Souilhé 140 n.1; Krüger 30-1) - Plato, as well as other Socratic writers, persistently recur to the same crafts for their analogies (but θεριζόντων above seems an important exception) - nevertheless it is hard to resist the conclusion that the two passages are related. This seems, in other words, one more place in which a connection can be drawn between *Thg.* and an *Alcibiades*-dialogue; see also *Intr.* ch. I, b, iii, v, vi, vii; c; ch. II, c. Pangle's attempts (155f.) to detect special motives behind Socrates' particular choice of crafts in these examples is unconvincing.

**d1-2.** Τί δὲ ἄλλο...ἄλλ' ἤ: The idiom is very common in Plato (cf. 125e6 ἄλλο τι ἤ and n.), but the origin of the combination ἄλλ' ἤ (i.e., whether ἄλλ' = ἄλλο or ἄλλ᾽) is obscure, see Denniston, *GP<sup>2</sup>* 26-7; Bluck *ad Men.* 76b7.

**d3.** ἡνιοχία: Socrates returns to his last example (cf. c4). ἡνιοχία (B) is merely an itacism which occurs independently in a couple of *recentiores* as well (Par.1811 Ambros.409), in Ald., and passes through the latter into the Vulgate.

**d3.** σοφία...ἀμαθία: The regular antonyms in Plato (as σοφός-ἀμαθής), e.g. *Hp. ma.* 296a5-6, *Prt.* 337a6, *Euthd.* 275d4.

**d8.** Ἡ τι χρῶμεθα: τι is internal (adverbial) accusative; cf. *Euthd.* 292d1 ἢ τι χρῆσόμεθα, 292d5.

**d8-9.** οὐκ... ἄρχειν: Socrates slides easily into the verb of wider application; see *Intr.* ch. I, b, iii.

**d10.** Ναί: See above on c5.

**d11.** κυβερνητική: Socrates' first example (cf. b7-8). It is described as an ἀρετή in *Alc.* I 125c11, 135a6, a τέχνη *ib.* 135d12-3, ἐπιστήμη in *Grg.* 511c7-d1; cf. *X. Mem.* 3.3.9.

**d14.** μὲν οὖν: Generally taken as assentient when preceded by a word repeated from the previous speaker (as here), the usage is apparently confined to Plato; see Denniston, *GP*<sup>2</sup> 476; des Places 106 (see also *addenda* to *GP*<sup>2</sup> 587: "corrective" μὲν οὖν, rather than "affirmative").

**d15.** Ἡς δὲ δὴ σὺ ἐπιθυμεῖς ἡ σοφία τίς ἐστίν: For the word-order Stallbaum compares *Ap.* 20e5. On δὲ δὴ see c6 n.

**e3.** Μῶν: Rare in early Plato: no occurrences in *Chrm.*, *La.*, *Euthphr.*, *Cri.*, *Ap.*, *Menex.*, *Grg.*, once in *Ion*, twice in *Prt.*, *Hp. ma.*, three times in *Euthd.*, *Lys.*, *Men.*; only here in *Thg.* μῶν is often said to expect a negative answer (e.g. LSJ s.v.), but see Barrett *ad E. Hipp.* 794.

**e4.** Οὐ δῆτα: Especially common in the early and middle dialogues as a formula of response: eight times in *Grg.*, seven in *Chrm.*, eight in all the dialogues acknowledged as late (only here in *Thg.*).

**e5.** Ἰατρική: Another popular craft in Socrates' analogies, cf. *Chrm.* 165c8, *La.* 198d6, *Euthd.* 291e5, *Grg.* 450a1; *X. Mem.* 3.3.9. The author is flexible in his use of the article with the names of τέχναι: in e10, e14, and here it is omitted, but present in d3 and d11 (see KG I.606f.).

**e10.** Μουσική: Again, frequent in Socratic analogies, e.g. *Grg.* 449d3-4, *R.* 333d8, *Hp. ma.* 295d4.

**e14.** Γυμναστική: Cf. *Grg.* 450a5, *Cri.* 47a13f.

**e16.** προθυμοῦ εἰπεῖν: The phrase also in *Alc.* I 109a5, 126e1. προθυμοῦ here = "do your best" (cf. *R.* 344e7).

**e17.** τὰ ἔμπροσθεν: I.e. 122e-123e.

**124a1-e10.** Socrates' equation of σοφία with ἄρχειν has up to this point been too wide, for it is still uncertain what the object of ἄρχειν is to be. Theages now offers a solution, τῶν ἐν τῇ πόλει (124a1). But this also turns out to be too ambiguous, and "to rule those in the city" soon comes to be identified with τύραννος εἶναι (124e7).

Again, Theages' failure to specify what he desires (see on 123b3-e17) allows Socrates to draw the conclusions he wants. For the reason behind Socrates' obviously ironic tone in this section, see *Intr.* ch. I, b, iii.

**a1.** ἔμοιγε δοκεῖ: ὡς ἔμοιγε δοκεῖ and ἐμοὶ/ἔμοιγε δοκεῖν are apparently more frequent *in parenthesi* than ἔμοιγε δοκεῖ; see Adam *ad R.* 332e5 and the passages cited there.

**a2.** οὐκοῦν...οἱ κάμνοντες: Cf. 123e3.

**a3-4.** Ναί...ἐν τῇ πόλει: Although Theages seems here to be giving Socrates the information required of him, the further distortion of his intentions which Socrates subsequently manufactures results from Theages' failure to specify the *manner* in which he is determined to rule (this is postponed until 126a7-8).

**a5-8.** Ἐν ἄρ...ἄρχομεν: Strictly speaking, this analogy, and the one that follows in b1-3, seem vitiated by the equation of the craft (γερῶργική and τεκτονική) with the ability to supervise or order those who carry its various tasks out, rather than with the ability to do the work oneself. But Socrates is induced to form these analogies because he is thinking in terms of the πολιτικὴ τέχνη, which is concerned with the mastery over

others (see *Intr.* ch. I, *b*, *iii*). Moreover, the force of his argument is probably, at least in part, *ad hominem*: Theages' father, a prominent citizen in his deme, and so perhaps a wealthy farmer in his own right (see *Intr.* ch III, *c*), may well see γεωργική (and consequently other occupations, such as τεκτονική) in the light of someone who encounters little of the manual side of the operations, but nevertheless still considers himself to be a γεωργός. Yet this reasoning is not un-Platonic, for in *Plt.* 259e1ff. the supervisor of manual workers is held to be no less a craftsman (again, by reference to the πολιτικὴ τέχνη; the example used is that of the master builder, ἀρχιτέκτων); cf. also *Amat.* 135b1-7, where it is said to befit the freeman, who is experienced in all, or as many as possible, τέχνηναι, to learn ὅσα συνέσεως ἔχεται, μὴ ὅσα χειρουργίας.

**a5.** ὦρρά γε is more animated than ἄρα *simpliciter* (see Denniston, *GP*<sup>2</sup> 50), and likely colloquial (see Stevens 44).

**a5.** τέχνην: The tacit substitution now of τέχνη for σοφία consolidates Socrates' application of craft analogy to the notion of ruling men, an analogy which is broadened in 125a4, where Socrates remarks that Demodocus could have made Theages a δημιουργὸν...τῆς σοφίας τῆς ἐπιθυμεῖ; on this use of the craft analogy, see *Intr.* ch. I, *b*, *iii*, *iv*.

**a6.** θεριζόντων: For the use in analogy, see above on 123d1-2.

**a6.** τρυγόντων: The compendium τῶν (*s.l.*) which T<sup>c</sup> supplies is no improvement. Plato often varies his use of the article in enumerations (see Riddell §237; KG I.611-12), and the article appears but twice in the catalogue τῶν θεριζόντων...ἀλωόντων (a6-7) in order to delimit two separate processes, a) τῶν θεριζόντων...τρυγόντων, b) τῶν φυτεύόντων καὶ σπειρόντων καὶ ἀλωόντων (for this use of the article see Gildersleeve II.277).

**a7. ἀλωόντων:** The overwhelming mass of evidence from all periods is in favour of keeping the *spiritus levis* of TW, and this I have done (there are no other examples of the word in Plato). B alone preserves the *spiritus asper*, which most modern editors (except Bekker, Ast, Stallbaum, Knebel, Carugno) have printed; and although a few arguments for its retention may be produced (as a calligraphic ms. B might be expected to reproduce correctly just this sort of detail; the cognate noun ἀλῶς always displays the rough breathing; the tendency from the 3rd century B.C. forward towards psilosis [see L.R. Palmer, *The Greek Language* (London, 1980) 179] could explain the predominance of the *spiritus levis* in the transmission of this word [see LSJ s.v.]; and the aspirated form of the word occurs also in X. *Oec.* 18.3) are not compelling.

**a8. μὲν** (as also μὲν in b3) is answered by ἀλλ' b5; cf. 125e8-126a3, with n.

**a8. γεωργικῇ:** In Socratic analogies (also γεωργία), cf. *Grg.* 490 e5ff., *Ap.* 20a7ff., *La.* 198e1-2, *R.* 333a2, *Phdr.* 276c3-5; X. *Mem.* 3.3.9.

**b1-3. οὐδέ . . . οὐ:** Resumption of οὐ is not uncommon, e.g. *R.* 426b8-9, *Euthphr.* 4d5-9; Hom. *Od.* 3.27-8; Ar. *Lys.* 61-3; S. *Trach.* 1014, *Ant.* 5-6; see KG II.205-6; Wackernagel II.302.

**b1. Οὐδέ γε** is occasionally used in Plato (and elsewhere) to point a climax or, as here, an elaboration of some kind, after a preceding negative clause or statement, e.g. *R.* 499b2, 608b5ff., *Chrm.* 163b3, *Ion* 537c8, *Grg.* 456d5; Aeschin. 3.78; X. *HG* 2.3.42; Dem. 19.184 (only partially treated by Denniston, *GP*<sup>2</sup> 156).

**b1. πριζόντων:** Krüger (13) quotes *EM* 688: ἰστέον ὅτι οἱ Ἀθηναῖοι οὐ λέγουσι πρίζεται, ἀλλὰ χωρὶς τοῦ Ζ πρίεται; LSJ s.v. give D.S. 4.76 as the earliest other occurrence (but cf. also 3.27,

19.58); and Cobet accordingly emended to *πριόντων*. In fact, the word appears (apart from in *Thg.*) two and a half centuries or more earlier than has been stated, namely in Theophrastus, *HP* 5.5.6; and, although *πρίζω* is never employed with regularity (cf. Clem.Al. *Strom.* 6.16.148, Phlp. *in GC* 14, 2.30, Gal. *de Comp.* 12.848, Alex.Aphr. *Pr.* 37), there can hardly be any question that it is in place here (there is no other incidence of the *simplex* *πρίζω/πρίω* in the Corpus; *διαπεπρισμένοι Smp.* 196a3 is no proof one way or the other). Of course, a non-Attic form could betray the hand of a foreign member of the Academy (see Taylor, *PMW*<sup>6</sup> 529); but foreign writers are not the only ones to admit non-Attic items.

**b3.** γὰρ οὐ: Schanz's deletion of οὐ is arbitrary, having the sole advantage of making the resultant sentence conform exactly with a8 αὕτη...γεωργική. But here αὕτη...τεκτονική is a *nonne* question, an effect which ἦ γάρ; likewise achieves in a8.

**b4.** Ναί: See on 123b9.

**b5-8.** Ἀλλ'...σοφίαν: The skill which Socrates here describes, and which Theages agrees to be the σοφία he desires, is one to which several young men in Plato's dialogues aspire (as did Plato himself, according to *Ep.* 7.324b8ff.), and many sophists of course claimed to teach it; cf. *Men.* 73c9 (ἄρχειν οἷόν τ' εἶναι τῶν ἀνθρώπων [cf. 91a2-4]; this statement by Meno is accepted by Socrates [c6-8] as a regurgitation of Gorgias' position on ἀρετή, even though Gorgias apparently denied [cf. 95c1-4] that he could teach virtue), *Prt.* 319a1-2, *Grg.* 452d5-8, 466b4-5, *R.* 344a1, *Menex.* 234a6-b1, *Alc.* I 124eff.; for extreme forms of the desire cf. *Grg.* 491a5ff., *R.* 338c1-2; also X. *Mem.* 4.2.11 (Euthydemus has been trained by sophists, 4.2.1); Isocr. 15.285; Ar. *Ach.* 595ff. (Dicaeopolis mocks

the eagerness for office); see further *Intr.* ch. I, *b*, *iii*. For the historical evidence about Theages, see *Intr.* ch. I, *c*.

**b5-7.** ἴσως...ἴσως: A similar resumption of the adverb in *Phd.* 62a2-5, *Grg.* 455c6-8 (where W.C. Helmbold [*Mnem.* 4.5 (1952) 226] suggests deletion of either ἴσως). The effect here is slightly rhetorical (the anaphora of ἴσως marks a climax), and at the same time ironical: Socrates has uncovered a great secret.

**c1-e7.** ἔχεις...εἶναι: Socrates' ironical equation of ἄρχειν with τυραννεῖν (e5-7) serves the ostensible purpose of humbling Theages and placing him unequivocally into the position of learner (cf. the preliminary conversation in *Lys.* 210eff.). But this distortion, and the ambiguous inadequacy in the use of ἄρχειν which the distortion points out, have definite thematic value in *Thg.*; see *Intr.* ch. I, *b*, *iii*.

**c1-e3.** ἔχεις...ἀρχήν: There can be no real question here of "cheap erudition" (Heidel's criticism, 56 n.11), when the topics of discussion should be common knowledge to any educated Athenian. No more an attempt at learned display emerges here than in, e.g., Plato's frequent quotations of Homer, Pindar, tragedy, etc. Socrates is perhaps adapting the discussion to suit a young man who has just completed his formal education (cf. 122e8-11), and who will quite gladly display his knowledge about the questions he is here asked. Thus Socrates begins from a literary base in the examples that follow, advancing through legend (Aegisthus, Peleus), to the more recent romantic past (Periander), to a contemporary foreign despot (Archelaus), and finally to one of the more famous rulers in Athenian history (Hippias).

**c1-2.** Αἴγισθος ὁ Ἀγαμέμνονα ἀποκτείνας: The slayer of Agamemnon is variously said to be Aegisthus (initially in Hom. *Od.*



1.35ff., cf. 4.514-37), Clytemnestra (first, apparently, in Stesichorus' *Orest-eia*, see Jebb's ed. of *S. El.* [Cambridge, 1894] xiv-xix; she alone performs the deed in *A. Ag.*), and both Aegisthus and Clytemnestra together (as early as the epic cycle, see OCT Homer 5.109) The author's choice between the different accounts was probably dictated simply by the need to present Theages with an example of the actions of a male ruler.

**c2.** ἐν Ἀργεῖ: As Homer consistently places the home of Agamemnon in Mycenae (*Il.* 4.376ff., 9.43f., 7.180, 11.46, *Od.* 3.305), while Aeschylus is the first to adopt Argos as the location of his palace (*Ag.* 24), our author may be drawing directly upon the tradition represented in Aeschylus' play (but see C.P. Bill, *TAPA* 61 [1930] 111-29, who contends that Argos in the tragedians denotes only the country in which Mycenae was located, and never the city itself).

**c2.** ἄρα: Postponement of interrogative ἄρα is common in Plato, but rare in all other prose authors (see Denniston, *GP*<sup>2</sup> 49-50); emphasis is thrown onto the words which precede the particle. On ἄρα introducing an indirect question, see Denniston, *ib.* 50.

**c6.** τί δὲ δῆ; BW, τί δαὲ δῆ; B<sup>c</sup>T (Bekker is alone in printing the latter). The colloquial form δαί (see Denniston, *GP*<sup>2</sup> 262-4; LSJ s.v.) was universally rejected by Burnet, and few modern editors are prepared to accept it into their texts (DeVries [*ad Phdr.* 227b9] is an exception). Since it is colloquial, it may be best to consider keeping it (if it is to be retained at all) only where a degree of surprise is expressed (see KG II.134; but δὲ δῆ can perform the same function, see Denniston, *ib.* 259). Here τί δὲ δῆ; is clearly transitional, and should be printed (for τί δαὲ δῆ; elsewhere in Plato, see Denniston, *ib.* 264; Bluck *ad Men.* 71c4). In *Thg.*, δαί never occurs as the sole reading of mss., appearing always as a variant of δέ

(124d2, 125c7, 125e5, 126a2, 126a5, 126b8, 130b6), and for the most part it will be passed over in silence (but see on 126a5). τί δὲ δῆ; is tolerably common as a transitional formula (27 occurrences in the Corpus), but rare in earlier works (never in *Euthphr.*, *La.*, *Lys.*, *Chrm.*, once in each of *Ap.*, *Cri.*, *Prt.*, *Grg.*), though gaining somewhat in frequency thereafter (*R.* five times, *Prm.* four, *Sph.* three).

**c6.** Πηλεὺς ὁ Αἰακοῦ: Peleus comes as something of a surprise in this catalogue of destructive tyrants: in *R.* 391c2 he is called σωφρονέστατος (cf. *Ar. Nu.* 1067: Peleus married Thetis διὰ τὸ σωφρονεῖν; cf. *Hom. Il.* 9.432-84, 18.570-6 [Peleus' kindness to Phoenix and Epigeus]). Both Sophocles and Euripides composed a *Peleus*, but only fragments remain (see Nauck *TGF* fr. 447-56, 617-24), and in the absence of a comprehensive knowledge of the treatment of Peleus in Attic tragedy, there is perhaps no way of determining exactly why he is included in this list (in any event, Pelus bears no resemblance to a violent despot in *E. Andr.*, e.g. 789ff.). References to brutality on the part of Peleus are late, and on a domestic subject (the slaying of his brother Phocus: *Ov. Met.* 11.266ff., *Paus.* 2.29.9, *Apollod.* 3.12.6-7; *D.S.* 4.72.6).

**c9.** Περίανδρον δὲ τὸν Κυψέλου: Though Peleus appeared to be an anomaly within this list of tyrants, the same cannot be said of Periander; for Plato's low opinion of Periander cf. *R.* 336a5; similarly *Hdt.* 5.92.3, *Arist. Pol.* 1313<sup>a</sup>37ff. (cf. 1284<sup>a</sup>26, 1311<sup>a</sup>20), *Nic. Dam. FGriHist* 2.A.58-9.

**d2.** Τί δέ; With all editors except Burnet I prefer to punctuate after δέ and ἄρχειν, thus placing greater emphasis on Ἀρχέλαον τὸν Περδίκκου, rather than break up Ἀρχέλαον...ἄρχειν (cf. τί δὲ δῆ; c6; ἄρα c2 and n.; also the emphatic position of Περίανδρον c9 and

Ἰππίαν d5); see Adam *ad R.* 332e3; and for transitional τί δέ; see Denniston, *GP*<sup>2</sup> 176. But for τί δὲ introducing a sentence without a verb, see KG II.518; England *ad Lg.* 639c1; Dodds *ad Grg.* 509d7. BTW favour Burnet's punctuation, but the mss. are quite unreliable in this respect.

**d2.** Ἀρχέλαον τὸν Περδίκκου: Polus (*Grg.* 470c9-471d2) takes Archelaus to be the typical ἄδικος εὐδαίμων (a view incidentally which most Greeks likely would have shared, cf. *Grg.* 472a2ff.). What Socrates thought of Archelaus, on the other hand, is indicated by his discussion with Polus on the subject of εὐδαιμονία (471d-479e); and Socrates declined an invitation to come to Archelaus's court in Macedonia (Arist. *Rh.* 1398a24; D.L. 2.25), though Euripides (*Satyr. Vit. Eur.* 22ff.; *Suda* s.v. Εὐριπίδης), Agathon (Ar. *Ra.* 83f.; Ael. *VH* 13.4, cf. 2.21), and Timotheus (Plu. *Mor.* 177b, 334b) accepted a similar offer. Archelaus died in 399 at the hands of his own subjects (cf. *Alc.* II 141d2ff.).

**d2.** νεωστί: I.e. 413 B.C.; for this use of νεωστί see *Intr.* ch. V, Appendix.

**d2.** τοῦτον is offered independently by three *recentiores* (Urb.80 Ambros.409 Par.1812); BTW have τούτων, which Stephanus preferred to delete (his suggestion was followed by Baiter, Hermann, and Schanz). τοῦτον is clearly superior: the redundancy of the pronoun is only apparent (Fritzsche compares οὗτοι in *Phd.* 69c3-4, see also KG I.628), since it is used contemptuously here (see KG I.629-30; Burnet *ad Phd.* 69c4; Dodds *ad Grg.* 470d5 [τούτον again of Archelaus]); and the corruption into τούτων was likely facilitated by the presence of τούτων in d3.

**d5.** Ἰππίαν δὲ τὸν Πεισιστράτου: Thucydides makes it clear that Hippias' tyranny became oppressive only in its last three years, after the assassination of Hipparchus (6.54.5f., 59.2; cf. *Hipparch.* 229b5-

7). So also Herodotus (5.62.2) and Aristotle (*Ath.* 19.1), who are however less willing to grant that Hippias' reign had been wholly beneficent in the period preceding Hipparchus' death (see Dover in *Commentary on Thucydides IV* [Oxford, 1970] 321).

**d8.** Βάκις: Philetas *ap. Σ ad Ar. Pax* 1071 offers the highly contentious piece of information that there were three Βακίδες, a Boeotian, Athenian, and Arcadian (cf. Ael. *VH* 12.35), the most famous of which was the Boeotian; the earliest references however mention only one Βάκις (Hdt. 8.20.2, 8.77, 8.96.2, 9.43). Rhode defended the tradition for a plurality of Βακίδες (*Psyche*, tr. W.B. Hillis [London, 1925] 314 n.58), but Dodds' argument against this position seems to me irrefutable (*G. and I.* 88 n.45). Bakis was said to be inspired by the nymphs (Paus. 4.27.4, 10.12.11; *Ar. Pax* 1071), and apparently predicted some important events in the Persian wars (cf. Hdt. *loc. cit.* ).

**d9.** Σίβυλλα: The multiplication of Sybils seems to be a later elaboration: Heraclitus (DK 22B92), Aristophanes (*Pax* 1095), and Plato (*Phdr.* 244b3) mention only one. Heraclides Ponticus adds a second (fr. 130 Wehrli), while Philetas (*ap. Σ ad Ar. Av.* 962) mentions a third; ten Sibyls are listed in the *sch. vet. ad Phdr.* 244b; see further Dodds, *G. and I.* 88 n.45.

**d9.** ὁ ἡμεδαπὸς Ἀμφίλυτος: Much less is known about this figure than the previous two. The words ὁ ἡμεδαπὸς (i.e. Athenian; cf. Clem. Al. *Strom.* 1.132.2) are problematical, since Herodotus (1.62.4) speaks of Amphilytus as ὁ Ἀκαρνάν, prophesying ἐνθεάζων; yet if Herodotus had known that Amphilytus was Athenian, we should certainly have expected him to mention what would no doubt have been an important detail to him. The most sensible proposal seems to be Stein's (*ad Hdt.*

1.62): Peisistratus may have given the Acharnanian citizenship, as the Spartans had given full citizenship to the seer Tisamenus (Hdt. 9.33ff.). Valcknaer proposed to emend ὁ Ἀκαρνάν in Herodotus to ὁ Ἀκαρνέυς (i.e. an Acharnian, a man from the deme Acharnae). But Stein rightly observed (*loc. cit.*; see also How and Wells *ad* Hdt. 1.62.4) that Acharnanian seers and sages are often mentioned in literature, e.g. Hdt. 7.221; Paus. 9.31.5, 3.13.4.

**d10.** χρησµωδοί: Nominative despite the accusative ἑπωνυµίαν (d8); so also τύραννοι e4; cf. *Ap.* 23a3, *Lg.* 956c1-2, *Smp.* 205d7-8; see KG I.45. Since the χρησµωδοί were a familiar group in the late fifth-century in Athens (see V. Ehrenberg, *The People of Aristophanes*<sup>2</sup> [Oxford, 1951] 260f., and the references collected there), Theages ought to have no real difficulty, as Schleiermacher (350) supposed he should, in identifying Bakis, Sybil, and Amphilytus as members of this class. But the connection between soothsayers and the tyrants listed from c1-d5, other than the fact that both groups have an ἑπωνυµία, is not immediately apparent, nor is Socrates' motive for introducing the three χρησµωδοί into an analogy. Perhaps the mention of χρησµωδοί is itself a contribution to the general ironic tone in this part of the dialogue (cf. Adeimantus' remarks in *R.* 364b5ff.); yet the source of the irony has a specific relevance to the structure of the present argument, see *Intr.* ch. I, b, *iii*.

**e1.** τοῦσδε anticipates the subject of the dependent clause (e2 Ἱππίας καὶ Περίανδρος) by prolepsis; see Riddell §226; KG II.577ff.

**e1.** οὕτω: Not pointing forward to e2-3 τίνα...ἀρχήν, but rather "in the same way" (sc. as you did before [i.e. d10]); see Tucker *ad R.* 338e.

**e2.** Ἱππίας καὶ Περίανδρος: Only Hippias and Periander are repeated from the earlier list of five tyrants, probably for the sake of

economy; but presumably Hippias is included because of his connections with Athens.

**e3.** διὰ τὴν αὐτὴν ἀρχήν: Baiter proposed αὐτῶν *pro* αὐτὴν; Urb.80 reads αὐτῶν, which is likely a scribal conjecture. But the evidence of all other witnesses is sound: Socrates is forcing Theages to reason inductively by having him give the name which the five rulers have by virtue of the similarities in their rule.

**e4.** τύραννοι: For the nominative see on d10.

**e8.** The hesitant φαίνεται implies a resignation to the implications of the discussion (cf. ἔοικέν e10); for a similar reaction among Socrates' younger interlocutors, cf. *Chrm.* 161a7ff., *Men.* 86a2-b5, *Euthphr.* 15b7-c10 (see also K. Vretska, *WS* 71 [1958] 33). The same of course occurs with older characters, e.g. Laches in *La.* 193c9-d10. Some are just as likely to display their exasperation through silence, obstinacy, or departure, e.g. Callicles (*Grg.* 505d8-9), Thrasymachus (*R.* 349a9ff.), and Anytus (*Men.* 94e3ff.); so also the younger Euthyphro (*Euthphr.* 15e3-4).

**e10.** ἔοικέν: Shorey (*CP* 12 [1917] 201) preferred ἔοικα, "which expresses the slightly humorous surprised acceptance of the personal application of the argument." But for ἔοικέν cf. *Phd.* 89b6, *Ion* 532b2, *Prt.* 313c3-4; see Carugno *ad loc.*

**e10.** ἐξ ᾧν ἐγὼ εἶπον: Socrates has in fact done most of the speaking (though he offered himself as μάρτυς at the outset [123b1-2]; see *Intr.* ch. III, a), Theages rarely offering more than Ναί, Ἐγώ γε, Πῶς γὰρ οὐ;, or the like. Theages is of course not admitting to a desire for tyranny, only to the possibility that his words could be interpreted to mean this.

**124e11-125b4.** Socrates is aghast that Theages should wish to become a tyrant. He turns to Demodocus and chastises him for not finding a teacher to oblige the boy, and then suggests that they decide to what teacher of tyrants they might send Theages. Demodocus agrees to this.

Socrates' words (e11-125b4) can scarcely be interpreted as anything but ironic, but the difficulty in this section lies in the interpretation of Demodocus' response. Here too I think the basic tone is that of irony (so also Knebel, Stallbaum, and Fritzsche *ad loc.*): Demodocus, by accepting Socrates' proposal, indicates that he is actually enjoying the spectacle being acted out before him; and since this is his only speaking part between 122d9 and 127b2, we have no cause to believe that he objects to any aspect of Socrates' conduct. In fact his acceptance of Socrates' proposal can be explained on thematic terms (see *Intr.* ch. I, *b*, *iv*; also ch. III, *c*). Schleiermacher (350) curiously interprets Socrates' address to Theages, on the one hand, as irony, but his recommendations to Demodocus, on the other, as serious, and then draws attention to "ein dem Platon nicht leicht möglicher Widerspruch." There is, however, no contradiction in Socrates' tones of expression. Janell (428) and Pangle (159) contend that Demodocus fails to perceive Socrates' irony.

**e11.** ὦ μῆαρ: The expression seems to be more strongly abusive in comedy than it is in Platonic dialogue; cf. *Ar. Ra.* 446, *Pax* 183, *Eq.* 304, *Nu.* 1327; see R. Parker, *Miasma* (Oxford, 1983) 3-5. Here it is ironic and playful, setting the tone for the interlude that follows; cf. *Phdr.* 236e4, *Chrm.* 161b8, 174b11.

**e11.** ἄρα: Denniston's explanation of ἄρα (*GP*<sup>2</sup> 35: it expresses "the surprise attendant upon disillusionment") is only partly right; it can also (as here) alert the reader to the fact that the words in question reflect another

speaker's thoughts (referential, as opposed to inferential, use); see Jowett-Campbell 208; KG II.323-4; des Places 268-72; England *ad Lg.* 693b2.

**e11.** πάλαι, followed by πάλαι a3, is ironic, implying "the two of you have let matters get this far?"

**125a1-2.** ἐμέμφου...τινός: Cf. 123b5-6.

**a1.** οὐκ ἔπεμπεν: The tense signifies Demodocus' repeated refusals (see Gildersleeve I.95: "The negative imperfect commonly denotes resistance to pressure or disappointment").

**a1-2.** εἰς διδασκάλου τυραννοδιδασκάλου τινός: Schleiermacher, taking offence at the apparent cumbrousness of διδασκάλου τυραννοδιδασκάλου, excised διδασκάλου (Ast proposed the same measure; the word is bracketed by Schanz, Burnet, Souilhé), while F. Sydenham conjectured διδασκαλείον. But τυραννοδιδασκάλου amplifies διδασκάλου in a humorously climactic manner, i.e., "...because he didn't send you to a teacher's place - a teacher of tyrants." τινός at the same time apologizes for τυραννοδιδασκάλου ("as it were," cf. *Men.* 72a7); see Riddell §51; Tucker *ad R.* 328e. *Figurae etymologicae* of this kind are moreover not uncommon in Greek, see Fraenkel *ad A. Ag.* 215ff. Fritzsche (*ad loc.*) compares *A. Ch.* 315 πάτερ αἰνόπατερ; *Hom. Od.* 23.97 μῆτερ...δύσμητερ; *E. Ph.* πόδα σὸν τυφλόπουν. In our passage the expression is highly affected and sarcastic.

I can see no force in Pavlu's argument (21 n.1) that the compound word in this passage was merely inspired by γεροντοδιδάσκαλος (equally sarcastic) in *Euthd.* 272c5. Besides being perfectly suited to its context here, the term τυραννοδιδάσκαλος is employed by Libanius (*Decl.* 1.60 [*Apologia Socratis* ]) in his defence of Socrates against the charge that he taught Critias to be a tyrant; the word may therefore have



appeared originally in Polycrates' κατηγορία as part of the defamation of Socrates himself.

**a2.** καὶ σὺ: For καί introducing an indignant (here mock-indignant) question, see Denniston, *GP*<sup>2</sup> 311-12; KG II.247f.

**a3.** πάλαι: See on e11 above.

**a3-5.** εἰδὼς...πέμπειν: Cf. 123a7-8.

**a3.** ὄθι: This poetic substitute for οἶ is rare in prose, and in the Platonic Corpus it occurs only here and in *Phd.* 108b4 (ὄθιπερ). As far as the latter passage is concerned, the word is appropriate in the elevated context of the myth of the Afterlife. In our passage Cobet suggested οἶ (adopted by Fritzsche and Schanz; Bekker ὅποιοι comparing 126e6), but ὄθι is *lectio difficilior*, and the poetic diction would seem to deepen the irony developed in the whole of this interlude. The effect is that of mock-solemnity.

**a4.** δημιουργὸν...τῆς σοφίας: As Socrates had earlier compared the σοφία that Theages was pursuing to practical skills, so now he makes explicit the analogy of crafts to the ruling of men; see on 124a5 τέχνην, and *Intr.* ch. I, b, iv.

**a4.** ἔπειτα: As often, ἔπειτα expresses surprise (in this case ironic surprise) at the inconsistency of another's behaviour; cf. 122c1 κἄπειτα.

**a5.** φθονεῖς is elsewhere used of a father denying his son education, cf. *Men.* 93d1; also *La.* 200b7, *R.* 338a3.

**a5.** τε...καὶ: Explanatory; see Verdenius, *Mnem.* 4.32 (1980) 11.

**a5.** ὀρᾶς: The interjection is colloquial, see Stevens 36-7; KG II.353-4; in the Corpus cf. *Prt.* 336b4, *Lys.* 211c5, *Hipparch.* 228a6; in prose also, e.g., X. *Hier.* 1.16; Luc. *Peregr.* 45; copious examples in comedy, see Stevens *ad loc.*; Starkie *ad Nu.* 355 (add Alex. 9.8 Kock). It indicates a

degree of agitation or excitement (not necessarily "a touch of malice" as Starkie [*ad loc.*] maintains).

**a6.** ἐναντίον...σου: Cf. 123b2.

**a6.** κοινῇ βουλευόμεθα: A similar context for the phrase in *Men.* 91a1: Anytus and Socrates are to deliberate together over the one to whom Meno should go in order to learn how to rule men. For a list of passages descriptive of the "common search," see Zeller II.1<sup>5</sup> 118 n.3. For the use of the plural βουλευόμεθα, despite the fact that only Socrates takes part in the "search," cf. *La.* 196c3ff., and see on b3 πρῶτον.

**a7.** ἐς τίνος: Bekker's restoration is palmary.

**a7-8.** διὰ...τύραννος: Shorey (*WPS* 429) felt that the quotation of "Euripides" in b7 below is introduced abruptly, but a7-8 here provide a fluid transition to the quotation, the more so since these words constitute a loose iambic tetrameter, with catalexis in the concluding metron. This metrical effect probably contributes to the overall irony of the section; cf. esp. *Phdr.* 241d1 (with DeVries *ad loc.*), and 238c9ff., where Socrates' claim to poetic inspiration is explicitly ironic.

**b1.** Ναὶ μὰ Δία...βουλευόμεθα δῆτα: The latter phrase emphatically picks up βουλευόμεθα in a6 (for this use of δῆτα see Denniston, *GP*<sup>2</sup> 276), and the preceding oath combines with it to impart a colloquial flavour (see Dover, *CQ* n.s. 35 [1985] 341).

**b2.** βουλῆς...οὐ φαύλης: Disjunction and postponement emphasize οὐ φαύλης, and the litotes perhaps serves to increase the irony of Demodocus' response.

**b2.** περὶ τούτου: I.e. a7 ἐς τίνος...b8 τύραννος.

**b3.** Ἦρασον: Sc. τὸ βουλεύεσθαι (Knebel), or still more accurately τὸ κοινῇ βουλεύεσθαι (see on b3 πρῶτον). Knebel adds "Ab-

rumpit Socrates facetam confabulationem, quae a primario fine colloquium abducere videbatur"; but the imperative implies only a dismissal of the offer of joint deliberation between Socrates and Demodocus, since the humour is merely transferred to the questioning of Theages in b5ff. (for Socrates' concentration on Theages see on 122c8-d2).

**b3.** ὤγαθέ: A polite remonstrance, cf. 128d1 (though not always this nuance of meaning in Plato, see DeVries, *Mnem.* 4.37 [1984] 441). To judge from its numerous occurrences in Aristophanes, the phrase possesses a colloquial flavour.

**b3.** ὤγαθέ. διαπυθώμεθα: The asyndeton is explanatory, as the sentence διαπυθώμεθα...ἱκανῶς implies the reason for a shift (cf. Ἔεσον) in the conversation.

**b3.** διαπυθώμεθα: The aorist, the prefix δια- (see on 121d3), and ἱκανῶς on the same line, combine to impart perfective force. For the meaning of a verbal prefix intensified by an apparently redundant adverb, cf. *Grg.* 461b1-2, *Sph.* 217b7-8; see W. Jaeger, *RhMus* 100 (1957) 378-85.

**b3.** πρῶτον: Socrates' offer of joint investigation with Demodocus (cf. a6), which he here purports to postpone, is in fact never taken up. This may be regarded as a symptom of the dialogue genre, one parallel for which is *R.* 328a6-9: Polemarchus invites the present company to dine at his home, on the understanding that they will return to the festival of Bendis afterwards; but nothing further is said of these plans (von Arnim [*Platos Jugenddialoge und die Entstehungszeit des Phaidros* (Leipzig-Berlin, 1914) 73] considered this one indication that Bk. 1 of *R.* was originally a separate work). But Socrates' turning of the conversation towards Theages is thematically important, see *Intr.* ch. I, b, iv.

**b4.** πυνθάνου: For the simplex form after the compound διαπυθώμεθα, cf. 129e2, e4, e5 (and n. *ad* e4); see R. Renehan, *Studies in Greek Texts* (Göttingen, 1976) 11-16; KG II.568. DeVries' opinion (*ad Phdr.* 248a2-5) that "This usage is mainly poetical" is not borne out by its appearance in, e.g., inscriptions and the Hippocratic Corpus (see Renehan *loc. cit.*); see also C. Watkins, *HSCP* 71 (1966) 117.

**125b5-e7.** In an effort to have Theages himself name the teacher best-suited to train him, Socrates recites a line which he attributes to Euripides: "Tyrants are wise by association with the wise." "Wise at what?" Socrates asks. But this expedient is no more successful at eliciting a precise answer from Theages than previous attempts had been, and Socrates himself offers Theages an answer through reference to a poem of Anacreon. Theages complains that Socrates is not taking him seriously.

Theages himself in e4 recognizes Socrates' irony. But Socrates' tone is more than simply ironic, as the quotations of both "Euripides" and Anacreon are important elements within the structure of the dialogue; see *Intr.* ch. I, b, v.

**b5.** τί οὖν ἄν εἶ: τί followed by εἶ + optative may be considered colloquial (see Stevens 30). On ἄν without a verb, cf. below c1-2; see in general KG I.243-4; Goodwin *MT*<sup>2</sup> 75; Gildersleeve I.184-5.

**b5.** Εὐριπίδῃ: Plato quotes the line σοφοὶ . . . συνουσίῃ b7 in *R* 568b1, and there too it is attributed to Euripides. But a number of much later authors (e.g. Σ *ad Ar. Thesm.* 21; Lib. *Ep.* 33; Zen. 2.52; Them. *Or.* 6.72c; Gel. 13.19.1; see further Radt, *TrGF IV.* 120-1) report that the verse is in fact taken from Sophocles' *Αἴας Λοκρός* (fr. 14 Radt), and the Aristophanes scholiast (above) adds that Aristophanes, Plato, and Antisthenes all made the same mistake in crediting it to Euripides. Most scholars have

been inclined to accept at face value the testimony of the later writers, but it is impossible to determine the source or the authority of these witnesses, nor do we know the context in which the verse originally occurred. The attribution of the verse to Euripides by Aristophanes, Plato, and Antisthenes should not be disregarded; they are much closer in time to Euripides and Sophocles than are any of the upholders of Sophoclean authorship. But without any other evidence to go on, the solution to the authorship of this verse must be *non liquet*. However, it must be noted that the acceptance of a mistaken attribution of the verse has led some critics to opposite conclusions concerning the authorship of *Thg.* For example, Schleiermacher (350; cf. Ast, *Leben* 496) felt that the same error of ascription in two works is evidence that the author of *Thg.* blindly copied the verse from *R.*, while Grote (431) used the same evidence to prove that both dialogues are products of the same hand. Yet the only thing that may be established as certain is that no objection can be made to Plato's quotation of the same verse in more than one dialogue, since he does this on more than one occasion; cf. *Grg.* 451e3-5 ~ *Lg.* 661a5-6; *Smp.* 199a5-6 ~ *Tht.* 154d5; *Lg.* 718e2-719a2 ~ *Prt.* 340d2-5 ~ *R.* 364c7-d3.

Nevertheless, if a mistake was made in both *Thg.* and *R.* (and by Antisthenes and Aristophanes) in attributing the verse to Euripides, the error is an understandable one. Euripides was notorious for his σοφία, as Plato himself notes in *R.* 568a9 (cf. *Ar. Nu.* 1369ff., 1377-8, *Lys.* 368, and [probably] *Ra.* 1413), his plays often stress it (e.g. *Ba.* 178-214, 395, 877 [*et pass.*], *Andr.* 379), and they frequently contain glorifications of tyranny (e.g. *Ph.* 524f., *Supp.* 166, *Tr.* 1168ff., fr. 250, 332.6, 605 Nauck; also *Andr.* 481ff.). In fact, the mention of Euripides at this point and the ascription of the verse to him has special point., since Euripides was perceived as being

so much more in sympathy with sophistic reasoning than Sophocles was (cf. *Ra.* 771ff., 1043ff., 1180-1, and the passages above from *Nu.*), and Socrates, by citing the verse σοφοὶ...συνουσίᾳ five successive times, is parodying sophistic exegesis of poetry (see *Intr.* ch. I, *b*, *v*). For the implicit irony involved in quoting Euripidean verses within an educational context, cf. *Ar. Nu.* 1361-79 and Pheidippides' scandalous use of Euripides' *Aeolus* to justify incest.

**b5.** προσχρησαίμεθα: The significance of the preverb προσ- is possibly "use in addition" (sc. to the methods of investigation that we have already attempted). But approximate parallels for the meaning "to quote" or "recite" are *Plt.* 268d8-9, *Lg.* 713a6.

**b6.** πού is infrequently employed elsewhere in the Corpus when Socrates is introducing a quotation (a natural usage); cf. *Crat.* 402a8, 410b3, *La.* 191a9, *Phd.* 94d6ff., *Prt.* 339a6, c2, *Alc. II* 147b3; see G. Langbein, *De Platonis Ratione Poetas Laudandi* (Diss. Jena, 1911) 54-5.

**b8.** εἰ...Εὐριπίδην: The main apodosis is postponed until d6 τί ἂν φαίη;. The intervening illustrations (c2-4, c7-9, c12-d1) are expressed in the aorist indicative not, I think, because the change of mood from optative (ἔροιτό b8) "is a change from a vague future supposition to a present unreal supposition" (Thompson *ad Men.* 74b4, with specific reference to our passage; see also KG II.480), but rather because the aorist aspect denotes distinct, individual questions within the general interrogation of Euripides. For the dialogue with a poet, cf. *R.* 329b8-c4 (Sophocles); and for εἰ οὖν ἔροιτό τις... τῶν τί σοφῶν κτλ., cf. *Prt.* 312d1 (the discussion with the young Hippocrates) ἀλλ' εἰ τις ἔροιτο ἡμᾶς, "Τῶν τί σοφῶν εἰσιν οἱ ζωγράφοι ἐπιστήμονες".

**b8.** *τις*: For the imaginary speaker (hypothetical *τις*), see D. Tarrant, *CQ* 21 (1927) 83-4; and cf. Quintilian 9.2.15 for a brief discussion of this common rhetorical device (*ficta interrogatio*).

**c1-2.** ὥσπερ ἂν εἶ: See on b5; see also Goodwin *MT*<sup>2</sup> 179, 344.

**c3.** γεωργοί: The craft has already occurred in an analogy in 124a5-8.

**c4.** τί ἂν ἡμῖν ἀπεκρίνατο: The marginal variant τί ἂν οἶει αὐτὸν ἀποκρίνασθαι, preserved by TW and in B by an early corrector, must be fairly ancient. There is, in fact, little to choose between the two readings (for the variant cf. *R.* 332c7-8 τί ἂν οἶει ἡμῖν αὐτὸν ἀποκρίνασθαι), but the marginal reading probably represents an attempt to avoid duplication with τί ἂν ἡμῖν ἀπεκρίνατο in c9. (No editor accepts this variant, but Aldus, and following him Stephanus, print τί ἂν οἶει αὐτὸν ἀποκρίνασθαι in c9 below for τί ἂν ἡμῖν ἀπεκρίνατο.)

**c7.** Τί δὲ εἶ: See on b5; the use with the indicative is equally colloquial (see Stevens *loc. cit.*).

**c8.** μάγειροι: For μάγειροι in Socratic analogies, cf. *Grg.* 491a2ff., *Euthd.* 301c8-d1, *R.* 332c12.

**c10.** τῶν τὰ μαγειρικά is Hirschig's conjecture. If we accept τῶν μαγείρων (BTW; so Burnet, Souilhé, Carugno, Amplo), we must assume a difficult anacolouthon, for the response οὐχ ὅτι τῶν μαγείρων; simply does not answer the hypothetical question "by association with those skilled at what are οἱ μάγειροι skilled." On the contrary, it substitutes the name of the group represented by the words "those skilled" for the desiderated answer to the question "at what" (τί). Hirschig's emendation, based on c5 τῶν τὰ γεωργικά, is therefore preferable

(marginal τῶν μαγειρικῶν [γρ. TW], read by most editors, might preserve a vestige of it). τῶν μαγείρων, like the marginal variant in c4 (see n.), most likely found its way into the text as an attempt to relieve the repetitiousness of this section.

**c12.** Τί δ' εἶ: See on c7 above.

**c13.** παλαισταῖ (παλαίειν) occurs in Socratic analogies in e.g. *Chrm.* 159c8, *Hp. ma.* 374a2, *Prt.* 350e1-2.

**d2.** Ναί: See on 123c5.

**d3.** Ἐπειδὴ δέ: We might have expected ἐπεὶ δὲ δὴ, see on 123c6, 126c3.

**d6.** ποῖ' αὖ εἶναι ταῦτα: For the accusative and infinitive construction governed by a verb in the preceding sentence, see on 123b7; and for the plural referring back to τί, cf. *Tht.* 154e4, *Phd.* 57a5; see on 122a5. The mss. tradition attests a difficulty here, both by the disagreement in the evidence of our primary witnesses, and in the sense afforded by the readings that are preserved. ποῖα ἄ (B) is impossible, and ποῖα ἄν (TW) is dubious, as potentiality belongs rather to the putting of the question (τί ἄν φαίη) than to the content of the answer to be given; as such, ἄν has probably intruded here under the influence of ἄν in the preceding sentence (note that in the similar accusative and infinitive construction in 123b7 ἄν is not repeated from the previous sentence). The confusion would have been easy if we assume, as I have done, that the original text had ποῖ' αὖ, which gives the satisfactory sense (literally) "that this is what, in turn (or) this time?" For a similar emendation (ποῖ' ἄν to ποῖ' αὖ) cf. *R.* 468a4 (Burnet); and for the (not uncommon) corruption of αὖ into ἄν, cf. also *R.* 463e6, *Smp.* 207c2, *Alc. I* 107b4. Among other suggested changes to the text, Burnet's ποῖα δὴ is plausible (it is of



course transcriptionally easy). ποῖα *simpliciter*, recommended by both Hermann and Cobet, originates from a belief in B as *codex optimus*: ἄν in TW began existence as ἄ in B, which itself was caused by dittography in that ms. But ἄ could just as easily have resulted from the accidental falling out of a letter.

**d7.** Ἀλλὰ...ἔγωγε: Theages' failure to render any answer at all to Socrates' simple question is taken by Krüger (16) and Pangle (153, 160) as evidence that the young man is being depicted as unusually dim. However, as C.W. Müller recognized (136 n.3), Theages is in fact refusing to offer a response, wishing above all not to equate openly the object of his desire with τυραννική, an identification that must, to his dissatisfaction, seem inevitable at this moment. The negative oath Ἀλλὰ μὰ Δί' emphasizes this disapproval of the path on which Socrates is leading the discussion. On this and other signs that Theages is not represented as one-dimensionally naïve in this dialogue, see *Intr.* ch. III, *b*; also below on d9, e4, 125e8-126a4, 127a8-9.

**d9.** Εἰ σὺ βούλει: The disinterested acquiescence is probably a sign of annoyance.

**d10-e3.** Ταῦτ'...πόλει: Anacreon fr.449 Page (*PMG*) = 132 Gentili. For what seems to be the most likely interpretation of this fragment, see **Appendix 2**; and for its importance to the structure of the dialogue, see *Intr.* ch. I, *b*, *v*.

**d10.** Καλλικρίτην (Ang.107 Ambros.409) is shown to be correct, against κρήτην of all other mss., by the spelling of inscriptions (*IG* 12<sup>2</sup> 9.636, 637).

**d13.** καὶ emphasizes σὺ (rather than stressing an addition), "so that *you* might become...?" (see Denniston, *GP*<sup>2</sup> 320).

**e1.** ὁμότεχνος: Further play on the analogy with practical skills; see **Intr.** ch. I, *b*, *v*.

**e1.** τῇ Κυάνης: For the unusual application of the metronymic expression, see **Appendix 2**.

**e1.** Κυάνης (B), not Κυανῆς (TW), is the correct form: proper names usually accent recessively, and those in -νη are almost without exception paroxytone; see H.W. Chandler, *Practical Introduction to Greek Accentuation* (Oxford, 1862) 38-9 (esp. 39, §139). Diodorus Siculus (5.7.6) and Arcadius (110.26) accent the name paroxytone.

**e2.** ἐπίσταται τυραννικά: It seems the safest course not to follow Burnet, Souilhé, and Page, in setting these words apart as the *ipsissima verba* of Anacreon; see **Appendix 2**.

**e3.** ἡμῖν...τῇ πόλει: For the *dativus commodi/incommodi* with τύραννος, cf. *Lg.* 710b4.

**e3.** καὶ τῇ πόλει has greater mss. authority (BT) than ἐν τῇ πόλει (W, ἐν *s.l.* b). I take καὶ here to mean "and in general" (cf. 129d6 and n.); see Verdenius, *Mnem.* 4.7 (1954) 38, 4.9 (1956) 250, 4.27 (1974) 21.

**e4.** Πάλαι...με: Schleiermacher (350) found it difficult that Theages only now raises an objection to his treatment at Socrates' hands (cf. Πάλαι). Knebel responded (*ad loc.*) that the only place in which he could have done so earlier was in 124e10, where however Socrates stole the opportunity from Theages by turning to address Demodocus directly. But it will hardly do to invent a controversy such as this, and although this sentence is important for a full understanding of the characterization of Theages, its value has, so far as I can tell, been overlooked by everyone except C.W. Müller (136 and n.6). Essentially, it confirms our previous interpretations

in 125d7 and d9 that Theages is, and has been for some time, fully aware of the ironic intent in Socrates' treatment of him (see on 125d7, with references), and Theages' disquiet over this treatment receives its most articulate expression in 125e8-126a4. There is no reason why Theages should not postpone his display of irritation; indeed, if my interpretation of 125d10-e3 (Anacreon fr.449) in **Appendix 2** is accurate, Theages' outburst at this precise moment will be seen to be particularly well-motivated (see **Intr.** ch. III, *b*).

**e4.** σκώπτεις καὶ παίζεις πρὸς με: Cobet (*Novae Lectiones* [Lugduni-Batavorum, 1858] 623-4) expunges καὶ παίζεις, under the conviction that παίζεις originally glossed σκώπτεις, and was incorporated into the text with the requisite aid of καὶ (σκώπτεις apparently fell out of use in later antiquity [see LSJ s.v.]). But the resultant σκώπτεις πρὸς με would be unexampled elsewhere in the Corpus, and LSJ give our passage as the only instance in Greek. πρὸς με must go closely with παίζεις in the very common sense "make fun of," "toy with" (cf. 128c1, *Grg.* 500b6, *Men.* 79a7, *Euthd.* 278c6-7), and με is to be supplied *ad sensum* with σκώπτεις from πρὸς με. This tautology merely lends emphasis to Theages' retort. On the role of παιδιὰ in this dialogue, see **Intr.** ch. I, *b, c*.

**e5.** Τί δέ: Colloquial, expressing surprise; cf. 130b6; see Thesleff 93; Stevens *CQ* 31 (1937) 184; Denniston, *GP*<sup>2</sup> 175.

**e5-7.** οὐ...εἵης: Socrates underlines the reality that πολιτική, viewed as ἄρχειν and nothing more, is inevitably τυραννική. There must, in other words, be further content to πολιτική if it is to be a worthwhile pursuit. Theages thinks he has the correct solution to the problem (126a7-8); see **Intr.** ch. I, *b, iii, v*.

e6. ἄλλο τι ἦ: The meaning is basically *nonne* (see Dodds *ad Grg.* 496d6): logically speaking, the acceptance of Socrates' equation of the ruler of all citizens with the tyrant demands a positive reply, but ἄλλο τι ἦ does not imply that such an answer is self-evident, and Theages modifies Socrates' equation within the next few lines.

125e8-127d1. Theages affirms that to be a tyrant is indeed a desirable thing, but in reality he wishes to become a constitutional ruler, like Themistocles, Pericles, Cimon, and others who have been δεινοὶ τὰ πολιτικά. Once again Socrates invokes analogies with practical skills (horsemanship, javelin-throwing), which illustrate that Theages must find a teacher who is σοφὸς τὰ πολιτικά if he wants to fulfill his ambition, viz., to become a πολιτικός. When Theages proclaims that Socrates himself has in the past observed that οἱ πολιτικοί cannot pass on their skill to their sons, Socrates accuses Theages of blocking all possible avenues of instruction, and therefore finds it understandable that Demodocus is perplexed by Theages' desire. Thereupon Theages turns to Socrates to take the task upon himself. Socrates is surprised, but Demodocus fully supports Theages in this suggestion.

Socrates has argued for a short while on the ironic assumption that Theages wishes to become a tyrant. Theages at last removes the veil of misunderstanding from Socrates by clarifying his desire for σοφία. This section elaborates on the true nature of Theages' pursuit of σοφία, and exemplifies the apparent futility in searching for a teacher of "wisdom" in traditional places. But it also has a transitional function, in as much as it directs the reader's attention first to the educational claims of οἱ πολιτικοί, and then to Socrates' capacity as educator (see *Intr.* ch. I, b, v).

**125e8-126a4.** Εὐξαίμην...ἐπιθυμεῖν. The first and last words of the passages contrast strongly (see following n.), and superlatives and hyperbole fill the intervening phrases (μάλιστα...ἀνθρώπων; ὥς πλείστων; πάντες ἄνθρωποι; θεὸς γενέσθαι); the language helps to characterize Theages (see *Intr.* ch. III, *b*). On the uses made of this passage in determining the date of *Thg.*, and on its function within the present context, see *Intr.* ch. V, *c, d*.

**e8-a4.** Εὐξαίμην...ἐπιθυμεῖν: The relegation of prayer to the status of "wishful thinking," as apparently implied in this contrasting pair, is generally consistent with Platonic usage (see J. M. Rist, *Plotinus: The Road to Reality* [Cambridge, 1967] 201-2). But a considerable allowance must be made for the possibility that here εὐξαίμην at least partly reflects a manner of speaking rather than a solely philosophical conviction of the author's (in 131a6 Theages clearly sees some efficacy in prayer); see *Intr.* ch. V, *c*.

**e8.** Εὐξαίμην...γενέσθαι: The envy of the tyrant as εὐδαίμων was a commonplace, cf. *Grg.* 468e6-469c7, *R.* 344b7ff. (see Adam *ad loc.*), *Alc. I* 105a4-c7, *Alc. II* 140e10-141b6. The desire for absolute power has literary antecedents as far back as Homer (e.g. *Od.* 1.389ff.).

**e8.** μὲν is answered by ἀλλ' a3; see Denniston, *GP*<sup>2</sup> 5-6.

**a1.** μάλιστα μὲν...εἰ δὲ μή: Colloquial (Stevens 23) and formulaic; cf. *Menex.* 247a3-4, *R.* 473b8; see KG II.485; England *ad Lg.* 758d1; A. Bloch, *MH* 1 (1944) 255-6.

**a2.** καὶ σύ γ' ἂν οἶμαι: A gross misjudgement on the part of Theages; cf. X. *Mem.* 1.3.2 τοὺς δ' εὐχομένους χρυσίον ἢ ἀργύριον ἢ τυραννίδα ἢ ἄλλο τι τῶν τοιούτων οὐδὲν διάφορον

ἐνόμιζεν [sc. Σωκράτης] εὔχεσθαι ἢ εἰ κυβείαν ἢ μάχην ἢ ἄλλο τι εὔχοιντο τῶν φανερώς ἀδήλων ὅπως ἀποβήσοιτο.

**a2-3.** ἔτι...γενέσθαι: For the (traditional) sequence of preferred alternatives 1) θεός ~ 2) τύραννος, cf. *Lg.* 661a4-b4 (similarly *Grg.* 481a2-b1); also E. fr. 250 Nauck τυραννίδ' ἢ θεῶν δευτέρα νομίζεται; Archil. 19 W.

**a2.** δέ γε: Continuative, a rare prose usage (Denniston, *GP*<sup>2</sup> 155-6).

**a5.** δή (Flor.b Neap.337 Urb.80), δέ (BTW), or δαί (B<sup>c</sup>)? δαί certainly conveys the liveliness of Socrates' ironically exasperated question; but the appearance of δαί in Platonic mss. is fraught with difficulties (see on 124c6). δέ might be defended as a weak form of δή (see Verdenius, *Mnem.* 4.9 [1956] 248). Yet emphatic δή is preferable: it essentially specifies τί (τί δή = "what exactly," see on 123c6), and for ἀλλὰ...δή after a rejected suggestion, see Denniston, *GP*<sup>2</sup> 241-2.

**a5-6.** οὐ...ἐπιθυμεῖν: Socrates' facile restatement of earlier conclusions now forces Theages in the next two lines to modify the bald assessment of his desire.

**a7.** Οὐ...ἐκόντων: A traditional contrast between the constitutional and unconstitutional ruler; cf. *Plt.* 291e1-6, 308e4-309a2, *Lg.* 832b10-c7; also X. *Mem.* 1.2.41-6, 4.6.12; Thuc. 3.37.2; *Anon. lambl.* 7.12-3; Arist. *Pol.* 1285a24-9; *Plb.* 6.4.2 (with Walbank's n. *ad loc.*). But the currency given to the formulation was probably due to Socrates himself (so Xenophon in *Mem.* 4.6.12; see Schmid-Stählin, *Geschichte der Griechischen Literatur* 1.3 [München, 1940] 250 n.9; Guthrie, *HGP* V. 184); Theages has been coaxed into expressing a Socratic ideal.

**a8.** οἱ ἄλλοι οἱ: "The other sort, the famous etc."

**a8.** ἐλλόγιμοι makes explicit what is no doubt a primary impetus behind Theages' seeking after political power; cf. *Prt.* 316b10-c1 (of the young Hippocrates).

**a8.** ἄνδρες: The addition of the substantive is commendatory, as also 126d2, 127a8-9 (not simply a substitute for a demonstrative pronoun, as Ast, *Lexicon* I.174f.); see Dodds *ad Grg.* 518a7-b1.

**a9-10.** ἘΑρα...γεγόνασιν: Socrates attacks these three politicians (and Miltiades) in *Grg.* 516e9-519b2, yet it appears that here they are presented simply as exemplary public figures whom Theages will recognize as such. But they, and others like them, are also now said to be δεινοὶ τὰ πολιτικά, and this can hardly be complimentary: the adjective has replaced σοφοί, an exchange which harmonizes with Socrates' statements elsewhere about these politicians, e.g. *Alc.* I 118c3ff. (Pericles not even σοφός, cf. *Prt.* 319e3-320b1), *Grg.* 517c3-4 (the four great statesmen of Athens δεινότεροι at procuring ships, walls, dock-yards, and such like, but at nothing else). Socrates' use of δεινοί may therefore be ironic; see on a12-b1.

**a9.** ἘΑρα γε: See on 124a5.

**a12-b6.** Τί...πολλοῖς: For this ἵππος-analogy, cf. *Ap.* 25a13ff.

**a12-b1.** σοφὸς...δεινὸς. The apparent interchangeability of σοφός and δεινός in these sentences makes clear the semantic value which is to be ascribed to σοφός in this context (see Tucker *ad R.* 337a). Additionally, the close interplay of the two adjectives is reminiscent of the popular epithet δεινὸς καὶ σοφός, a catch-phrase applied to sophists, rhetors, and public figures generally, which carried with it a pejorative flavour; cf. *Hdt.* 5.23. *Ar. Ec.* 245, *Ra.* 968, *S. Ph.* 438-40, *Dem.* 19.126; and it is often used ironically by Socrates, cf. *Prt.* 341a9, *Hp. mi.* 373b7, *Tht.*

154d8, 173b2-3; see Tucker *loc. cit.* I would suggest that Socrates' choice of adjectives is ironically motivated in a12-b2 as well; see further *Intr. ch. I, b, v, vi.*

**b1.** ἐτύγχανες...ᾧ ἤθης: For the mixed condition, see on 123b7.

**b1.** παρὰ τίνος: τίνος (BT) is indefensible (cf. b2, b4, c8), though perversely supported in the *Arethae scholia* as an Atticism (on the fallibility of these *scholia* in questions of grammar and syntax, see Greene xxiv n.4).

**b4.** καὶ: Probably explanatory, see Verdenius, *Mnem.* 4.8 (1955) 14-5, 277-8; *id.*, *Mnem.* 4.9 (1956) 249; Trenkner, *Le Style KAI* 34-6.

**b5.** οἷς εἰσὶν τε ἵπποι καὶ χρῶνται: The verb in a coordinate relative clause (here χρῶνται) does without a relative pronoun (or the relative is frequently replaced by a demonstrative pronoun) when that relative would be in a different case from the initial pronoun; see KG II.432. It is perhaps ignorance of this rule (although it is sometimes broken, cf. *Prt.* 313a6-7) that produced the corrupt οὐ εἰσὶ τε ἵππικοὶ κτλ. (BTW; the true reading is preserved *i.m.* TW).

**b5-6.** οἰκείοις καὶ ἄλλοτρίοις πολλοῖς: Neither these words, nor the parallel πολλοῖς...ἄκοντίοις in b10-c1, are unnecessary and clumsy, as Heidel supposed (55 n.11). The choice of adjectives is dictated by the analogy with οἱ πολιτικοί who Ἑλληνίσιν προσομιλοῦντας πόλεσιν καὶ βαρβάροις (c7-8), and the ability to use another's implements (or similar) as well as one's own is an obvious criterion of genuine technical skill (the issue to which these examples are leading, see *Intr. ch. I, b, v*).

**b7.** Δῆλον ὅτι *simpliciter* as a formula of response also in *Ion* 531b10, *Grg.* 459b3, 475c9, *Hp. ma.* 296c5.



**b8.** Τί δὲ εἶ: Most editors print a semi-colon after δὲ, but see on 125b5.

**b8.** τὰ ἀκοντιστικά: It is somewhat surprising that analogies involving spear-throwing are so rare in Plato. The young men with whom Socrates converses elsewhere in the Corpus will likely have been trained in the skill (cf. Antiph. *Tetr.* b), but the closest Socrates comes to employing the analogy is the simile of the δεινὸς ἀκοντιστῆς in *Prt.* 342e3.

**c1.** χρῶνται: For the absence of a relative pronoun, see on b5.

**c1.** [ἀκοντίοις]: Hirschig thought this word a gloss, and its awkward position at the end of the sentence is certainly suspicious; nor was a need to include the dative ἵπποισι felt in the parallel οἷς...πολλοῖς b5-6. If we retain ἀκοντίοις, it must be assumed that it was included for the sake of variety after b4-6. But I do not think this explanation is quite strong enough to obviate the other considerations against the retention of the word, and I have therefore followed Hirschig.

**c3.** ἐπεὶ δὲ δὴ BT; ἐπειδὴ δὲ δὴ W is awkward and would be unparalleled in the Corpus, though ἐπεὶ δὲ δὴ is not infrequently corrupted to ἐπειδὴ δὲ, cf. *Prt.* 357a5, *La.* 183e5, *Euthd.* 295d5 (ἐπεὶ δὲ BW, ἐπειδὴ T). For δὲ δὴ marking the crucial example, see on 123c6. For δὲ in an interrogative sentence after an initial imperatival expression, see Denniston, *GP*<sup>2</sup> 174; the lively idiom is probably colloquial (*ib.* 189).

**c4-9.** οἷε...τούτοις: As early a text as *Ap.* 21c4ff. indicates that Socrates does not accept that οἱ πολιτικοί will make Theages σοφός, and this belief proves to be important to the structure of this part of the dialogue (see *Intr.* ch. I, b, v). What is surprising, at first sight (but see *Intr.* ch. III, b), is that Theages asserts (d1ff.) that οἱ πολιτικοί have no special capacity; see on d1-7.

**c6-7.** χρωμένους...πολλαῖς: As Themistocles, Pericles, and Cimon had done.

**c7-8.** Ἑλληνίσιν...βαρβάροις: The possessive adjective (here it would be Ἑλληνικαῖς) is not used in Attic with names of cities, cf. *R.* 469b9, 470e4, *Alc. I* 104a7; also Thuc. 2.97.3; see Stallbaum *ad loc.*; Burnet *ad Cri.* 53a1. The desire to manage the affairs of both Greek and barbarian states, and the presumption of an ability to do so, is considered by Plato to be characteristic of well-born young men (*R.* 494c4-d7; Alcibiades is frequently mentioned in connection with this passage); see further *Intr.* ch. III, *b.*

**c7.** προσομιλοῦντας: Of political interaction, cf. *Grg.* 463a8, *R.* 494a8.

**d1-7.** Ἀκήκοα...ἀνθρώπων: For the opinion here attributed to Socrates, cf. *Prt.* 319d7ff., *Men.* 93b2-e2, *Alc. I* 118d10ff.; Lysimachus and Melesias (*La.* 179c2ff.) are an embodiment of the statement. The same observation is made in the *Dissoi Logoi* (DK 90.6.4), where however it is refuted (90.6.8-9), and by Aristotle in *EN* 1180<sup>b</sup>28ff.; the thought goes back in essentials to Homer, cf. *Od.* 2.276. But Socrates' conclusions from this maxim were significant, namely that ἀρετή or σοφία is not teachable (cf. the Platonic passages cited above), and this issue was of course hotly debated both in Socrates' time (cf. *Dissoi Logoi* DK 90.6, Simon the Cobbler *ap.* Diogenes Laertius 2.122 [περὶ ἀρετῆς ὅτι οὐ διδακτόν], Crito *ap.* D.L. 2.121 [ὅτι οὐκ ἐκ τοῦ μαθεῖν οἱ ἀγαθοί]), and long after (cf. Posidonius E-K fr. 2 [Chrysippus, Cleanthes, Posidonius, Hecato]; Plu. *Mor.* 439a-440c [*An virtus doceri possit*]); see C.W. Müller, *Die Kurzdialoge* 220-249. Some (Ast, *Leben* 496; Stallbaum *ad loc.*; Fritzsche *ad loc.*; Pavlu 31-2) have tried to argue for a dependence here on another

Platonic work, but the failure of the sons of famous fathers is a Socratic commonplace.

**d1-3.** Ἀκήκοα...σκυτοτόμων: Understandably, this is the one piece of Socratic doctrine with which Theages is familiar, as it would doubtless cause him considerable anxiety. In other places a character may claim remote or second-hand knowledge about Socrates and his tenets, cf. *Chrm.* 156a6-8, *La.* 181a1ff., 194d1ff., *Tht.* 148e1ff., *Phd.* 72e3ff., *Smp.* 215d3ff. (the effect of Socrates' words at second-hand); Stallbaum's objections to our passage (222; similarly Steinhart 464) are therefore groundless as regards this point. Theages' failure to connect Socrates' reported assertions with the whole question of σοφία or ἀρετή and their teachability illustrates that he does not apprehend the full implications of Socrates' observations; see on d3-4. Steinhart's objection (440) that the *topos* expressed here is a sign of defective composition, because it does not lead to some more significant generalization, results from a misapprehension of the context (see further *Intr.* ch. I, b, ν).

**d1-2.** Ἀκήκοα...λόγους: Reference to Socrates' own set of beliefs makes him the focus of attention, and prepares the reader for Theages' eventual request (127a8-10) that Socrates become his trainer.

**d1.** γάρ expresses a general dissent, sweeping away the whole of Socrates' line of questioning (see Denniston, *GP*<sup>2</sup> 73-5).

**d1-2.** οἷς...τοὺς λόγους: For the hyperbaton cf. *Phd.* 88d2 ὃν ὁ Σωκράτης ἔλεγε λόγον; and for the juxtaposition of λέγειν and λόγους cf. *Hp. ma.* 285b3-4, 286a8. The article τοὺς probably has specifying force here, i.e. "those particular" or "well-known λόγοι" (see KG I.598).

**d1.** φασι: The subject might be understood to be τῶν ἡλικιω-  
τῶν τινες αὐτοῦ καὶ δημοτῶν of 121d1-2, but see *Intr.* ch. I n.49.

**d2.** ἀνδρῶν: See on 126a8.

**d3.** τῶν σκυτοτόμων: The conventional depreciation of banausic crafts, cf. e.g. *R.* 495c8ff. But the bias here is Theages' own, as Socrates himself does not employ this particular comparison when speaking elsewhere of the sons of successful fathers; although Socrates does of course mention cobblers in his analogies and comparisons generally, and sometimes disparagingly, e.g. *R.* 456d10, 466b1 (cf. also Critias' remarks in *Chrm.* 163b5ff., Callicles' in *Grg.* 491a1-2). I fail to understand Fritzsche's confident assertion (230) that the comparison here is grossly un-Platonic.

**d3-4.** καὶ . . . αἰσθέσθαι: Theages, attracted by the new intellectuals (cf. 122d4-6), happily rejects old-fashioned notions of natural family education and upbringing, and embraces the critical evaluation of Socrates. But a full appreciation of the necessary implications of this evaluation would lead Theages to question whether ἀρετή or σοφία could be taught to him at all, whereas in fact this problem is never addressed, and his enthusiasm remains undiminished.

**d5.** παραδοῦναι: According to Bluck (*ad Men.* 93b4) this word is "appropriate to the sophistic kind of 'teaching'." It might be better to take it as descriptive of the traditional (aristocratic) ideal of education, whereby ἀρετή or σοφία is transmitted from one who is ἀγαθός to another person in some indefinable way (cf. *Men.* 92e4ff., *Ap.* 24e4ff., *Prt.* 319e3; also *Arist. EN* 1180<sup>b</sup>33). But παραδοῦναι is used in a sophistic context in *Euthd.* 273d8-9 (ironically applied to the kind of pseudo-ἀρετή that the two charlatans Euthydemus and Dionysodorus profess to impart); cf. *Isoc.* 13.5.

**d6.** ὠφελεῖσαι: Sc. ἂν from the previous clause (Hirschig's supplement of the particle is unnecessary). Here ὠφελεῖν is almost equivalent in meaning to παιδεύειν in the sense "to improve"; cf. 127d3 (with n. *ad loc.*), d7, d8, *Ap.* 24e10, 25c1; see S.R. Slings, *Mnem.* 4.29 (1976) 47. For the application of ὠφελεῖν to teachers, cf. 129e6, 130e9, *Hp. ma.* 281c1, 283d5, *Men.* 91c8, *Grg.* 520b7-8.

**d7.** εἰς ταῦτα ὠφελεῖν: I.e. to help him become skilled at statesmanship and know how to manage his own πόλις as well as other πόλεις (cf. c5-9). For the construction cf. 127d7 ὠφελεῖσαι πρὸς κτλ.

**d8-e7.** Τί...μανθάνειν: The dialogue returns (by a kind of ring form) to an earlier point of departure: Theages is humbled by Socrates, who now proceeds to demonstrate that Demodocus, earlier criticized by Theages for neglect of his fatherly duties, can be pardoned because he did not hand his son over to anyone, since Theages himself has no clear conception of who will make him σοφός. For the affinities which this process shares with the dialectic of other Socratic dialogues, see *Intr.* ch. I, b, v.

**d8.** ὦ βέλτιστε ἀνδρῶν: The vocative is colloquial (Thesleff 87), and here ironic, as often; cf. *Euthphr.* 4a7, *Chrm.* 162d7, *Hp. mi.* 373b6, *Ion* 541c7. But the presence of ἀνδρῶν is telling: Theages elsewhere in the dialogue is described as a μεираκίσκος (122c8), a νεανίσκος (122d6), and a μεираκίον (131a9), and to my mind the inclusion of the genitive here produces what Thesleff (70-1; see also *Studies on the Greek Superlative* [Helsingfors, 1955] 73) called a "pathetic" effect. For the admonitory use of a similar address, cf. *Ap.* 29d7 (ὦ ἄριστε ἀνδρῶν).

**d8.** σαυτῷ: αὐτῷ Schleiermacher (so also Baiter, Schanz), deleted altogether by Fritzsche. Yet αὐτῷ before the expressed *referendum* of the pronoun is difficult, and despite the presence of αὐτῷ ὅτι χρῶ soon

afterwards (e6), *σαυτῷ* can be explained: the close juxtaposition of *σαυτῷ* with *σοι* (d8) stresses more forcefully the hypothetical application of Demodocus' anxious predicament to Theages himself. A similar effect is gained in English by italics, e.g., "What would *you* do, if *you*..." That the collocation of *σαυτῷ* and *σοι* is deliberate is suggested by the hyperbaton of *σοι* (to be taken with *γένοιτο*, not *παρέχου*) before *ἐπειδὴ* (for postponement of *ἐπειδὴ*, see Denniston, *GPS* 45).

**d9.** *τοιαῦτα*: *τοσαῦτα* (Richards) is unnecessary; the meaning is "such troubles as you have caused."

**e1.** *ἄν*: Richards' *δὲ* is no improvement, as *ἄν* with the optative in a protasis is perfectly admissible; cf. *Men.* 98b3, *Phlb.* 58d7-8; see Gildersleeve I.447 ("... the optative with *ἄν* [*in protasis*] is often a semi-quotation or reference to a known or imagined state of mind"); KG II.482; Goodwin, *MT*<sup>2</sup>192; Bluck *ad Men.* 79c4.

**e1-5.** *ζωγράφος... αὐλητάς*: In consecutive hypothetical questions cf. *Prt.* 318b4-c8.

**e1-3.** *μέμφοιτο... ἄργύριον*: Cf. 123a8, 124e11ff.

**e2-3.** *τούτων αὐτῶν*: For the plural see on 122a5; but it jars slightly before the singular *αὐτοῦ τούτου* (e3), which has the same point of reference, viz., *τὸ αὐτὸν γενέσθαι ζωγράφον*.

**e4.** *ἀτιμάζου*: "Disregard" (Lamb) is too mild; an ironic "insult" or "abuse" is what is required, with reference to Theages' earlier treatment of οἱ πολιτικοί and their sons (d2-3).

**e6.** *κιθαριστάς; ἔχου*: The asyndeton marks Socrates' impatience.

**e6-7.** ἔχοις...χρῶο...πέμποις: Assimilation of the verbs in an indirect question into optative after an introductory optative verb is quite regular; see Goodwin, *MT*<sup>2</sup> 62; KG I.253.

**e6-7.** ὅποι...ἄλλοσε: ὅπη (W) is false, and probably simply an itacism: ὅπη/ὅπη always have modal force, but a locative expression is obviously required here (cf. ὅποι 127a2); for ὅποι + ἄλλοσε cf. *Men.* 97a10, *Cri.* 45c1, *Phdr.* 230e1, *Phd.* 82a5 (ποῖ), *Cri.* 51d8 (ποῖ).

**127a1.** ταῦτὰ ταῦτα αὐτὸς: The accumulation of pronouns is perhaps deliberate, as indicated by the mild hyperbaton of αὐτὸς (for the hyperbaton of pronouns in Plato, see Riddell §290).

**a2.** ἀπορεῖ...χρήσηται: Cf. 126e6 ἔχοις...χρῶο; *R.* 368b3-4, *Prt.* 321c2-3. The future χρήσεται (W, and some secondary mss.) is also possible; see Magnien, *Le Futur Grec II* (Paris, 1912) 229; Dodds *ad Grg.* 521b7; Tucker *ad R.* 368b.

**a2-3.** ἀπορεῖ...ὅποι πέμπη: πέμποι (BTW), adopted by Burnet and Souilhé, was rightly rejected by Bekker, who opted (as have most editors) for the subjunctive πέμπη (it occurs only in Vat.2218, which Bekker did not see). The argument that the optative without ἄν is admissible in an indirect question in primary sequence (allegedly a more remote, less possible deliberative question; see Sidgwick in Appendix I of his *A. Ag.* [Oxford, 1881]; Jebb, Appendix to *S. OC* [Cambridge, 1885]; Verrall *ad A. Ag.* 625) is not supported by any parallels in prose (Sidgwick recanted in *CR* 7.3 [1893] 97ff.), and the only possible analogue to our passage, *Euthd.* 296e1, can be readily explained as an omission of ἄν by haplography before ἀμφισβητοῖν. πέμποι is best accounted for as an assimilation to ὅποι immediately preceding. For a discussion of this problem, see W.G. Hale, *TAPA* 24 (1893) 156-205, esp. 179ff.

**a3-4. ἐπεὶ...συνέσται:** The same idea is restated in 128a3-4. *Prt.* 320a3-b1 is the best commentary on this sentence: Pericles took Clinias away from the latter's brother, Alcibiades, and handed him over to Aripbron (the brother of Pericles), in order to prevent Clinias from being corrupted. Greek convention, which sanctioned the relationship between a youth and an adult male on educational grounds, would have facilitated the sort of arrangement Socrates is here describing; cf. *Men.* 95a6-b2; see K.J. Dover, *Greek Homosexuality* (Cambridge, Mass., 1978) 202-3.

**a3. ἐπεὶ...γέ:** "And yet," cf. 128b8 and 128b2 (ἐπεὶ); see Goodwin, *MT*<sup>2</sup>288; Burnet *ad Euthphr.* 4c3; England *ad Lg.* 669b6.

**a3. τῶν...πολιτικᾶ:** Very much the equivalent of οἱ πολιτικοί whom Socrates has discussed a little earlier (126a9-c9), but the emphasis here is different: by confining knowledge of τὰ πολιτικὰ to καλοὶ καγαθοί, Socrates pays ironic respect to the traditional concept that the acquisition of political skill is a matter of heredity, dependent upon one's membership in the class καλοὶ καγαθοί (on this phrase see on 122e9; and with acc. of respect cf. *Ap.* 20b1, *Grg.* 526a7); see further the following n. (Wagner thought τὰ πολιτικᾶ a gloss, arguing [*ad loc.*] that the phrase τῶν...πολιτικᾶ conflicts with Socrates' true intentions for Theages; i.e., all Socrates envisages for Theages is that he will become a good πολιτῆς [cf. 127d7], not an active statesman. But the words are in place, for Wagner misses the irony of the passage, and also the dramatic situation: there is no reason to feel that Socrates has *any* specific plans for Theages at this stage. Besides, neither Socrates nor Plato believed that the political life *qua* political life was bad, but only as it was practised in contemporary circumstances; see *Intr.* ch. I, b, v.)



**a4.** ὅτι ἂν βούλῃ: Any καλὸς καὶ ἀγαθὸς will improve Theages; it does not matter which he chooses. Socrates is ironic, but Anytus on the other hand is in dead earnest when he voices the same conviction in *Men.* 92e3-5, and Meletus (*Ap.* 24e1-25a11) extends this notion by claiming that all Athenians (except for Socrates) make the young men of Athens καλοὶ καὶ ἀγαθοί.

**a5.** ἅμα μὲν... ἅμα δὲ: Cf. *Chrm.* 158d2, *Grg.* 452d6-7, *Phd.* 108d7, 115d5-6.

**a6.** εὐδοκίμῃσεις... ἀνθρώποις: Socrates recites one important reason why a young man like Theages would wish to become σοφός; cf. ἐλλόγιμοι 126a8. The words are a comment on popular standards of political success (cf. *R.* 362e4-363a7, the pursuit of the just course for the sake of the εὐδοκίμῃσεις that derive from it), and the invocation of the approval of οἱ πολλοί is ironic in the mouth of Socrates.

**a6.** ἀνθρώποις is deleted by Hirschig (also absent from Coisl.155). But the addition of ἀνθρώποις is derogatory (see Dodds *ad Grg.* 518a7-b1), and for οἱ πολλοὶ ἄνθρωποι cf. *Euthphr.* 5a1, *Ap.* 29b3-4, 35a1, *Phd.* 92d2.

**a8-9.** οὐ... ἀνδρῶν: It is most reasonable to assume, I think, that to Theages Socrates is καλὸς καὶ ἀγαθὸς not *qua* πολιτικός, but that it is rather the moral sense of the phrase which Theages has in mind (see on 122e9). However this may be, Socrates does emerge in this dialogue as a special kind of πολιτικός; see *Intr.* ch. I, *b*, *vi*, *vii*; *c*. For the epithet καλὸς καὶ ἀγαθὸς as applied to Socrates, cf. *X. Mem.* 1.2.17; and for his ability to make his companions so, cf. *Mem.* 1.2.48. Presumably the opinion that Theages here expresses about Socrates is intended by the author

to represent information gathered from others (cf. 126d1f., 128c2f.), although a level of irony is not out of the question (see *Intr.* ch. III, *b*).

**a9.** ἀνδρῶν: See on 126a8.

**a9-10.** εἰ...ζητῶ: Theages embraces Socrates as his prospective teacher; as we learn later (128c2-5), he knows others his age who have shown remarkable improvement through regular association with him. Cf. *La.* 200c7-d2 for similar context and phraseology.

**a9.** γὰρ is slightly elliptical: the sense is ("Let us now forget about the others, i.e., other καλοὶ καὶγαθοί) for if you..."; see Denniston, *GP*<sup>2</sup> 61-2.

**a9.** συνεῖναι: The word, according to Schleiermacher (351), is objectionable here because Socrates, as teacher, is the subject, whereas in similar contexts συνδιατρίβειν is the term more regularly predicated of the instructor (e.g. 128b8, *La.* 180d3); but cf. (with Fritzsche) *R.* 328d5, *Tht.* 151a4.

**b1.** Τί...Θέαγες: Socrates' surprise at Theages' proclamation is in character, for in this dialogue he disclaims (as usual) any ability to teach; cf. 128a7ff., and see *Intr.* ch. III. *a*.

**b1.** Τί...λέγεις: λέγεις, omitted from B (but *i.m.* *b*), is necessary: in the phrase τί τοῦτο (*simpliciter*) the verb διαφέρει is normally understood, but this sense would be discordant here (see Dodds *ad Grg.* 448b1; Stevens 31); and b2 μέντοι...λέγει pick up λέγεις in this sentence (see Denniston, *GP*<sup>2</sup> 401).

**b1.** Θέαγες: Both Thompson (appendix *ad Men.* 98a4) and Dodds (*ad Grg.* 489a5) doubted that the vocative without ὦ is admissible in the Platonic Corpus. But no convincing proofs are brought forward, and the conventional explanation of the usage, that the simple vocative conveys a tone of surprise or astonishment (or better perhaps agitation or excite-

ment), is credible; see KG I.48; Gildersleeve I.7; Chantraine, *Grammaire homérique* II.37. Socrates' surprise can readily be accounted for, see above on b1 τί...θέαγες.

**b2-c2.** ὦ...διαφθεῖραι: Demodocus reaffirms his earlier confidence in Socrates (122a6ff.) by approving Theages' choice of him as the boy's mentor. For a father's eagerness to enlist Socrates as his son's teacher, cf. *La.* 200c2-d8; Socrates himself was also aware of parental approval, cf. *Ap.* 33c8ff. Demodocus' ready acceptance of Socrates is one reason for detecting an apologetic function in *Thg.*; see *Intr.* ch. I, *b, i, c.*

**b2.** ὦ Σώκρατες: For the initial vocative, see on 121a1.

**b2.** οὐ...κακῶς: The litotes deepens the vehemence of Demodocus' statement.

**b2.** μέντοι: The examples Denniston gives (*GP*<sup>2</sup> 401) of assentient μέντοι (asseverative) accompanied by a verb in the third person are almost exclusively Platonic.

**b2.** ἄμα μὲν: μὲν is retrospective and contrasts with οὐ...λέγει; i.e., the connection lies between what Theages says and how Demodocus reacts to it, a connection reinforced by ἄμα; see Denniston, *GP*<sup>2</sup> 377-8.

**b3.** ἐμοὶ χαριῇ: As Socrates earlier set out to "oblige" Theages (χαρισώμεθα 123a4), so also now Demodocus equally desires to be obliged; both father and son are presently convinced of Socrates' suitability as companion.

**b3.** οὐκ ἔσθ' ὅτι...μείζον: Colloquial, cf. *Ap.* 36d5-6 (see Tarrant, *CQ* n.s. 8 [1958] 159).

**b3-4.** τοῦτου μείζον...ἤ: Epexegetic ἤ after a genitive of comparison is common in Plato, cf. *Phd.* 89d2, *Cri.* 44c2; see Riddell §163; England *ad Lg.* 738e1; L. Reinhard, *Die Anakolouthē* 164-5.

**b3. ἔρμαιον:** A "stroke of good fortune" or "lucky find"; fairly frequent in Plato, e.g. *Grg.* 468e3, *R.* 368d6, *Chrm.* 157c7; it also occurs in comedy (*Men. Dysc.* 226), and is doubtless colloquial. Cf. *sch. vet. ad Smp.* 217a: τὸ ἀπροσδόκητον κέρδος ἀπὸ τῶν ἐν ταῖς ὁδοῖς τιθεμένων ἀπαρχῶν, ἃς οἱ ὁδοιπόροι κατεσθίουσιν· καὶ γὰρ ἐν ταῖς ὁδοῖς ἔθος ἰδρῦσθαι τὸν Ἑρμῆν, παρ' ὃ καὶ ἐνόδιος λέγεται. For the association of Hermes with luck, see L.R. Farnell, *The Cults of the Greek States* 5 (Oxford, 1909) 23ff.; R.G. Ussher *ad Thphr. Char.* 30.17; L. Preller-C. Robert, *Griechische Mythologie* 5 (Berlin, 1964) 403. The expression is highly emotive here; cf. similarly 122a7 παρεφάνης and n.

**b4. ἀρέσκοιτο** (B<sup>c</sup>W *i.m.* γρ. T) has greater authority than ἀρκέσσοιτο (BT), which is also possible. For the metathesis in mss. of κ in this word, cf. *R.* 369d6.

**b5-6. καὶ...βούλομαι:** καὶ μέντοι καὶ, αἰσχύνομαι, and ὡς σφόδρα combine to impart almost an affected tone to this sentence (see also on 127c6-d1); see *Intr.* ch. III, c.

**b5. καὶ μέντοι καὶ:** Progressive; the combination is more common in Plato than in other writers, where καὶ μέντοι is preferred (see Denniston, *GP*<sup>2</sup> 413-4). But this cannot be a criterion for authenticity, since the full combination occurs also in the spurious *Eryx.* (397d5).

**b5. αἰσχύνομαι:** Not so much "am ashamed" as "shrink from," "feel strong scruples about," as e.g. *Ap.* 22b5.

**b6-7. ἀμφοτέρων ὑμῶν δέομαι, σε...σε:** δέομαι + genitive governing accusative + infinitive is not recognized by LSJ or Stephanus, but cf. *Phlb.* 28b7-8, *Ep.* 3.317c3, 7.338b3-4; see KG II.26; MacDowell *ad And. de Myst.* 9.

**b7. συνεῖναι:** See on 127a9.

**b8-c1.** καὶ...φροντίδων: Cf. the laudatory remarks of Laches and Nicias concerning Socrates' courage and integrity in *La.* 181a7-b4, 188a6ff.; also *R.* 328d4-6, *Ap.* 34a6ff.

**c1-2.** ὥς...διαφθεῖραι: Cf. 122a4-5 and n. The sentence explains why Demodocus considers the desire for σοφία to be σφαλερά (121c8). Souilhé (*ad loc.*) recognizes the apologetic function of these words: "... la réplique de Démodocos est une protestation contre la calomnie répandue à Athènes par les adversaires de Socrate. Ce dernier, dans l'*Apologie*, écrite par Platon, en appelle aux nombreux disciples, et à leurs parents, qui assistent au procès, entre autres au frère de Théagès, Paralos, fils de Démodocos, pour témoigner de la moralité de ses leçons (33d, e; 34a, b)"; see *Intr.* ch. I, c.

**c1-2.** φοβοῦμαι...ἐντύχη: Unlike Anytus (*Men.* 92e3f.; see above on 127a4), Demodocus prefers not to entrust the matter of education to anyone at all.

**c2.** οἷω: For οἷος = τοιοῦτος ὥστε, cf. *Grg.* 487d5, *R.* 334d3, 381e8-9, *Euthphr.* 11a5; see Goodwin, *MT*<sup>2</sup> 305-6. οἷος + inf. connotes "character," οἷός τε + inf. "circumstance" (see Gildersleeve, *AJP* 7 [1886] 165).

**c3-4.** Μηκέτι...προσδέξασθαι: For Theages' receptiveness towards Socrates as his prospective companion, see on a8-9, a9-10.

**c4.** προσδέξασθαι: Of the acceptance of a pupil by a teacher, cf. *Euthd.* 272c7, 295d7.

**c5-6.** πρὸς...λόγος: Cf. *Sph.* 218a7-8 πρὸς δὲ σὲ ἤδη τὸ μετὰ τοῦτο, ὡς ἔοικε, γίγνοιτο ἂν ὁ λόγος.

**c5.** πρὸς σὲ: "In reference to you"; attention is now cast formally, and permanently, upon Socrates (see on 126d1-2).

**c5.** πρὸς σὲ δ' ἄν: For the position of δὲ (contrast *Sph.* 218a7-8 quoted above on c5-6), see Denniston, *GP*<sup>2</sup> 18. The instances of its postponement in affirmative sentences after an initial vocative are perhaps not quite as limited in prose as Denniston suggests (*GP*<sup>2</sup> 189); to his six prose examples add *Euthd.* 293b3, *Lg.* 890e1 (with England's n. *ad loc.*). Verdenius explains such occurrences of δέ as a weak form of δή; see *Mnem.* 4.9 (1956) 248.

**c6.** τοῦτο (Ven.189) is indispensable.

**c6-d1.** ἐγὼ...ῆς: The sentence as a whole is awkward and slightly contrived: n.b. the dislocation of σοι to its strong early position, and the repetitious διὰ βραχέων...ἔμβραχυ and οἷόν τε...οἷός τε ῆς; see on b5-6. The effect is likely intentional, see *Intr.* ch. III, c.

**c6.** ὥς has superior mss. authority (TW) and ought not to be omitted (as Schanz, Fritzsche, following B; ὥς *i.m.* b): for ὥς διὰ βραχέων εἰπεῖν, cf. *R.* 424b3, *Lg.* 791b1-2.

**c7.** βραχέων in the phrase διὰ βραχέων is classified by Brandwood (s.v. βραχύς) as neuter, though he suggests that the masculine (sc. λόγων) is also possible. But comparison with the formulaic ὥς ἔπος εἰπεῖν makes the neuter probable.

**c7-8.** οἰκειότατα is of course the superlative of οἰκείως, and ὥς...οἰκειότατα = "as personably as I can." Lamb curiously takes οἰκειότατα with τὰ ἐμὰ and translates "all that I hold dearest of what is mine" (cf. Pangle "whatever I have that is most my own").

**c8.** ἔμβραχυ: The *sch.vet.* on this passage explains: ὅπερ ἂν εἴποι τις εὐχερῶς εἰπεῖν θέλων ἢ ἀπλῶς, τοῦτο ἔμβραχυ λέγεται. ἔμβραχυ συντόμως καὶ ἀπλῶς. Ast deletes ἔμβραχυ, for no apparent reason other than a redundancy with the previous διὰ

βραχέων. But ἔμβραχυ is highly idiomatic (Attic; see W. Schmid, *Der Atticismus* I [Stuttgart, 1897] 118) after a relative word such as ὅστις or ὅπου (see LSJ s.v.), and in such contexts performs much the same function as ὡς ἔπος εἰπεῖν + οὐδείς/πάντες. Ignorance of this usage produced the false variant ἐν βραχεῖ in the three other Platonic appearances of ἔμβραχυ (*Grg.* 457b1, *Hp. mi.* 365d5, *Smp.* 217a2); but ἐν βραχεῖ = "in a short time," "briefly."

**c8.** Θεάγη τουτονι: The article is omitted because its presence in conjunction with a personal name + demonstrative pronoun would denote a degree of contempt (cf. Lat. *iste*); cf. 127e6, 128d8, *Euthphr.* 5c6; see KG I.629.

**d1.** ἀσπάζη: Sometimes with an erotic flavour (e.g. *Smp.* 192b5, *Phdr.* 256a3), but here simply = "gladly accept" (cf. *Cri.* 47b5-6).

**d1.** εὐεργετηῖς: Virtually synonymous with ὠφελεῖν (see on 126d6).

**127d2-128c8.** Socrates commends the solicitude Demodocus feels about Theages' future education, but expresses wonder that Demodocus ever imagined Socrates himself could assist him in this. Surely Demodocus, Socrates continues, is better equipped, as a πολιτικός, to be successful at training his own son; or failing that, the sophists specialize in just the thing Theages is after. But Socrates himself has nothing to offer, except a surpassing knowledge of τὰ ἐρωτικά. Theages is unsatisfied by Socrates' disclaimers, accuses him of imposture, and cites, as proof against Socrates' protestations, his knowledge of young men who improved by association with him. Socrates asks Theages if he knows how this happens, and Theages announces that it is dictated by Socrates' consent.

Socrates maintains an ironic position in 127d2-128b6, and the irony is of a characteristic kind: Socrates himself cannot teach young men (see on 127b1). Though the individuals he holds up as better candidates are elsewhere in Plato denied any educational ability (see *Intr.* ch. I, *b*, *iii*, *v*, *vi*), Socrates' behaviour in promoting others as possible educators over himself harmonizes well with his position elsewhere (cf. *Ap.* 19d8-20c3, *La.* 186b8-187b7, 200c7-d4, *Tht.* 151b2-6). On the levels of meaning implicit in Socrates' claim to his own possession of a special kind of knowledge (128b2-6 τὰ ἐρωτικά), and on the importance of this claim for the structure of the dialogue, see *Intr.* ch. I, *b*, *vi*.

Stylistically 127d2-128b6 is fairly elaborate, notable particularly for a number of rhetorical traits; n.b. the framing of the initial sentence by θαυμάζω (d2, e1); anaphora (θαυμάζω d2, e1, ὁπόθεν d5, 8, εἰκός 128a7, b1); argument from εἰκός (128a7-b1); πρῶτον μὲν...ἔπειτα...ἔπειτα (e1-5); asyndeton (128a7); perhaps also the opening of an initial sentence with an articular infinitive (cf. *Lys.* 1.1, 4.1); see individual nn. *ad locc.*

**d2-e1.** ὦ...θαυμάζω: Commendation of Demodocus' concern is coupled with wonder at Demodocus' and Theages' belief that Socrates will improve Theages; cf. 122b2-6 (praise of Demodocus' care) and 127b1 (surprise at Theages' request).

**d2.** ὦ Δημόδοκε: For the initial vocative see on 121a1; perhaps a parody of Demodocus (see *Intr.* ch. III, *a*).

**d2.** τὸ...ἐσπουδακέναι: Illustrated first by Demodocus' opening monologue (see *Intr.* ch. I, *b*, *i*; ch. III, *c*), as well as by his immediately preceding words (see on 127b1-c2, c5-d1). Socrates brings the σπουδῆ-παιδιά contrast into focus (see *Intr.* ch. I, *b*, *c*).



**d3.** εἴπερ: No implication of doubt is intended (cf. d5-e1).

**d3.** σοι: Ethic dative; see on 121c8.

**d3.** ὠφεληθῆναι: See on 126d7. The verb follows closely again at d7 and d8, and later in 130e8-9; Xenophon gave prominence to ὠφελ-εῖν/ὠφελία as an apologetic theme in Bks. 3 (3.1) and 4 (4.1) of *Mem.*; see also *Intr.* ch. I, b, vi, vii; c.

**d3-5.** οὐ...ἔσται: For the sentiment cf. 122b2-6 and nn. on b2 and b5-6; and for the phraseology cf. *Grg.* 500c1-3.

**d5.** ὅπως...ἔσται: Elsewhere this is taken for granted as the principal concern generally felt towards the young, cf. *Ap.* 24c9-d1, *La.* 179a8-b2; but Socrates extends it to encompass the highest personal goal for each individual (*Ap.* 39d5-8), and it sometimes implies "care of the soul," cf. *Ap.* 29d7-e3, *La.* 186a5-6; for the importance of this detail see *Intr.* ch. I, b, vi.

**d5-e1.** ὁπόθεν...θαυμάζω: Characteristic Socratic self-deprecation (see *Intr.* ch. III, a), explained by the remainder of this speech; cf. also 127b1 (and n.), 128a7ff.

**d5.** ὁπόθεν: "Judging from what," "on what basis"; Stallbaum (*ad loc.*) found the combination with ἔδοξε unusual, but cf. *Grg.* 486c5-6 ἄσκει ὁπόθεν δόξεις φρονεῖν.

**d5-6.** ἔδοξε σοι: σοι ἔδοξε of Priscian is also possible (cf. *Chrm.* 156c8, *La.* 180b3).

**d6-e1.** ὡς...θαυμάζω: These words strangely contradict the earlier remarks (126d1ff.) about the inability of distinguished fathers to pass on an expertise in τὰ πολιτικά to their sons; and when that passage is set beside this one, Socrates' irony here seems to descend into callousness. Yet a few explanations can be offered for an apparent *volte-face*: 1) It does

not take long before Socrates shifts the real blame onto Theages, who is said possibly to "pour scorn on" (καταφρονεῖ e6, a strong word) the political types of the city; 2) although there is a good deal of irony in Socrates' words, he fails to link Demodocus directly with the famous politicians of Athens, and so the same opprobrium is not directed specifically against Demodocus; 3) it was actually Theages, not Socrates, who earlier raised the subject of the failure of the sons of famous fathers; 4) the author has simply subordinated strictly consistent behaviour on the part of Socrates to the needs of creating an intensely ironic atmosphere. Yet one expects Socrates to display behaviour of this kind towards a sophistic interlocutor, not towards the rather innocuous Demodocus.

**d6.** ἄν...οἷός τ' εἴην: So Priscian (*loc. cit.*; Ast, unaware of this reading, anticipated Burnet's text); τέ τ' ἦν of B likely preserves a vestige of the reading. τέ ἦν T (τ' ἦν W), which is retained by a number of nineteenth-century editors (Bekker, Stallbaum, Baiter, Hermann, Fritzsche, Schanz), is decidedly inferior to the vague potentiality of the optative, which represents thoughts Demodocus is likely to have entertained (see J.M. Stahl, *Kritisch-historische Syntax des griechischen Verbums der klassischen Zeit* [Heidelberg, 1907] 358). The deletion of ἄν (Cobet) and its emendation to δὲ (Richards) were proposed before Priscian's reading came to light.

**d7.** τὸ...γενέσθαι: I.e., the sort of man Demodocus is presently described as (e1-4).

**d7.** οὐ αὐτός: αὐτός + personal pronoun (cf. d8) may be the more regular order in Plato; see Stallbaum *ad Euthd.* 273b7; also KG I.558. But αὐτὸν σέ 128a8, 130e2.

**e1-5.** πρῶτον μὲν...ἔπειτα...ἔπειτα: The sequence is sometimes rhetorical (Thesleff, *Arctos* 4 [1966] 97), sometimes colloquial (Trenkner, *Le Style KAI* 12). In view of *Crat.* 437a2-b2 and *Smp.* 181b3-4, the use here is somewhat confused, since strict logic would demand "firstly you are Theages' father...secondly there are οἱ πολιτικοί...thirdly there are the sophists." But Plato himself does not shun such deviations from absolute uniformity in this usage, see Burnet *ad Ap.* 18c4; Bluck *ad Men.* 90a5; Dodds *ad Grg.* 491a7.

**e1.** σὺ...ἐμοῦ: Characteristic Socratic deference towards advanced years, cf. *La.* 181d3-5, 186d3-5, *Prt.* 318b1-4, *R.* 328d7ff.

**e2.** ἔπειτα...ἡρξας: For the dative with ἄρχειν, cf. *Thuc.* 2.2.1; and for the dative involved in the notion of ruling, cf. 125e3; see KG I.409.

**e2-3.** ἀρχὰς...τιμῇ: τιμή derives from and is consequent upon the holding of public office; an expression of conventional Athenian values. For the combination cf. *Men.* 78c7-8, *Ti.* 20a4.

**e3.** τιμῇ: Likewise Theages wishes to become ἐλλόγιμος (126a8; cf. εὐδοκιμήσεις 127a6).

**e3.** Ἀναγυρασίων: See on 121d2.

**e4-5.** ἐμοῖ...ὑμῶν: For all this modesty Socrates did stand as a πρύτανις at least once, and perhaps even as ἐπιστάτης (cf. *Ap.* 32a9ff., *Grg.* 473e7ff. [with Dodds' n.]), and his courage in battle is celebrated highly (*Smp.* 220d5-221c1, *La.* 181b1-4).

**e4-5.** ἐμοῖ...ἐνορῶ: ἐνορῶν + ἐν everywhere else in the Corpus (*Grg.* 477b2, *Amat.* 133d5, *Ep.* 3.318d3); but ἐνορῶν + dat. already in *Thuc.* 3.30; *X. Cyr.* 1.4.27.

**e5-6.** ἔπειτα...καταφρονεῖ: Only here does it become clear that Socrates has been treating Demodocus himself as representative of the class οἱ πολιτικοί.

**e5.** εἰ ἄρα: Denniston's explanation ("the hypothesis is one of which the possibility has only just been realized" [*GP*<sup>2</sup> 37]) can be elaborated, see on ἄρα 124e11.

**e6.** ἀνδρῶν: See on 126a8 (but here the application may be partly ironic).

**e6.** Θεάγης ὅδε: See on 127c8.

**e6.** καταφρονεῖ: A strong word chosen doubtless to characterize Theages' impetuosity; cf. 126e4 ἀτιμάζοι and n. For καταφρονεῖ of rejecting a teacher or mode of education, cf. *Clit.* 407e4.

**e7-128a7.** ἄλλους...εἰδέναι: On the source of this passage (*Ap.* 19e2-20a2), see *Intr.* ch. I n.54.

**e7.** ἐπαγγέλλονται is regularly used of sophistic "professions"; cf. *Prt.* 319a7, *Men.* 95b10, *La.* 186c4, *Grg.* 447c2, *Euthd.* 273e5; *X. Mem.* 1.2.7; *Arist. EN* 1180<sup>b</sup>35.

**e8.** ἔστιν...πολλοί: The so-called σχῆμα Πινδαρικόν, employed when ἔστι or γίγνεται mean "there are," or when several subjects may be considered to represent a unity. In Plato cf. *Euthd.* 302c4-5, *R.* 463a1-2, *Smp.* 188b3-4; see *KG* I.68f.; Tucker *ad R.* 363a.

**e8.** Πρόδικος: So also in *Tht.* 151b2-6 Prodicus is offered as an alternative to Socratic association (cf. *X. Smp.* 4.62).

**128a1.** Γοργίας: The implication is that Gorgias was considered a sophist. This has however been disputed, see Dodds, *Gorgias* 6-10; but compare also Guthrie, *HGP III.* 36 n.4; I.G. Kidd, *PhQ* 11 (1961) 81; E.L.

Harrison, *Phoenix* 18 (1964) 183-92; G.B. Kerferd, *The Sophistic Movement* (Cambridge, 1981) 45.

**a1.** Πῶλος ὁ Ἀκραγαντῖνος: Hippias, not Polus, is the final member of the sophistic trio in the parallel passage (*Ap.* 19e3-4), and the change here is curious (see Stallbaum *ad loc.*, Fritzsche *ad loc.*): Polus does not usually seem to be considered a sophist as such, that is to say a professional educator, unlike Hippias (though a very brief account of Polus is given in Philostratus' βίοι σοφιστῶν; cf. also *Suda* s.v. Πῶλος Ἀκραγαντῖνος). On the other hand Polus was the author of a τέχνη (cf. *Grg.* 462b11-12), and this may be evidence for the other side of the argument. Notwithstanding this difficulty, it is entirely appropriate that Polus' name should appear at this point, since in *Grg.* 470c9ff. he is representative of the type of young man who would justify and exalt tyrannical ambitions (see *Intr.* ch. I, *b, iii*); and this is therefore a likely indication also for the priority of *Grg.* over *Thg.*

**a2.** ἄλλοι πολλοί: Ironical: the vaunted ability which the sophists possess is not so extraordinary as to be confined to a select few of them; the σοφία they impart can be bought at a price from any number (see also on 127a4).

**a2.** σοφοί: For the implicit connection between σοφός and σοφιστής, see on 121d1.

**a3.** γενναιοτάτους...πλουσιωτάτους: Ostensibly, the superlatives convey a high praise of the sophists, but the hyperbole is ironical: these educators are concerned solely for the profit to be won from rich and high-born young men (the emphasis here, an accretion onto the original passage from *Ap.*, is no doubt meant for the benefit of Demodocus, who is well aware of the sophists' fees [121d6]; cf. the definition of σοφ-

ιστική in *Sph.* 223b1-7, esp. b5-6 νέων πλουσίων καὶ ἐνδόξων γιγνομένη θήρα).

**a4.** οἷς ἔξεστιν: "Who have the opportunity"; said to be somewhat less complimentary than ἔξεστιν + accusative, see Thompson *ad Men.* 90e10f.

**a4-5.** τῶν...συνεῖναι: Cf. 127a3-4; οἱ καλοὶ καγαθοὶ τὰ πολιτικά are now identified simply as οἱ πολιταί.

**a4.** τῶν πολιτῶν: An explicit contrast with the sophists, who are all ξένοι.

**a5.** τούτους πείθουσιν: The resumptive repetition (picking up πείθουσιν 128a2) after an interruption in the narrative is quite normal in Plato, e.g. *Grg.* 456c8-d5, *Prt.* 311e1-4; see Reinhard, *Die Anakolouthē* 151ff.; Jowett-Campbell II.229-30; Denniston, *GPS* 90. As Hollenberg recognized (358), there are no grounds for the charge (Stallbaum 223, Steinhart 464, Heidel 53 n.2) that the author of *Thg.* has transparently and uncritically reproduced the anacolouthon of the parallel *Ap.* passage, for our passage is simply not anacolouthic.

**a5.** ἀπολείποντας: Cobet's ἀπολιπόντας would bring our text into line with *Ap.* 20a1, but cf. *Prt.* 316c7 ἀπολείποντας, and the present participle here is parallel with the present προκατατιθέντας a6. The present participle can also signify antecedent action, where the aorist is expected; see R. Renehan, *Studies in Greek Texts* (Göttingen, 1976) 157-9.

**a5-6.** τὰς...συνεῖναι: συνουσία and συνεῖναι came to be especially associated with the meeting of sophist and pupil; see Taylor *ad Ti.* 17a5. On this thematic word see *Intr.* ch. I, b, vii.

**a5.** ἐκείνων: Sc. τῶν πολιτῶν.

**a6-7. προκατατιθέντας...μισθόν:** As so often in the Corpus a reference to the sophists is accompanied by a reference to their fees; see on 121d5.

**a6. προκατατιθέντας:** The meaning of the προσ- element in προσκατατιθέντας of mss. is elusive; we expect it most naturally to signify "in addition" or "besides," as Ar. *Nu.* 1235. The text in 128a5-7 may be paraphrased "the sophists persuade the young men to abandon their association with those people (i.e. οἱ πολιταί a4), to associate with them, to pay a great deal of money *in addition*, and to be grateful in addition to this." But this is otiose, and the passage would be much more pointed if we suppose that the original reading was προκατατιθέντας, subsequently corrupted to the mss. reading under the influence of πρὸς in a7 (parablepsis). The sophistic practice of taking money in advance (προ-) is enunciated by Isocrates (13.5), and may be hinted at in *R.* 337d9-10; at *Prt.* 328b7 the perfect ἀποδέδωκεν would seem to imply advance payment (see Adam *ad loc.*), although an alternative form of remuneration is also mentioned by Protagoras in that passage, a form nevertheless clearly peculiar to him (b6-c2). In fact, it appears that advance payment was the standard method used by the sophists; see D.L. Blank, *ClassAnt* 4 (1985) 10ff., where the relevant passages are gathered. As the Isocratean passage above indicates, the notion of advance payment was considered offensive, and here it would arouse a similar feeling in Demodocus: he is already suspicious of the sophists, and will be shocked to hear that they want payment before they have even accomplished anything. The only difficulty with this proposal is that προκατατίθημι in the sense "pay in advance" seems unexampled. But κατατίθημι = "pay" or "deposit" is so well established that the preverb προ- would have imparted a readily in-

telligible meaning to the word, and in any event προσκατατίθημι is itself barely attested (LSJ s.v. list as classical examples only our passage and the line from Ar. *Nu.* above). Similarly the compound συγκατατίθημι is first attested in Plato (*Grg.* 501c5).

**a6-7.** ἀργύριον πάνυ πολὺ μισθόν: πολὺν BTW; Schanz deletes ἀργύριον as a gloss on μισθόν, while Cobet reads πάμπλου. Some sort of emendation is indeed necessary, since the passage is awkward if μισθόν receives the adjectival qualification, as it must do if πολὺν stands. Beck's πολὺ (anticipated by Ficino) is therefore the simplest solution, and μισθόν becomes appositional with ἀργύριον πάνυ πολὺ (cf. *Prt.* 311d2).

**a6-7.** ἀργύριον...χάριν: For the co-ordination of χρήματα and χάρις, cf. (with Schanz *ad Ap.* 19e) *La.* 187a1-3, *Cri.* 48c8-d1, *Crat.* 391b10, *X. Mem.* 3.5.23.

**a7.** εἰδέναι. τούτων: Asyndeton is frequent in rhetorical contexts where the speaker introduces, with emphasis, his final point (see Denniston, *GPS* 120).

**a8-b1.** εἰκὸς...εἰκός: The argument from "probability" or "likelihood" is a rhetorical commonplace; cf. *Phdr.* 272d7ff., and Thesleff 87; also *id.*, *Arctos* 4 (1966) 97-8; rhetorical also is the anaphora of the word.

**a8.** εἰκὸς ἦν: For the absence of ἄν in a potential statement, see Goodwin, *MT*<sup>2</sup> 151f.

**a8.** αὐτὸν σέ: See on 127d7.

**b1-4.** οὐδὲν...ἑρωτικῶν: For the importance of this sentence to the interpretation of *Thg.*, and for the likely antecedent of the thoughts expressed here, see *Intr.* ch. I, b, vi.



**b1-2.** οὐδὲν...μαθημάτων: The standard literary Socratic claim to ignorance; cf. (*int. al.*) *Ap.* 21d2-7, 23a7-b4, *Chrm.* 165b7-c1, *Grg.* 506a3-5, *Men.* 80c8-d3, *Tht.* 150c4-d2; see especially M. Hiestand, *Das Sokratische Nichtwissen in Platons ersten Dialogen* (Zurich, 1923); also Vlastos, *PhQ* 35 (1985) 1-31, esp. 1-11 for testimonia. But the present instance is significantly different from the stereotyped claim, see on b2-4.

**b1.** μακαρίων: For the ironical value of this word, cf. the common ὦ μακαρίε; and for its application to sophists, cf. *Hp. ma.* 304b7, *Euthd.* 303c4. The exact meaning is hard to identify: it can denote something or someone elevated above the human norm, or something granted someone by divine favour, or something which reveals outstanding success, or simply someone or something which is unique in a particular way; see C. De Heer, *ΜΑΚΑΡ-ΕΥΔΑΙΜΩΝ-ΟΛΒΙΟΣ-ΕΥΤΥΧΗΣ* (Amsterdam, 1969) 56-7, 83-7.

**b2.** ἐπεὶ: See on 127a3.

**b2.** ἐβουλόμην ἄν: The assertion continues the irony in Socrates' tone. For the impf. of βούλομαι + ἄν = *vellem*, see on 122a7; it is especially frequent among the orators, cf. *Ant. De caed. Her.* 1, *Lys.* 12.22, 86, *Isoc.* 15.114, *Is.* 10.1, *Lycurg.* §3, *Aeschin. Ctes.* 2; a parody in *Ar. Ec.* 151f.

**b2-4.** ἀλλὰ...ἐρωτικῶν: Socrates often confesses a susceptibility to young male beauty or a desire for particular young men (e.g. *Men.* 76c1-2, *Phdr.* 227c3f., *Alc. I* 103a1ff.; *X. Mem.* 2.6.28; *Aeschin. Socr. Alc.* fr. 11c Dittmar), yet the positive claim to be skilled in nothing but τὰ ἐρωτικὰ is exceedingly rare, cf. *Smp.* 177d7f., 198d1f., 212b6f., *Lys.* 204b8f.; and in our passage this statement appears abrupt and intrusive (so Heindorf [see Hollenberg 354]; Schleiermacher *ad loc.*; Stallbaum *ad loc.*;

Heidel 54 n.7; Lamb 345). But Socrates' words are thematically motivated: they introduce what is to Socrates the difference between συνουσία with himself and with the sophists; see *Intr.* ch. I, *b*, *vi*, *vii*.

**b3.** δῆπου ("of course," "as you know") practically assumes (perhaps ironically, see Denniston, *GP*<sup>2</sup> 267; KG II.131) a foreknowledge in Theages and Demodocus of what Socrates is about to say. What follows, however, does not appear to have been a well-known profession of Socrates' (see on b2-4); but see below on b3.

**b3.** ἀεὶ: Socrates appears to be saying that his claim to know nothing but τὰ ἐρωτικά is a regular one, yet this is hardly borne out by the frequency with which he elsewhere actually professes a knowledge in love-matters (see on b2-4). Difficulties are removed, it is true, if we understand ἀεὶ to refer not to the sentence as a whole but simply to Socrates' customary assertion of ignorance in b3 alone. Alternatively, ἀεὶ could be taken distributively, "from time to time," "on occasion." Nevertheless in *Phd.* 72e3-5 Cebes is able to allude to the doctrine of *anamnesis* with the words κατ' ἐκείνον τὸν λόγον...ὃν συ [sc. Σωκράτης] εἰωθας θάμα λέγειν, even though only one dialogue containing a reference to *anamnesis* can certainly be dated earlier than *Phd.*, viz., *Men.* (cf. 81a5-e2). In both places the inconsistency can best be explained, I think, by the author's desire to stress the contextual importance of the topic that is being referred to (though Burnet [*ad Phd.* 72e4] not unexpectedly explains the language of *Phd.* by the *datum* that the historical Socrates himself upheld the theory of *anamnesis*); see further *Intr.* ch. I, *b*, *vi*.

**b3.** ὡς ἔπος εἰπεῖν: Socrates adds the same qualification to his profession of ignorance in *Ap.* 22c9-d1 ἐμαυτῷ γὰρ συνήδη οὐδὲν ἐπισταμένῳ ὡς ἔπος εἰπεῖν κτλ.

**b4.** πλὴν...μαθήματος: Cf. 122c8 and n. for a similar ironic device; and for the impact of the device as used here, see **Intr.** ch. I, *b*, *vi*.

**b4.** μαθήματος: That Socrates calls τὰ ἐρωτικά a μάθημα has important implications for the interpretation of this passage, and for evaluating the author's intentions; see **Intr.** ch. I, *b*, *vi*, *vii*.

**b5-6.** τοῦτο...νῦν: Not only is Socrates skilled in τὰ ἐρωτικά, but there has never been a man as δεινός at the skill as he. These words take on a substantial veneer of irony (see following nn.), yet in a very important sense they are consistent with some (though not all) of Socrates' later statements; see **Intr.** ch. I, *b*, *vi*, *vii*.

**b5-6.** τοῦτο...παρ' ὄντινοῦν ποιοῦμαι...τῶν νῦν: Interlaced word order of this kind (*abab* structure) is considered to be especially characteristic of Plato's late style (see **Intr.** ch. IV, *b*). Here it may convey a mock-elevated tone in Socrates' words.

**b5.** μέντοι reinforces the demonstrative τοῦτο, as often; see Denniston, *GP*<sup>2</sup> 399f. The usage, absent outside of dialogue (*ib.* 401), is a conversational, and probably colloquial, idiom.

**b5-6.** παρ' ὄντινοῦν: A slightly contrived form of comparison, see Riddell §174 (to whose references add [with Knebel] *La.* 183c6-8, *Ion* 539e1-5). The dislocation of παρ' ὄντινοῦν from τῶν...νῦν b5-6 also increases the (ironic) gravity of the report about Socrates' unparalleled talent.

**b5.** ποιοῦμαι: Numerous substitutes have been suggested for this, the consensus reading, which has often been considered devoid of intelligible meaning: οἶομαι or προσποιοῦμαι Stallbaum, without printing (the first was taken up by Schanz, the second by Hirschig); ἡγοῦμαι Cobet; ἀντιποιοῦμαι Fritzsche, who also draws attention to ποῦ οἶμαι

*Phd.* 85b4 (BW). There is in fact no need for emendation, for ποιοῦμαι not infrequently means "I am reputed," cf. *R.* 498a3, 538c2, 573b2, 574d6 (see LSJ A.VI s.v.), and it is characteristic of Socrates that he should represent these laudatory words as the expressions of others: while he claims simply to know about τὰ ἐρωτικά, others say he is the greatest authority on it. Thus in *Smp.* 221c2ff. (a passage which our author may have had in mind here) it is partly because of Socrates' disposition towards τὰ ἐρωτικά that the drunken Alcibiades reckons Socrates to be like no man, μήτε τῶν παλαιῶν μήτε τῶν νῦν ὄντων (similarly d3-4). Alternatively, ποιοῦμαι could be translated as "acknowledge" (see J. Rudhart, *MH* 19 [1962] 39-64), in which case Socrates' statement becomes much more assertive. This interpretation however has the advantage of anticipating the tone Socrates later assumes (128d1-130e4) in relating stories about his influence on others around him. ποιοῦμαι also gains indirect support from its presence in the paraphrase of b5-6 by Aristaenetus (I.4).

**b5.** δεινὸς: For the ironic content of this word, see on 126a12-b1; and for its use here, see *Intr.* ch. I, *b*, *vi*.

**b5-6.** τῶν...νῦν: Regular Greek form would involve a superlative expression + τῶν νῦν alone (see Fraenkel *ad A. Ag.* 532), but the inclusion of τῶν προγεγονότων as well is a slyly hubristic touch which must be ironic (the effect is softened somewhat if ποιοῦμαι b5 is interpreted in the first of the two ways suggested above [on b5]). It does, however, lay the degree of emphasis on τὰ ἐρωτικά that the author is seeking; see *Intr.* ch. I, *b*, *vi*.

**b7.** Ὁρᾷς...ὅτι...μοι δοκεῖ: So BTW; Cobet rejected the redundant ὅτι ("insanientis oratio est") and altered to ὁ, and he was

followed by Burnet and Lamb. But redundant ὅτι is common in Plato, cf. *Prt.* 356a5-7, *Men.* 75a1-3, 87a1ff.; see Riddell §279, 280; KG II.366f.

**b7-8.** οὐ πάνυ...δοκεῖ ἔτι: If we retain τι after δοκεῖ, with all mss. except Ven.189 Flor.c Ang.107, then we must assume a dislocation in the stereotyped phrase οὐ πάνυ τι. But even if *Lys.* 204e3 Οὐ γὰρ πάνυ, ἔφη, τι is treated as evidence that τι can for no apparent reason be separated from πάνυ (I do not believe it furnishes such evidence), our instance is much more exaggerated, and it is better to delete τι from our text (Stallbaum, Hirschig, Burnet, Lamb). τι was an easy dittography before ἔτι.

**b8.** ἔτι: I fail to understand why ἔτι has been so often excised (Bekker, Baiter, Hermann, Fritzsche, Schanz, Souilhé, Carugno, Amplo, also suggested by Ast). In terms of sense it is unassailable (Socrates, at least in Theages' mind, has already balked at the thought of becoming Theages' teacher in 127a1-7 and b1, and his speech in 127d2-128b6 suggests to Theages that he is *still* of the same frame of mind), and its absence from Pal.175 is best explained as haplography after δοκεῖ τι.

**b8.** συνδιατρίβειν can take on the specialized meaning of "to carry on a philosophical discussion with," cf. *La.* 188c2, *Lys.* 204c6, *Smp.* 172c5.

**b8.** ἐπεὶ...γ': See on 127a3.

**b8.** τὸ...ἔτοιμον: τὸ γ' ἐμὸν is adverbial in *Grg.* 458d5, *Prt.* 338c5, *Chrm.* 176b2-3 (see also England *ad Lg.* 688a6; Tucker *ad R.* 345a), but the accompanying ἔτοιμον in the present instance indicates that here τὸ γ' ἐμὸν is, strictly speaking, the subject: "And yet for my own part I am ready"; cf. *La.* 188c4. For τὸ ἐμόν, τὸ σόν, etc., as subject (but

not gratuitous substitutes for ἐγώ, σύ), see J. Diggle, *Studies on the Text of Euripides* (Oxford, 1981) 106 (with reff.).

**c1-5.** ἀλλὰ...χείρους: Falsely attributed to Demodocus in B; Socrates actually alludes to the words as Theages' own in 129e8.

**c1.** παίζων πρὸς ἡμᾶς: Cf. 125e4; for Socrates' παιδιᾶ see *Intr.* ch. III, *a*; and for Theages' inclusion of his father in his terms of reference, see *Intr.* ch. III, *b*.

**c2-5.** ἐπεὶ...χείρους: An anticipation of 129e1-130e4. It is curious that Theages, despite his acquaintance with contemporaries who have improved by association with Socrates, sets out at the beginning of the dialogue to find a sophist to enlist as his teacher.

**c3-4.** τούτῳ...τούτῳ: Resumption of οὗτος can be a rhetorical technique, especially in consecutive asyndetic clauses (see Denniston, *GPS* 107-8); but the repetition here is simply a colloquial emphasis (similarly 130e8); see Riddell §49; Thesleff 91; KG I.660f.

**c3.** οὐδενὸς ἄξιοι: The idiom is common in Plato, e.g. *Ap.* 23b3, *Euthd.* 307a5, *Phd.* 88c6.

**c4.** ἐν...χρόνῳ: Cf. 130a6; and for the order "prep.~adv.~adj./noun," cf. *Euthd.* 303e6 ἐν πάντῳ ὀλίγῳ χρόνῳ; see Riddell §299.

**c4.** βελτίους: In what respect? Theages' terminology is as vague as ever (also c5 χείρους), and we must, I suppose, assume he means "better in discussion and argumentation," which is what Aristides claims to have become through association with Socrates (130c2-3). Yet Theages' choice of vocabulary proves to have importance as a description of the effect Socrates generally has over others; see *Intr.* ch. I, *b*, *vi*, *vii*; *c*.

**c5.** φαίνονται: Ast's ἐφαίνοντο is unnecessary: the present denotes a lasting effect, "appeared and still do"; see Stallbaum *ad loc.*; KG I.135-7; Schwyzer-Debrunner II.273-4.

**c6.** ὦ παῖ Δημοδόκου: Although this solemn address may be ironic (see Adam *ad Prt.* 328d8), if that is the tone here it is not obvious. Perhaps it was chosen for our passage as suitable to the lofty theme, the divine sign, which Socrates is about to introduce, as also *Alc.* I 103a1 (where the divine sign is mentioned a5f.); cf. similarly *Crat.* 384a8 ὦ παῖ Ἰππονίκου Ἑρμόγενες, anticipating the παλαιὰ παροιμία (Thesleff [76] calls the patronymic address "ceremonious"; it is used from its first appearance to arrest attention, cf. Semonides fr.1 West). At times the address is employed quite naturally where parentage and ancestry are emphasized, e.g. *Chrm.* 158b1, *La.* 180d7; and for the mock-dignified application of ὦ παῖ τίνος, cf. *Euthd.* 278e2, *Men.* 76e6.

**c7.** ἐὰν σὺ βούλη: For the possible source of this exchange (including d1f.), see *Intr.* ch. I, b, vii.

**c7-8.** καὶ...καὶ: Corresponsive, see on 122b3-4.

**128d1-130e10.** The account of Socrates' divine sign forms the culmination of the dialogue. In terms of structure this section serves to contrast Socratic συνουσία with everything put forward up to this point about other educators, and can be conveniently subdivided further into two parts, 128d1-129d8 and 129e1-130e10. The first part consists of a general statement about the manner in which τὸ δαιμόνιον manifests itself, followed by stories of several acquaintances who suffered by not heeding its advice (in one case the story involves Athens itself). The second part concentrates more directly upon the influence of the divine sign in the educational process, only one sphere within which its influence could be

felt, but for this dialogue obviously the most thematically important. In this instance one example is given to demonstrate the practical effect of τὸ δαιμόνιον on the intellectual progress of an individual. In all the Platonic Corpus this is the most extensive repository of information for Socrates' divine sign; as various aspects of the representation of the divine sign in *Thg.* have been examined fully throughout earlier chapters (see *Intr.* ch. I, *b, vii*; ch. II, *b-d*; ch. III, *a*; ch. IV, *d*), I shall restrict the present comments to a few observations on the author's anecdotal style in this section.

It can be shown that much of the Socratic biographical tradition in antiquity was engendered and perpetuated by stories of the kind we meet in this part of *Thg.*, i.e., collections of apophthegms or slightly longer reports, also commonly attached to other legendary figures (e.g. Pythagoras, the Seven Sages [cf. *Hdt.* 1.27], and cf. Socrates' anecdotes in *Tht.* 174a4-8, *R.* 329e7ff.). This type of transmitted information becomes especially widespread in the Hellenistic period and onwards, but anecdotes about Socrates enjoyed literary circulation even within his own lifetime. The earliest extant evidence is *Ar. Nu.* 143-183: the μαθητής at the door of the *phrontisterion* tells Strepsiades of the marvellous wit and subtlety of his master through short accounts of Socrates' experiments and of his cleverness in procuring food for the school. Socrates' own report of Chairephon's questioning of the Delphic Oracle (*Ap.* 20e8-21a8; cf. *X. Ap.* 14) perhaps belongs within the same genre. It is impossible to ascertain whether any of the minor Socratics composed what might be considered collections of anecdotes or apophthegms: the titles of works which Diogenes Laertius transmits (e.g. 6.15-18 Antisthenes; 2.121 Crito; 2.105 Phaedo; 2.84 Aristippus; 2.124 Simmias, Glaucon) provide no guidance in this matter. Aeschines Socraticus, the one minor Socratic for whom we do



possess substantial fragments, does not seem to have constructed his Socratic discussions in a strictly anecdotal manner, but rather sought conversational verisimilitude (cf. also the remarks of Demetrius *Eloc.* 297). Xenophon on the other hand is an exponent of this kind of discussion, especially in *Mem.*, which is to a great extent an episodic stitching together of Socratic anecdotes not altogether unlike the type we find in *Thg.*, e.g. 2.8ff., 2.9.1.ff., 3.9.14-15. The fragments of a papyrus from the first half of the third-century B.C. (*PHibeh* 182) contain similar reports of rather brief Socratic conversations, and this work may well be a fourth-century composition (see Turner's notes in *The Hibeh Papyri II* [London, 1955] 27-8). For the assembled evidence on the anecdotal approach to Socratic biography in the Peripatos, see F. Amory, *Class. et Med.* 35 (1984) 34ff. One Herculaneum papyrus has a column with the heading ἀποφθέγματα Σωκράτους (see H. Crönert, *RhMus* 57 [1902] 285-300), and it is all but certain that collections of Socratic anecdotes were in existence by the first century B.C. (see I. Gallo, *QUCC* 18 [1974] 182-3). The abundant use of anecdotal information in Diogenes Laertius (2.18-47) reflects the same biographical tradition and approach (cf. D.L. 2.34); we also find occasional traces of this method in other authors, e.g. Cicero (cf. *Tusc.* 3.77, *Div.* 1.123 [anecdote about the divine sign]), Plutarch (cf. *Mor.* 580dff.), and Athenaeus (cf. 14.628, 14. 643). Yet nowhere else in the Socratic anecdotal tradition are stories of this kind related by Socrates in the first person, as they are in *Thg.*; and, though τὸ δαιμόνιον of Socrates was bound to become a prominent anecdotal topic (see *Intr.* ch. II, *b*), and the anecdotes in this dialogue may themselves stem from oral tradition (see *Intr.* ch. I, *b*, *vii*), nevertheless a collection of such stories is something quite unique in

extant Socratic literature, and may well reflect certain post-Platonic literary interests (see **Intr. ch. V, b**).

**128d1-129d8.** Socrates' divine sign has attended him since childhood, and is distinguished mainly by its apotropaic function: it only occurs when he must desist from a course of action, it never urges him forward, and the same holds true when Socrates' friends ought not to pursue an enterprise which they are contemplating. Charmides did not heed the warnings of Socrates' sign, continued to practise for the Nemean games, and suffered the consequences. Likewise Timarchus, when he was leaving a *symposion*, disobeyed Socrates' exhortations not to depart, after the divine sign had come to Socrates; Timarchus was thereupon caught in an attempted assassination of a certain Nicias. The divine sign also came to Socrates at the departure of the Sicilian Expedition, and even while Socrates speaks Sannio is off on a military venture to Ionia: a shadow was cast over this man's departure by the occurrence of Socrates' sign.

These accounts represent an ascending scale of disasters for the individuals and groups involved: first, an apparently trivial instance (Charmides); next, the personal destruction of Timarchus; the loss of the Sicilian Expedition, felt by all Athenians; and finally an incident involving an otherwise unknown Sannio and the Athenian fleet in general, which carries the discussion to contemporary circumstances. Three of these premonitions occur on typical occasions for divine guidance and assistance, i.e., athletic games and battles (a military expedition also figures in the final anecdote in 130a6-7, c1ff.). Note as well that all the warnings that Socrates here brings down through the agency of the divine sign are non-moral in character, that is to say, the sign causes Socrates to recommend not the juster, but the safer, course of action (see **Intr. ch. II, a, b**). The Timarchus

episode is no different in this respect, since it is there said, not that Timarchus attempted to take another person's life, and thereby committed an unjust act, because he disobeyed Socrates and the sign, but simply that his disobedience cost him his own life (129a7-8, c7-8).

At first sight the four incidents in this section appear to bear little relation to the question of Socrates' suitability as a companion. But as Socrates himself remarks later (129e1ff.), they reveal that the divine sign "is almighty" (τὸ ἅπαν δύναται e3) in his associations with others, and this includes his educational associations. The connection is nevertheless not completely coherent; see on 129e1.

**d1.** ὡγαθέ: See on 125b3.

**d2-5.** ἔστι...οὐδέποτε: *Ap.* 31c7-d4 is the source (see *Intr.* ch. II n.28).

**d2-3.** ἔστι...ἔστι: ἔστι/ῆν opening a sentence frequently begins a new story, account, or section of a narrative, cf. *Prt.* 320c8, *Menex.* 237c5, *Phdr.* 249d4; see J.P. Barron, *CQ* n.s. 14 (1964) 220 and n.2 (with references). The use here is highly emphatic (here underlined by the repetition) and grandiloquent, cf. 130e5; see Gildersleeve I.32.

**d2.** ἔστι...παρεπόμενον: The periphrastic form (for παρεπέταλ) marks ἔστι out for special emphasis (see on 123a9-b1, and W.J. Alexander, *AJP* 4 [1883] 300ff.); in fact emphasis has dictated word order generally in this sentence, n.b. the postponement of δαιμόνιον (d3) to climactic final position in apposition with τι (d2).

**d2.** θείῃ μοίρᾳ: For the importance of this detail, see *Intr.* ch. I, b, vii; and on the connection of the phrase with τὸ δαιμόνιον of Socrates, see *Intr.* ch. II, b.

**d2. παρεπόμενον:** ἐπόμενος and its compounds are "often used in connection with daemons" (R.G. Morrow, *Plato's Cretan City* [Princeton, 1960] 458 n.200). For the implications of this connection, see **Intr.** ch. II, *b*.

**d3. ἐκ...ἀρξάμενον:** This piece of information, which occurs also in *Ap.*, may well have suggested a specific "demological" line of thought for our author, see **Intr.** ch. II, *a*. Plutarch was likely thinking of the present passage when he called the divine sign (*Mor.* 580c) a προποδηγὸν ἐξ ἀρχῆς (see **Appendix 1**).

**d3. δαιμόνιον:** On the controversy over the substantival vs. adjectival use of this word when used to describe Socrates' divine sign, see **Intr.** ch. II, *a*, and nn.16-8.

**d3-5. ἔστι...οὐδέποτε:** A fundamental characteristic of τὸ δαιμόνιον, see **Intr.** ch. II, *a* (also for d3 φωνή, d4 γένηται [and nn.24, 34], d4 σημαίνει [and n.12]).

**d5-7. καὶ...πράττειν:** This extension of the apotropaic function of the divine sign to the activity of Socrates' friends is a feature present in Xenophon's description of the divine sign (cf. *Mem.* 1.1.4, *Ap.* 13), but Plato never mentions it in works that are definitely genuine (see **Intr.** ch. II, *a, b*). Heidel argues (53 n.2) that this sentence is "at once seen to be an unfortunate attempt to vary the phrase" (sc. from that of *Ap.* 31d2-4), but it is in fact more than that: Socrates will proceed immediately to enumerate witnesses (μάρτυρας d7) for his statement, ensuring that d5-7 are anything but superfluous.

**d6. ἀνακοινῶται:** "Consult," properly of sharing information concerning oneself with another, cf. *Lys.* 206c1, *La.* 180a1, *Prt.* 314b7; *X. An.* 3.1.5. The word implies communication with Socrates for the intentional

purpose of gaining advice on a contemplated course of action; but the following anecdotes do not quite bear this procedure out.

**d6.** ταῦτ' οὖν τοῦτο: Colloquial (cf. 130c5 τοῦναντίον), see Thesleff 91; Stallbaum *ad Philb.* 37d; cf. *Smp.* 178e1, *Men.* 90d7-e1, *Prt.* 318a8.

**d7-8.** καὶ...παρέξομαι: Cf. *Ap.* 19d1, 20e7, *Smp.* 215b7-8.

**d7.** ὑμῖν: Socrates' previous description of the basic behaviour of his divine sign was addressed to Theages alone (σε d1, σοι d2); from the present point up to 129d8 Socrates' narrative is directed towards both Demodocus and his son (cf. d8 γιγνώσκετε, 129a1 βούλεσθε, a5 ὑμῖν, c7 ὑμῖν, d1 ἀκούσεσθον); then from 129e1 to 130e10 Socrates reverts to addressing his words primarily at Theages (129e1 σοι, 129e8 σὺ ἥσθησαι). For the significance of this change of pronouns, see *Intr.* ch. I, b, vii.

**d8-129c8.** Χαρμίδην...ἀπιστήσαι: The extent to which story-telling convention has been imposed upon these anecdotes about Charmides and Timarchus is considerable. Just enough information is offered in both accounts to create the kind of aristocratic ambience in which Socrates so commonly moves (see following nn. *pass.*). There are additionally a few features common to the "miracle" story (see on 129b1). At the close of the Charmides episode the author heightens interest through the use of *praeteritio* (128e8-129a1), and in the Timarchus anecdote strict logic is at one point partially sacrificed to dramatic convenience (see on 129c3-5). The unheeded warning which leads to disaster is, moreover, a story pattern of a popular kind particularly familiar from Herodotus (see H. Bischoff, *Der Warner bei Herodot* [Diss. Marburg, 1932]; R. Lattimore, *CP* 34 [1939] 24-35).

**d8-129a1.** Χαρμίδην...ἀσκήσεως: Nothing else is known of this incident, but the athletic contest at least is a typical occasion for a prophetic utterance. As H. Müller noted (472 n.24), it is worth considering the details of this anecdote in the light of the closing portion of *Chrm.* In *Chrm.* 176a6-d5 Charmides (on his identification see following n.) is represented as a young man eager for the company of Socrates, and confident that he will thereby become σώφρων; he is portrayed, in other words, as conscientious and determined. Yet at the same time both he and Critias are unwilling to allow Socrates a say in the matter of this proposed association (c5ff.). In *Thg.* Charmides, conformably with his character in *Chrm.*, practises diligently, thinking it will benefit him; but, like the character in *Chrm.*, he disregards the prohibitions and counsel of Socrates. It is characteristic of biographical anecdotes in general that they rely heavily on prior literary evidence (see M. R. Lefkowitz, *The Lives of the Greek Poets* [Baltimore, 1981] viii-ix; also below on d8).

**d8.** Χαρμίδην: The nephew of Critias and uncle of Plato. He joined in the oligarchic revolution of 404 and fell with Critias in 403 (cf. X. *HG* 2.4.19), and is familiar as an acquaintance of Socrates from both Platonic and Xenophontic works; cf. *Chrm.*, *Prt.* 315a1; X. *Mem.* 3.6.1, 3.7.1-9.

**d8.** Χαρμίδην...τουτονι: For the omission of the article, see on 127c8; but the pronoun here is not deictic, signifying rather "the well known," cf. *Hp. ma.* 282b4, 282c2.

**d8.** τὸν καλὸν γενόμενον: Plato and the Platonic Socrates are elsewhere at pains to emphasize the extraordinary beauty of Charmides; cf. *Chrm.* 154a3-155e3, *Smp.* 222b1ff. For the force of this epithet, see on 129d4-5 (I can see little effect in H. Müller's assertion [472 n.24] that καλὸς cannot have been used of physical beauty here; the word is

plurivalent, and may refer simultaneously to beauty of both body and character). *γενόμενον* in this passage makes particular sense if the author had in mind the early portion of *Chrm.* (154a4-b7), in which Critias tells Socrates how attractive Charmides has become (*γέγονεν* b6) since Socrates last saw him (Cobet's emendation to *λεγόμενον* is superfluous).

**e1. τὸν Γλαύκωνος:** The addition of a patronymic expression, a demotic, or the like, to the name of a character, seems to be an occasional anecdotal feature, cf. 129a2, b1-2, d4-5, 130a4-5, a8-9; see Dover *ad Nu.* 156.

**e1. Γλαύκωνος· οὗτος:** The asyndeton is quite normal where an introductory pronoun refers back to the sentence immediately preceding, or to a character within that sentence, cf. 130a5; see Denniston, *GPS* 109-10.

**e1. ποτε:** Vague *ποτε* referring to an indeterminate past and introducing a report of some kind (cf. 130a4) is a story-telling commonplace: it occurs as early as Homer (cf. *Od.* 8.76), appears frequently, for instance, when Pindar breaks into mythical digressions (e.g. *Ol.* 6.13, 7.34, 72), and is used regularly by Xenophon in *Mem.* (e.g. 1.6.1, 1.6.11, 2.2.1, 2.3.1) when he is setting basic dramatic scenery for a Socratic story.

**e2. μέλλων:** The divine sign comes when someone other than Socrates is on the verge of acting; elsewhere in the Corpus it occurs when Socrates himself is about to proceed, cf. *Phdr.* 242b8, *Ap.* 40a6, b3, c3; see *Intr.* ch. II, a, b.

**e2. μέλλων ἀσκήσειν:** Cf. e3 μέλλοι ἀσκεῖν: the future ἀσκήσειν denotes intention, the present ἀσκεῖν imminence; see Magnien II.104; Goodwin, *MT*<sup>2</sup> 20.

**e2. στάδιον:** The use of the article with this word is rather fluid: Plato attaches it in *Lg.* 833a10, but cf. (with Fritzsche) *X. An.* 4.8.27. The prize for the *stadion* was the most eagerly sought-after of all the athletic events in the various games, and Charmides' zeal for this prize typifies the aristocratic circles in which Socrates involved himself.

**e2. εἰς Νεμέαν:** We might expect εἰς Νεμέα (the games as opposed to the place), but metonymy in the use of place names is quite common (see KG I.12), and Pindar for instance frequently employs a place name to denote the athletic games held there (e.g. *Ol.* 7.82, *Nem.* 6.19-20).

**e3. ἀρχομένου...μέλλοι:** A few secondary mss. have μέλλει, but the optative is admissible, ἀρχομένου being an imperfect participle; see KG I.200; J. Humbert, *Syntax grecque*<sup>3</sup> (Paris, 1960) 172f.; A. Oguse, *Recherches sur le participe circonstanciel en grec ancien* (Wetteren, 1962) 42f.

**e3-4. ἡ φωνή:** The article, absent from W and Aelian, is clearly required here.

**e4. διεκώλυον...εἶπον:** The imperfect defines broadly the sphere within which the action of the aorist falls; cf. *Euthd.* 288b3-4, *R.* 328c5; see KG I.157f.; Gildersleeve I.91-2; K. Strunk, *Glotta* 49 (1971) 201-3; J.L. Rose, *The Durative and Aoristic Tenses in Thucydides* (Baltimore, 1942) 18-20.

**e4-5. Λέγοντος...μεταξύ:** Cf. *Ap.* 40b3-4 καίτοι ἐν ἄλλοις λόγοις πολλαχοῦ δὴ με ἐπέσχε [*sc.* τὸ τοῦ θεοῦ σημεῖον] λέγοντα μεταξύ.

**e5. ἡ τοῦ δαιμονίου:** The phrase occurs also as a consensus reading in *Ap.* 40a4 (ἡ γὰρ εἰωθυῖά μοι μαντικὴ ἡ τοῦ δαιμονίου), but it is secluded there by Schleiermacher, whose primary objection



was that the phrase personalizes τὸ δαιμόνιον excessively (see Burnet *ad loc.*; few editors have followed Schleiermacher). But in *Ap.* Socrates' language (ἐναντιούμενη a6, εἴ τι μέλλοιμι a6, τὸ τοῦ θεοῦ σημεῖον b1) makes it clear that his customary μαντική is in fact the direct consequence of τὸ δαιμόνιον, and he is in any event persistently vague in his description of the divine sign (see further *Intr.* ch. II, a). By a circular form of reasoning Schleiermacher (*ad loc.*, followed by Cousin 425) faulted the presence of ἡ τοῦ δαιμονίου in *Thg.* (cf. also 129e1-2, e7-8) as an un-Platonic expression; but I doubt it should ever have been questioned in *Ap.* Still, that the divine sign in *Thg.* has been personalized can hardly be denied (*pace* Zeller II.15 73 n.4); see *Intr.* ch. II, b, d.

e5. ἀλλὰ introducing an exhortation is probably a less formal idiom (very rare in the orators, see Denniston, *GP*<sup>2</sup> 14), though not necessarily colloquial (common in tragedy, *ib.*).

e6. νικήσω: A modal future (since parallel with e7 μέλλω νικᾶν), cf. 121d6; see Magnien II.188.

e8. ὠφελήσομαι: Cobet needlessly emended to ὠφελήσονται ("Plato et Platonis imitatores dicebant ὠφελήσομαι"): a form of ὠφελήσομαι (i.e., middle with passive meaning, see LSJ s.v.) occurs only once in Plato (*R.* 343c1, where there is a *varia lectio* ὠφελήθησονται in M), against two instances of ὠφελήθησονται (*Hp. ma.* 285a7 *bis*). ὠφελήσομαι is indeed common in the passive sense "derive advantage" (see Magnien I.177), but by no means is it used to the exclusion of the future passive in *θη*; see Magnien I.375; KG I.116.

e8. ταῦτα: For the asyndeton see on e1.

e8. ἥσκει: Inceptive imperfect.

**e8-129a1.** ἄξιον...ἀσκήσεως: The allusiveness of the statement seems to indicate that the outcome of Charmides' practising was common knowledge to the contemporary reader of *Thg.*, though we know nothing about it ourselves. However, it is pointless to argue (Willing 180) that *Thg.* must therefore have been written when the event was still a matter of first-hand knowledge. The story may indeed be factually-based; yet the author, if he had fabricated the story, might equally have felt that an explicit account of the anecdote's actual conclusion would have been superfluous and less dramatically effective (129d2-3 is somewhat similar); see Schleiermacher 173 for further suggestions. Robin's proposed solution of the meaning of this sentence (1643: "se blessa-t-il de manière à perdre sa beauté native?") is merely an attractive guess.

**e8-129a1.** ἄξιον...αὖτοῦ: Charmides is still alive, a detail consistent with the dramatic date of *Thg.*; see *Intr.* ch. V, Appendix, and d8 n.

**a1-c8.** εἰ...ἀπιστήσαι: Nothing is known either of the characters named in this story or of the incidents related. The anecdote likely depends in a few details on Socrates' account of an occurrence of τὸ δαιμόνιον in *Euthd.* 272d7ff.; see on b1, b8. The story is more highly animated than the previous one (see on a7-8, a8-9, c1-2); for the supposed presence of novellistic traits, see Bruns 346-7; Gigon, *Sokrates* 172-3 (see also S. Trenkner, *The Greek Novella* [Cambridge, 1958] 46-55, for novellistic themes of intrigue).

**a1.** εἰ δὲ βούλεσθε: A common conversational idiom in Plato (Attic; see W. Schmid, *Der Atticismus II* [Stuttgart, 1897] 64-5), serving as a transitional formula, "or if you like," "then again"; see Thompson *ad Men.* 71e2. The incomplete protasis (no complementary infinitive) is sound Greek; see Riddell §254, and on a2 ἔρυσθε.

**a2.** τὸν Τιμάρχου ἀδελφὸν Κλειτόμαχον: Both names are fairly common in inscriptions, but neither of our characters can be identified. Plutarch likely named the hero of his myth in the *De genio Socratis* after the Timarchus of this anecdote; see **Appendix 1**.

**a2.** ἔρεσθε *W<sup>c</sup>* (also Coisl.155 independently, it would seem); ἔρεσθαι (BTW) would complement the formulaic εἰ δὲ βούλεσθε **a1**, a construction not unparalleled in Plato (cf. *Smp.* 177b1ff.), but much less idiomatic than if ἔρεσθε is retained (see on **a1**). The lack of apodosis to εἰ δὲ βούλεσθε...ἔρεσθαι would not be impossible by any means (see on 131a3; Stallbaum and Knebel, who accept ἔρεσθαι, compare *Grg.* 454b9ff., but that passage [anacolouthic] is very different); but ἔρεσθαι is probably the result of an ignorance of the Attic idiom cited above (**a1**).

**a3.** ἀποθανούμενος ἦει: εἶμι, ἔρχομαι, βαίνω, and the like, in conjunction with a future participle, can serve one of two possible functions: 1) they can, as in the large majority of instances, retain their primary notion of physical movement (as, e.g., 129d5-6); 2) less often, the verb loses its sense of motion, lapses into a mere auxiliary, and verb + future participle become a periphrastic construction. 2) has been virtually ignored in comprehensive discussions of periphrastic constructions, which are usually concerned only with εἶναι or ἔχειν + future participle (e.g. W. Aerts, *Periphrastica* [Amsterdam, 1965]; W.J. Alexander, *AJP* 4 [1883] 291-308). Even Magnien, who devotes considerable space to the construction (II.8-20), lumps 1) and 2) together rather indiscriminately, distinguishing them only by the remark that ἔρχομαι + ἔρων (*vel. sim.*), which according to his list occurs in Herodotus, Xenophon, and Plato, is used "indiquant la marche du discours" (18). But ἔρχομαι/εἶμι are occasionally coupled

with a future participle that denotes something other than speaking; cf. *Prt.* 311e5-6, *Tht.* 198e2-5; *Ar. Ec.* 574-5 (perhaps also *Plut.* 844). In the form in which I have printed 129a3 (see on a3 [εὐθὺ τοῦ δαιμονίου]), ἦει ἀποθανούμενος must be considered another example of this latter idiom. The *v.l.* εἴη (*sic*) by the original hand of B (*i.m.*) could possibly represent a misunderstanding of this construction, and εἴη may originally have been written by B and W in c7 (see *app.crit. ad loc.*); but the verb in a7 and c6 has been left untampered with in all mss.

**a3.** ἦει: Singular despite the plural subject (ἐκεῖνος τε καὶ Εὐ-αθλος a4), since Euathlos is an afterthought; cf. b1, *Ap.* 36a9, *Phd.* 77d5-6, *Lys.* 207d6; a mark of a loose conversational tone.

**a3.** [εὐθὺ τοῦ δαιμονίου]: This phrase cannot stand in our texts, and should probably be deleted outright; for one explanation of its presence in all mss., see **Appendix 3**.

**a4-5.** καὶ . . . φεύγοντα: In Attic law one who protected a fugitive was liable to the same punishment as the fugitive, cf. *D.* 50.49; also *Lys.* 29.11.

**a4.** Εὐαθλος ὁ σταδιοδρομῶν: Nothing certain is known of this person, and Heidel (54 n.6) remarks that Εὐαθλος "has the appearance of a name chosen to suit the fictitious character." But Εὐαθλος may just happen to be a particularly apt name; cf. the statue dedicated at Olympia to the wrestling victor Φερένικος (*Paus.* 6.16.1). At any rate the name Εὐαθλος appears on Attic inscriptions from the very early fourth-century (*IG*<sup>2</sup> II.652a, II.653b), and we know of a Euathlos who was a pupil of Protagoras and an orator in his own right (see *DK* 80A1; *Kirchner, Prosopographica Attica* [Berlin, 1901] s.v. Εὐαθλος; cf. also *Athen.* 619e, *Quint. Inst.* 3.1.10). To my mind the only known historical personage who might

possibly be identified with our Euathlos is the individual who prosecuted Thucydides son of Melesias sometime between 433 and 425 (see MacDowell *ad Ar. Vesp.* 592, 947). If the identification is correct, Socrates' mention of Euathlos would have provoked a reminiscence of the demise of an overly ambitious young man, for in *Ar. Ach.* 710 Euathlos is cited as an example of the indecorous prosecution of a helpless old man (Thucydides) by a youthful advocate; on this reading Euathlos would share some characteristics with several impetuous characters in these anecdotes. For the contextual effect produced by the phrase Εὐάθλος ὁ σταδιοδρομῶν, see on 128e2 στάδιον.

**a4.** σταδιοδρομῶν: A rare word, cf. D. 59.121 (σταδιοδραμοῦμαι at E. *HF* 863 is emended to στάδια δραμοῦμαι by Bond *ad loc.*). σταδιοδρόμος (W) is also possible, cf. *Lg.* 833a7.

**a5.** ὑπεδέξατο: *Vox propria* for the harbouring of a fugitive, cf. *Lg.* 955b5; D. 50.49; Thuc. 5.83.3; Hdt. 1.41.1.

**a7.** μέντοι emphasizes ἐγὼ, see on 128b5.

**a7-8.** ἔρχομαι ἀποθανούμενος: See on a3.

**a8-9.** τί...φράσω: Rhetorical interrogation is frequently employed by the Platonic Socrates; see Riddell §325.

**a9.** δὲ οὖν: The more common order in Plato's earlier works; οὖν δὲ becomes the favoured combination in later dialogues (although δὲ οὖν and οὖν δὲ appear in all periods). Both combinations are said to be rare outside of Plato and Herodotus (see Denniston, *GP*<sup>2</sup> 468), but this cannot be used as evidence for the authenticity of *Thg.*: the combinations occur also in *Alc I*, *Epin.*, *Epp.*, and *Min.* (see Brandwood s.v. οὖν δὲ, δὲ οὖν; also des Places 85-7).

**a9.** ἐγὼ φράσω: Asyndeton after the rhetorical question heightens expectation.

**a9-b2.** ὅτε...Φιλημονίδου: An occurrence of the divine sign in *Euthd.* 272e3 is similar, and was probably a source for our author: κατὰ θεὸν γάρ τινα ἔτυχον καθήμενος ἐνταῦθα, οὐπὲρ σύ με εἶδες, ἐν τῷ ἀποδυτηρίῳ μόνος, καὶ ἤδη ἐν νύφει εἶχον ἀναστῆναι· ἀνισταμένου [cf. b1, 4, 5, 7] δέ μου ἐγένετο τὸ εἰωθὸς σημεῖον τὸ δαιμόνιον [cf. b8]. πάλιν [cf. αὖθις c1-2] οὖν ἐκαθίζομην, καὶ ὀλίγω ὕστερον [cf. c1 διαλιπὼν χρόνον] εἰσέρχεσθον τούτῳ – ὅ τ' Εὐθύδημος καὶ ὁ Διονυσόδωρος κτλ.

**b1.** ἀνίστατο: For the singular verb with plural subject, see on a3 ἦει.

**b1.** ἐκ τοῦ συμποσίου: Again, incidental details tend to reinforce the impression of an aristocratic environment; cf. Theognis 467-96, and see on 128e2 (στάδιον), 129a4. At the same time this is perhaps the sort of dramatic scenery which a writer of Σωκράτικοι λόγοι working from a literary base, i.e., recalling the *Symposia* of Plato and Xenophon, might be tempted to adapt to his dialogue. (The symposium seems to have quickly become a *topos* of dialogue after Plato and Xenophon; cf. the *Περὶ τῆς ἄπνου* of Heraclides Ponticus [see Gottschalk 16-17]; see Hug, *RE* 2.8 Halbe 1273ff.; R. Hirzel, *Der Dialog I* [Leipzig, 1895] 283f., 359ff.)

The identification of time or circumstances (cf. a3 ἡνίκα ἀποθανούμενος ἦει, a9-b1 ὅτε ἀνίστατο), of place (cf. b1 ἐκ τοῦ συμποσίου), and of persons involved (cf. a2 τὸν Τίμαρχου ἀδελφὸν Κλειτόμαχον, b1-2 Φιλήμων ὁ Φιλημονίδου, b2 Νικίαν τὸν Ἡροσκαμάνδρου), is supposedly typical of "miracle" stories in general;

see D.A. Stoike on Plu. *De genio Socratis* 580d in H.D. Betz (ed.), *Plutarch's Theological Writings and Early Christian Literature* 3 (Leiden, 1975) 258.

**b1-2.** Φιλήμων ὁ Φιλημονίδου: Philemon is a common name in all periods, but nothing is known about either of these figures. Still, behind the name Philemonides may perhaps be detected further colouring of the story with a specific atmosphere, since the -ίδης name ending was possibly noble; see B. Marzullo, *Maia* 6 (1953) 108-10; the evidence has recently been reviewed by M. Golden, *Classical Views* 5 (1986) 264-5.

**b2-3.** ἀποκτενοῦντες...ἡπιστάσθην: For the juxtaposition of dual and plural, cf. *Prt.* 317e1; see KG I.69-74.

**b2.** Νικίαν τὸν Ἡροσκάμανδρου: Not the Athenian general who died at Syracuse in 413 during the Sicilian Expedition. While Nicias is a very common name, it is interesting that the rare Ἡροσκάμανδρος turns up on two third-century inscriptions (they may refer to the same man), and that in both cases the deme is Socrates' own, Alopeke (*IG*<sup>2</sup> II.859.52, II.1811); see Friedländer 153.

**b3.** ἡπιστάσθην...μόνω: The successive duals lay emphasis on the clandestine nature of the plot, further underlined by the adjective μόνος (for μόνω cf. *Phdr.* 236c8, *Menex.* 236d2, *Clit.* 406a10). The stress is important here since the credibility of Socrates' clairvoyant powers must be guaranteed.

**b4.** πρὸς ἐμὲ (BW); πρὸς με (T) is also defensible, cf. 125e4, *Tht.* 145b8, *Chrm.* 165b6, *Men.* 91a2; see J. Vendryès, *Traite d'accentuation grecque* (Paris, 1945) 103.

**b4.** εἶπεν...ἔφη: For φάναι *in parenthesi* after an introductory verb of speaking, cf. b7, *Chrm.* 164e5-6; see Thompson *ad Men.* 95e;

Tucker *ad R.* 329b. Its effect here is to preserve a natural and spontaneous flavour for the telling of the tale.

**b4.** τί λέγεις: Perhaps allied with the colloquial τί πράττεις (on which see Stevens 41). But these words may imply, like the opening words of *Hp. mi.* (363a1 Σὺ δὲ δὴ τί σιγᾷς, ὦ Σώκρατες), and (possibly) those of *Hipparch.* (225a1 Τί γὰρ τὸ φιλοκερδέες; [where the use of γὰρ is suggestive]), that the characters are supposed to be in the middle of a conversation of some kind.

**b5.** ὑμεῖς...πίνετε: The plural is a little odd after the singular address ὦ Σώκρατες (b4), but perfectly understandable in the context of informal conversation (cf. Lamb: "Go on drinking, all of you"; Souilhé: "Bouvez vous autres"). The same combination of plural imperative and singular vocative occurs in *Ar. Vesp.* 975-6, but there it is part of the comic incongruity of the passage (see MacDowell *ad loc.*). However, compare the rather more stereotyped shift in *Euthd.* 283b4: Εἰπέ μοι, ἔφη, ὦ Σώκρατες τε καὶ ὑμεῖς οἱ ἄλλοι.

**b5.** ποι: The secrecy of the plot is again underlined.

**b5.** ἐξαναστήναι: "Rise up and go out"; cf. *Prt.* 311a3-4.

**b5.** ἦξω: For ἦκω = "come back," "return," cf. *La.* 201c4, *Crat.* 440e3-4; also esp. *Ar. Ra.* 1156-7.

**b6.** ἐὰν τύχω: "Perhaps," "maybe," a stereotyped expression, cf. *Hp. mi.* 367a3, *Tht.* 179c5 (for the assimilation into the person of the leading verb, see on 130e9-10); but a possible shading over in sense to "if I succeed," cf. *Thuc.* 4.63.2.

**b6.** καί: "Thereupon," a common narrative use of conjunctive καί, cf. b8, c1, d2 (similarly the paratactic use at 128e2, e4); see Jowett-Campbell II.201; S. Trenkner, *Le Style KAI* 74-8 (colloquial).



**b7.** εἶπον...ἔφην: See on b4.

**b8.** τὸ...δαιμόνιον: Cf. *Euthd.* 272e3 (quoted above on a9-b2); also *Ap.* 40a4 ἡ γὰρ εἰωθυῖά μοι μαντική. But here the whole phrase sounds impossibly clumsy within a dramatic narrative context.

**b8.** ὅς ἔπεσχε: For the relic personal pronoun, cf. (*int.al.*) *Prt.* 310 d4, 312a2, *Phd.* 118a13, *Smp.* 172a6, 202b10; see Gildersleeve II.222.

**c1.** διαλιπὼν χρόνον: Cf. *Phd.* 117e7 διαλιπὼν χρόνον, 118a11-12 ὀλίγον χρόνον διαλιπὼν.

**c1-2.** αὖθις...αὖθις...αὖθις: The anaphora heightens tension and urgency, and adds emphasis. For the repeated attempts to defy the admonitions of τὸ δαιμόνιον, cf. *X. Ap.* 4 καὶ δὲς ἤδη ἐπιχειρήσαντός μου σκοπεῖν περὶ τῆς ἀπολογίας ἐναντιοῦταί μοι τὸ δαιμόνιον.

**c2.** Σώκρατες: For the omission of ὦ see on 127b1.

**c2.** αὖθις: Asyndeton increases the gravity of the narrative (so also τὸ τρίτον). For the combination of asyndeton and anaphora (see on c1-2), cf. *Menex.* 284a4-6; see Denniston, *GPS* 107-8.

**c3-5.** τὸ...ἔχοντα: "In ἀλλὰ λαθῶν there is an admission fatal to the prophetic spirit ascribed to Socrates and hardly in keeping with the deification of the δαιμόνιον" (Heidel 53 n.3). It is true that dramatic considerations here overtake the author's desire to present a strictly coherent picture of a divine force (see further *Intr.* ch. II, *b*, and above on 128d8-129c8), but the contemporary reader of *Thg.* would doubtless have been less troubled over the lapse of τὸ δαιμόνιον than the modern reader may be. Divine agents in Homer (to take one example) are often described as omniscient, but are nevertheless frequently deceived; e.g. *Od.* 4.468: Proteus "knows everything," yet is captured while asleep; *Il.* 5.311, 8.131:

the notion is entertained that Aeneas and Troy would have been overtaken had the attention of their respective patron deities, Aphrodite and Zeus, been diverted at the wrong moment; *Od.* 1.22ff.: Poseidon, alone among the Olympian gods in his hatred for Odysseus, is unknowingly overruled while among the Ethiopians; and in [A.] *PV* Zeus' omniscience does nothing to help him discover the secret which Prometheus holds. Despite statements such as Adeimantus' in *R.* 365d6-7 (Ἄλλὰ δὴ θεοὺς οὔτε λανθάνειν οὔτε βιάσασθαι δυνατόν, offered as a standard and popular view), and Aristotle's in *Po.* 1454<sup>b</sup>5-6 (ἅπαντα γὰρ ἀποδίδομεν τοῖς θεοῖς ὁρᾶν), both of which must have expressed a rather vaguely-conceived *opinio communis*, omniscience among Greek deities is only relative; see R. Pettazzoni, *The All-Knowing God* tr. H.J. Rose (London, 1956) 145. Yet for all this it is worth observing that Satyrus (*POxy.* 9.1176 [*Life of Euripides*] fr.39 col.2.8-22) labelled as peculiarly Socratic the belief that nothing can be concealed from the gods; and some time earlier Xenophon (*Mem.* 1.1.19) contrasted Socrates' rigid ideas about divine omniscience with the attitude of "most people," who claim that the gods know some things, but not everything. It therefore appears to have been part of the Socratic tradition that Socrates accepted divine omniscience in the strictest terms, unlike the vast majority of the Greek population (see Gigon's n. *ad Mem.* 1.1.19; M.L. McPheran, *JHPh* 23 [1985] 301ff.). If we bear in mind the present passage from *Thg.*, it is interesting to note that, according to Xenophon (*ib.*), in Socrates' view the gods know τά τε λεγόμενα καὶ πραττόμενα καὶ τὰ σιγῇ βουλευόμενα.

**c3.** τὸ τρίτον: For adverbial τὸ τρίτον, cf. *Prm.* 155e4, *Lg.* 753 d3, 920a4, *Ep.* 7.336c1. An instance of the common "first...second... third"

of popular story-telling; cf. Hom. *Il.* 6.179-86; *Ap.* 21b1-22e5 (Socrates questions three classes reputed to have knowledge); a fairly high concentration of this ingredient in stories of the Aesopic Corpus (e.g. 105, 155, 173, 271b, 305, 308); see G.S. Kirk, *The Nature of Greek Myths* (Harmondsworth, 1974) 35.

**c3-5.** βουλόμενος...εἰπών...λαθών, ἐπιτηρήσας... ἔχοντα: The one instance in this dialogue of an accumulation of participles is not very elaborate, as compared with, e.g., *Grg.* 480b7-d6, *Menex.* 237b2-c3, *R.* 488b1ff.

**c5.** ἄλλοσε...ἔχοντα: Cf. *Grg.* 504d9 πρὸς τοῦτο ἀεὶ τὸν νοῦν ἔχων; *Prt.* 324a6-7 πρὸς τούτῳ τὸν νοῦν ἔχων; *R.* 534b5-6 νοῦν περὶ τούτου οὐ φήσεις ἔχειν.

**c5.** καὶ οὕτως: A natural method of concluding a story, cf. *R.* 621b8. οὕτως here perhaps = "without more ado," "just" (see Stevens 56, who classifies the use as colloquial).

**c5.** ὥχεται ἀπὼν: An emphatic expression, cf. *Ap.* 32d7, *Menex.* 242b2, *Smp.* 217b7, 220d4.

**c5-6.** διεπράξατο ἐξ ὧν: For the omission of the antecedent, see on 123b6.

**c6.** δὴ: For δὴ with the relative (specifying), see T.K. Abbott, *Hermathena* 7 (1890) 44-5.

**c7.** ὅτι ἴοι ἀποθανούμενος: The repetition after a3, a7-8, and c6, is probably an attempt to point the moral of his story.

**c8.** διὰ τὸ ἐμοὶ ἀπιστῆσαι: For the disregard of Socrates' divine sign leading to death, cf. the anecdote in Cic. *Div.* 1.123, Plu. *Mor.* 581d-e (*De genio Socratis*), and Socr. *Ep.* 1.9.

**c8. ἀπιστήσαι:** ἀπιστεῖν = ἀπειθεῖν (the latter, in this instance, would have been too elevated to apply to Socrates, according to Burnet *ad Ap.* 29a3, c1) is rather common in Plato, see Ast, *Lexicon* s.v.; also among the tragedians (LSJ II s.v.). Cf. *Suda* s.v. ἀπιστεῖν: τὸ ἀπειθεῖν. λέγουσι δὲ καὶ Ἀπιστίαν, τὴν ἀπειθείαν. καὶ Ἄπιστος, ὁ μὴ πειθόμενος. οὕτως Πλάτων.

**c8-d2. ἔτι...ἀκούσαι:** Did Socrates predict the destruction of the Sicilian expedition (as Plutarch, drawing in all likelihood upon the account in *Thg.*, believed [see **Appendix 1**]), or is this merely a *vaticinatio ex eventu*? The evidence bearing on this question, meagre though it is, has not yet been fully examined, and it will be appropriate to do so here.

1) Our sources are completely silent about the precise circumstances of Socrates' alleged warning, yet, assuming the truth of the story, it could hardly have been made in the *Ekklesia* or *Boule*: *Ap.* 32a9-e1 and *Grg.* 473e6-474a1 are unecquivocal on the point that it was Socrates' deliberate decision never to offer formal political advice unless he was left with no choice (i.e., as ἐπιστάτης); had he made an exception in 415, we can feel confident that Plato or Xenophon would have mentioned it (in fact Plato is conspicuously reticent about the Sicilian expedition; the only other possible allusions to it in the Corpus are *Menex.* 242e4ff., and in the spurious *Eryx.* 392c2-3 [on which see Souilhé *ad loc.*; D.E. Eichholz, *CQ* 29 (1935) 130 n.6]). In any event, Thucydides (6.24.4) makes it clear that, once Nicias had made his second speech, no Athenian dared oppose the Assembly. Thus, if Socrates forewarned disaster for the expedition, the utterance must have been a relatively private one. The implication of the statement that many people knew about Socrates' warning (d1 πολλῶν ἀκούσασθον) therefore seems to be, at first glance, that the warning

gained wide currency after the event (so Plutarch, see below on d1) because it was felt to have been somehow extraordinary.

2) But the warning could hardly have been considered unique if it had been nothing more than a prediction of imminent trouble. Nicias held serious doubts about the advisability of the Sicilian campaign (cf. Thuc. 6.9-14), and Meton the astronomer (especially famous for the caricature of him in Ar. Av. 992ff.) reportedly predicted disaster for the expedition (cf. Plu. *Nic.* 532b, *Alc.* 199f.). Although the fleet itself sailed amidst popular approval and high optimism (cf. Thuc. 6.24, 31), and had been sanctioned by apparently favourable omens and prophecies (cf. Thuc. 8.1.1), there was a moment at which the Athenian people as a whole felt considerable trepidation (τὰ δεινὰ Thuc. 6.31.1) about their decision to send the armada to Sicily. Euripides expressed his protest, and foreboding, in the thinly-veiled form of the *Troades*. The mutilation of the Hermae before the expedition may have reflected political opposition to the campaign. Additionally, Ar. *Lys.* 387-97 indicate some kind of resistance to the expedition. Opponents of the campaign were doubtless in a small minority, but they did exist; and without question many private misgivings must have been expressed for which no information is now extant.

3) The "prophecy," if it occurred, resisted oblivion for some other reason: because of its inspiration, because of the personality of the individual who uttered it, or, possibly, because of the suspicion that some motive that lay behind it. In *Thg.* it is clearly for the first reason that the warning is considered unique and worthy of mention: the inspiration for Socrates' prescience came from τὸ δαιμόνιον (although here alone among the collection of anecdotes the author does not *explicitly* link the prediction with the divine sign). Our question must therefore be, what role

could τὸ δαιμόνιον have played in Socrates' prediction, allowing that the report about it is genuine. Now, to accept that Socrates' prophecy about the Sicilian expedition should be closely linked with a divine warning requires that we abandon the traditional, Platonic conception of the divine sign as personal and apotropaic, as distinct from prophetic. This conception, however, while it should not be treated as sacrosanct, is not lightly to be cast aside, as the extension of the sign's activities in *Thg.* is, in important respects, popular and derivative (see *Intr.* ch. II, *b, d*). Realistically, Socrates' alleged warning can hardly have had anything to do with his divine sign (Nicias, for instance, did not need divine guidance to prompt him to adopt the position which he took), though *Thg.* is evidence that rumours to this effect persisted.

This does not constitute proof that Socrates did not make the prediction ascribed to him here, only that the central place given to the divine sign ought to be discarded. On the other hand, that the Sicilian expedition, which, generally speaking, generated such high confidence among the Athenians, likely became *post eventum* an easy peg on which to hang anecdotes about an individual's clairvoyant gifts (for omens, prophecies, and signs before the expedition, cf. *Thuc.* 8.1.1 with Andrewes' n. *ad loc.*), is suggestive. The possibility that the present passage of *Thg.* is the result of such a process is enhanced if we accept the story as evidence, at least in part, for the assimilation of the Socratic biography into patterns of popular religious feeling (see *Intr.* ch. II, *b, d*).

4) At best, then, we can conjecture that Socrates was, like others, against the sailing of the fleet; at worst, that the tradition (if it can be called that) is merely a fabrication. Without taking sides on this issue, it may be noted that, if Socrates had uttered a warning, even if not unique or extra-

ordinary in its inspiration, the personality and reputation of the source would probably have been sufficient to ensure its preservation. But, in that case, why the silence of Plato, Xenophon, and (apparently) other Socratics (let alone other sources of a relatively early date besides *Thg.*) concerning the Sicilian expedition and any connection of Socrates with it? This question might, I think, be answered as follows: Numerous companions of Socrates were implicated in the profanation of the Mysteries and mutilation of the Hermae (the evidence is assessed by Dover, *Commentary on Thucydides IV*. 271ff.). In the year of Socrates' death feelings about these incidents still ran high (Andocides was brought to trial in 399 for his alleged part in the profanation of the Mysteries), and it is possible that the charge of irreligion brought against Socrates was partly founded upon a persistent notion that, although he could never be proved to have taken part in these affairs, he was at the very least guilty by association (see Burnet, *Greek Philosophy: Thales to Plato* [London, 1914] 153-5; Taylor, *PMW*<sup>6</sup> 159). The amnesty of 403 will have guaranteed that the topic could not be raised at Socrates' trial, and Plato would have carefully avoided all references to the uncomfortable controversy of his master's supposed involvement. In Socrates' mouth, the words "I predicted the destruction of the Sicilian expedition," combined with a reader's recognition of Socrates' relationship with Alcibiades and others, would have done little to promote a Socratic writer's apologetic efforts. It seems likely that, in a work purporting to be Plato's, this "prophecy" of Socrates' (even if merely an invention) would only have been mentioned either long after any controversial connection between Socrates and the Sicilian expedition had faded, or by someone who was unaware of the sensitivity of the issues involved (i.e., not Plato).

**c8.** ἔτι τοῖνυν: Introducing a new example in a series, without logical connection; see Denniston, *GP*<sup>2</sup> 575-6; des Places 300f.

**c8-d1.** τῶν...πολλῶν are not syntactically connected: with τῶν sc. πραγμάτων, and with πολλῶν sc. ἀνθρώπων.

**d1.** πολλῶν ἀκούσεσθον: Cf. Plu. *Nic.* 532b καὶ διηλθεν εἰς πολλοὺς ὁ λόγος (sc. about Socrates' prophecy of doom).

**d2-3.** καὶ...ἀκοῦσαι: The sentence refers not specifically to the experiences of the Athenian fleet, but rather more generally to the three preceding reports.

**d3.** πείραν...φοβοῦμαι: For similar anecdotes which connect Socratic advice with expeditions and the individuals who participate, or intend to do so, cf. X. *An.* 3.1.4 and the famous piece of advice which Socrates gave to Xenophon; also the anecdote in Ael. *VH* 3.27 to the effect that Socrates dissuaded the young Plato from pursuing a career as a mercenary soldier. Aristotle views the sea battle as a typical occasion about which future events are frequently apprehended (*Div. Somn.* 463<sup>a</sup>2, cf. 463<sup>b</sup>1).

**d3.** πείραν...λαβεῖν...εἰ: Cf. 131<sup>a</sup>2 ἀποπειραθῆναι τοῦ δαιμονίου τούτου; and for the prolepsis, cf. *Prt.* 342<sup>a</sup>1 εἰ βούλει λαβεῖν μου πείραν ὅπως ἔχω κτλ. See further below on d4.

**d3.** νυνὶ: Not "at this precise moment," but, less specifically, "as matters stand," "under the present circumstances."

**d3-4.** εἰ ἄρα: Not quite the same as εἰ ἄρα e5 (referential), but rather a more animated εἰ: "if it should turn out that"; see Denniston, *GP*<sup>2</sup> 37; KG II.324; des Places 273f.

**d4.** τὶ λέγει: Like οὐδὲν λέγω, the phrase is colloquial (see Thesleff 89; Stevens 25; also A.C. Moorhouse, *CQ* n.s. 15 [1965] 31-40). It



may be considered remarkable that Socrates should predicate the verb λέγω of his otherwise nebulous σημεῖον; but two considerations militate against such an impression: 1) the divine sign is occasionally called ἡ φωνή (cf. 128d3, e3, e5, 129c2; see *Intr.* ch. II, a, b), and a form of λέγω is therefore a natural term to apply to the processes of the "voice"; 2) τὸ λέγειν conveys essentially "makes sense," "is right" (only imperfectly conveyed by λέγειν = "means"); the oral connotation of the verb is secondary. The conditional clause εἰ...λέγειν in effect raises the question of whether the divine sign, at the present moment, can be verified by observable events. Nevertheless, the clause cannot be explained away so easily, as λαβεῖν πείραν usually in Plato refers to dialectical procedure (cf. *Euthd.* 275b5, *Prt.* 342a1, 348a2, *Grg.* 448a5, *Tht.* 176c6; cf. *Arist. Top.* 171b4; and for εἰ ἄρα τὸ λέγειν cf. *Hp. ma.* 298c9 [of Socrates]); see *Intr.* ch. II, b.

**d4.** ἐπὶ...ἐπὶ: The use of the same preposition twice in a sentence, and governing different cases, is awkward, but almost identical is *E. Alc.* 119-20 (where editors have however suggested a number of emendations, see Dale *ad loc.*). Whatever effect (if any) the author was striving after through this collocation is difficult to determine.

**d4.** ἐξορμῇ: *Hapax legomenon*.

**d4.** Σαννίωτος: Unknown to us from any other source, although the name occurs in inscriptions, e.g. *IG*<sup>2</sup> I.374.9, 205; II.3.3233.

**d4-5.** τοῦ καλοῦ: Bekker, Schleiermacher, and Knebel rather naïvely followed the "authority" of Ficino and Cornarius in understanding these words as a patronymic expression (*Cali filius* Ficino); Souilhé (though he prints τοῦ καλοῦ) reports Καλοῦ for W (my own collation does not bear this out; the proper name in any event ought to be accented paroxytone).

But τοῦ καλοῦ must represent a manifestation of Socrates' interest in physical beauty, and the addition of the epithet is extremely natural for him (cf. 128d8, *Prt.* 316a4, *Hp. ma.* 281a1). It can be added that the personal name + ὁ καλός is reminiscent of inscriptions on countless archaic vases depicting aristocratic ἐρώμενοι, e.g. Μιλτιάδης καλός, Μεγακλῆς καλός, etc. (see Dover, *Greek Homosexuality* [London, 1978] 114-22).

**d6.** Θρασύλλου: On Thrasyllus and his expedition to Ionia in 409, see *Intr.* ch. V, Appendix. For the false spelling Θρασύλου (W), see Andrewes *ad Thuc.* 8.73.4.

**d6.** Ἐφέσου καὶ Ἰωνίας: Ἐφέσου is placed first because it was Thrasyllus' main goal (see *Intr.* ch. V, Appendix), and with the advantage of hindsight, the author knows that Thrasyllus suffered his major losses there. καὶ must mean "and in general" (see on 125e3).

**d7.** ἢ ὁμοῦ τι τοῦτω γ' ἐλᾶν: "Or will draw quite near it, at any rate." The phrase is perhaps "a metaphor from the chariot race" (so Burnet *ad Euthphr.* 4b1); or possibly from sailing (see R.G. Ussher *ad Ar. Ec.* 109), a derivation that *prima facie* seems particularly appropriate here. Steinhart (465 n.38) objected to this euphemistic expression, but it is typically Greek (cf. the common τι παθεῖν = "to die," see LSJ s.v. πάσχω III.2).

**d7.** ὁμοῦ τι: Stallbaum (*ad loc.*; also Fritzsche 230, Krüger 13-4) calls ὁμοῦ + dative un-Platonic, but cf. perhaps *Plt.* 303d5-6; it is at any rate Attic (see Krüger *loc. cit.*; cf. Σ *ad Ap. Rhod.* 2.121 τὸ ὁμοῦ καὶ ἐπὶ τοῦ ἀθροίσματος τιθέασι καὶ ἐπὶ τοῦ ἐγγός, ὡς Ἀθηναῖοι εἰώθασι χρῆσθαι; also *sch. vet. ad Phd.* 72c). On the other hand, ὁμοῦ τι + dat. has been considered a late usage (Stallbaum *ad loc.*, Fritzsche *ad loc.*, Krüger 14), apparently first found in D.H. 1.78.3. But, as ὁμοῦ τι

in an adverbial sense does occur in Demosthenes (27.11) and Antiphanes (fr.217.11 Kock), the value of this criterion for dating seems doubtful (cf. the semantically related ἐγγύς τι in *Phd.* 65a6, *R.* 548d8).

**d7.** γ' ἐλᾶν (Hermann, *ε* γελᾶν B) offers excellent sense, and is moreover to be preferred over ἐλᾶν (TW) as *lectio difficilior*. For the resultant γε...γε (d7-8), see Denniston, *GP*<sup>2</sup> 144; and for intransitive ἐλαύνω, cf. *Grg.* 486a7, *Euthphr.* 4b1.

**d8.** τῆς πραγματείας: τῆς στρατιᾶς has greater mss. support (τῆς στρατείας BW; but for the orthography, see England *ad Lg.* 942a5; Brandwood s.v. στρατεία), and has been the reading preferred by most editors this century. But πραγματείας must be accounted for: it cannot be simply a scribal error, and the possibility that it is a gloss on στρατιᾶς can scarcely be countenanced. The opposite hypothesis, that πραγματείας was early glossed στρατείας, is on the other hand a much more plausible explanation of the mss. evidence (see Stallbaum, Wagner *ad loc.*), since πραγματείας is just vague enough to invite amplification. The less specific τῆς πραγματείας is moreover well complemented by the generalizing τῆς ἄλλης immediately following.

**129e1-130e4.** The divine sign also exercises complete control in Socrates' educational contacts: it prevents some individuals from deriving any benefit from the time they spend with Socrates; others it does not stand in the way of, but they nonetheless gain no advantage from association with Socrates; still others are given positive assistance by τὸ δαιμόνιον, and some of them make rapid and lasting progress. But of the last group, many leave Socrates after achieving wonderful improvement, only to lose the gains they have made. One such young man was Aristides, son of Lysimachus, who, after much time in Socrates' company, actively pursued

discussion and argument with the best-educated men of the city. But after he departed on a military campaign, he lost all his confidence and ability. Aristides asserts that he never learned anything from Socrates, but that he made his greatest progress the closer he sat to him; in fact, the results were best when he actually physically grasped Socrates.

Whereas in the previous section Socrates cited four examples to prove the importance of the divine sign in his associations with others, now he reports only one story to convince Theages of the vital role it plays in his educational contacts. In *Smp.* 175c6ff. Plato entertained the idea encountered here of influence by physical proximity and contact, but there he seemed to deride the notion. In our passage the question must be considered whether the author has drawn upon and distorted those lines in *Smp.*; see *Intr.* ch. II, *b*, and nn. on 130d5-e4, d7-e1. At the same time, the whole problem of the use of sources for 129e1-130e4 in general is of primary importance for the interpretation of this part of the dialogue.

**e1.** Ταῦτα δὲ: Either demonstrative with πάντα (in which case δὲ is progressive, see Denniston, *GP*<sup>2</sup> 238-9), summarizing the previous excursus, as frequently initial ταῦτα (δὲ) immediately after a story or series of stories, a myth, an exposition, or the like (cf. *Tht.* 151b6, *R.* 363d4, *Grg.* 524a8 [ταῦτα], *Cri.* 54d2 [ταῦτα]); or adverbial, "That's why...", anticipating ὅτι e1 (cf. *Euthphr.* 4d5 [see Burnet *ad loc.*], *Smp.* 174a3; see Riddell §18; LSJ s.v. C.VIII; KG I.310f.; England *ad Lg.* 830d2). The presence of πάντα immediately following ταῦτα δὲ inclines me towards the first interpretation (so Ficino, Schleiermacher, Lamb, Souilhé).

**e1-2.** αὕτη...τούτου: For the accumulation of pronouns, cf. *Cri.* 54d4 αὕτη ἡ ἡχὴ τούτων τῶν λόγων.

**e1.** ἡ δύναμις αὕτη: These words involve some confusion. If the author is suggesting that the ability of the divine sign to foretell the outcome of a course of action (as exemplified by the preceding four anecdotes) is almighty in Socrates' associations with others and in the improvement these people will make (to my mind the interpretation strictly required by the context), this is inconsistent with the sentences that follow immediately. For as we are clearly shown, the divine sign does not foretell the success or failure of a companion, but actively participates in his progress and determines who is to succeed and who is to fail. On this problem see *Intr.* ch. I, *b*, *vii*; and for the meaning and use of δύναμις in this context (cf. e7-8), see *Intr.* ch. II, *b* (at any rate, ἡ δύναμις αὕτη τοῦ δαιμονίου, and similarly ἡ τοῦ δαιμονίου δύναμις e7-8, are not merely periphrases for τοῦτο τὸ δαιμόνιον [cf. *Phdr.* 246d6 πέφυκεν ἡ πτεροῦ δύναμις τὸ ἐμβριθὲς ἄγειν ἄνω], as shown by e3 τὸ ἅπαν δύναται).

**e2-3.** τῶν...συνδιατριβόντων: Periphrases such as this allow Socrates consciously to avoid any overt claim that he actually taught and had pupils of his own. Such language is characteristic of the Platonic Socrates, but not exclusively so: cf. Aeschin. *Socr. Alc.* fr. 11c (Dittmar); X. *Mem.* 1.2.3; Isoc. 11.5.

**e2.** μετ' ἐμοῦ: Elsewhere διατρίβω (uncompounded by συν-) + μετ' ἐμοῦ e4, 130a5, or συνδιατρίβω + dative 128b8, 129e5 (the regular construction everywhere else in the Corpus).

**e3.** τὸ ἅπαν δύναται: A vague description of divinity and omnipotence, cf. Hom. *Od.* 4.237, 10.306, 14.445 (see W. Kiefner, *Der religiöse Allbegriff des Aischylos* [Hildesheim, 1965] 25-6). It is however modified and limited somewhat by e2-3 εἰς...συνδιατριβόντων. Omnipotence

frequently carries with it capricious and arbitrary behaviour (often exemplified in Greek religious experience by Zeus, e.g. in Hom. *Il.*, in Hes. *Op.* 665-9, and in [A.] *PV*; cf. also Archil. 130 W, Sem. 1.1ff. W), and accordingly here too some of Socrates' companions are aided by τὸ δαιμόνιον, others are hindered by it, while others are unaffected by it (see on 129e1-130e4, e3-9); there is no apparent motivation; see further *Intr.* ch. II, *b*.

**e3.** τὸ ἅπαν: Cobet plausibly suggested πᾶν *pro* ἅπαν: adverbial τὸ ἅπαν is unexampled in Plato, but τὸ πᾶν in an adverbial sense does occur, cf. *Ap.* 32d3, *Plt.* 262b7-c1, *Lg.* 959a6. I am hesitant, however, to depart from the mss. evidence at a place such as this; there is no need to force this dialogue to conform with Platonic usage in every detail.

**e3-9.** πολλοῖς...ἐπιδιδόασιν: On this passage see *Intr.* ch. II, *b*. Socrates' three kinds of associate are classified according to the effects of τὸ δαιμόνιον: it prevents Socrates from any dealings with many men; many others make no progress in Socrates' company, despite the non-opposition of τὸ δαιμόνιον; lastly, τὸ δαιμόνιον lends active assistance to others, who then make rapid progress. These lines are constructed in a form resembling the priamel, which is especially (but not exclusively) familiar from poetry, whereby an enumeration serves as background for the crucial element: thus πολλοῖς μὲν (e3)...πολλοῖς δὲ (e6), followed by οἷς δ'...οὔτοι (e7-8). This development is continued by the further subdivision of the final class into two types (οἱ μὲν [130a1]...πολλοὶ δέ [a2]), in which the second is expanded upon, and the excursus on it is introduced by emphatic asyndeton (130a4). See W.H. Race, *The Classical Priamel from Homer to Boethius* (Leiden, 1982) esp. 1-17, 111-13.

In the various kinds of companion enumerated here one may be reminded of the different persons considered in *Ep.* 7.344a2-c1 to be especially suited to the study of philosophy. Those who are intelligent, but have no aptitude for philosophy, and similarly those who have an aptitude but are unintelligent, can make no real progress (a2-b1); they are like the individuals who receive no assistance from the divine sign of Socrates (129e3-7), and consequently derive no benefit from association with him. Only those who combine a judicious application of themselves with intelligence and a natural affinity for philosophy arrive at a knowledge of the truth about virtue and vice (b1-c1); the important addition which is made to the conditions of this study, μετὰ τριβῆς πάσης καὶ χρόνου πολλοῦ (b2-3), is reminiscent of the fact that in *Thg.* (130a2-4; and in *Tht.* 150e1-151a5), continued and prolonged association with Socrates is the only way to ensure lasting benefit from him.

**e3.** ἐναντιοῦται: Of the activities of the divine sign, cf. *Ap.* 40a6, b1, c2.

**e4.** οὐκ ἔστι: For a similar use of the phrase in the sense of "that which is fated never to be," cf. *E. Alc.* 53, 1076.

**e4.** ὠφεληθῆναι: See on 126d6 and 127d3.

**e4.** διατρίβουσιν: On the dropping of the prefix συν- (e5), see on 125b4; also R. Renehan, *op. cit.* 11, for the iteration of a verb with only one instead of both original preverbs.

**e5.** οὐχ οἶόν τέ μοι: Because the divine sign has "absolute power" (e3), there is no question of Socrates' disobeying it; at all events, the consequences for one who disobeys the sign have been well-documented in the preceding four anecdotes.

**e6. πολλοῖς...διακωλύει:** Pavlu (22 n.1) took this clause as proof that the author misunderstood the context of *Tht.* 151a3 (ἐνίοις μὲν τὸ γιγνόμενόν μοι δαιμόνιον ἀποκωλύει συνεῖναι), and that he senselessly produced the dative πολλοῖς in imitation of ἐνίοις. He further suggested that what is demanded here is πολλοὺς *pro* πολλοῖς. But while the author must indeed have been thinking of the *Tht.* passage (see *Intr.* ch. II, *b*), the question of distortion and misapprehension is in this case not a valid one, for the present passage is simply the counterpart of the second possibility in *Tht.* (151a4-5), namely ἐνίοις δὲ ἐᾷ [*sc.* τὸ δαιμόνιον as subject, Σωκράτῃ as object, and συνεῖναι], where ἐᾷ can readily be seen to be the equivalent of οὐ διακωλύει in *Thg.* Friedländer recognized (328 n.14) that the object to be supplied with διακωλύει is *με*.

**e7-8. οἷς...δύναμις:** For the construction, cf. *Phdr.* 237a9; E. Valgiglio *ad* [Plu.] *Mor.* 574b (*De Fato*, where the editor quotes our passage) compares S. *Phil.* 281-2; E. *Med.* 946; *Ion* 331; Ar. *Vesp.* 734; X. *Hipp.* 1. 22; see also KG I.347.

**e7. συλλάβηται:** On the active role which τὸ δαιμόνιον plays in this dialogue, and the use of this word in this context, see *Intr.* ch. II, *b*. The cognate συλλήπτωρ can be used of a supernatural accomplice, e.g. A. *Ag.* 1507, E. *Or.* 1230.

**e7-8. ἡ...δύναμις:** See on e1-2.

**e8. οὕτοι...ῆσθαι:** Cf. 128c2-5.

**e8. οὕτοι:** The emphatic recapitulating demonstrative (after the relative οἷς e7) as in 127d8; see Fritzsche *ad loc.*; also on 128c3-4.

**e8. καὶ σὺ:** "even you," i.e., despite Theages' youth and general inexperience.



**e8-9.** ταχὺ...ἐπιδιδόασιν: So too the sophists themselves lay claim to the rapid progress of their pupils, cf. *Euthd.* 273d8-9, *Prt.* 318a6-9. This surfaces also as a protreptic theme in Arist. *Protrepticus* B.55 [Düring] (people make swift improvement in philosophy, proving how easy it can be), and elsewhere in a generally (non-philosophical) context, cf. I. Düring, *Aristotle's Protrepticus: an attempt at reconstruction* (Göteborg, 1961) 226.

**e8-9.** ταχὺ...παραχρήμα: The pleonasm is unparalleled in the Corpus, and Papanikolaou (*Athena* 76 [1976-77] 201) suggests ταχὺ γὰρ <καὶ> παραχρήμα. But the text is sound: [Plu.] *Mor.* 574b quotes our passage as it stands in the mss., and the collocation ταχὺ...παραχρήμα can be accounted for by the widespread Greek habit of combining asyndetically two or more temporal adverbs or phrases for the sake of (colloquial) emphasis; cf. 131a4 τότε ἤδη παραχρήμα, *Euthd.* 303e8 ταχὺ...ἐκ τοῦ παραχρήμα, *Lg.* 867a3 οὐκ ἐκ τοῦ παραχρήμα ἐξ-αίφνης, *ib.* 867a5-6 ἐκ τοῦ παραχρήμα εὐθὺς, *Grg.* 472d1 αὐτίκα πρῶτον; also the very common πάλιν αὖ/αὖθις (see Ast, *Lexicon* s.vv. αὖ, αὖθις); see KG II.584. Similar locative pleonasms are well-attested, see R. Renehan, *Studies in Greek Texts* (Göttingen, 1976) 121-3.

**e9-130a2.** καὶ...ὡφελίαν: This class of individuals is not included in any explicit way in the parallel passage of *Tht.* (150d2ff.), and it is not certain, historically speaking, what individuals (if anyone), οἱ μὲν (a1) might be intended to represent: perhaps Plato himself, or more generally perhaps the young men Socrates was keeping in check until after his death (*Ap.* 39c8-d3).

**a1.** βέβαιον...παραμόνιμον: Cf. *Smp.* 184b3-4 οὔτε βέβαιον οὔτε μόνιμον.

**a2.** ὠφελίαν (B) *pro* ὠφέλειαν (TW; but ὠφελίας T in 130e8) is supported by the custom of our oldest Platonic witness, Par.1807 (A), as well as by B in all dialogues but *Phdr.* (see Schanz, *Platonis...omnia* II.2.xi); inscriptions also favour this spelling (see Meisterhans-Schwyzler, *Grammatik der Attischen Inschriften*<sup>3</sup> [Berlin, 1900] 56).

**a2-4.** πολλοὶ...ὅπου οὖν: For this sentence, see **Intr.** ch. II n.41.

**a3-4.** ἐπειδὴν...ἀποσχώνται: No specification is given as to how long an absence from Socrates would result in the degeneration of a companion; the ensuing account of Aristides might suggest a fairly lengthy one.

**a4-e4.** τοῦτο...ἐξεργύηκε: On the use of *Tht.* in this anecdote, see **Intr.** ch. II, b. If this section and *Tht.* 151a1-2 are to be trusted, it would seem that Socrates did in fact become a companion of Aristides and Thucydides, to whom he is first, and very briefly, introduced in *La.* 181a1ff.

**a4.** τοῦτο: For the demonstrative pronoun in asyndeton, see on 128e1.

**a4.** ποτε: See on 128e1.

**a4.** ἔπαθεν (TW) is commonly confused in mss. with ἔμαθεν (B); see J. Van Leeuwen *ad Ar. Nu.* 340; Goodwin, *MT*<sup>2</sup> 335. ἔμαθεν is intelligible, but most likely a scribal error made by contextual association.

**a4.** Ἀριστείδης ὁ Λυσιμάχου: See on a4-e4.

**a5.** ὅς τοῦ: I can find no difficulty (*pace* Ast) with ὅς here or with ὅν in a8; cf. *Euthd.* 275a9-10 ἔστι δὲ οὗτος Ἀξιόχου μὲν ὅς τοῦ Ἀλκιβιάδου τοῦ παλαιοῦ. The employment of patronymic expressions in the Corpus is quite fluid; e.g., in *Men.* 94a1, *Lys.* 203a4, and *La.* 181a1 the genitive *simpliciter* is used, whereas in *Chrm.* 154b1-2 and *Prt.* 310a9 a form of ὅος is included. If any tendency can be observed, it is simply

that where the noun is added, its presence can be explained by a desire for clarity, i.e., in instances where not only the father of the principal character but also some other relative is mentioned.

**a5.** Ἀριστείδου: Aristides "the Just."

**a6.** πάμπολυ...χρόνῳ: Cf. 128c4-5.

**a7.** ἦκων: See on 129b5.

**a8.** Θουκυδίδην: See on 130a4-e4.

**a8-b1.** Μελησίου...Θουκυδίδου: On the statesman Thucydides and his son Melesias, see Bluck *ad Men.* 94c2.

**a8.** ὅν τοῦ: See on a5.

**b1-2.** ὁ...ἐγγέγονει: The preamble about Thucydides (which includes b2-8) adds colour to the main story (b8ff.), but this sentence may not be simply foil. It is perhaps intended to reflect, without elaboration, a familiar circumstance for Socrates and an interlocutor: in the course of discussion Socrates brings his respondent to a state of ἀπορία, and forces him to realize that he does not know what he thought he did, a realization which is sometimes attended by a degree of annoyance (e.g. *Euthphr.* 15b7ff., *Men.* 79e7-80b7; Nicias [*La.* 188a4ff.] and Alcibiades [*Smp.* 216 b2ff.] are much milder in their reactions); Socrates himself tells his jurors (*Ap.* 22e6ff.) that much of the enmity (ἀπεχθείαι) against him arose from his cross-examining and demonstrating to others around him that they did not possess the wisdom which they presumed they did. We can imagine that Aristides is describing the aftermath of a typical Socratic encounter with another individual. The ensuing description of Thucydides as ἀνδράποδον corroborates this interpretation; see also on b4 σεμνύνεσθαι...χαλεπαίνειν; **Intr.** ch. I, b, vii.

**b1-2.** μοι...ἐγγόνει: "odium in me ceperat" (Ast), "had quarelled with me" (Lamb); but these translations downplay the possible meaning "in the course of discussions/ investigations/ disputes" for ἐν λόγοις τιςὶν (see preceding n.). For the turn of phrase, cf. X. *Hier.* 9.2; see LSJ s.v. διὰ A.IV.a and "Supplement" s.v. διὰ ("become an object of hatred").

**b3.** Θουκυδίδην δέ: The apparently superfluous δέ is probably an informal, conversational idiom (Denniston, *GP*<sup>2</sup> 172-3). But that δέ looks back and marks a contrast (so Denniston, *ib.*) is doubtful, and Verdenius has suggested (see on 127c5) that it can in such instances be explained simply as a weak form of δή.

**b4-5.** σεμνύνεσθαι...χαλεπαίνειν: For the collocation, cf. Ar. *Ra.* 1020 μήδ' αὐθάδως σεμνυνόμενος χαλέπαινε. The conjoining of a more recherché word or phrase (σεμνύνεσθαι...σε) with an explanatory word is common Platonic practice; see Adam *ad R.* 451b; R. Renehan, *Studies in Greek Texts* (Göttingen, 1976) 136-7. χαλεπαίνειν frequently occurs in Plato to describe an interlocutor's frustration at his state of ἀπορία; see V. Goldschmidt, *Les Dialogues de Platon*<sup>2</sup> (Paris, 1963) 30 nn.8-9 (add *Sph.* 230a1, b9). σεμνός and its congeners are almost invariably employed by Plato in an ironic sense (see DeVries, *Mnem.* 3.12 [1944] 151-6); but σεμνύνεσθαι in any event possesses an inherently pejorative meaning (*ib.* 153). If it is correct to detect a dialectical context behind these words (see on b1-2), σεμνύνεσθαι possibly hints at Thucydides' condition of δοξοσοφία.

**b5.** ὥς τὸ ὄντα: Colloquial (see Stevens 25); cf. Ar. 41e5, *Euthd.* 303d1. For σεμνύνεσθαι...ὥς τὸ ὄντα cf. *Phdr.* 243a1.

**b5.** Ἔστι...οὕτως: Pavlu's observation (28) that Plato uses this formula of response only in the middle and later dialogues needs some

qualification. In the first place, the combination, to my reckoning, is never very common as a response, even in later works. I have counted one occurrence in each of *Phd.*, *Tht.*, *Sph.*, *Plt.*, *Prm.*, and *Lg.*, and five in *R.* But it also occurs in the form of a question in the presumably earlier *Hp. ma.* (303a10); and we might also take note of *Grg.* 504a6 (Ἔστω τοῦτο οὕτω), 513e1 (Ἔστω, εἰ βούλει, σοὶ οὕτως).

**b6.** τί δέ: See on 125e5.

**b6-7.** οὐκ...ἀνδράποδον: On the significance of this passage for the problem of literary and philosophical antecedents, see *Intr.* ch. I, *b*, *vii*.

**b7.** ἀνδράποδον: Thucydides' former condition contrasts neatly with the position of his companion Socrates, who is frequently described as ἐλευθέριος, or in terms similar to this; cf. *Smp.* 219d3ff.; *X. Ap.* 14, 16, *Mem.* 1.6.1-10, 4.8.1.

τὸ ἀνδράποδον cannot be right, and Cobet correctly secluded the article. Omission of a definite article is naturally more common in mss. than the false addition of the same, but the latter process does frequently occur, e.g. *Hp. ma.* 293d4, *Menex.* 241c2, *Ion* 532d7. Still, the imposition here of such an awkward construction (lit. "does he not know what sort of person the slave was?") must be accounted for; yet the explanation is, I think, quite simple. A scribe, confronted with ἀνδράποδον, took the neuter noun as an abstract, "slavery," and thought that with τὸ he was appropriately adding a generic article (Knebel likewise mistranslated τὸ ἀνδράποδον as *servitium*). A similar addition of a false generic article can be detected in, e.g., *Hp. ma.* 290b6, 304b8, *Men.* 94e2 (see *app. crit. ad locc.*).

**b7.** νῆ: Cobet's rejection of νῆ was based on the "rule" that where an oath follows a negative particle in a sentence, μά is to be preferred over

νή (see H. Thesleff, *Studies on Intensification in Early and Classical Greek* [Helsingfors, 1954] 166). But the sequence negative particle + νή is also possible, see Blaydes *ad Ar. Nu.* 217. Similarly μά is not uncommonly used in a positive sentence, even though strict conformity would in these instances require νάι/νή (see Gomme-Sandbach *ad Men. Dysc.* 151).

**b8.** Ἀλλὰ μὲν καὶ...γε: Probably progressive (see Denniston, *GP<sup>2</sup>* 344). ἀλλὰ μὲν...γε is very common in the classical period (especially in Plato and Xenophon), almost wholly absent in Hellenistic prose (see J. Blomqvist, *Greek Particles in Hellenistic Prose* [Lund, 1969] 65), a fact which may have value as evidence for dating. ἀλλὰ μὲν...γε is more common than ἀλλὰ μὲν καὶ...γε, but figures and percentages for Plato are not given by Denniston or Blomqvist (but see Blomqvist 64, fig. 8).

**c1.** Τί μάλιστα: "Why exactly" (colloquial, see Thesleff 93).

**c2-6.** πρὶν...φασυλότητι: In *Tht.* 150e1-151a2 Aristides is given as an example of those who, either on their own initiative, or by the persuasion of others, leave Socrates too early, suffer miscarriage as a result of keeping bad company, and thereby come to realize their own ignorance. Since the circumstances of Aristides' departure from Socrates in *Thg.* are different (an expedition, cf. 130a6-7), it is tempting to see in this a sign of later elaboration on the part of our author (see Burnyeat, *BICS* 24 [1977] 16 n.20).

**c2-3.** ὁπωοῦν...λόγοις: This is all we are told about the actual form of "improvement" which Socrates' companions made, and by itself it sounds very odd. Far from being what we think of as a marker of Socratic "education," οὐδενὸς χείρων φαίνεσθαι ἐν τοῖς λόγοις sounds more sophistic-eristic (see Stallbaum 222; Steinhart 439). But then, Socrates claimed not to be responsible for his companions' behaviour after they

left him (cf. *Ap.* 33b3-6), and both Plato's Socrates (cf. *Phlb.* 15d8-16a3) and Isocrates (12.26) report that young men are in any event exceedingly fond of eristic *διάλογοι*, and Aristotle seems to have the same thought in mind in *Top.* 164b8-14. The discussion between Alcibiades and Pericles in *X. Mem.* 1.2.40-6 provides an example of this youthful love of eristic. Still, some irony may be intended in Aristides' misconceived boast: as L. Woodbury remarked (*Phoenix* 27 [1973] 14 n.21; see also Pavlu 22 and n.1), it is likely that the mediocrity of the descendants of Aristides the Just became a commonplace; cf. 130b6-7, c6, e4.

**c2.** ὁπποῦν ἀνθρώπων: ἀνθρώπω (B) is the choice of most editors, but the partitive ἀνθρώπων (TW), read by Bekker, Stallbaum, Hirschig, and Wagner, is more idiomatic, cf. 128b5-6, *Prt.* 328e6, *Menex.* 248e5-6, *Euthd.* 303e6-7, *Grg.* 499b7, 456c5-6, 513a8, *R.* 335b3, 571d1-2, 599c1, *Lg.* 880d2. The addition ἄν s.l. by vet.b (Burnet and Souilhé report this wrongly as B<sup>2</sup>) makes no sense; I suspect it is a corruption of a variant ων.

**c4.** χαριεστάτων: Frequently of intellectual capacity, cf. *La.* 180d2, *R.* 452b7, *Lg.* 680c2, but also perhaps ironic (n.b. ἀνθρώπων c4, and see on 127a6).

**c5.** τοῦναντίον: Colloquial, as also τουναντίον in modern Demotic; cf. ταῦτὸν τοῦτο 128d6.

**c5.** καὶ ("even") goes closely with αἰσθάνωμαι (see Denniston, *GP*<sup>2</sup> 304).

**c5.** πεπαιδευμένον: Cf. χαριεστάτων c4.

**c6.** οὕτως...φαιλόγητι: This, in contrast with c2-3 (see n.), is much more the result one expects of association with Socrates (for αἰσχύνωμαι of an interlocutor's reaction to refutation by Socrates, see V.

Goldschmidt, *Les Dialogues de Platon*<sup>2</sup> [Paris, 1963] 30-1, and n.14); possibly a reminiscence of an *Alcibiades*-dialogue (see *Intr.* ch. I, *b*, *vii*).

**c6.** αἰσχύνομαι ἐπὶ is not well-attested (LSJ [s.v. B.II.2.a] list only *X. Mem.* 2.2.8), but it does occur once in Plato, cf. *R.* 396c8; also in *Alc. I* 122c3.

**c7-8.** Πότερον...σμικρόν: See *Intr.* ch. II, *b*.

**d1-2.** Ἡνίκα...τρόπῳ: These words, along with Aristides' answer to them (d4-5), essentially confirm Socrates' claim in 128b1-4.

**d2.** τινι ἄλλῳ τρόπῳ: There is much to be said for Wagner's suggestion that we read τίνι *pro* τινι, since Socrates is not concerned here to discover whether Aristides improved, but rather in what way he did, if not by actually learning from Socrates.

**d2-4.** Ἐγὼ...δέ: Fritzsche prints a full stop after Σώκρατες d3, but cf. *Ap.* 32a8 ἐρῶ δὲ ὑμῖν φορτικὰ μὲν καὶ δικανικά, ἀληθῆ δέ. Appeals of this kind to the veracity of an imminent statement are very common in oratory, and usually anticipate a remark which the speaker considers will be seen as outrageous, or even likely to cause embarrassment (see T. Meyer, *Platons Apologie* [Stuttgart, 1962] 25ff.).

**d4-e4.** ἐγὼ...ἐξερρύηκε: On the two possible strata of sources for this passage (*Tht.* and *Smp.*), see *Intr.* ch. II, *b*.

**d4.** γὰρ explains ἄπιστον and ἀληθές in d3.

**d4.** παρὰ σοῦ: Burnet tacitly altered to the enclitic παρὰ σου (he was followed by Souilhé, also without remark), but the emphatic form (BTW) is, I think, in place here. In d1-2 Socrates asked Aristides if he learned anything παρ' ἐμοῦ, or if on the contrary his ability to converse came to him in some other way. The statement in d4 is a response to the first half of this question, and the emphasis in παρὰ σοῦ is required.



**d4-5.** ὥς...οἴσθα: An obvious allusion to Socrates' regular profession of ignorance and general avoidance of the term μαθητής or the like when speaking about his associates; see also on 129e2-3.

**d5-e4.** ἐπεδίδουν...ἐξεργύηκε: The profound influence of physical proximity with Socrates is to Aristides ἄπλοστον, and it is likely to be disturbing for a reader as well (see *Intr.* ch. II, *b*; ch. IV, *d*). Nevertheless, Tarrant demonstrated (*CQ* n.s. 8 [1958] 95-8) that influence by contact is a notion which the ancient mind found quite acceptable (although Socrates scoffs at the idea in *Smp.* 175c6ff.). She fails to note, however, 1) that the whole concept of influence by contact was not nearly as common in Greek experience as it was among other cultures (see Dodds, *G. and I.* 22 n.52), and 2) that in the examples she cites from Greek literature the context of this influence usually involves a god or divine element which transfers some power (most often directly) to another individual (for touching as an aspect of miracle stories see R. Bultmann, *History of the Synoptic Tradition* [New York, 1968] 222). Thus the efficacy of Socrates' touch here in *Thg.* demonstrates that a divine element is to be identified within him, and that element is surely the divine sign itself. It is difficult not to view this as part of the hagiographical process within the Socratic tradition; see *Intr.* ch. II, *b*, *d*; ch. IV, *d*.

**d7-e1.** καὶ...ὀρώην: Aristides makes further progress by fixing his gaze on Socrates alone. The experience is remarkable in itself, but perhaps reflects a fairly common belief that the eyes can possess a special capacity when focussed on a certain object. Yet the one who fixes his gaze is usually also the one who is exerting the influence, and this effect is normally malignant (the most familiar example of this is the so-called "evil-eye"; cf. *Plu. Mor.* 680c-683b, and see W. Déonna, *Le Symbolisme de l'oeil*

[Paris, 1965] 153-8; J.P. Holoka, *CP* 80 [1985] 228-9). The passage is more coherent if it is seen to be an adaptation of certain philosophical antecedents; see *Intr.* ch. I, *b*, *vii*; ch. II, *b*.

**e1-2.** πολὺ . . . πλεῖστον: The pleonasm is highly emphatic and climactic after μάλλον δὲ d6 ("or rather") and πολὺ μάλλον d7. This combination of superlatives is unparalleled in the Corpus, and the nearest analogues I can find are not very close (cf. *Hp. ma.* 284a4-6, *R.* 587a7-8, *Ti.* 53a4-6, 63b2-4); but see Novotny *ad Epin.* 992b2.

**e1.** δὲ: δὴ (B<sup>2</sup> [b Burnet, wrongly] W) is not out of the question; for the emphatic use with superlative expressions, see Denniston, *GP*<sup>2</sup> 207.

**e2.** παρ' αὐτόν σε: For this use of αὐτός ("right beside you"), cf. *Lys.* 203a2 ὑπ' αὐτὸ τὸ τεῖχος ("directly below the wall"); *E.Hipp.* 1187.

**e2.** καθήμην: Several secondary mss. offer this optative form over καθοίμην of BTW. We might reasonably suspect that the reading of those *recentiores* originates from nothing more than an itacism, and so it may be (Cobet no doubt derived his "conjecture" καθήμην from Bekker's *app. crit.*, which lists a number of secondary mss. that display this orthography). But καθήμην deserves attention in its own right, as it was apparently the earlier form, καθοίμην representing a later (probably Hellenistic) variation; see Schwyzer-Debrunner I.680, 794 and n.2; less decisively KB II.228. However, one cannot be dogmatic about this, and the καθοίμην/καθήμην confusion occurs in mss. also in *Ar. Ra.* 919, *Lys.* 149, *X. Cyr.* 5.1.8; see J. Wackernagel, *Glotta* 7 (1916) 231-2.

**e3-4.** πᾶσα . . . ἔξερρύηκε: Aristides describes the phenomenon in quasi-physical terms: ἔξις is common in medical contexts, see LSJ s.v. II.1.a; and for ἐκρεῖν in a material sense, cf. *Phd.* 112a6, b1, *Ti.* 85c6,

*Criti.* 118d5; *Ar. Av.* 104. The language is unobjectionable (*pace* Steinhart 465).

**130e5-131a10.** Socrates reasserts that god decides if he can offer help to anyone, and states that it must yet be determined if someone else ought to be entrusted with Theages' education. Theages wishes to make a provisional test of the divine sign, and, if it does not respond favourably, to placate it with prayers and sacrifices. Demodocus supports Theages, and Socrates agrees to this course of action.

The conclusion of the dialogue; formally its brevity marks it as similar to the closing portions of other Platonic works. Socrates is in character to the end, recommending others as better alternatives for the instruction of Theages. But Theages' suggestion to win over τὸ δαιμόνιον through ritualistic means goes beyond anything said about the divine sign elsewhere (see on 131a2).

**e5.** ἡμετέρα: For the plural reference see on 122d7 προσαγορεύωμεν.

**e6.** πάνυ...ταχύ: Cf. 129e8-9.

**e6-7.** εἰ δὲ μή following upon a parallel εἴαν/ἤν is formulistic, cf. 131a3-4; see H. van Herwerden, *Mnem.* 2.19 (1891) 338-9 ; KG II.484-5.

**e7-9.** ἀσφαλέστερον...μᾶλλον ἢ: Superfluous μᾶλλον is used resumptively after the gist of the initial comparative has been lost track of; cf. *Plt.* 286a7-b1, *Phd.* 79e4-5; see Riddell §166. In ἀσφαλέστερον there is perhaps an ironic echo of σφαλερά at 121c8.

**e8.** ἐγκρατεῖς αὐτοί: In half-ironic contrast with Socrates, others have control in their own right over the help they can render men; Socrates on the other hand is at the mercy of a divine agent (further underlined by e9-10 μᾶλλον ...πρᾶξαι); see *Intr.* ch. I, b, vii; ch. III, a.

**e8-9.** τῆς . . . ἀνθρώπους: For ὠφελεῖν + cognate accusative ὠφελίαν (+ acc.) cf. *R.* 346c5, 520a1-2, *Euthd.* 275e2.

**e9.** παρ' ἐμοῦ: Hermann's emendation παρ' ἐμοῖ possesses the sole advantage of harmonizing the prepositional phrase with the combination παρ' . . . τινὶ earlier in the sentence (e7). The proposal is, however, superfluous: the meanings of the two prepositions must be carefully distinguished, "alongside" and "from" respectively; and παρ' ἐμοῦ . . . τοῦτο πράξαι is in any case good Greek (see LSJ s.v. πράσσω III.1).

**e9-10.** ὅτι ἂν τύχης: τύχη has near unanimous mss. support (a few secondary mss. read τύχοι), but the assimilation of τύχη into τύχης (after σοι e7) represents the regular Greek idiom; cf. *Cri.* 44d9-10, 45d2, *Prt.* 353a8, *Tht.* 179c5, *Grg.* 522c2-3; also above 129b6 and n.; see Kühner *ad X. Mem.* 3.12.1. Bekker's proposal (he printed τύχη) should therefore be adopted, against the verdict of all editors except Schanz. The ease with which τυγχάνω in the above construction (*vel sim.*) could be corrupted from the personal to the much less idiomatic impersonal use is illustrated in 129b6, where the true reading τύχω has been altered to τύχη in Par.1811 Par.1812.

**131a1.** μὲν τοίνυν: Plato is fond of this combination, especially in dialogue (see Denniston, *GP*<sup>2</sup> 579; des Places 309). For μέν *solitarium* see on 123e2.

**a1.** οὕτως points to what follows; see DeVries, *Mnem.* 4.16 (1963) 287 (with references).

**a2.** ἀποπειραθῆναι: Cf. 129d3-4; but whereas πειρᾶν λαβεῖν earlier referred to the testing of the sign's prophetic veracity, here the testing concerns its willingness to participate in Theages' improvement - a

shift in meaning which reflects the dislocation in the divine sign section (see *ad* 129e1). ἀπο— is perfective, see Schwyzer-Debrunner II.268-9.

**a3.** παρείκη: Cf. *Tht.* 150d3-5, where however permission for a companion's progress is granted not by τὸ δαιμόνιον, but by ὁ θεός (see *Intr.* ch. II, *b*).

**a3.** ταῦτα βέλτιστα: Hirschig tentatively suggested the seclusion of these words, thus producing an idiomatic omission of the apodosis after an ἐάν-protasis and before the antithetical εἰ δὲ μή (**a4**); see Goodwin, *MT*<sup>2</sup> 179; KG II.484-5. But the emendation is unnecessary; see H. van Herwerden, *Mnem.* 2.19 (1891) 338-9 (who cites, *int.al.*, *Hp. ma.* 295b3-4).

**a4.** εἰ δὲ μή: For εἰ following ἐάν, see on 130e6-7.

**a4-6.** βουλευσόμεθα...πειρασόμεθα: Fritzsche explains the successive plurals in this sentence by reference to *Men.* 71c1-2 (see also Bluck *ad Men.* 75b8, and above on 122d7). But at this stage Theages probably does not yet exclude his father from his plans; elsewhere he speaks in similar terms, cf. 128c1 παίζων πρὸς ἡμᾶς; see *Intr.* ch. III, *b*.

**a4.** δράσομεν: Modal future ("ought to," "must").

**a5-6.** τὸ...γιγνόμενον: Cf. *Tht.* 151a4 τὸ γιγνόμενον δαιμόνιον; see *Intr.* ch. II, *b*.

**a6.** εὐχαῖσί τε καὶ θυσίαις: Cf. *Menex.* 244a5 εὐχαῖς καὶ θυσίαις, *Lg.* 885b8-9 θυσίαις τε καὶ εὐχαῖς, *Euthphr.* 14b3-4 εὐχόμενος τε καὶ θύων. The Ionic dative is generally (since Campbell, *Sophistes and Politicus* [Oxford, 1867] xxxiv) accepted as a chronological marker, because it is said to occur only in post-*Republic* dialogues; and Plato, moreover, largely avoids Ionicisms (see Wilamowitz, *Platon I*<sup>β</sup> [Berlin, 1962] 413). Ritter therefore accepted εὐχαῖσί as a decisive mark

of inauthenticity, since he felt that *Thg.* otherwise conforms perfectly to Plato's earliest style (*Untersuchungen über Platon* [Stuttgart, 1888] 94; see also **Intr.** ch. IV, *b*). This judgement, however, must come in for two serious objections. 1) It is not quite true that the Ionic dative only occurs in post-*Republic* works: Burnet's edition of *Ion* restored χρυσοῖσι (F) at 535d3 where χρυσοῖς (TW) had previously been read (on the probable date and authenticity of *Ion*, see Guthrie, *HGP* IV. 199; Ritter [*Neue Untersuchungen über Platon* (Munich, 1910) 217] considered it spurious). This is clearly the superior reading: in a dialogue with a Homeric rhapsode, the archaic dative is particularly suitable (it is also *lectio difficilior*). 2) As Friedländer remarked (329 n.17), εὐχαῖσί τε καὶ θυσίαις form a dactylic rhythm (a quotation?), and it seems generally consistent with the characterization of Theages that he should express himself in a manner reflecting the education he has only recently completed (see **Intr.** ch. III, *b*); Ionic datives are admitted freely in Attic poetry (especially in tragic lyrics), and in Theages' proposal to placate τὸ δαίμόνιον there is an epic flavour which makes the form appropriate here. In this instance it is important to exercise some flexibility in evaluating style, especially since general conclusions about chronology are at stake.

Critics who object that only here is it ever suggested that one can appease τὸ δαίμόνιον (so Stallbaum *ad* 131a7; Rist, *Phoenix* 17 [1963] 20) tend to overlook the fact that Theages, not Socrates, is speaking. Nevertheless, it may be evidence for the date of *Thg.*; see **Intr.** ch. V, *b*.

**a7.** ἐξηγῶνται: *Vox propria* for a seer's interpretation or explanation of signs or omens; cf. *R.* 427c4, *Thuc.* 7.50.4, *E. Ph.* 1011, *And. de Myst.* 115.

**a8-9.** Μηκέτι...Θεάγης: As elsewhere, the concerned adult has the last word but one; cf. *La.* 201b6-c3 (Lysimachus), *Euthd.* 307b5 (Crito); cf. also the intrusion of the παιδαγωγοί and their dispersal of the gathering before Socrates' final words in *Lys.* 223a2ff.

**a10.** 'Αλλ'...ποιῶμεν: Cf. Socrates' second last sentence in *Prt.* (362a1) 'Αλλ', ἦν δ' ἐγώ, οὕτω χρὴ ποιεῖν, εἰ σοι δοκεῖ. There is a vague reference to a future course of action here, cf. *Chrm.* 176d1ff., *La.* 201b6ff., *Menex.* 249e3ff., *Men.* 100b7ff., *Phlb.* 67b11ff.; see *Intr.* ch. I, c.

## APPENDIX 1

### Plutarch and the Ὑπὲρ τοῦ Πλάτωνος Θεάγους (Lamprias Catalogue §70)

We know of only one work in the ancient world which might possibly have been a commentary or separate study on *Thg.*, namely the entry in the Lamprias Catalogue (§70) entitled Ὑπὲρ τοῦ Πλάτωνος Θεάγους. But this work is no longer extant, and, since Plutarch apparently does not refer to it directly or indirectly in any of his surviving compositions, and since the Lamprias Catalogue is probably a library inventory rather than simply a list of Plutarch's works,<sup>1</sup> it can hardly be assumed without question that §70 was the product of Plutarch's own hand. Indeed, the claim for inauthenticity has been made, for reasons that are closely connected with the argument that Plutarch, and others, did not even accept the Platonic authorship of *Thg.* Since I have earlier asserted that the authenticity of *Thg.* was not questioned until the nineteenth century (see *Intr.* ch. IV, *a*), the very limited evidence concerning the Ὑπὲρ τοῦ Πλάτωνος Θεάγους must be examined in detail.

If the Ὑπὲρ τοῦ Πλάτωνος Θεάγους was Plutarch's own composition, he obviously believed that *Thg.* was written by Plato. But Plutarch never mentions *Thg.* or quotes from it under Plato's name, and this has been taken to prove that he did not accept the dialogue as genuine.<sup>2</sup> And

<sup>1</sup>As indicated most sharply by the inclusion in it (§56) of eight books of Aristotle's *Topica*; see K. Ziegler, *RE* 41.696-7; D.A. Russell, *Plutarch* (London, 1973) 18-9.

<sup>2</sup>See Stallbaum 225; Wagner 10 n.2; H. Patzig, *Quaestiones Plutarcheae* (Diss. Berlin, 1876) 3; Fritzsche 227; Wilamowitz II.325.



since the title of §70 in the Lamprias Catalogue unambiguously ascribes *Thg.* to Plato, it follows, we are told, that that work cannot have been written by Plutarch.<sup>3</sup> Quite recently Sandbach, who has edited the Lamprias Catalogue, has asserted that "The authenticity of the *Theages* was disputed," and, to judge by his translation of §70 in the Catalogue as "In Defence of (or About) Plato's *Theages*," it would appear that he is prepared at least to entertain the possibility that the Ὑπὲρ τοῦ Πλάτωνος Θεάγους addressed the question of the authenticity of *Thg.*<sup>4</sup> Thus the prevailing opinions about §70 in the Lamprias Catalogue promote three inferences: 1) Plutarch refused to accept *Thg.* as authentic; 2) there existed a school of thought in antiquity which held *Thg.* to be spurious, and against which the author of the Ὑπὲρ τοῦ Πλάτωνος Θεάγους was reacting; 3) the latter-named work was a pamphlet whose sole or primary aim was to defend *Thg.* against charges of inauthenticity.

It will be best to consider Plutarch's attitude to the dialogue first. It is true that he never quotes *Thg.* as Plato's; the one testimonium for *Thg.* which occurs in the Plutarchan Corpus is from the (probably) spurious *De Fato* (*Mor.* 574b).<sup>5</sup> This fact, however, is of little significance. For *Thg.* is not the only Platonic dialogue which Plutarch fails to quote: he provides no testimonia, for example, for *Lys.* or *Ion*; and he never explicitly ascribes to Plato references to *Cri.* or *La.*<sup>6</sup> These four works, it will be noted, never

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<sup>3</sup>So Patzig, *op. cit.* 3.

<sup>4</sup>F.H. Sandbach, *Plutarch's Moralia* 15 (London, 1969) 15. Patzig (*op. cit.*) did not raise this further possibility.

<sup>5</sup>For a brief discussion of the un-Plutarchan character of this work, see Ziegler, *op. cit.* 725-6. J. Hani (*Plutarque: Oeuvres Morales* 8 [Paris, 1980] 3-4 n.2) has collected a convenient list of those who defend or reject its authenticity.

<sup>6</sup>*Cri.* ~ *Mor.* 581c, 1126b, *Demetr.* 889c; *La.* ~ *Mor.* 1033b, 1117e, 987f. Additionally, Plutarch never makes any form of reference to *Hp. ma.*, which has of late won a great deal of support in favour of authenticity (see Guthrie, *HGP IV.* 175-6).

had their authenticity called into question in antiquity, nor are they doubted nowadays. On the other hand, Plutarch attributes material extracted from *Alc. I*, *Clit.*, and *Min.* to Plato, although the authorship of these three works is much disputed in modern scholarship.<sup>7</sup> It seems that the safest tentative conclusion one can draw about Plutarch's position as regards the Platonic Corpus in general is that he accepted as genuinely Platonic those works which were received into the canon of Thrasyllus,<sup>8</sup> and that, like the vast majority of ancient authorities (see further below), he made no real critical attempt to identify spurious works embedded within the nine tetralogies.<sup>9</sup> That he never quotes from *Thg.* is no more an indication that he considered it spurious than the absence of testimonia is for *Lys.* and *Ion.*

A more telling argument against the possibility that Plutarch believed *Thg.* to be Plato's own work is the one that holds that *Thg.* is not quoted by Plutarch where one would most expect him to do so, i.e., in the *De genio Socratis*.<sup>10</sup> Now, this would be significant, but for certain considerations. First, the *De genio* is not an overtly philosophical treatise. It

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<sup>7</sup>*Alc. I* ~ Plu. *Alc.* 192a, *Lyc.* 49f; *Clit.* ~ *Mor.* 439c, 534e; *Min.* ~ *Mor.* 550a-b, 776e. On the question of the authenticity of *Alc. I*, see *Intr.* ch. V, g; on *Clit.* see Taylor, *PMW*<sup>6</sup> 536-8; Shorey, *WPS* 422, 657-8; Guthrie, *HGP* V. 387-9; and on *Min.* see Taylor, *ib.* 538-40; Shorey, *ib.* 425-7, 659; Guthrie, *ib.* 389-90.

<sup>8</sup>See Field's comments (225) on Plutarch's use of the *Corpus Platonicum*. For a list of the dialogues from which Plutarch quotes, see Ziegler, *op. cit.* 750; it is noteworthy that Plutarch passes over the *Spuria* in complete silence, selecting only from the dialogues of Thrasyllus' tetralogies. For the tetralogical and trilogical organizations of the Corpus in antiquity, see *Intr.* ch. V, a.

<sup>9</sup>One exception to Plutarch's unwavering acceptance of the authenticity of the Platonic Corpus has been suggested, namely *Ep. 7*. Edelstein speaks with great confidence about Plutarch's rejection of the authenticity of *Ep. 7* (see *Plato's Seventh Letter* [Leiden, 1966] 57 n.133), but the phrases in Plu. *Dio* which allude to *Ep. 7*, such as ὡς αὐτὸς γέγραφε Πλάτων (4.5), and the reverential ὡς φησιν αὐτός (11.3), make this rejection extremely doubtful. Plutarch's failure to use the philosophical digression in *Ep. 7* has recently been accounted for by a new hypothesis about the composition of the letter (see H. Tarrant, *Phronesis* 28 [1983] 81ff.).

<sup>10</sup>See the scholars cited in n.2 above. Concerning the absence in Plutarch of quotation from *Thg.* Ziegler (*op. cit.* 751), drawing attention to the presence of the ὑπὲρ τοῦ Πλάτωνος Θεάγου in the Lamprias Catalogue, says merely "sehr merkwürdig."

displays lively dramatic elements, and in it we do not find quotation from *Thg.*, or from any other work of Plato's for that matter, with attribution to Plato, because this would have jarred sharply with these dramatic elements.<sup>11</sup> We might contrast, for instance, the *De sera*, which begins from philosophical premises; here Plato *is* mentioned as the authority for certain statements (e.g. 550a, d), but such mention is much more in harmony with the academic tone of the work. The second consideration is, simply, that Plutarch probably *does* make use of *Thg.* in the *De genio*. For one thing, the prophecy about the destruction of the Sicilian expedition which Plutarch reports Socrates as having made (*De genio* 581d, cf. *Nic.* 532b, *Alc.* 199f) is most likely to have been taken from *Thg.* 129c8-d2, which is the only surviving source of information for the prophecy before Plutarch's time.<sup>12</sup> More difficult to evaluate is the evidence provided by a few structural details in the *De genio*. The hero of its myth (590a-592e), who enters the cave of Trophonius to learn the nature of Socrates' divine sign (590a), is given the name Timarchus, and the story about him is told among a group of conspirators on the night in 379 B.C. that Thebes was freed from Spartan occupation. Several scholars, some independently it would seem, have suggested that Plutarch named the hero of his myth after the character Timarchus in the third anecdote of *Thg.* (129a1-c8), and draw this inference from the prominence of Socrates' divine sign in both *Thg.* and *De genio*, and from the fact that a secret plot bulks large in the *Thg.*

<sup>11</sup>See R.M. Jones, *The Platonism of Plutarch* (Diss. Chicago, 1916) 107: "The formal quotation of extended Platonic passages, with indication of the dialogue from which they are taken, is relatively infrequent; it occurs almost altogether in exegetical works, such as *de animae procreatione in Timaeo*, and the *quaestiones Platonicae* ...."

<sup>12</sup>I might add that other sources for the story have been suggested, namely Antisthenes and the historian Timaeus (see Dittmar 79-80).

anecdote as well.<sup>13</sup> Certainty will never be reached on this theory, but it should be noted that Plutarch frequently indicates literary or philosophical indebtedness through the simple naming of a character. Thus Simmias, one of the main interlocutors in *Phd.*, is included as a character in the *De genio*, which itself has been strongly influenced by *Phd.* in its dramatic setting.<sup>14</sup> Similarly, Aridaeus/Thespesius in the myth of the *De Sera* (cf. *Mor.* 564c) is clearly modelled after the Ardiaeus of the myth of Er in *R.* (cf. 615c6ff.); Epicurus, mentioned at the outset of the *De Sera* (548b), is not physically present in it but is merely a symbol for the philosophical position from which the dialogue takes its start; and so also the name of the character Aristotle in the *De Facie* (920f *et pass.*) signifies the Peripatetic viewpoint in that work.<sup>15</sup> The application of the name Timarchus in the *De genio* may likewise be Plutarch's implicit acknowledgement of his use of *Thg.*

Hence the *argumentum ex silentio* for Plutarch's rejection of *Thg.* is supported by exceedingly weak foundations, and as such it is hardly tenable. Concomitantly the proposition that the Ὑπὲρ τοῦ Πλάτωνος Θεάγους is un-Plutarchan falls to the ground. But there are further reasons, more positive in nature, for believing that Plutarch was its author.

We know from the *De genio Socratis* (*Mor.* 575b-598f) that the precise nature of Socrates' sign was a controversial matter for Plutarch (580c-582c, 588c-589f). *Thg.* provides the most extensive collection of informa-

<sup>13</sup>See Schleiermacher 351; W. Christ, *SBAW* (1901) 95, 103; Gigon, *Sokrates* 173-4; A. Corlu, *Le Démon de Socrate* (Paris, 1970) 60-1. On this connection some scholars are non-committal (e.g. Knebel *ad* 129a; Hermann, *Geschichte und System* 597 n.240), others reject the connection outright (e.g., von Arnim, *Verhandelingen Kon. Akad. van Wetenschappen te Amsterdam* 22 [1921] 17; G.M. Lattanzi, *Il "De Genio Socratis" di Plutarco* [Roma, 1933] 49 n.3), while others are perhaps unaware of the possibility (e.g., De Lacy and Einarson, *Plutarch's Moralia* 7 [London, 1959] 365 and n. a; Hani, *op. cit.* [n.5] 47).

<sup>14</sup>See DeLacy and Einarson, *op. cit.* 362 n. a.

<sup>15</sup>See Cherniss, *Plutarch's Moralia* 12 (London, 1957) 6.

tion about Socrates' sign to be found anywhere in the Platonic Corpus, and it is reasonable to assume, given Plutarch's interest in Socrates' sign and the interest in it current around Plutarch's lifetime (cf. Max. Tyr. 15; Apul. *Socr.*), that the Ὑπὲρ τοῦ Πλάτωνος Θεάγους was largely concerned with τὸ δαιμόνιον of Socrates. Another Plutarchan work is of special interest in this connection. In *Quaestiones Platonicae* 1 (*Mor.* 999c-1000e) a discussion is offered on the meaning of the famous passage in *Tht.* (150c7-8) where Socrates disavows any ability to "beget" ideas of his own, asserting instead that he merely assists others to give birth to their own intellectual "offspring." Plutarch goes so far as to suggest that it was a spiritual guide (τὸ δαιμόνιον 1000d; cf. 999e θεῖόν τι καὶ δαιμόνιον) that prevented Socrates from producing any of his own positive doctrines. In this passage he is extending the role of τὸ δαιμόνιον as he found it in *Tht.*, much as the author of *Thg.* also elaborated on the Platonic account in 129e3ff., a passage which is certainly dependent on part of the same lengthy discourse in *Tht.* as that from which Plutarch derived the theme for *Platonic Questions* 1 (see *Intr.* ch. II, *b*). In both works τὸ δαιμόνιον is said to participate actively in Socrates' educational contacts (συλλάβηται *Thg.* 129e7; ὑφηγήσατο *Mor.* 999e, so also *Mor.* 581b), although this assertion is in direct contradistinction to the purely apotropaic function assigned to the divine sign everywhere else in Plato's indisputably genuine works (see *Intr.* ch. II, *a*).

Plutarch, in other words, is at one with the author of *Thg.* on the behaviour of the divine sign, and we may therefore suppose that he would have felt a particular attraction to write about this work. It is certain, at any rate, that he would have defended the adaptation made in *Thg.*, as he himself clearly subscribed to a similar representation of the divine sign in

his own writings. But the Ὑπὲρ τοῦ Πλάτωνος Θεάγους would in addition have provided ample scope for Plutarch generally to indulge his interest in both δαίμονες<sup>16</sup> and prophecy.<sup>17</sup> Moreover, I would venture to suggest that the position of the Ὑπὲρ τοῦ Πλάτωνος Θεάγους in the Lamprias Catalogue also offers a clue as to its content: it occurs between §69 Περὶ Σωκράτους δαιμονίου (*De genio Socratis*) and §71 Περὶ μαντικῆς ὅτι σώζεται κατὰ τοὺς Ἀκαδημαϊκοὺς (lost; cf. §131 Περὶ τοῦ μὴ μάχεσθαι τῇ μαντικῇ τὸν Ἀκαδημαϊκὸν λόγον); these three works would seem to comprise, as the product of deliberate editorial activity, a small cluster of thematically-related treatises, dealing generally with Socrates' divine sign and μαντική.<sup>18</sup> As a parallel it may be observed that shortly after this section there appear similar sets of anti-Stoic works (§§76-9) and anti-Epicurean compositions (§§80-2).

This is, I believe, as far as we can go concerning both Plutarch's attitude to the authenticity of *Thg.*, and his own authorship of Lamprias Catalogue §70; until solid evidence to the contrary is brought to light, we may assume that the work was from the hand of Plutarch. What, then, can be said for Sandbach's proposal that the authenticity of *Thg.* was a subject of dispute in antiquity, and for the corollary that the Ὑπὲρ τοῦ Πλάτωνος Θεάγους defended the authenticity of the dialogue?

There are no external data to support Sandbach's first assertion. That *Thg.* was not considered spurious in antiquity is strongly suggested by

<sup>16</sup>See in general G. Soury, *La Demonologie de Plutarque* (Paris, 1942); J. Dillon, *The Middle Platonists* (Ithaca, 1977) 216-24; F.E. Brenk, *In Mist Apparellled: Religious Themes in Plutarch's Moralia and Lives* (Leiden, 1977); K. Döring, *Mnem.* 4.37 (1984) 376-92.

<sup>17</sup>For Plutarch's interest in the prophetic side of τὸ δαιμόνιον, cf. *Mor.* 580df., 581df., 588c; his concern with μαντική hardly requires documentation, but cf. the treatises *De E apud Delphos*, *De Pythiae oraculis*, *De defectu oraculorum*.

<sup>18</sup>Ziegler (*op. cit.* 704-5) classifies §§70 and 71 as "wissenschaftlich-philosophischen Schriften," while §69 is placed in the category of "theologische Schriften."

the complete absence of explicit statements about its inauthenticity; for while this dialogue is cited relatively infrequently by ancient authors (see the Testimonia between the text and apparatus), on those occasions when it is ascribed to a particular source, that source is always Plato (see *Intr.* ch. IV, a). Once again, the conclusion imposes itself that no one in antiquity doubted the authenticity of *Thg.*, largely for the simple reason that it belonged to the canon of Thrasyllus. Only very rarely is any work within the canon called into doubt: such was the case with *Epin.*;<sup>19</sup> Athenaeus (11. 506c) informs us that *Alc. II* was attributed by some to Xenophon; Aelian (*VH* 8.2) was aware of an uncertainty about the authenticity of *Hipparch.*; and there is an indication that the authorship of *Amat.* may have been questioned in antiquity (Thrasyllus *ap.* D.L. 9.37).<sup>20</sup> But only in the case of *Epin.* does this scepticism seem to have been at all widespread. Thus if *Thg.* was considered spurious, this belief has left no traces, except for the possibility that "In Defence of Plato's *Theages*" refers to a defence of its authenticity. Could this be what the title implies?

This is a heavy, but not, perhaps, impossible burden for the preposition ὑπέρ to shoulder. And while it is a well-established feature of Plutarch's diction that ὑπέρ is frequently used as a virtual synonym of περί +

<sup>19</sup>For the details see L. Tarán, *Academica: Plato, Philip of Opus, and the Pseudo-Platonic Epinomis* (Philadelphia, 1975) 3-13. Plutarch himself never expresses any doubt about the authenticity of *Epin.*, but neither does he ever mention it by name. On the other hand *Mor.* 477c may contain a direct reference, with ascription to Plato, to *Epin.* 984a (see W. Helmbold, *Plutarch's Moralia* 6 [London, 1939] 239).

<sup>20</sup>Aelian says of *Hipparch.* εἰ δὲ ὁ Ἱππάρχος Πλάτωνός ἐστι τῷ ὄντι, a statement which need not be taken to imply *his* doubt as to the authenticity of the dialogue (see comm. *ad* 127d3 for this use of εἰ), but which must nevertheless indicate scepticism in some circles. Similarly Thrasyllus' words concerning *Amat.*, εἴπερ οἱ Ἀντερασταὶ Πλάτωνος εἰσι, could well show that he assumed the genuineness of that dialogue. But, despite the explanations of Taylor (*PMW*<sup>6</sup> 531 n.2), I fail to see the reason for a strong assertion of Platonic authenticity unless, again, some doubt had been cast on it from elsewhere. On Theopompus' attitude towards the Platonic writings, see *Intr.* ch. IV n.1.

gen., meaning simply "about,"<sup>21</sup> yet among the titles of Plutarch's extant works and those of the Lamprias Catalogue the preposition ὑπέρ is used only twice, in §70 and in the extant treatise Πρὸς Κωλώτην ὑπὲρ τῶν ἄλλων φιλοσοφῶν (*Mor.* 1107dff. [*adv. Colotem*], §81 in the Catalogue; but in some mss. περὶ is found *pro* ὑπὲρ). When Plutarch in his titles wishes to say "about," he invariably uses περὶ; so it seems doubtful that ὑπέρ is here merely a synonym for περὶ. We are left then to speculate on the force of ὑπέρ in the title.

While it is impossible to discount the notion that the preposition means "in defence of the authenticity of," the lack of any other evidence for such a controversy concerning *Thg.* should induce us to look for another explanation of the title. The explanation may lie behind the inferences already drawn above concerning the content of §70. Under circumstances in which various theories about the divine sign were circulating, a polemical position was bound to be taken against certain accounts of it; and since *Thg.* goes beyond all other Platonic works in the influence it ascribes to the divine sign, especially through its attribution to the sign of *positive* activities, through the assimilation of the sign to conventional δαίμονες, and through the prophetic powers which the sign is able to impart to Socrates (see *Intr.* ch.II, *b*), it is probable that the Ὑπὲρ τοῦ Πλάτωνος Θεάγους was, at least in part, an attempt to reconcile the extension of the powers of τὸ δαιμόνιον as depicted in *Thg.* with the information about it which Plato provides in every other instance. And if Plutarch upheld the presentation of the divine sign in *Thg.* as the "true" sign of Socrates, it does not follow necessarily that the authenticity of *Thg.* was ultimately at stake.

<sup>21</sup>See H.A. Holden, *Life of Demosthenes* (London, 1893) 181 s.v. ὑπέρ A; and on the gradual shift in meaning of the preposition from "in defence of" to "about," see P.T. Stevens, *CQ* 30 (1936) 211-12.



Plutarch frequently takes it upon himself to reconcile apparent contradictions within Plato (e.g. *Mor.* 1006c-1007e, 1015f-1017b; cf. 1013 e), as we should expect him, as a devoted Platonist, to do.<sup>22</sup> Nor should we ignore the fact that Plutarch possessed what we do not, namely descriptions of Socrates' divine sign, some presumably from the fourth century, which no longer survive. We cannot know what non-Platonic (and non-Xenophonic) accounts other authors contemporary with Plutarch may have favoured over the one, influenced by *Thg.*, that Plutarch espoused. The possibility must not be dismissed that some writers rejected *tout court* the various descriptions of τὸ δαιμόνιον in the Platonic Corpus. In a situation such as this, a "defence" of *Thg.* would be fitting.

Although this investigation cannot admit of any absolute conclusions, there is no compelling reason to believe that Plutarch, or anybody else in antiquity, considered *Thg.* to be spurious. That assessment, to all appearances, belongs to a much more critical period of scholarship.

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<sup>22</sup>See Field 225; Russell, *op. cit.* 65-6.

## APPENDIX 2

### ANACREON FR.449 (PMG)

Σωκράτης. Ταῦτ' ἐστὶν ἅπερ ἔφη Ἀνακρέων τὴν  
Καλλικρίτην ἐπίστασθαι· ἢ οὐκ οἶσθα τὸ ᾄσμα;  
Θεάγης. Ἐγώ γε. Σω. Τί οὖν; τοιαύτης τινὸς  
καὶ σὺ συνουσίας ἐπιθυμεῖς ἀνδρὸς ὅστις  
τυγχάνει ὁμότεχνος ὦν Καλλικρίτῃ τῇ Κυάνῃ καὶ  
ἐπίσταται τυραννικά, ὥσπερ ἐκείνην ἔφη ὁ ποιη-  
τῆς, ἵνα καὶ σὺ ἡμῖν τύραννος γένῃ καὶ τῇ πόλει;

(= *Theages* 125d10-e3)

There is predictable disagreement about the extent of poetic quotation which can be extracted from this passage. Burnet set off ἐπίσταται τυραννικά as though lifted *verbatim* from the Anacreon poem in question, and Page followed suit. Gentili accepted only Καλλικρίτῃ τῇ Κυάνῃ (i.e. Καλλικρίτῃ ἢ Κυάνῃ), and explicitly cast doubt over ἐπίσταται τυραννικά.<sup>1</sup> Edmonds manufactured the iambic line Καλλικρίτῃ ἢ Κυάνῃ ἐπίσταται τυραννικά as a possible restoration of the particular passage to which Socrates alludes in *Thg.*<sup>2</sup> Although on this question a verdict of *non liquet* seems inevitable, and there is little hope that fr.449 can be connected up as a part of any other surviving fragment or poem of Anacreon, nevertheless there is a fairly strong presumption that Gentili, at least, was correct. Metronymic formations of the kind Καλλικρίτῃ τῇ Κυάνῃ are very rare in Greek generally, and no less in lyric

<sup>1</sup>*Anacreonte* (Roma, 1958) 81-2.

<sup>2</sup>*Lyra Graeca II* (London, 1924) 183.

poetry (the Cologne Archilochus papyrus preserves the only other example of a metronymic expression in Greek lyric [*Pap.Col.* 7511.10-12]). This strongly suggests that Socrates is quoting, rather than introducing the formation himself.<sup>3</sup> Moreover, it is reasonably clear that, besides the likelihood that Kallikrite and her mother Kyane were named in the poem, ἐπίσταται τυραννικά, if not the *ipsissima verba* of Anacreon, must nevertheless embody the main thrust of a particular statement made by Anacreon about Kallikrite, for Socrates' pretext in citing this poem is its mention of τυραννικά, which has emerged as an ironical theme of discussion in the dialogue within the last page or so (124e1ff.).

As to the meaning of fr.449 within the original poem, there has been considerably greater unanimity. According to commentators, ἐπίσταται τυραννικά described Kallikrite's political sagacity, or ability, or both, an inference usually supported by citing the alleged parallels of Aspasia or Diotima (Kallikrite thereby becomes a "teacher" of the political craft in Anacreon's poem),<sup>4</sup> or by identifying Kallikrite's mother Kyane with the little-known mythical Kyane, who was wife of Aeolus.<sup>5</sup> To my mind, however, it is much more probable that from Anacreon, who is patently a poet of

<sup>3</sup>The use of a metronymic with the name of a deity is, however, not uncommon in lyric (see Anne Pippin Burnett, *Three Archaic Poets: Archilochus, Alcaeus, Sappho* [Cambridge, Mass., 1983] 90 n.31), and this might lead us to believe that Kallikrite and Kyane were divinities of some kind. But, while not excluding this possibility, it is not what we would expect of Anacreon, who largely avoids mythical themes and references, except for stereotyped invocations to Aphrodite, Eros, and the like.

<sup>4</sup>I.S. Müller, *Sechs auserlesene Gespräche Platons* (Hamburg, 1736) 432; Cousin 249; Burges 408.

<sup>5</sup>Initially Souilhé 151; following him Robin 1643; Carugno 31; Amplo 18; most recently Pangle 139 n.12. Souilhé's assertion is at best suspect: the evidence he adduces (Diodorus Siculus 5.7.6) confirms that a Kyane was wife of Aeolus, but Kallikrite is mentioned neither there nor elsewhere as her daughter, nor is there any reference in Diodorus to the joint administration of Lipara which Souilhé ascribes to Kyane and Kallikrite. Moreover, the scholiast *ad* Hom. *Od.* 10.6 does not mention Kallikrite in the list of Aeolus' twelve children (although he does cite the existence of a different list), and Telepatra is given as his wife (but Amphithea in [Plut.] *Mor.* 312c-d and in Sostratus *ap.* Stob. 44.35 = 4.472 W-H). Kyane and Kallikrite simply cannot be identified with any degree of certainty.

*erotika*,<sup>6</sup> the reference was rather to a prowess in love matters. The metaphor of erotic tyranny (love or the lover as tyrant) already occurs in extant Greek literature once before this fragment (Archilochus 23.20 West), and the conceit increases somewhat in frequency thereafter.<sup>7</sup> On this reading, fr.449 represents one more instance in Anacreon of love or desire described in terms of oppression, of dominance and subservience;<sup>8</sup> and Kallikrite, accordingly, was depicted as the erotic tyrant.<sup>9</sup>

That Socrates should introduce a reference to erotic tyranny at this point in *Thg.* is not only coherent within the structure of the dialogue, but also represents an important stage in its argument (see *Intr.* ch. I, *b*, *v*). It should be mentioned as well that this metaphor of the erotic tyrant can be paralleled from elsewhere in Plato. In *Men.* 76b4-5 Socrates comments that Meno's behaviour would prove, even if Socrates were blindfolded, that he is handsome and still possesses ἐρασταί; Meno asks how this can be, and Socrates responds (b7-c1) that it is because he acts so imperiously in his discussions, ὅπερ ποιοῦσιν οἱ τρυφῶντες, ἅτε τυραν-

<sup>6</sup>So, consistently, the ancient tradition on Anacreon's poetry, cf. Cic. *Tusc.* 4.71, *Suda* s.v. Ἀνακρέων, Athen. 13.600d, Σ *ad* Pi. *I.* 2.1, Paus. 1.25.1, Him. *Or.* 19; see further J.M. Bell, *QUCC* 28 (1978) 31 n.7.

<sup>7</sup>Cf. E. *Hipp.* 538, *id.* fr. 136.1 Nauck; S. fr. 855.15 Nauck; Ar. *Vesp.* 500-502; Bion *ap.* Plu. *Mor.* 770b-c (and see below n.14); also the occasional use of δεσπόζειν in amatory contexts in later Greek literature (see J.C. Yardley, *CQ* n.s.30 [1980] 240 and n.8). For the extension of the same idea into Roman literature, see R. Pichon, *Index Verborum Amatorium* (Paris, 1902) s.vv. *domina*, *regnum*, *regno*.

<sup>8</sup>E.g., fr. 357.1 (δαμάλης ἔρωσ), 360 (the lover as charioteer drives the poet's ψυχῇ), 413 (the hammer as instrument of Eros), 460 (φόρτον ἔρωτος); cf. also 368 and (probably) 346.4.3-6.

<sup>9</sup>Our evidence suggests that when a man attaches the metronymic to another man's name, or to the name of a woman (as Anacreon apparently does here), he does so for some special, often abusive, effect, since this practice represents a direct reversal of convention (see M.B. Skinner, *Ancient History Bulletin* 1 [1987] 39-40). Hence one possibility open for fr.449 is that Kyane was notorious for her erotic behaviour, and Kallikrite has followed in her mother's footsteps; reproof is not necessarily implied, but is likely enough.

νεύοντες ἕως ἂν ἐν ὥρᾳ ᾧσιν.<sup>10</sup> In *Thg.* Socrates displays the same preoccupation with ἔρως that he does in *Men.*, and describes it along similar lines.

It is worth adding here that the interpretation presented above of fr. 449 as an instance of the erotic tyrant may shed some light on a passage in *Anacreontea* 15.7-10 which has recently been subjected to emendation by M.L. West.<sup>11</sup> The *textus receptus* of the poem in these lines is as follows:

Ἀνακρέων μ' ἔπεμψε  
πρὸς παῖδα, πρὸς Βάθυλλον  
τὸν ἄρτι τῶν ἀπάντων  
κρατοῦντα καὶ τύραννον.

West objects to the text on two fronts: "Eros himself is τύραννος θεῶν καὶ ἀνθρώπων (Eur. fr. 136.1), but I do not know a parallel for τύραννος used of someone to whose charms everyone is enslaved. It is, to be sure, not much of an advance on κρατοῦντα." Accordingly, in his critical edition of the *Anacreontea*,<sup>12</sup> West reads τυράννων for τύραννον. Of his two arguments in favour of emendation, his second is not particularly compelling; by itself there is little that is remarkable, or indeed suspicious, about the kind of particularizing climax which τύραννον, if retained, provides.<sup>13</sup> As for the first objection, West, it is true, has collected an impressive amount of evidence, mostly from poetry, and covering a wide chronological period, to demonstrate that it is ἔρως who is frequently cast as a tyrant.<sup>14</sup> And yet, from the preceding discussion it should now be

<sup>10</sup>Cf. *R.* 573b6-7 (τύραννος ὁ ἔρως), 573d4, 574e2.

<sup>11</sup>*CQ* n.s.34 (1984) 210.

<sup>12</sup>*Carmina Anacreontea*, ed. M.L. West (Leipzig, 1984) 11.

<sup>13</sup>Cf., e.g., Archilochus 23.20 West (mentioned above).

<sup>14</sup>In his *apparatus criticus* to *Anacreontea* fr.1.4-5 (p.48).

evident that a lover, male or female, could without any special constraints on the poet be labelled as a tyrant, or as exercising a tyranny, and there is correspondingly no reason why Bathyllus in this poem should not be depicted as such a character. Indeed, I would go farther than this and suggest that, since it can be assumed that the author of *Anacreontea* 15 aimed to imitate Anacreon successfully, a respectable Anacreontic example of the lover-tyrant for him to draw inspiration from was ready to hand, and presently survives in fr.449. τύραννον in *Anacreontea* 15.10 is therefore unobjectionable and should be retained. It may be, as well, indirect confirmation of the interpretation of fr.449 presented here.<sup>15</sup>

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<sup>15</sup>My thanks are due to Professor David Campbell, who brought this passage in the *Anacreontea* to my attention.

### APPENDIX 3

#### *Theages* 129a3

εἰ δὲ βούλεσθε, τὸν Τιμάρχου ἀδελφὸν Κλειτόμαχον ἔρεσθε τί εἶπεν αὐτῷ Τίμαρχος ἥνίκα ἀποθανούμενος ἦει τεύθ' τοῦ δαιμονίου†, ἐκεῖνός τε καὶ Εὐαθλος ὁ σταδιοδρομῶν ὃς Τίμαρχον ὑπεδέξατο φεύγοντα.

Burnet is responsible for the formal identification of the crux, but it appears that the obscurity of the passage was attested several centuries earlier. In his 1485 Latin translation of the dialogue, Ficino renders a3 ἥνίκα...a5 φεύγοντα with the words *cum iam moriturus esset. Is enim et Euathlus quidem cursor qui illum fugientem suscepit....* Ficino's neglect of a Latin equivalent for εὐθ' τοῦ δαιμονίου might be interpreted in a couple of ways: 1) his exemplar did not contain the words,<sup>1</sup> or 2) he did not understand how they should be construed and translated. A third possibility, that Ficino considered εὐθ' τοῦ δαιμονίου trivial enough to omit, has little to recommend it, since Socrates' sign is the focus of attention for this part of the dialogue. 1) is highly unlikely: all mss. containing *Thg.*, one of which is in the hand of Ficino himself (Ambros. 329), preserve the problematic εὐθ' τοῦ δαιμονίου. On balance, 2) remains the likeliest possibility.<sup>2</sup> In spite of this, Johannes Serranus, who supplied Stephanus with the Latin translation to his 1578 edition of Plato,

<sup>1</sup>This exemplar was Flor.a or a descendent of the same; see "Fic." in *Text. Trans.*

<sup>2</sup>Cf. the comments on Ficino's treatment of the text of *Men.* in Bluck's commentary (145) on that dialogue.

felt confident enough of the meaning to turn the phrase by the words *contra daemonis mandatum*. This explanation satisfied most scholars, with hardly a murmur from a dissenting voice,<sup>3</sup> until Baiter suggested (he did not print) δημίου or δημοσίου *pro* δαιμονίου: "(straight) to the executioner/prison."<sup>4</sup> Subsequently, C.F. Hermann, Schanz, and Lamb, incorporated δημοσίου into their editions of the dialogue.

One thing, however, is certain: εὐθὺ τοῦ δαιμονίου cannot stand in our texts. εὐθύ as a preposition normally (and always in Plato)<sup>5</sup> means "straight to" or "to"<sup>6</sup> (cf. *Thg.* 129d6 εὐθὺ Ἐφέσου καὶ Ἰωνίας); "(straight) to the daemonic/τὸ δαιμόνιον" is nonsense in the present context, and no parallels have been discovered to prove the meaning *contra daemonis mandatum* correct.<sup>7</sup> Knebel (*ad loc.*) thought he had found a parallel for the latter in Max. Tyr. 15.7 Ἀχιλλεὺς νῆσον οἰκεῖ εὐθὺ Ἰστροῦ κατὰ τὴν Ποντικὴν θάλατταν, but the alleged similarities are illusory, for εὐθὺ in that passage is locative in sense, as *contra daemonis mandatum* is patently not. Nevertheless, this approach has recently been resurrected by A. Papanikolaou,<sup>8</sup> who further adduces Hom. *Il.* 5.849 and Hdt. 1.107.4 in defence of the mss. reading of *Thg.*; but those instances too are essentially locative, and in any event we are still without adequate Attic parallels. Baiter's suggested emendations are the

<sup>3</sup>Cf. Ruhnken's comment on the interpretation (Tim. *Lex.* s.v. εὐθύ [ed. nova cur. G.A. Koch, Lipsiae, 1828]): *qui formulae usus ob raritatem notandus*.

<sup>4</sup>For δῆμιος = "executioner," cf. *R.* 439e8; for δημόσιον = "prison," cf. *Thuc.* 5.18.7 (no Platonic instances of this usage). LSJ list no examples of δημόσιος = "executioner" earlier than D.S. 13.102.

<sup>5</sup>Cf. *Grg.* 525a6, *Lys.* 203a1, b2, b3; as an adverb at *Ax.* 364b1.

<sup>6</sup>H. Richards however questions the nuance of immediacy implied by the translation "straight to" (*CQ* 15 [1901] 442-5).

<sup>7</sup>The interpretation is accepted by LSJ s.v. εὐθύ B.I.1.a; see also Ast, *Lexicon* s.v. εὐθύ, who translates by *contra, adversum*.

<sup>8</sup>*Athena* 76 (1976-77) 196-8.



most attractive solutions which have been offered, yet to my mind neither δημοσίου nor δημίου are wholly satisfying conjectures, as they supply a circumstantial detail which the story about Timarchus can do without. Souilhé is also sceptical about the text, but refuses to offer a replacement for τοῦ δαιμονίου; he prints εὐθὺ + τοῦ δαιμονίου<sup>†</sup>, reckoning the obelized words as some form of gloss.

I suggest that another explanation for the appearance of εὐθὺ τοῦ δαιμονίου at *Thg.* 129a3 can be offered. At a relatively early stage in the transmission of this dialogue, a note may have been entered alongside, or in the immediate vicinity of, the line or lines containing ἡνίκα ἀποθανούμενος ἦεν (perhaps *supra lineam*). If this note read αὐθις τὸ δαιμόνιον (the point of reference is, after all, Socrates' *second* anecdote about the divine sign), we may imagine that αὐθις was corrupted into εὐθὺ, and that the genitive required to complement εὐθὺ was fashioned from τὸ δαιμόνιον.<sup>9</sup> This may have occurred through multiple stage corruption: 1) αὐθις – εὐθὺς: αὐθις is glossed εὐθύς by Hesychius, and palaeographically the alteration is easy enough;<sup>10</sup> 2) εὐθὺς – εὐθὺ.<sup>11</sup> From this point it would have been a simple matter for a scribe to insert the aberrant gloss εὐθὺ τοῦ δαιμονίου into the text, without thinking a great deal about precise meaning; the most natural

<sup>9</sup>We may compare the behaviour of ἔμβραχυ in Platonic mss.: when ἐν- or ἔμβραχυ appeared in an exemplar, scribes were naturally disposed to alter βραχύ to βραχεῖ, for the simple reason that ἐν takes the dative, and that ἔμβραχυ was an unfamiliar form; cf. *Grg.* 457b1 ἔμβραχυ BTP, ἐν βραχεῖ F; *Hp. mi.* 365d5 ἔμβραχυ TW, ἐν βραχεῖ F; *Smp.* 217a2 ἔμβραχυ Cobet, ἐν βραχεῖ BTW.

<sup>10</sup>Cf. *Plu. Per.* 164f for the restoration of αὐθις *pro* εὐθὺς of all mss. (accepted by Flacellère-Chambry [Budé] and Perrin [Loeb]; Ziegler [Teubner] retains εὐθὺς).

<sup>11</sup>For the confusion of εὐθύς and εὐθύ, cf. *Lys.* 203b3.

place for it would be after a verb of motion, in this instance ἦει.<sup>12</sup> The divine sign is moreover a topic which was bound to invite even cursory acknowledgement from a copyist: for marginal notes on the divine sign, cf. *sch. vet. ad Alc. I* 103a5-6, *Arethae sch. ad Ap.* 31c8-d1; φωνή at *Ap.* 31d1 is generally accepted as a gloss on the sign which was wrongly entered into the text as it now stands. An example of an intrusive gloss which, like the one postulated above, simply alluded in its original form to the general subject of discussion in a particular portion of the text, is *Hp. ma.* 283a2-3 περὶ Ἀναξαγόρου λέγεται (bracketed by Burnet, following Stallbaum; deleted by Croiset). Since these words occur in the two mss. families represented by TW and F, which are known to have diverged at an early stage in the history of the Platonic text,<sup>13</sup> we can safely assume that the interpolation of the phrase is quite ancient.<sup>14</sup>

If this analysis is correct, εὐθὺ τοῦ δαιμονίου has no place in our texts, and should be excised completely, rather than emended. Such a measure may gain support from 129a7-8 ἔρχομαι ἀποθανούμενος, 129c6 ἦει ἀποθανούμενος, and 129c7 ἴοι ἀποθανούμενος, in all of which instances the phrase εὐθὺ τοῦ δαιμονίου is absent.<sup>15</sup>

<sup>12</sup>It may be noted that Hackforth's emendation of *Epin.* 976a7-8 (see *PCPS* 178 [1946] 9) assumes a similar set of circumstances.

<sup>13</sup>See Dodds, *Plato: Gorgias* (Oxford, 1959) 41-2.

<sup>14</sup>I am grateful to Professor C.W. Müller, who drew the relevance of this parallel to my attention.

<sup>15</sup>On the future participle + εἶμι, ἔρχομαι, or the like, where the verb has lost its primary notion of movement and has assumed the function of a virtual auxiliary, see comm. *ad* 129a3.

## APPENDIX 4

### A Collection of Conjectures on the *Theages*

The following lists are intended to give the user of the text and commentary information concerning all places in *Thg.* which have been subjected to modern conjecture. These lists are, I believe, tolerably complete, although I cannot vouch for possible emendations offered in works unrelated to *Thg.* which I may not have seen. Section A below catalogues all readings accepted into the present text of *Thg.* that are the result of modern conjecture, including *minutiae* such as breathing, accentuation, and word separation. Detailed information on these passages is provided in the *apparatus criticus* to the text. Section B is a list of all other conjectures that have not been accepted into the text itself.

- A. Readings in the present text of *Thg.* which depend on modern conjecture: 121a7, a8, 121b1, 121b3, 125a7, 125b7, 125c1, 125c10, 125c13, 125d4, 125d6, 126c1, 127d5, 128a6, 128a7, 129a3, 129d7, 129e9, 130b6, 130b7, 130e10.

B.

- |       |   |
|-------|---|
| 121a1 | ἰδιολογήσασθαι] διαλογίσασθαι Cobet   |
| 121a2 | δὲ] γε Ast: ἀλλὰ Cobet  |
| 121c6 | πολλὰ ἄν] πολὺ ἄν ἔργον Cobet   |
| 121d1 | δοκῶ γάρ μοι] δοκεῖ γάρ μοι Stephanus: δοκεῖν γάρ μοι Cobet: δοκῶ γάρ Beck ( <i>ap.</i> Bekker) |
| 121d6 | καὶ] <i>secl.</i> Cobet   |
| 121d6 | καὶ ἔλαττον] ἔλλατον ἢ μηδὲν Burges   |
| 122a1 | ἰέναι] ἰέναι ἰόντα Knebel   |
| 122a2 | σπεύδει] σπεύδει σπεύδοντα Schanz   |
| 122a7 | ἄν] δὴ Cobet ("quidem" <i>vertit</i> Ficino)  |
| 122a8 | πράξειν] τι πράξειν Cobet   |
| 122c1 | ὑπολαμβάνω] ὑπολαμβάνων Cobet   |
| 122d7 | καλὸν] <i>secl.</i> Baiter: καλῶ Taylor ( <i>ap.</i> Burges): καὶ Richards                      |
| 122d8 | προσαγορεύωμεν] προσαγορεύω Richards  |

- 122d9 τούτῳ] τουτῷ Hirschig  
 122e8 καὶ ἐπαίδευσεν] *secl.* Cobet  
 124b1 πριζόντων] πριόντων Cobet  
 124b3 οὐ τεκτονική] οὐ *secl.* Schanz  
 124d2 τοῦτον (τούτων BTW)] *secl.* Stephanus  
 124e3 αὐτὴν] αὐτῶν Baiter (αὐτῶν Urb.80)  
 124e10 ἑοικέν] ἑοικά Shorey, *CP* 12 (1917) 201  
 125a1 διδασκάλου] *secl.* Schleiermacher: διδασκαλεῖον F. Sydenham (*ap.* J.H. Lupton, *CR* 2 [1888] 228)  
 125a3 ὅθι] ὅποι Bekker: οἱ Cobet, *Novae Lectiones* (Lugduni-Batavorum, 1858) 624  
 125a6 ὀρᾶς] ἄρα Cornarius  
 125d6 ποί' αὖ (ποῖα ἂν TW, ποῖα ἂ B)] ποῖα Hermann: ποῖα δὴ Burnet  
 125d10 Καλλικρίτην] Χαλικρήτην Burges  
 125e4 καὶ παίζεις] *secl.* Cobet, *Novae Lectiones* 623-4  
 126a5 τί δῆ] τί γε Stephanus  
 126a5 δὴ ἐστὶ ποτε] δὴ ποτ' ἐστὶν Hirschig  
 126b4 παρ' αὐτοὺς αὖ τοὺς] παρὰ τοὺς αὐτοὺς Hirschig  
 126c8 βαρβάροις] βαρβαρικοῖς Knebel: βαρβαρικαῖς Fritzsche  
 126d6 ὠφελῆσαι] ἂν ὠφελῆσαι Hirschig  
 126d8 σαυτῷ] αὐτῷ Schleiermacher: σὺ αὐτῷ Wagner: *secl.* Fritzsche  
 126d9 τοιαῦτα] τοσαῦτα Richards  
 126e1 ἂν] δὴ Richards  
 126e2 ἐθέλεις] ἐθέλοις Richards  
 127a3 τῶν καλῶν καὶ ἀγαθῶν] τῶν ἀγαθῶν Burges  
 127a3 τὰ πολιτικὰ] *secl.* Wagner  
 127a6 ἀνθρώποις] *secl.* Hirschig  
 127a8 τῶν καλῶν καὶ ἀγαθῶν] τῶν ἀγαθῶν Burges  
 127b8 ἀπαλλάξετε] ἀπαλλάξαι Stephanus  
 127c6 σοι] τοι Hermann (*fortasse e typographo*)  
 127c8 ἔμβραχυν] *secl.* Ast  
 127d6 ἂν] *secl.* Cobet: δὴ Richards  
 127e8-128a8 ἔστιν...εἰδέναι] *secl.* H. Müller  
 128a5 ἀπολείποντας] ἀπολιπόντας Cobet  
 128a7 ἀργύριον πάνυ πολὺ (ἀργύριον πάνυ πολὺν BTW)] πάνυ πολὺν Schanz: ἀργύριον πάμπολυ Cobet  
 128b4-7 πλήν...νῦν] *secl.* H. Müller  
 128b6 ποιούμεαι] οἶομαι aut προσποιούμεαι *anonymus ap.*

- Stallbaum: ἀντιποιοῦμαι (*et* που οἶμαι) Fritzsche:  
 ἡγοῦμαι Cobet
- 128b8 ὅτι] ὁ Cobet (*et post* πάτερ *signum interrogationis posuit*)
- 128b8 μοι] *secl.* H. Müller, Richards
- 128b8 δοκεῖ ἔτι] δοκεῖ τι Bekker
- 128c1 οὗτος] αὐτὸς Ficino ("modo ipse voluisset" *vertit*)
- 128c5 φαίνονται] ἐφαίνοντο Schleiermacher
- 128d4 γένηται] γίγνηται Richards
- 128d7-130e4 καὶ τούτων...ἐξερρύηκε] *secl.* H. Müller
- 128e1 γενόμενον] λεγόμενον Cobet
- 128e8 ὠφελήθησομαι] ὠφελήσομαι Cobet
- 129a1 εἰ δὲ] ἔτι δ' εἰ Wagner
- 129a3 ἦει] ἦειν Schanz
- 129a3 {εὐθὺ τοῦ δαιμονίου}] εὐθὺ τοῦ δημοσίου *vel* δημίου  
 Baiter: †εὐθὺ τοῦ δαιμονίου† Burnet: εὐθὺ {τοῦ  
 δαιμονίου} Souilhé
- 129b8 τὸ δαιμόνιον] *secl.* Wagner
- 129c6 ἦει] ἦειν Schanz
- 129d5 τοῦ καλοῦ] τοῦ Κάλου Ficino ("filius Cali" *vertit*)
- 129d7 ὁμοῦ τι] ἄλλο τι Papanikolaou
- 129d7 γ' ἐλᾶν] τελεῖν Burges
- 129d8 πραγματείας] στρατιᾶς Cobet (στρατείας BW)
- 129e3 ἅπαν] πᾶν Cobet
- 129e8 ταχὺ γὰρ παραχρῆμα] ταχὺ γὰρ καὶ παραχρῆμα  
 Papanikolaou
- 130a5 ὕδς] υἱοῦ Cornarius, Stephanus: *secl.* Ast
- 130a6 ἐπεδεδώκει] ἐπεδεδώκειν Schanz
- 130a8 ὕδν] υἱοῦ Cornarius, Stephanus: *secl.* Ast
- 130b2 ἐγεγόνει] ἐγεγόνειν Schanz
- 130b7 νῆ] μὰ Cobet
- 130d2 τινι] τίνι Wagner
- 130d3 μὲν νῆ] μέν τι νῆ Stephanus
- 130d4 παρὰ σοῦ] παρὰ σου Burnet
- 130e3 ἕξις] λέξις Vat.1029
- 130e9 ἐμοῦ] ἐμοῖ Hermann
- 131a3 ταῦτα βέλτιστα] *secl.* Hirschig

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